



**Kith and Kin Affinities and Inter-State Engagements: An
Analysis of the International Community's Reactions to
Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform Programme**

By

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degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and Public
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DECLARATION

DPhil Thesis	Title - Kith and Kin Affinities and Inter-State Engagements: An Analysis of the International Community's Reactions to the Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform (2000 – 2016)
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I, Joe Muzvidziwa, declares that the above thesis, apart from my supervisors' guidance, is my own independent work, and that it has not been submitted for a degree programme at another university.

Candidate's Signature.....Date 20 October 2021

I/We.....
approve the submission of the above thesis for examination.

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DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to my dear wife, Fabbie, and the entire family for their undying effort in aspiring to create an enabling family environment that affords the growth of talent for all members.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For this research to be possible firstly, I acknowledge God Almighty for the inspiration and revelations on various aspects of the study throughout the process. I extend special acknowledgements to my supervisors, Doctors TM Mashingaidze and KT Zengeni, for their tireless effort and timely guidance throughout the journey.

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To my sons, Munashe, Humphrey and Takunda Joe Junior, I say thank you for running around when it mattered most and for accepting the challenge which has urged you to compete for awards in your areas of interest.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis on 'Kith and Kin Affinities and Inter-State Engagements: An analysis of the International Community's Reactions to the Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform' (FTLR) programme probes the international community's intersecting, conflicting and racialised responses to Zimbabwe's post-2000 radical land reform process. Most countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region and their respective leadership who viewed the late President Robert Mugabe as a committed revolutionary and exemplary Pan-Africanist considered the FTLR programme as a decolonial exercise, a case of Blacks justifiably retaking their patrimony. This view resonated with the anti-colonial sentiments prevalent in the SADC sub-region, especially in the countries led by former armed liberation movements such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. The ruling parties of these countries revived their erstwhile armed liberation struggle's solidarity networks to guard against what they perceived as imperial snooping in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. Western countries on the contrary, applied the neo-imperial governance debate by opposing the FTLR programme for violating property and human rights. Essentially, the West punished Zimbabwe through economic sanctions and ostracisation on the international arena for retaking its land from approximately 4 500 White farmers, representing 5% of the population, but owned 80% of the prime land in the country. The contradictory positions between the African and Western countries reveal the racial fault-lines in the international community's reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. Therefore, it is revealed in this study that kith and kin ideas informed the opposing African and western communities' orientations towards Zimbabwe's Indigenous Blacks' repossession of the country's prime land from the minority White farmers. The study further observed that kith and kin affinities and inter-state engagements failed to address the land imbalances in Zimbabwe and protected the land invasions when the process was internationalised through the SADC Tribunal. China and Russia remained neutral in their engagements with Zimbabwe, largely because of ideological reasons. Both countries pursued an international relations policy premised on the ideal of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries. The development of effective communications at all levels in national survival programmes will address the polarisation challenge that has left Zimbabwe exposed to negative external influence in its debates on national survival issues. This thesis was grounded on the Social Constructivism Theory which used the qualitative research methodology and deployed the interpretive and critical philosophy. The narrative design, utilised the thematic and content technique for data analysis.

Key words: Kith and kin; international community's reactions; Fast-Track Land Reform; the West.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLS	Front Line States
FTLR	Fast-Track Land Reform
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MPLA	Movement for the Peoples' Liberation of Angola
PAC	Pan-African Congress
PLIC	Provincial Land Identification Committee
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TTL	Tribal Trust Land
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZIDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

This study on Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform (FTLR) policy, colloquially known as *Jambanja*,¹ reveals the international community's composite reactions to the post-2000 land redistribution programme by making a comparative analysis of the conflicting African, Asian and Euro-American blocs' reactions to this transformative strategic land ownership re-orientation. This thesis deploys the 'kith and kin' concept to refer to an entanglement of racial, historical, geographical and ideological ties that shaped and informed the international community's diverse reactions to Zimbabwe's contentious FTLR programme. African countries in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) sub-region supported Zimbabwe's radical reconfiguration of its land ownership regime, viewing it as a bold attempt to empower the once marginalised and colonised majority Blacks (Otika 2004).

The late former President Mugabe was identified as a committed and pragmatic exponent of the African decolonisation and self-empowerment agendas when Nujoma (2002) announced that Blair had created problems for Southern Africa. The Americans and Europeans, including Australia, Canada and New Zealand condemned the seizure of the minority White-owned land as a violation to the hegemonic neo-liberal ideals of property and human rights (Berry 2002, Freeth 2011 and Matondi 2012). Consequently, they swiftly imposed economic sanctions against Zimbabwe.

The Americans sanctioned Zimbabwe through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001.² The Act empowered American representatives at the Bretton Woods institutions and other multilateral financial institutions to block

¹ In everyday usage *Jambanja* means a chaotic and violent situation. The term was appropriated and deployed by Zimbabweans to refer to war veterans' youths and peasants' invasions and appropriation of White owned land during the FTLR programme that started in February 2000.

² ZIDERA is a sanction regime regulating political and economic policy measures crafted by the legislative system of the United States of America to allow the Zimbabweans achieve the democratic change, broad-based economic growth, and restore the rule of law according to the neo-liberal interpretation. <https://www.glnet.org/> Global Legal Information Network accessed: 29 June 2017.

Zimbabwe's access to international resources for its developmental programmes. This remains the kingpin in hamstringing Zimbabwe's black empowerment efforts and a masterstroke for the neo-liberals' efforts to align Zimbabwe to the dictates of the West's norms. This backlash arose once the Parliament of Zimbabwe amended the constitution authorising compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement of the landless Blacks without compensation for the land component.

Cognisant of the foregoing competing reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme, this study analyses these contradictions through the 'kith and kin' lenses, arguing that Africans' reactions were informed by a shared sense of blackness born out of the crucible of lengthy colonial abuse. China, Russia, India, Malaysia, Japan and Pakistan among others in the Asian bloc were either supportive or non-committal to Zimbabwe's land reform exercise (Stiftung 2004). In fact, in the face of mounting Western hostility Zimbabwe turned its foreign policy antenna towards Asia by adopting the 'Look East' policy which sought to leverage the diplomatic and economic support from that region (Moyo 2020 and Mutsvangwa 2020).

In addition to solidarity with the Whites in Zimbabwe who owned 45% of the agricultural land, the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) decided to ostracise and penalise Zimbabwe for violating and disrupting neo-liberal ideals of property rights and private ownership of the means of production (ZIDERA 2001 and 2018, Public Law 107-99—DEC. 21, 2001 and Public Law 115 – 213 ZIDERA Amendment Act 2018). This view overlooked the unfair and racialised nature of land ownership in Zimbabwe, because up to 2000, 80% of the prime land in Zimbabwe was controlled by a motley crew of 4 500 White farmers and a significant number of these had acquired the land by colonial largesse (Mamdani 2008). The historical background was conveniently ignored and continues to be overlooked by the neo-liberals when weak nations such as Zimbabwe decide to address land imbalances because such programmes disadvantage their kith and kin.

To analyse the foregoing, this study positions the neo-liberal and neo-colonial theories against the pan-African theory in order to unravel the contradictory reactions of the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. The study reflects on why the West in general reacted differently from the African community and the mixed reactions from the Asian community regardless of international norms as enunciated in the United

Nations (UN) Charter (Nujoma 2002, Nkomo 2007, Ndulo 2010 and Ndlovu 2020). The variations noticed at both inter and intra-region levels set the rivals of the domestic appraisals and the foreign policies' imperatives in addressing the inherent selfish national interests.

Besides solidarity to ideals and possibility of black empowerment, the Africans' reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme were partly informed by the need to resolve inherent colonial imbalances that had informed the armed liberation struggles both in Zimbabwe and other former colonies in the SADC sub-region. The pan-African ideals of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Patrice Lumumba of former Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia among others developed the basis for African survival. The founding fathers' original idea of 'Africa for Africans' continues to shape intra-African states relations and the associated discourses of pan-African unity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009).

This study argues this ideal continues to be challenged by neo-liberal standards for its collective approach to the management of relations in the anarchical international system. The main borne of contention is that the African ideal rebuts the neo-liberal's world view in an enormous way. According to Chiwenga (2016), the neo-liberal value system has been set as the measure for international interaction at the expense of other competing norms obtaining in the global village. Challenging what has become the international norm attracts huge sanctions from the West.

The pro-people efforts of the governments of the Movement for the People's Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Mozambique's *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Azania People's Congress of South Africa and Chama Cha Mapinduzi of Tanzania supported Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (the ZANU PF) government's quest to address the skewed colonial land distribution pattern. These are viewed as fruits of effective pan-African solidarity networks that shape the economic and political roadmap in the SADC sub-region.

It can also be deduced that, among those governments whose independence came out of the armed liberation struggle, the West's behaviour towards Zimbabwe was perceived as a

brazen attempt to reverse the gains of the hard-won armed liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and by extension elsewhere in the sub-region. Once the reversals succeeded in Zimbabwe, it could have been inferred, the same would then have been true for the remainder in the group that won their freedom from the armed liberation struggle.

The Fredrick Ebert Stiftung (2004) observes that China, Malaysia, Pakistan and Russia were among the members from the Asian community that supported Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the FTLR programme. The historical thread can be traced in this relationship with Zimbabwe from the attainment of its majority rule in 1980 dating back to the armed liberation struggle of the SADC sub-region. China and Russia were the key international strategic sponsors in the fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009b and Mumbengegwi 2016).

Malaysia and Pakistan cemented their relationship with Zimbabwe after the southern African country's independence in 1980. Pakistan developed the Air force of Zimbabwe's capabilities at a critical moment of its growth after unidentified saboteurs attacked the main air force base in Gweru in 1982 where thirteen planes, including four new Hawks bought from Britain for about \$35 million were hit (Reuters 1982). Jaya (2017) observes that whoever brought the Pakistan Air-force Contingent to Zimbabwe during the 80s had foresight that has kept the country going well after their departure. Jaya reveals the parallel structures that Pakistan deployed which allowed Zimbabweans to understudy and develop the necessary capabilities that sustained the Air force of Zimbabwe for all times. Furthermore, these Asian nations also share some common ground with Zimbabwe in the struggle for the equitable land redistribution in their region.

World Bank Report (2017) notes that reforms, encompassing policies on land services have been crucial for Malaysia's safeguard on land-tenure, that secured a robust land market and sustainable organisation of land possessions which have added value to economic growth. This process also secured an efficient delivery of public services, and enhanced social cohesion and security. These are fruits of national programmes that address national challenges and guide economic growth that assures improved living standards for citizens.

At the instigation of the British government, the European Union (EU) including other members in the Commonwealth of Nations joined in instituting sanctions on Zimbabwe.

The United States of America (USA) enacted a sanctions cocktail through the ZIDERA.³ The state of affairs forged by Zimbabwe had translated into a huge threat to the norms in the neo-liberal steered international system (Berry 2002, Rice 2005, Fisher 2010, Freeth 2011 and Matondi 2012). This had to be addressed before others in similar circumstances in other parts of the world adopted Zimbabwe's FTLR programme.

These reactions and activities remained not only complex but, multi-layered and multidimensional in nature. This study brings to the fore the importance of kith and kin lenses to the academia and policy makers in explaining the relational decisions that nation states have to take as they interact to safeguard national interests as revealed in the international relations field. Regional interactions continue to be guided by the established regional norms as a generic rule to guarantee national survival within the cluster.

Zimbabwe's Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A of 2000 triggered the mixed reactions in the international community. This amendment gave the impetus for the acquisition of land for resettlement purposes whose compensation was to be provided by the British government and the Zimbabwe government only paying, subject to the availability of the finances for the improvements that had been effected on the land (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 Act 2013 Chapter 16 Section 295 (3)). The compensation however, was not to be based on the obtaining market value as was the case during the willing buyer willing seller system.

This stance that Zimbabwe adopted was viewed as a direct and unacceptable challenge to the concept of the passage of land ownership, as interpreted by the market-oriented neo-liberal system (ZIDERA 2001 and 2018, Public Law 107-99—DEC. 21, 2001 and Public Law 115 – 213 ZIDERA Amendment Act 2018). This sharp difference became the turning point that generated the standoff and heightened the conflict between Zimbabwe and the West led by Britain and the USA.

The effective year, 2000, incidentally followed on the footsteps of a 'NO' vote to the constitution referendum that had been sponsored by the West (Constitutional Convention

³ The Bretton Woods and other international development institutions were to stop giving Zimbabwe balance of payment support and any credits to allow transactions with other nations, instead Zimbabwe was to pay-off its debt with these institutions before any other assistance was to be considered. The actions of these institutions led to Zimbabwe's economic strangulation as part of the West's international statecraft – coercive persuasion through economic suffocation.

1999 and Slaughter and Nolan 2000). Zimbabwe's choice became yet another hurdle that the West had to overcome in succession. The West reacted by developing and employing 'smart power' to frustrate the envisaged gains from the revolutionary land redistribution stance that the government of Zimbabwe had adopted. Gallarotti (2015) defines smart power as "the optimal diversification employment of soft and hard power resources by a nation to achieve the desired outcomes in international relations" Gallarotti notes that whilst this modification has always shown to be a grander approach, it is crucial in the current world system and the future. Highlighting that changes in international politics suggest that the world order is a more composite and refined where the importance of physical forces of the military have weakened in their standing compared to soft power.

The period between 2000 and 2016 witnessed the antagonistic rifts which reached a crescendo in 2008 when Zimbabwe was saved by a 'Double Veto' from China and Russia, a rare feat that failed a West-sponsored Security Council Chapter VII intervention in Zimbabwe (Nasaw and Rice-Oxley 2008). In 2008, a conflict resolution mechanism that the South African Development Community (SADC) initiated guided Zimbabwe's governance for the first time since independence, to the formation of an inclusive government that ran the country from 2008 to 2013 (Dugger 2008).

Chitiyo and Kibble (2014) note that, some re-engagements and engagements with the EU and other players in the international system through the efforts of the local commercial farmers were initiated during the intervening period between 2003 and 2013. A shift in approach towards Zimbabwe after the 2013 harmonised elections which were won by the ZANU PF provided impetus for re-engagement, was witnessed as well.

As observed by Moral (2015) the three years after the 2013 elections also registered some progress on the re-engagement with the EU, Japan and the USA removing selected individuals and companies from the sanctions list which had been imposed at the onset of the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. However, these selective removals could have been part of the divide and rule tactic aimed at aligning behaviour and further frustrate the land reform programmes not only in Zimbabwe but wherever such a choice became attractive to pursue. The seemingly divisive strategy created a polarised society that failed to reach consensus on important national security imperatives, a scenario that the West would continue to exploit in its interaction with Zimbabwe throughout the intervening period.

According to Christian (2008) the struggle over land reveals a number of social fault-lines that are exemplified by the tensions between ordinary citizens as well as the nations' domestic politics and the international perceptions on property rights. Christian notes that any revision of a country's land laws can be a huge political process, as relationships within and between communities, as well as between communities and the state result from reforming land. Thus, even small scale land reforms may be subject to intense debate and or conflict. The skewed distribution of land which is an important source and a resource of wealth for the landlocked agricultural based economies, becomes a crucial undertaking for any government with an obligation to combat poverty and improve the economic wellbeing of the people and the contribution of the majority in the economic growth of a nation.

Muzondidya (2007) observes that Zimbabwe's FTLR programme exercise was unique in that the land question brought in not only the racial issue, but class connotations have been embedded in the various theoretical discourses used in the study. According to Berry (2002) much of the violence on Zimbabwe's large commercial farms was directed not against White land owners only but at black farm workers and tenants, a pattern repeated, albeit with variations, on black-owned land. The land reform approach profiled the uptake based on the need analyses which attracted decongestion and commercial models to address. These models have attracted both positive and negative observations from researchers across the political divide within and without Zimbabwe.

Berry (2002) and Muzondidya (2007) opine that the land question in Zimbabwe was a huge national security issue that attracted very emotive debates across the width and breadth of the nation among and between the political groups. Nkomo (2012) argues that the human security component ensured that people sustained themselves by adding their labour that transcends to state security as people prospered in their activities on the land. The debate and schism on the emotive land question were exported to the international arena and created a much polarised society.

Willems (2004) notes the extent to which the media's portrayal of the land occupations and the land question in general contributed in the polarisation of the Zimbabwean community. Willems draws upon the stance that the government controlled daily newspaper, The Herald adopted the mind of the land question rooted in anti-colonial debate where colonial injustices had to be addressed immediately.

This was unlike the position of the privately-owned Daily News, which disregarded the question of history in the land issues paying attention on the economic challenges spawned by what the effects of the land invasions of February 2000. Thus the Daily News lost the opportunity to engage on the land reform as an important occurrence in the history of the nation. Willems and others' observations are important to appreciate, because the media as the fourth state has a crucial role to play in aligning the nation's rallying points for their interaction in the international system. There is no denying that land was an important rallying point for the nation especially considering how it had galvanised and mobilised Black Zimbabweans on the struggle to dislodge colonialism.

The FTLR programme commenced in February 2000 as a result of some spontaneous farm occupations dubbed as 'invasions' of the Whites' farms in Zimbabwe by the West (Fisher 2010). This process demands an appreciation of the founding parameters that have informed its rough trajectory which has attracted both positive and negative views. A lot of research has been conducted to reflect on its unfolding path and Zimbabwe continues to grapple with the dominant damning voices mostly from the dispossessed group two decades after it was authorised by a statutory instrument 16A which legalised compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement without compensation. In trying to unpack Zimbabwe's FTLR, Fisher (2010) took the crisis outlook while Berry (2002) used a comparative method and Muzondidya (2007) Freeth (2011) and Matondi (2012) applied the identity approach. These studies reveal the importance that humankind attaches to landholding.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The adoption of Zimbabwe's FTLR programme in 2000 triggered strong reactions albeit contradictory ones from the international community. On one hand, the West at the behest of Britain adopted an abrasive and negative stance against the Zimbabwean government. The relations between Zimbabwe and Britain and her allies deteriorated to their lowest ebb, resulting in sanctions and restrictive measures being imposed by the latter (ZIDERA 2001 and 2018, Public Law 107-99—DEC. 21, 2001 and Public Law 115 – 213 ZIDERA Amendment Act 2018). On the other hand, African states especially from the SADC sub-region including, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania were supportive of Zimbabwe's bold efforts to redress colonially induced land imbalances

(Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Maputo Mozambique, 2012 - 18 August).

There is no denying that these contradictory reactions on Zimbabwe's land question deserve some analysis. A detailed review of extant literature for the period between 2000 and 2020 shows that the main issues discussed after the FTLR programme include democracy, human rights abuses and the disregard for the rule of law. However, these neo-liberal governances and the anti-colonial debates have not been explored through the Social Constructivist Theory. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to examine the factors that shaped the international community's reactions to Zimbabwe's revolutionary FTLR programme using the kith and kin lenses and provide options that decision makers may employ to harness advantages that arise out of kith and kin interactions in inter-state engagements in the international system.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the study are as follows:

- a) To review the international community's reactions to Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform (FTLR) programme for the period between 2000 and 2016.
- b) To analyse and explore the specific factors behind the international community's reactions to the FTLR programme.
- c) To evaluate the survival strategies adopted and deployed by the government of Zimbabwe to mitigate the impacts of the international community's negative reactions to the FTLR programme.
- d) To assess the implications and limits of international law and norms in resolving domestic policy orientations.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study seeks to address the following questions:

- a) How did the international community react to Zimbabwe's (FTLR) programme between 2000 and 2016?

- b) What factors informed the international community's reactions to the FTLR programme?
- c) How did the Zimbabwean government manage the negative reactions emanating from the FTLR programme?
- d) What were the implications and limits of international law in addressing the FTLR programme?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Zimbabwe's FTLR programme continues to attract a lot of interest from the academia and decision makers at both the strategic and policy levels. Discussions have revolved around rights issues, democracy and the rule of law as observed in the background section of this study. The devastation associated with the policy to the country's formerly thriving agriculture-driven economy has also attracted some research work. However, these debates and reactions from the international community have not been examined through the lens of the 'kith and kin' dynamics in inter-state engagements especially as it is glaringly evident that while the West rallied behind the British government to sanction Zimbabwe for the FTLR programme, the SADC sub-region and the generality of the African nations supported Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. These are contradictory positions that demand different lens to analyse the basis for these divergent reactions considering the inherent international norm informed by the UN Charter.

The impacts of these reactions have exerted huge influence in the structuring of the national discourse between Blacks and Whites in Zimbabwe. These above observations require close examination to derive meaning from the realities. This study therefore critically analyses the neo-liberal and the anti-colonial orientations' contradictory reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. The inputs and outputs from these divergent orientations can be developed by identifying inherent areas of convergence which can be utilised to soothe relations of nations striving to protect their own selfish national interests in the international system. The insights deduced from this analysis, it is hoped can help as drivers of regional norms and standards as well as influence key decision makers to analyse kith and kin driven trends in order to anticipate and better manage conflicts that retard national developments across regions.

1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study reviews the period between 2000 and 2016 which can be benchmarked for future studies. Zimbabwe's FTLR programme is premised on the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement and the attendant restrictions it imposed on the land question yet this was the anchor of the country's armed liberation struggle. The period from 1980 to 1998 outlines the flashpoints that led to the year 2000 when the programme was officially declared 'fast-track' through a constitutional amendment (Act Number 16A).

The years between 2000 and 2016 were a period that Britain and her allies sanctioned Zimbabwe for the FTLR programme because it had become an unusual threat to the neo-liberal ideals. This study notes that it was during this period that the parties to the conflict decided to allow some meaningful dialogue leading to the re-engagement and engagement which by 2016 revealed some common ground leading to Britain and her allies removing selected individuals and institutions from their sanctions list. This study assumed that the period between 2000 and 2016 was sufficient to have allowed any changes that were FTLR programme induced to become visible and the trends on the outcomes for the programme to have run their courses.

The researcher paid particular attention to the major milestones for the period between 2000 and 2016, analysing the Constitutional Referendum of 2000 and its link to the contested section on land acquisition, the 2000 Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A and the reactions by the West in imposing economic sanctions as well as the counter reactions by the generality of Africa. The researcher also examined the contested 2008 election results which were followed by the China and Russia's 'Double Veto' to stop the USA sponsored Security Council Chapter VII intervention in Zimbabwe and the SADC Tribunal and how it got entangled in the land question in Zimbabwe.

The SADC engineered inclusive government of 2008 leading up to the elections of 2013 where the ZANU PF won a Parliamentary majority and formed the government were discussed. The study also reviewed the impact on re-engagement, engagement and reconciliation efforts and the removal of various groups, individuals and institutions from the restrictive measures and the sanctions list to normalise relations between Zimbabwe and the West. In an effort to assess the impact of international laws in regulating

behaviours of states in the international system the study analysed the escalation of the land issue to the SADC's sub-regional Tribunal.

The heterogeneity of the interviewees presented some limitations in achieving trustworthiness of the research findings. However, to enhance the trustworthiness of the research findings the researcher employed pre-test face to face interviews based on FTLR programme generic questions to improve on the themes and content. Triangulation of theories via gathering data from different sources both primary and secondary helped the researcher clearly reveal the themes underlying the study.

This approach helped in the evaluation and analysis of the contenting themes and how these were shared by the different sources. The employment of several methods and a variety of theories and procedures was meant to enhance the degree of the trustworthiness of the research findings. The sample of face to face interviewees was increased beyond thirteen the minimum threshold, to twenty where the saturation level was achieved as the themes and content under study started to recur. The overflow brought with it more refined revelations across the respondents. All this was meant to enhance the trustworthiness of the study's findings.

1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing literature on Zimbabwe's FTLR programme extensively dwells on the issues of human rights, rule of law and property rights as expounded by the neo-liberal theory (Fisher 2010, Howard-Hassmann 2010 and Matondi 2012). Mashingaidze (2006) notes, that the Western countries have the same capitalism world outlook and possess the same motivation of private enterprise and profit. They have the same political ethics guided by liberty, equity and fraternity – exclusively for themselves. They also share the same politico-economic aspirations anchored on world domination and the same international obligations fixed on the self-serving principle of the White Man's Burden. These are important observations that will be matched against the factors that informed the mixed reactions from the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme.

1.7.1 The Human Rights Advocates

On the so called Zimbabwe's crisis, Howard-Hassmann (2010) castigates the responsibility to protect (R2P) concept, asserting that the near-famine condition that befell

Zimbabwe was neither a result of natural disasters nor was it a result of policy failure but a policy success to keep the then president late Mugabe in power. Howard-Hassmann also notes that the crisis was an outcome of deliberate decisions of political agents engaged in governance-strategies perpetuating own interests and that Zimbabwe was not a futile state but an intentionally ruined state. Howard-Hassmann further reveals that the euphemistic descriptions of Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2009 protected Mugabe and his regime from punishment for crimes against humanity because millions of Zimbabweans fled the country risking malnutrition and disease and only the good offices of international agencies came to their rescue.

In a related study, Shaw (2003) contends that the late Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF colleagues' expropriated White-owned farms, and claimed the moral high ground. Shaw bemoaned observers, within and without Zimbabwe for taking these activities for granted arguing that, whatever Mugabe's excesses were, there was injustice in his cause. Shaw outlined three moral arguments that Mugabe and his supporters advanced to justify their land policies; that the peasants needed the land; that the war of liberation was fought for the land; and that Zimbabweans were only taking back land that was originally stolen from them, an argument that rests on an implicit entitlement theory of justice.

However, despite their emotive appeal, Shaw concludes that all the three arguments were flawed beyond reproach and defends the Whites' continued ownership of land by stating that the right dispute achieves numerous valuable purposes for Mugabe; appropriating the farm repossessions into ZANU PF's bigger nationalist agenda. In doing so, ZANU PF deflected observations from difficult inquiries on the expenses and revenues of the party's land rules, now and in the past, and from hard realities about the social and economic inequalities among Blacks that had accrued from 1980.

From the perspective of the underlying entitlement theory of justice Shaw revisits Nozick and Locke (1976) who state in their theory that, one honestly obtains a formerly un-owned resource only by collaborating one's labour with it. Thus, the process of settlement and working of some White farmers on unused land established a property right to that piece of land. However, Shaw agrees that whichever settlers who evicted the original peasants violated entitlement values because these rules were historical. Shaw called for investigations to prove the legality of the possession claims of those ejected by the colonisers.

This study observes that what is absent in Shaw's debate is the acknowledgement that the rights and justice issues are always interpreted by analysing the obtaining legal provisions pronounced in the national laws that are guided by domestic realities. Once the land acquisition law in Zimbabwe was enacted, the law affected the citizenry of Zimbabwe in total. This study further notes that there is no dispute on the labour the White farmers expended on the pieces of land they acquired, but to claim that the land was un-owned is indicative of lack of knowledge of the circumstances when the Whites under the Pioneer Column of 1890 appropriated land from the indigenous Blacks.

According to Galbraith (1974) mankind from an extensive variety of upbringings composed the ranks of the column and predominant were prospectors, but nearly every trade and profession was represented. Galbraith reveals that majority of the forerunners were self-identified as South African rather than British, and numerous were Afrikaners. As Galbraith further observes, at the insistence of the then Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, Cecil John Rhodes (1890 to 1896), there were several sons of the Cape colony's leading families who were promised 3 000 acres (12 km²) of land and fifteen mining claims individually for their service.

However, it cannot be denied that Zimbabwe is endowed with its own history that predates the advent of the Pioneer Column and that history must inform the nation on the best way to go. This history must align with the obtaining legal dictates governed by the national constitution. It is a fact that when the Pioneer Column set foot in Zimbabwe, they found Black Africans already subsisting on the land. Even if the investigations were to be convened as Shaw reveals, what remedy would they bring that would run contrary to the land redistribution profile that was guided by the enacted laws of Zimbabwe? Any recourse on land possession and repossessions should have in any event been done by the White regime during its reign and clearly these remedies were not going to serve the interests of the Whites anywhere.

The settler government enacted laws that applied to the citizens and the obligations they provided for the disregard of such laws applied equally to the citizenry even though the laws favoured the White minority race. The best way to proceed in the view of this study should have been informed by the inherent land imbalances and the insecurity that continued to haunt Zimbabwe as long as the equitable land redistribution formula as discussed in the following chapter was not applied. The injustices committed by the

Rhodesian government in the land acquisition were clearly undone by the same process in the Black majority-ruled Zimbabwe but, through the institutions that the Whites built and utilised to acquire the rights to land in Zimbabwe during their rule. The same laws cannot be found to be unjust this time around if they were appropriately enacted and aimed at resolving the historic injustices.

1.7.2 The Developmental Outlook

During the period preceding the FTLR programme Tobaiwa (1998) predicted that Zimbabwe's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be split into two parts and formal sector service decline by at least 15%. The situation was to result from the shrinking agro-based activities and the follow-on job losses. Tobaiwa further opined that decreasing exports would lead to added current account shortages such that import cover was to be reduced to less than one month if large-scale commercial farms were acquired.

Likewise, during the same period, McCormick (1997) revealed that the investment window was predicted to deteriorate due to hesitation among investors regarding property rights and the falling security value of land. As well, the regime's fiscal problem and shortfall were projected to increase due to farm purchases, relocation and extension services. These projections were informed by the market-driven motive, an anchor of the neo-liberal thinking which sought to project the image of an ailing economy arising from compulsory land acquisition. The idea was to galvanise the international community against the country's land reform while appearing to be championing the best interest of Zimbabwe as an important contributor to the regional economic growth through its framed agriculture enterprise.

The world had to be lectured on the envisaged challenges arising directly from the FTLR programme venture as indications of a possible radical approach became clear after the 1998 Svosve invasions. To ensure that such warnings came to pass, every institution that had funded agriculture projects even before independence in 1980 stopped funding such activities in order to suffocate the Black new farmers' expected returns. Before 2000, all commercial banks, including the Standard Chartered Bank and Barclays Bank had supported agriculture project across the country but stopped after 2000 leaving only the Agriculture Bank (a government owned) one of the ZIDERA-sanctioned institutions.

The negative impact of recurring cyclone-induced challenges in farming production outputs were not taken into account although these continue to affect the agriculture-driven economies. Padatha (2016) observed that SADC had declared *El Nino* induced drought a regional disaster as more than 40 million people in the region urgently needed assistance. Padatha revealed that Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe had declared national drought emergencies. At the same time, South Africa also declared a deficiency in food in eight of its nine provinces while Mozambique had affirmed a 90-day “red alert” for some areas. This study observes that in all the neo-liberal work, there is conveniently no mention of the prevalence of these climate change induced adverse weather patterns and the attendant costs associated with measures to mitigate their impact on Zimbabwe’s agriculture-based economy.

As Padatha (2016) notes, more than 60 million people in twenty-two countries across southern and eastern Africa, central America and the Pacific faced food shortages because of *El Nino*. Padatha further reflects that *El Nino* had also affected livestock with some 643 000 drought-related livestock deaths reported in Botswana, Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The absence of such revelations regarding climate change and its negative impacts on the agriculture sector in Zimbabwe and other nations across the world is deliberate and misleading. While it cannot be denied that the FTLR programme may have had its negative impacts on Zimbabwe’s agriculture, it is only prudent that more studies be initiated in order to prove this hypothesis, just as evidence abounds of the climate change-induced challenges to the agriculture-driven economies in the SADC sub-region.

Zimbabwe's land redistribution programme and the resource ownership were viewed by other writers as having not only been violent and coercive, but also disorganised and divisive as debated earlier. According to Muzondidya (2007) the government of Zimbabwe was thought to have resorted to authoritarian nationalism, invoking identity politics, which produced new concepts about rights and power that upheld racial and ethnic politics and the pre-eminence of majority over minority rights. The processes had also rekindled important questions about citizenship, identity, nationhood, rights and entitlement in post-independence Africa, issues that continue to be subject for intense debate.

Berry (2002) reveals that the veterans of Zimbabwe's liberation war and the youths invaded large commercial farms in Zimbabwe beginning February 2000. Armed with court orders the White landowners demanded that the invaders vacate the Whites' private properties but the police did not assist because Robert Mugabe refused to order them to carry out the court's instruction. Voters had, a few weeks earlier rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that would have strengthened the President's powers to seize White-owned land, without compensation, for redistribution to Blacks a few weeks earlier. This was throwback on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of November 1965, when the British government had chosen not to intervene after Smith regime's unilateral declaration of independence, noting the challenges of fighting their kith and kin. Yet Mugabe's application of the same concepts in 2000 was declared as a disregard for the rule of law.

However, it is important to note that Taylor and Williams (2002) observe that even though Zimbabweans largely supported the land reform, they voted against the 2000 referendum simply because they were unwilling to increase the President's powers as they were angry over the deteriorating economy, rising levels of corruption, and Zimbabwe's costly involvement in Congo's civil war. When the liberation war veterans moved onto White-owned farms, Mugabe unsurprisingly lost no time in associating with their cause.

The British government, the USA and the newly formed opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, (MDC) accused Mugabe of sacrificing the rule of law in order to save his own political programme. Zimbabwe's presidential election of March 2002 was described by Taylor and Williams as a coup by the ballot-box. Taylor and Williams noted the 2002 election as a sign of a deeper crisis in Zimbabwe, raising a dwindling economy, the question of land relocation, Zimbabwe's participation in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the nation's democratic discrepancy as four areas that underpinned Zimbabwe's crisis.

Just as significantly, Davies (2008) contends with the criticism of the then South African President Thabo Mbeki's policy of constructive engagement towards Mugabe's rule in Zimbabwe by comparing Pretoria's method with the Reagan management's constructive engagement towards South Africa during the 1980s and contends that the regime's leading importance in South Africa was to contemporary a strategy that would allow Washington to continue its strategic association with Pretoria without seeming to endorse apartheid.

Davies reveals that Washington's strategy was unsuccessful on two counts. It failed in encouraging Pretoria away from apartheid, and the other international observers.

Davies highlights that Mbeki was committing many of the same errors that Washington had made and that his actions were damaging his credibility and reducing constructive engagement, an important diplomatic tool, to camouflage and appease a business as usual strategy with a tyranny nation. On the other hand, Nathan (2005) described Mbeki as being as much an ideologue as a pragmatist with his outlook rooted in democracy, Africanism and anti-imperialism. When these three views are conflicted Mbeki takes the Africanist and the anti-imperialist over democracy. Spence (2006) notes that Mbeki's grand plan of an African renaissance was envisaged as an economic and political renewal of the continent led by Africans rather than the Africans following an agenda presented by the West.

This study argues that the chaotic perspectives of the FTLR programme are informed by the neo-liberal lens. The major question to consider is how one could have addressed the land question in Zimbabwe without resolving the racial realities that led to the armed liberation struggle in the first place. The equity component required that the racial imbalances be addressed by taking from the minority White farmers who had allocated themselves choice farmland from the prime regions that afforded them sufficient choices in their farming enterprises. In circumstances where the White farmers opted for the drier regions, ranching and sugar-cane production effectively supported by the central government through favourable funding models that assured sustainability were their motivations. Outside the FTLR programme that went through the constitutional amendment process (Act Number 16A) it is unimaginable that there could have been any other option that would have given the indigenous Blacks the much awaited landholding rights.

1.7.3 The Afrocentric and the Radical Orientations

Whilst the neo-colonial and the neo-liberal views emphasised the perceived damages to the agro-based economic potential of Zimbabwe resulting from land redistribution, the Afrocentric School of thought expounded by Chaumba, Soones and Wolmer (2003) points to the potential of increased production as more previously marginalised members of society were brought to the frontline of the nation's economic activities. According to

Berry (2002) land was bone of contention in colonial Africa not only in areas where Europeans appropriated land outright but also in regions where the commercialisation of agriculture, pastoral and forest products reshaped relations of production and exchange among Africans leading to new necessities for access to and control of land. Control over land meant the control of labour as well as asserting authority.

As new economic opportunities and pressure led to increased migration and changing patterns of production and trade, both colonisers and the colonised struggled to position themselves favourably with respect to the allocation and use of land and land based resources. Thus, regardless of the racial identity of the holder, land became an important resource that assured the beholder's livelihood.

In the radical academic view, McCusker and Fraser (2008) observe that some signs of an upsurge in subaltern resistance to neo-liberal approaches to land reform were emerging as there were indications that states such as Venezuela or Bolivia would pursue land reform agendas that departed from the market led or other, more market-friendly frameworks. Demand for radical land reform was becoming louder now than calls for alternative styles of land reform and this originally connected with prevailing broader disenchantment with Neo-liberalism and the dominant development discourse.

Similarly, Otika (2002) notes that the question of Zimbabwe was not about lack of Western form of democracy or human rights or such other names as portrayed by the West, rather, it was about whether Zimbabweans and Africans at large had the right to correct injustices done to them by their former European colonisers. Otika states that the world should not judge Mugabe and Zimbabwe as a nation from the biased and fabricated reports of the British and the American media. He reminds the world that society should not forget that Mugabe liberated Zimbabwe from colonialism and that he was henceforth repeatedly elected President to rule on the mandate and the trust of the same Zimbabwean people that the media claimed he was suppressing.

In Mozambique, Palmer (2004) notes the importance of the enactment of the Land Laws that must of necessity be supported by comprehensive public awareness campaigns to address the knowledge gap inherent in communities. Adams and Howell (2001) conclude that in the design of policy instruments for land redistribution, it is important to recognise that redressing past injustices and promoting rural development are different policy

objectives. Furthermore, it is important to differentiate between policy instruments intended to diversify ownership in the agricultural sector towards black commercial farmers and instruments meant to provide new opportunities for the rural poor.

Market-assisted land reform and expropriation by due legal process have been slow, because of inadequate administrative and technical capacity available to governments. The impact of land redistribution on intended beneficiaries has generally been positive although the numbers benefiting remain small. Unequal racial ownership of land has the potential for creating further agrarian crises in the region unless addressed by accelerated progress in land redistribution. Demands upon donors were likely to increase: the main purpose of support should be to enhance administrative and technical capacity.

The Zimbabwe land redistribution situation clearly reflects the risks inherent in any attempt by a weak African state to defy neo-liberal fundamentalism, choosing instead the path of self-destiny. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) points out that, the violent nativist position taken by the ZANU PF was a reaction to the fierce and sweeping neo-liberal globalisation storm. He argues that the neo-colonialism had manifested itself in the creation of opposition movements' parties, non-governmental organisations and individual organisations specialising on human rights advocacy, rule of law, democracy and such other concepts which are foreign to the newly independent nations of Africa.

Likewise, Mbeki (2001) raises concerns on foreign donors setting agendas for civil society. The civil society determined the pattern of elections, how they must measure-up, who must declare them free and fair and the appropriate candidates for such elections besides dictating the processes that land reform must undergo in order to change hands. The impetus of the advocacy groups in governance, democracy, human rights and rule of law in Africa cuing from the North during election periods are indicative of the need for the West to influence election results in Africa and generally in the South its periphery.

Moyo (2000) observes that the important debate facing Zimbabwe's land reform policy was how to balance control of and access to land, by redistributing land from large-scale mostly White landholders who underused their land to new small and medium-scale black users. The hitch was to find a way to amicably transfer land away from those who have been and remain unwilling and incapable of mobilising adequate financial and labour resources towards the optimal use of land and natural resources at their command. Moyo

further notes that those involved in Southern African debates on land reform tend to be hostile to large-scale land redistribution because of the specific settler-colonial and racial influences on the land discourse.

Moyo (2000) points out that the conceptual frameworks that evolves from settler-colonial ideology, are based upon three myths: that the land rights held by White minorities over the land they expropriated enjoys social and political legitimacy; that the large-scale farms owned by Whites are efficiently used both in terms of the scale of area used and yields per unit of land; and that freehold tenure and existing private land markets are effective and absolutely superior to other forms of tenure. The Southern African land restructuring deliberations remain confined to basic studies of the source, landscape, and impact of the social forces that have planned political force for land reform. The real foundation of either nation-led or society-led land reform programme is little appreciated because of the incapacity of most studies to deal with the injustice and foundational features of organising for reform.

Whilst this study made some observations of the literature exposed by different authors in Zimbabwe's land redistribution debate and elsewhere, the inherent gap that it aims to close resonates around the overarching issue in Zimbabwe's land redistribution programme; the untold story of the Blacks' unforgivable unexpected challenge to the neo-liberal dictates by repossessing land from the minority superior Whites. The concept of Black empowerment was a very serious rebuttal not only to the Whites' domination in Zimbabwe but, as well to the activities of the neo-liberals elsewhere in the international system once this precedent had been set.

The Whites anywhere across the world could not watch the indigenous-led Zimbabwe government falter by not allowing dialogue to address the land redistribution issue without someone challenging the process. The FTLR programme efforts disrespected the views of the White landowners for continued landholding as a rule. Whatever names the debates accounted for, the processes were in defence of the group's norms. Land was the source and the resource that assured comfort for the minority Whites throughout their stay in Zimbabwe and was expected to remain so perpetually. The debate for landholding is therefore anchored upon the concepts of 'the obligated service to the kith and kin'; the overarching subject of this study.

1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

This study utilises the social constructivism as a central theory to examine the international community's diverse reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme after triangulating the neo-liberal, neo-colonial and pan-African theories. According to Theys (2017) a leading social constructivist, nations can have numerous characteristics that are socially built through collaboration with other actors (McGlinchey, Walters and Scheinpflug 2017). Theys observes that these identities are depictions of an actor's acceptance of who they are, which in turn points to their interests. It has to be noted, though, that the actions of a state should be aligned with its uniqueness as a generic imperative. Theys further observes that nations that adapt to a particular identity are anticipated to conform to the norms of the identity and cannot act divergently to its identity because that will invalidate the identity, as well as its inclinations.

Wendt (1999) observes that collective philosophies rather than measurable forces are determinants of human association and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are also created by these collective ideas rather than nature driven. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) agree with the above observations by noting that, the social world is continually being created through group collaborations and that social reality can be understood through the perceptions of those entangled in such interactions. These perspectives underpin the constructivist theory and explain the reactions by the international community to the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme of 2000. This study observes that once Zimbabwe chose the path of black empowerment through the FTLR programme, negative reactions from the West was immediate whilst the opposite was true for the SADC sub-region and the generality of Africa who took cue from the SADC sub-region's reaction towards Zimbabwe's programme.

The neo-liberal theory which has remained the basis for capitalist societies' activities in the world is affixed on the economic base that is propelled by the profit motive and the importance of the respect to private property (Smith 1910). While the neo-colonial theory employs capitalism, to influence a developing country for the benefit of indirect political control (Nkrumah 1965). The Pan-Africanism theory notes the value of an individual's dependence on the collective as the heart of human meaning (Abdul-Raheem 1996 and Kuryla 2009). These entrenched positions contest for supremacy in the anarchic international system. Their relevance played out and continues to play out in the

Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. Regional reactions continue to be informed by the collective sub-regional norms. Zimbabwe has become an important test case to analyse the mixed reactions.

The social constructivism theory has not been debated in much detail to explain the interaction of nations in the international system. Zimbabwe's FTLR programme constitutes some fertile ground to appreciate not only the reasons why the British government easily internationalised a bilateral issue through the EU mechanisms. The USA as Britain's traditional ally came on board to sanction Zimbabwe through ZIDERA while SADC member states and the generality of Africa and China, Russia and Pakistan supported the FTLR programme.

This study in the politics of governance provides an optional tool that can be employed in defence against external abuse of the huge resources abound on the continent of Africa and other developing nations of the world. The actions, reactions and the behaviours by the contending groups reflect on the power of belonging. In this regard, the regional and institutional outlook determined the activities of the parties to the contested land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe. These behaviours can be explained better through the Social Constructivism Theory lens that aligns a nation's reactions with the regional norms and value systems.

McGlinchey et al (2017) argue that in the Social Constructivism Theory, international relations are aligned in the operating parameters of institutions and their activities in the international system. The Social Constructivism Theory assists in revealing how various international actors in the international organisations perform in the community of nations. The theory analyses the basic suppositions of the other philosophies like Neo-liberalism and pays attention to the links that the states have with numerous other arrangements in the international system (Wendt 1999).

Social Constructivism Theory further outlines different concepts like anarchy and the state's identity in the international structure and informs us on the indifferent behaviours revealed during important debates at the General Assembly level. Positions of debaters at the UN General Assembly and the Security Council levels clearly align with the values and norms of regional groups. The voting patterns in the Security Council on important international issues have also been aligned with the regional norms (Security


Council/9396: 2008). These are the reflections for the need and power of belonging as nations align on set principles and ideology besides the huge aspect of protecting the selfish national interests.

Whilst the neo-liberal theory encourages countries to look for comprehensive gain instead of normal returns to other countries, the social constructivism theory recognises that organisations and governments have a role to support in leading the international community that is anarchical. This study observes that the above impressions propose that the international community require more collaboration and multilateralism to safeguard the interests of all nations in the international system. Competition breeds more competition which at some point is bound to generate conflicts and activities that divert attention to trivial issues which derail national growth. Therefore, the world demands more of collaboration than competition for posterity.

1.8.1 Triangulation of Theories

The following diagram illustrates the convergence of the neo-liberal, neo-colonialism and the pan-African theories and how they align with social constructivism theory's dictates as an anchor of the reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. The values of these schools of thought derive from the appreciation of the group's collective good as a generic rule.

Figure 1: Triangulation of the Neo-liberal, Neo-colonial and Pan-African Theories



Source: Researcher's illustration, 2017.

Fig 1 reviews the tenets of neo-liberal, neo-colonialism and the pan-African theories and these attract collective views according to the cluster. For one to belong to the group they must adhere to the dictates of the obtaining norms. For the neo-liberals, democracy, rule of law and the sanctity of private property provide the parameters for belonging. Neo-colonialism and the pan-African provide for their preferred norms as highlighted.

As contributors to social groupings, the neo-colonial, neo-liberal and pan-African theories can be viewed as branches that explain the elements of 'kith and kin' in the international relations system. This study argues that the theories do not contradict the tenets of the social constructivism theory but, explain the nations' relations in the international system structure differently. The utility of their actions and reactions can be explained well using the social constructivism theoretical approach because their reactions are influenced by the collective sub-regional ideas, ideals, values and belief systems. The ideas, ideals, values and belief systems are harmonised as they play out within the regional mechanisms.

The UN Charter of 1945, articles 51 to 53 encourages interactions of regional groupings in dealing with the issues threatening international peace and security in their respective regions (Charter of the United Nations Chapter VIII). Events over the period between 2000 and 2015 reveal that regions continue to utilise the obtaining regional mechanism to address challenges that threaten peace within those respective regions.

The neo-liberal, neo-colonial and pan-African theories are alive and possess huge capacities and capabilities to defend themselves in their effort to stipulate, stimulate and guide behaviours in the international system. Regional mechanisms are prompted to address challenges as efforts to protect regional ideas that guide the regional ideals which are louder at the regional level than at the outer circles (Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of the Head of State and Government, Maputo, Mozambique: 18 August 2012). The regional essence is measured by the capabilities of regions to maintain and sustain regional peace and tranquillity by addressing forecasted challenges within their sphere of influence.

1.8.2 The Imperatives of 'Kith and Kin' Politics in International Relations

The effectiveness of international law and the impact of kith and kin ties as nations interact were revealed seven years into Zimbabwe's FTLR programme when a White

former commercial farmer, Campbell and 77 Others whose land had been compulsorily acquired during the FTLR programme escalated their conflict with the Government of Zimbabwe to the SADC Tribunal in 2007, arguing that their rights had been violated and seeking redress because the internal legal system had failed to address the challenge arising from the 16A and 16B legislative amendments (Ndlovu 2011).

This study argues that the choice to resolve domestic issues through international mechanisms is appealing when stakes are high, however, disregarding the domestic laws still creates disharmony in the long run as communities have to relate after such encounters are over. The competing ideas and ideals between Blacks and Whites in Zimbabwe demonstrate the existence of the huge impact of kith and kin within the human relations profile.

In 2007, seven years into the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe, the Whites escalated their fight for the continued hold-on land by taking the land issue to the SADC Tribunal cognizant of the emotions that were expected to erupt internationally from their undertaking. Initially Campbell was alone but before the court hearings started seventy-seven others joined him in their litigation efforts. Ndlovu (2011) examined whether the SADC Tribunal's mandate and authority had any legal force considering the noncompliance by the government of Zimbabwe with its decisions; the lack of concrete action by the SADC members and the Summit's decision to review the Tribunal's role. Ndlovu outlines aspects of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, access to justice by the applicant, whether there was racial discrimination and the expropriation of land without compensation.

Ndlovu reflected relevant parameters to evaluate and line up the dispute of the role of the SADC Tribunal in the execution of its mandate. However, while this study acknowledges that Ndlovu's assessment was correct, it was void of the facts that the legal rules were governed by the domestic laws that are politically driven through the inherent legislative mechanisms. The study also argues that the powers of the political pillar led to the demise of the SADC Tribunal once it regulated the Tribunal's role to determine complains on human rights conflicts between the member states and their citizens. The study further affirms that the effectiveness of the solidarity networks established during the armed liberation struggles of the SADC sub-region contributed in protecting the regional view

that nullified the neo-liberals' intended outcomes. The social constructivism theory was at play.

The legal provisions examined by the SADC Tribunal found that the FTLR programme contravened human rights because local remedies had been closed and that a party to an international protocol may not invoke provisions of its own internal laws as justification for failure to carry out an international agreement. The human right aspect was therefore appropriately analysed by the SADC Tribunal and found the land reform in Zimbabwe in conflict with the international law (*Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT 2*). However, the hostile stance taken by the government of Zimbabwe presented a new and unexpected challenge arising from the decision of the Tribunal which was directed to the highest body (the Summit) in the SADC mechanisms (Cowell 2013).

What was clearly viewed in the international community as a legal battle for the land conflict between the Whites and the Blacks in Zimbabwe became a very complex political issue that raised important discussions at the 32nd SADC Summit. Roschmann and Brandmeier (2012) note that, with a sense on the forthcoming presidential elections, the land issue offered itself as a clear approach for the ZANU PF government to avert a crisis. The Zimbabwe government had communicated that the ruling by the SADC Tribunal's findings was null and void of any legal effect and indicating that Zimbabwe was not bound by the Tribunal's rulings because the FTLR programme addressed Zimbabwe's domestic historical imbalances.

The 32nd Summit suspended the Tribunal and thus the doors of the Tribunal were closed from determining the human rights conflicts between member states and their citizenry (Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of the Head of State and Government, Maputo, Mozambique: 18 August 2012). This disbandment was instructive of the SADC sub-region hierarchy of values where commitment to human rights and regional legal order were subordinated to the political imperatives of regime solidarity and the respect for national sovereignty.

According to the United Nations Charter Chapter VII Article 51 sovereignty remains to date an important concept individual member states will always protect given the delicate balance nations undergo to address the dictates of national interests. McGlinchey et al

(2017) agree that, realists are guided by national interests as they relate bilaterally and internationally. National interests reflected as the nature and scope of a state's actions that are regulated according to the order of vital, most important, important and peripheral - regulate national reactions. Chapter Seven of this study which discusses the SADC Tribunal's engagement with the land issue in Zimbabwe addresses these issues in more detail.

Reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme attest to the centrality of kith and kin ties in international relations. The FTLR programme has attracted a lot of research work from within and without Zimbabwe as revealed in the literature review. Neo-liberal-oriented researchers that include Sachikonye (2003) Shaw (2003) Howard-Hassmann (2010) and Fisher (2010) among others told negative views of Zimbabwe's FTLR programme by articulating the neo-liberal values that spelt out the errors that the government of Zimbabwe made.

Predictions associating the land reform with economic meltdown were peddled; the purported human rights abuses and the alleged renegeing of the rule of law by the ZANU PF-led government attracted most research work. Nothing positive was debated and revealed from the neo-liberal studies and literatures. The neo-liberal sponsored media despite being aware of the importance of the land reform to Zimbabwe's peace and security after these issues had long been raised in seminars and conferences stretching as far back as the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference of 1979 to the Harare Donor Conference of 1998 evidently turned a blind eye to them (Nkomo 1979 and The All Africa Parliamentary Group 2009).

Whilst the neo-liberals disseminated a barrage of negative perceptions about the FTLR which they continually portrayed as chaotic and out of step with the norms in the international system, the opposite was true of the pan-African posture. Berry (2002) Chaumba, Soones and Wolmer (2003) and Moyo (2004) were among the researchers who told the FTLR programme differently. Among the then SADC leadership, Nujoma (President of Namibia between 1990 and 2005), Mbeki (Republic of South Africa between 1999 and 2008) and Kikwete (People's Republic of Tanzania between 2005 and 2015) appreciated the FTLR programme milestones that addressed the colonial era injustices. These leaders pledged their support for Zimbabwe's internal programmes at international

fora and in meetings at the SADC, African Union (AU) and the UN levels with conviction.

These divergent standpoints arising from the different schools of thought attest to the imperatives of kith and kin ties that inform established inherent norms, values and belief systems abound in different communities and anchored at the sub-regional levels. Societies align with these norms, shared values and beliefs that are objectified and secured over long periods of time. For the neo-liberals, any move to address the land issue in Zimbabwe was viewed as a direct affront to the ethics of democracy, property rights and rule of law whereas for the African society, repossessing the previously lost land through whatever formula was important to restore the dignity that was shattered under colonial rule (Moyo 2000, Chaumba, Soones and Wolmer 2003 and Pfukwa 2017). For the pan-Africanist, whichever process that addressed the shortcoming was welcome as long as it restored the land rights to the indigenous majority Blacks in Zimbabwe.

This study submits that Zimbabwe's repossession of land from the Whites represented a democratic right that had taken too long to effect because the Whites had enacted laws that safeguarded kith and kin. Under the White rule, the laws perpetuated a system that entrenched the White race as superior and that the inferior Black race could not challenge the status-quo. The statutes on White-only hotels, food outlets, streets, shops, toilets and such other amenities cemented the disposition. In businesses, Blacks were not allowed to venture into established ring-fenced White-only sectors. This evidently etched an inferiority complex in the minds of the Blacks and proved the superiority of the colour White, over Black. Whiteness was associated with cleanliness, holiness and even superior being while Blackness represented everything vile, uncouth and less than human.

Paradoxically, the colonial period with its distortions and artificial reflections not only succeeded in preparing the ground for the Whites to reflect their superiority, but established and armed the minority to defend their superiority complex at every opportunity, everywhere and every time. As the Blacks got hold of the steering wheel they perpetuated the Whites' concepts to determine the future landholding mechanisms for the country. Again the centrality of kith and kin as expounded by the Social Constructivism Theory was at play and became the core theory in the analysis of issues in this study. The neo-liberal, neo-colonial and pan-African theories as offshoots of the Social

Constructivism Theory are alive and possess huge capacities to defend themselves in their effort to perpetuate and regulate behaviours in the international system.

1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study adopted a qualitative approach using the case study of Zimbabwe's FTLR programme for the period between 2000 and 2016. McLeod (2000) defines qualitative research as a process of systematic inquiry into the meanings which people employ to make sense of their experiences and guide their actions. He argues that qualitative research aims to describe and interpret what things mean to people and that language can impact on how well one can gauge the local intercommunication patterns or cultural nuances which might escape the attention, if one was unfamiliar. Qualitative researchers stick close to their data and are constantly testing out their ideas as their data is being collected. The primary data arising from the interviews conducted converged with the previously held ideas that informed the themes which were the basis for data analysis, addressed later in section 1.9.7 of this study.

Makore-Rukuni (2001) states that, reflexivity is an element one needs to be extremely sensitive about. How and when one asks questions was important by placing oneself in the shoes of the informant. Makore-Rukuni indicates that if one could not sensitively catch the attendant nonverbal and verbal communication during interactions with the informants, a lot of meaning could get lost during data collection. In this study the feelings and the emotions of the research participants were exposed during the face to face interviews in answering to the topical issues regarding both the international reactions to the FTLR programme of Zimbabwe and the impact of the 2000 invasions to the farm owners and the farm workers alike.

Respondents were at liberty to express themselves in the language of their choice including vernacular. The vernacular option was evident in the special group of the former farm workers. The interviews with this special group of informants raised the inherent gaps associated with the process, because due attention was not applied to protect this group's needs as *Jambanja* took effect. The reactions to the nature the of the FTLR programme and the attention given on the selection of whose farms were targeted including the timings of when people invaded such targeted areas provided a vivid expression of the obtaining chaotic scenario during the *Jambanja* period. This observation

tallied with the literature reviewed that reported the prevalence of chaos as invasions of predominantly White-owned farmlands were conducted from February 2000.

1.9.1 Research Philosophy

The study's philosophy was interpretive and critical. The interpretation of the stories was crucial in aligning the respondents' relived experiences. The interpretation process revolved around democracy, rights issues, economic and rule of law as valuable themes that informed the study. This procedure echoed and outlined the reactions by the international community to the FTLR programme for the period 2000 to 2016 even though the overhangs of the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement reflected in section 1.1 above exposed the root-cause of Zimbabwe's land reform challenges.

Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) note that, using the interpretive lens, the social world is continually being created through group collaborations and that social reality can be appreciated through the perceptions of those involved in such interactions. The scholars contend that if one was using a critical approach, the discourse generated out of social power, shapes social reality and the study to it. This study contrasted the contending neo-liberal and pan-African ideals that informed the reactions giving value to such behaviours. The reasons for the sanctions map were supported by the neo-liberals' ideals on one hand and the pan-African views upheld the importance of the land reform in Zimbabwe as an undertaking that was unavoidable and overdue. These divergent views on the FTLR programme were revealed as the scripts were developed through the interviewees' interpreted inputs.

An interpretive approach was critical in revealing the positions of the contending groups' views and the alignment of the Social Constructivism Theory as the anchor theory that informed the prevalent variations. The contributions of the critical approach revealed the divergent reactions which remained important in reflecting the contradictions and aligning possible areas for agreement. The critical research paradigm is reflective in that the thesis sought to empower the marginalised South which was dispossessed of its ancestral lands. This inequitable land ownership pattern is vivid in the contemporary Southern Africa sub-region (Moyo 2004 and Palmer 2004). As the stories emerged from the interviews the kith and kin component as the key driver for the study became distinctive because the inherent

regionally-driven value systems and norms proved to be dictating the respondents' articulations.

1.9.2 Research Design

Cannuscio et al (2015) note that, the narrative enquiry research design; can reveal unique perspectives and a deeper understanding of a situation. This research design was considered appropriate in shaping the FTLR programme discourse. A narrative enquiry looks at the life experiences developed from the stories as told by the respondents. As the data was collected from different groups with different experiences, the meanings interpreted in the case study were revealed. The narrative inquiry approach also captured the huge emotions of the moment as described by the interviewees. The process rendered the event active rather than passive and infused the latent meaning being communicated by the storytellers from the different groups.

The perspectives of the diplomats which aligned with national statecraft imperatives revealed the mixed standpoints in the international community that accounted for the need to protect selfish national interests as an important driver for the mixed reactions. The current White farmers in the dairy industry raised the issues of losing their former White neighbours even though some among them appreciated the FTLR programme. Haydon, Browne and van der Riet (2018) observe that memory and notions of time concepts are tied to narrative storytelling, both as time found in the past and time relived in the present. The reflections from the respondents of this study aligned the mixed reactions to the values, beliefs and norms inherent in the individual interviewees. All the reflections were value driven.

1.9.3 Target Population, Sample and Sampling Technique

Kwesu et al (2002) define a research population, as all the entities of interest and as sample as a specific group that the study will collect data from. A sample is always less than the total size of the population from where inferences are drawn. Population is the entire group the study wants to draw conclusions from and it is often difficult or impossible to collect data from every individual. In this study, Africa, Asia, Europe, Oceania, Caribbean, North America, Central America and South America constitute the 8 geographic regions that were attracted by the FTLR programme of 2000. Gathering data

from such a population would not only be impossible but unreasonable given the costs and time associated with such a venture.

Patton (2002) and Cresswell and Plano Clark (2011) reveal that sampling is an exercise where the researcher selects some elements from a huge population using an appropriate method such that the sample elements are representative of the population characteristics. The sample for this study included selected diplomats, industry and commerce personnel, and the academia, farmers and farm workers who were affected by the FTLR programme.

The viable sampling strategy was premised on the non-probability sampling technique which was combined by the triangulation of the neo-liberal, neo-colonial and the pan-African theories. Snowballing happened incidentally based on a single case where a White farmer's interview led to the interview of another former White farmer who had lost his farm during the FTLR programme. The sampling procedure involved the identification and selection of individuals within groups that were especially knowledgeable about the FTLR programme and among them those who had experienced the FTLR programme first-hand.

This sampling technique used subjective judgement in identifying and selecting information-rich cases that involved six diplomats, three former Zimbabwe foreign affairs ministers, one former provincial governor, three former White farmers, four black farmers who acquired land through *Jambanja* and three former farm labourers. The interview question guide was used for all the groups and reflections during interviews corroborated the themes revealed by archival and the secondary sources utilised in the study. It was from the interactions with the above that this study established the correlation of kith and kin to the mixed reactions evidenced in the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe for the period between 2000 and 2016.

In addition to knowledge and experience, Bernard (2002) notes the importance of availability and willingness of respondents to participate, and the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner as important components. Experiences from purposefully selected groups were shared through face to face interviews. In addition, public addresses by the policy makers from across the political divide and literature on the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe were analysed to confirm the impact of kith and kin in inter-state engagements. This heterogeneous

approach allowed comparison and evaluation to be made on the contending themes exposed in the study.

1.9.4 Ethical Considerations

Some respondents may not provide the data expected freely. To pre-empt the possibility of this challenge occurring, the researcher informed the participants that they were expected to take part in the study voluntarily and there was not going to be any payment or financial rewards for participation. Notwithstanding the above shortcoming, to improve on the participants' freedom to express their experiences, feelings, opinions and choices, participants in the face to face interviews were assured that their names would not be disclosed. Where recording was necessary, consent was sought beforehand and notes were taken during the interviews.

This study into the FTLR programme demanded that these ethical considerations be effectively communicated. The interviewees had to be assured of their safety and the manner their revelations were going to enrich the study but remaining anonymous, if they chose that option. It was important to guarantee participants anonymity so as to allay fears of possible reprisals, especially to former farmers and farm workers who lost their livelihoods during the FTLR programme. These special groups of participants were assured that their personal details would not be divulged and would only be identified through codes such as the digits inscribed on the interview scripts.

1.9.4.1 Informed consent

Makore-Rukuni (2001) and Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) note that in conducting research, the ethical principle of autonomy is contained in the idea of informed consent wherein the participants were allowed to choose to participate or not to participate in the research after receiving all relevant information about the risks or harm that could have arisen if they participated. The researcher informed participants about the potential risks of taking part in the study and so they were given the opportunity to choose whether or not to participate by signing a consent form. The consent form also introduced the study and explained that the study was expected to add value, knowledge and understanding to the important area of land reform, especially as it relates to correcting colonial injustices, as well as how it impacts the interaction of nation states in the international system.

1.9.4.2 Risks and benefits to the participants

When carrying out research to create new knowledge, it is important that the researcher remembers that the study maintains the dignity and welfare of the clients. According to Makore-Rukuni (2002) harm could be embarrassment, anger, and irritation, physical and emotional stress. Other elements include loss of self-esteem, exacerbation of stress, delay in treatment and sleep deprivation. Further, loss of respect from others, negative labelling, invasion of privacy, and damage to personal dignity, loss of employment and civil or criminal liability can also occur. These potential risks were addressed by both the consent and anonymity clause.

1.9.4.3 Confidentiality and privacy

Welfel (2012) argues that, the researcher should protect the privacy and the confidentiality of participants' disclosure unless they consent to the release of personal information. The researcher protected the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants throughout the study. The value and the confidentiality of their disclosure and the limits of the confidentiality were explained to the participants in all cases. Participants took part in the research willingly and showed this by signing the consent form.

1.9.5 Methods of Data Collection

Face to face interviews were the primary source for this qualitative research. Respondents reflected on their feelings and opinions on the reactions by the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. As data was collected, the relevance of the Social Constructivism Theory through kith and kin affinities was confirmed. The researcher analysed official documents, public addresses by policy makers and literature on Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. From the archival material the researcher noted that an array of personalities gave divergent opinions in their analysis of Zimbabwe's land reform challenges arising from the 1979 Lancaster House Conference. This was corroborated through face to face interviews sessions whose duration ranged between 45 and 60 minutes.

Standard topical questions appropriate for the different purposefully sampled groups were administered based on the pre-test sample. Data captured during the interviews provided a more accurate screening, which enhanced the reliability of the data gathered. The process

seized on the verbal and nonverbal cues that became pointers to events that took place between the period 2000 and 2016. The interview process kept the interviewees focused and captured the emotions and behaviours relevant for appreciating the feelings pre, during and post-FTLR programme that corroborated the conclusions observed in the secondary data. Permission to undertake research was given through the university protocols. An appendix of the generic questions is at section 10.2.3.

1.9.6 Trustworthiness of the Research Findings

The trustworthiness of qualitative research generally is often questioned by positivists, perhaps because their concepts of validity and reliability cannot be addressed in the same way as in naturalistic settings. Silverman (2001) demonstrates how qualitative researchers can incorporate measures that deal with these issues, and has attempted to respond directly to the issues of validity and reliability in their own qualitative studies. Silverman used different terminology and proposed credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability as four criteria that should be considered. The four concepts are discussed below.

1.9.6.1 Credibility

Merriam (1998) notes that credibility deals with the correct relationship of the findings with reality because it is one of the most important factors in establishing trustworthiness by the adoption of research methods, well established qualitative inquiry and in information science. Merriam further urges that specific procedures be employed in the line of questioning pursued, the data gathering sessions and that the methods of data analysis be derived from those successfully utilised in previous comparable projects. In this study, the critical inquiry philosophy, the narrative design, the clustered sampling technique, face to face interviews and the thematic and content analysis used in the determination of the relationships of the primary data with the literature ensured the credibility.

1.9.6.2 Transferability

In positivist work, the concern lies in demonstrating that the results of the study at hand can be applied to a wider population. Since the findings of a qualitative study are specific to a small number of particular environments and individuals, it is impossible to

demonstrate that the findings and conclusions are applicable to other situations and populations. Stake (1994) and Denscombe (1998) suggest that, although each case may be unique, it is an example within a broader group, the prospect of transferability should not be immediately rejected. The use of the Social Constructivism Theory and the triangulation of the neo-liberal, neo-colonial and pan-African theories created sufficient ground for the transferability of the study. The reasons for the mixed reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme can be traced to the regional ideals and norms that are influenced by the kith and kin affinities.

1.9.6.3 Dependability

Dependability is achieved if similar results are obtained when repeated studies use same techniques, context, methods and participants. However, as Fidel (1993) and Marshall and Rossman (1999) note "the changing nature of the phenomena scrutinised by qualitative researchers renders such provisions problematic in their work." Lincoln and Guba, (1985) stress the close ties between credibility and dependability, arguing that, in practice, a demonstration of the credibility goes some distance in ensuring dependability. This study achieved dependability through the use of individual interviews based on the clusters in developing themes that ran in the reactions by the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. The huge impact of creditability arising from the chosen research design and the data analysis process assured dependability.

1.9.6.4 Confirmability

The concept of confirmability is the qualitative study's comparable concern to objectivity. Steps must be taken to ensure as far as possible that the research's findings are the result of the experiences and ideas of the informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researcher. The role of triangulation in promoting such confirmability must again be stressed, in this context to lessen the consequence of investigator bias. Miles and Huberman (1994) contend that a key criterion for confirmability is the degree to which the researcher acknowledges his or her own inclinations. A detailed description of a study methodology enables the reader to determine how far the data and constructs emerging from it may be accepted. This study utilised triangulation of theories to promote confirmability.

1.9.7 Data Analysis Techniques Used in the Study

Thematic data analysis and content analysis techniques were employed to record patterns within data that was important to the description of phenomena and specific research to the questions where themes became the categories for analysis. This approach was important to align the contending themes related to the factors that informed the mixed reactions from the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. The major themes running through this study were democracy, human rights, the rule of law and economic factors.

These themes were inherently value-based and contrasted between the neo-liberalism and the pan-Africanism schools of thought. The Social Constructivism Theory as an anchor of the neo-liberal and pan-African theories as discussed in section 1.8 above, revealed the parameters for the mixed reactions. The theory allowed this research to appreciate the exposed divergent reactions. The central variations were the inherent regionally-driven value systems. The utility of the competing regional norms correlated with the abounding mixed reaction of the international community to the FTLR programme of 2000.

During the content analysis, the notions of the schools of thought even as the interpretation was on the same concepts of democracy, rights, the rule of law and economic issues, gave different meanings. This was an indication of the preference for the regionally accepted views to the concepts. The contents from the archival data analysed on ZIDERA, CHOGM updates, the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement Speeches and the 31st and 32nd SADC Summit Resolutions described these concepts and provided the divergent meanings aligned to the self-serving interests inherent in the international system. The theories within the reviewed literature and the public addresses by accredited embassies from the international community weighed in to buttress the analysed themes.

1.10 KEY TERMS

The following constitute the conceptualisation of the key terms in this study;

1.10.1 Kith and Kin

In this study kith and kin refers to an organising principle, as a source of political and social processes and outcomes, and as a practical and analytical category that not only

reflects but also shapes politics and interactions on the international political arena as discussed in section 1.1 above. Haugevik (2018) observes that in different political and cultural contexts kith and kin looks at interactions taking place above, at and within the state level and can enlarge or curtail actors' political room for manoeuvre on the global political arena, making some activities and practices appear imaginable and likely, and others less so.

As a diagnostic group, this study argues that kinship can help us categorise and understand relations between actors in the international arena. It presents itself as a ready-made classificatory system for understanding how entities within a hierarchy are organised in relation to one another, and how this logic is all at once natural and social. Haugevik's views are fundamental and have been applied wholly in reference to kith and kin in this study.

1.10.2 International Community's Reactions

Rocard (2013) reveals that more pragmatically, international community refers to all countries when they decide to act together encompassing any country whose identity and sovereignty is recognised and that chooses to participate in global discussion and decision making. This study observes the above definition but further adds that, the choices for participation by member states are established at the sub-regional, regional and global levels and that more influence is exerted by the inner concentric circle. At bilateral level nations are more inclined to be influenced by their selfish national interest which is regulated at the regional level where the regional views take precedence over national priorities.

1.10.3 Fast-Track Land Reform

Zimbabwe's FTLR programme was a compulsory land acquisition process that gained widespread international attention since the February 2000 land invasions. The world was divided between those who supported the forceful and often chaotic commercial land takeover actions of the government of Zimbabwe and those that opposed (ZIDERA 2001 and 2018, Public Law 107 - 99 - DEC. 21, 2001 and Public Law 115 - 213 ZIDERA Amendment Act 2018 Nujoma 2002 Ramaphosa 2019 and Masisi 2020).

The media image of the FTLR programme was one reflecting an extensive forcible displacement of White commercial farmers and farmworkers, through violence. The process witnessed a collective of people, most of whom did not know each other who rallied to achieve the common goal of reclaiming land, based on the opportunities opened up by the veterans of Zimbabwe's protracted liberation war and the Government. The land invasions got the legal validation through the Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A. The FTLR programme was a matter of just distribution because 50 % of the land of what was then Southern Rhodesia belonged to the White settlers, who constituted a 5% of the total population. During the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations for the independence brokered by the British government the land issue was afforded little importance.

1.10.4 The West

The West in this study refers to governments and or institutions in the international community, whose domestic and foreign policies are informed by the neo-liberal and neo-colonial worldview. Kymlicka (1989) observes that the Western governments and institutions demand that the neo-liberal and neo-colonial beliefs, norms and value system be observed according to their interpretations and that these become the international benchmarks. This study observes that neo-liberal capitalism has become the dominant economic system that demands no challenge from any other. This dominant economic system is entrenched in Western values of unquenchable craving for new things that has led to competition even between neighbours for acquisitions and new accumulations. This unsatisfied craving for material possessions has led to neo-liberals' need for sustaining dominance and influence in the international system in all areas of endeavour.

1.11 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

The thesis is structured into eight chapters that unpack the diverse components of the nexus between Zimbabwe's FTLR programme and its international relations permutations between 2000 and 2016 as follows:

Chapter One outlines the basis for the thesis. It spells-out the background, the statement of the problems, the questions and objectives of the study. The chapter reveals the scope and limitations of the study, reviews literature and the underlying theories that inform the study. It also outlines the methodology and lays the background to the international

community's reactions by contrasting the Euro-centric view with the Afro-centric view in perceiving the contending reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme of 2000.

Chapter Two discusses the Lancaster House Agreement and its up-shoots. It reveals the shortcomings of the agreement and how the attendant constitution failed to resolve the land issue that was at the core of Zimbabwe's armed liberation struggle. It further notes that the agreement perpetuated the fragile racial imbalances for the new nation.

Chapter Three addresses the inconclusive land reform in the post-colonial Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1998. It debates the salient points that triggered the varying reactions from the international community, outlining the impact of the 'willing buyer willing seller period from 1980 to 1990; the 1992 compulsory acquisition period with compensation running to the 1998's Zimbabwe Land Reform Donor Conference; the impact of the 2000 'No' vote constitutional amendment referendum, leading to the constitutional amendment number 16A which authorised the government of Zimbabwe to acquire land for resettlement without compensation.

Chapter Four reflects on the conduct and articulations of the Third Chimurenga which was triggered by the failed market driven concept of the 'willing buyer willing seller' land reform policy. This revolutionary approach attracted mixed reactions within and without Zimbabwe heightening the polarisation of the Zimbabwean community even on issues of national survival. It reveals the invasion process as the only option that the majority Blacks were left with, given the stance that Britain and its allies had taken to demonise the country's efforts of equitable land redistribution in the international community.

The fifth chapter discusses the American, European and Asian blocs' contradictory reactions highlighting upon the sanctions approach, targeted researches and media onslaught on Zimbabwe as the options employed by the Americans and Europeans regions. This is pitted against the continued interactions approach by the Sino-Soviet region that supported Zimbabwe during its armed liberation struggle.

The African alliance's reactions discussed in Chapter Six give an overview of the competing national and regional interests that informed the contradictory reactions. It debates the effectiveness of the efforts Zimbabwe employed to address the negative

impact of the Western alliance's neo-liberal backlash and highlights the value and impact of kith and kin in international relations.

Chapter Seven discusses Zimbabwe's land question in the context of international law by reviewing the SADC Tribunal's reflections on the FTLR programme. It debates the regional challenges arising from the Tribunal's verdict on Campbell and others versus Zimbabwe. The chapter exposes the primacy of domestic laws over regional protocols and the influence of solidarity networks on relations. It aligns the obtaining solidarity networks to kith and kin as important components and influencers of decisions in nations' interactions at regional level.

Chapter Eight draws on the established conclusions from the study by revealing the emerging impact of kith and kin in relations among nation states. It takes cue from the varied reactions and points out that, nations' interactions will always be influenced by the obtaining norms established at sub-regional levels. This also suggests that, any interstate collaboration will also be more predictable due to the networks built over time by the sub-regional group members. The chapter also provides the researcher's recommendations and this researcher's epilogue before outlining possible areas for future research.

1.12 CONCLUSION

The struggle over land challenges social fault-lines exemplified by the pitting of leaders against ordinary citizens, fellow citizen against fellow citizen, kinsman against kinsman, husbands against wives, as well as countries against other countries. Any revision of a country's land laws becomes a huge political process, because relationships within and between communities, as well as between communities and the state result from the realignment of the land profile. Zimbabwe's FTLR programme was unique in that, the land question brought in racial issues and class issues. The land question in Zimbabwe remained a huge national security issue that attracted very emotive debates across the width and breadth of the nation across the political divide. Until now there seems to be no consensus on how best Zimbabwe's FTLR programme could have been conducted.

The Constructivist Theory used in the study observes that international relations are aligned with the operating parameters of institutions which have determined national activities in the international system. The theory helps in the appreciation of how various

international actors in the international organisations act in the community of nations because it discusses the elementary suppositions of the other theories like Neo-liberalism and pays attention to the links that the states have with numerous other arrangements. The theory outlines different themes like chaos and the country's identity in the international structure. This qualitative study contrasted the contending reactions by the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme.

The next chapter debates the Lancaster House Agreement and Zimbabwe's land question.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND THE LAND QUESTION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Zimbabwe's intractable land conflict with its former coloniser can be traced back to the partition of Africa in early 1880s at the Berlin Conference, where Britain got its land allocation in the Southern Africa region (Methuen and Brantlinger 1985, Moyo 1995 and MacKenzie 2005). However, the seizures of land and cattle from the indigenous Blacks during the 1890s were orchestrated by the victorious Pioneer Column which hoisted the British Union Jack in Zimbabwe in 1890 (Becker 1979 and Cowie 1982). The documented crucial driver for the armed liberation struggle of Zimbabwe was the land question, concluded at the negotiated Lancaster House Agreement.

The negotiations brought to the table three delegations, that is two former liberation movements⁴ and the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.⁵ The Lancaster House Conference was the last of the series of dialogues packaged in three agreements; the constitution debate, the transitional arrangements and the ceasefire, negotiated separately between 10 September and 21 December 1979 (Report of the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference 1979). Magaisa (2016) notes that the negotiations involved shuttle diplomacy where the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian delegations were forbidden from engaging in free discussion but would at times meet with the British distinctly in less official groups at different levels. The approach where actors sat in distinct apartments negotiating with Carrington⁶ rather than with each other allowed the exploitation of the planning to suit the British's schemes.

This study observes that the conference produced in 1980 a very weak underpinning of a new nation engrossed with racial fault-lines that created major threats from the beginning. The Lancaster House talks did not facilitate direct engagements according to the strategic outlook of the members in conflict but rather gave the chair the opportunity to direct

⁴ Here see the former liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU who formed the Patriotic Front Delegation led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo.

⁵ Abel Muzorewa led the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia delegation at the Lancaster House talks as the Prime Minister of the short lived Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

⁶ Lord Carrington was the former British Foreign Secretary in Margret Thatcher's Conservative government who chaired the Lancaster House talks that produced the Constitutional Agreement that establishment Zimbabwe as a member of the community of nations.

events according to the strategic end state of Britain that assured the protection of their kith and kin.

The period of negotiations between 10 September and 21 December 1979 brought out a host of unhappy players as noted below. Ian Smith⁷ thought that the agreement was a great betrayal, where the British pandered to the terrorists (Smith autobiography *The Great Betrayal*); Robert Mugabe⁸ felt cheated (*The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group 2009*); and Joshua Nkomo⁹ thought that the agreement came out of muddle and compromise reached in a haste to stop bloodshed (Nkomo 2012). These reflections were indicators of the unfulfilled expectations which came to haunt the nation for decades into its independence.

2.2 THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT OUTCOMES

When the liberation war movement nationalist leaders went to the 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, their resolve for an immediate land redistribution exercise to the majority Blacks in Zimbabwe became one of the hotly contested issues to be addressed (Plaut 2007). The all Africa Parliamentary Group and others note that the main objective of the Lancaster House Conference was to achieve a political settlement and in that regard it was important for the negotiators to defuse the land issue rather than solve it. The financial commitments by both the American and the British governments coupled with Samora Machel's whisper into Mugabe's ear broke the impasse and assured the signing of the Lancaster House constitution (Honwana 1979).

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (2009) observed that without specific financial figures pledged, there was no agreement on the land reform and it remained unsurprising that the land question continued to be a contested issue between Britain and Zimbabwe's land discourse over 30 years after the conference. This study can conclude from the above account that the unfulfilled promise for the funding of the land reform in Zimbabwe gave

⁷ Ian Douglas Smith was the first native-born prime minister of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia who was a strong believer of white rule, who in 1965 proclaimed Rhodesia's independence and its subsequent exit from the British Commonwealth. Smith was a key member of the negotiating team from Zimbabwe/Rhodesia led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa then Prime Minister.

⁸ Robert Mugabe was part of the Patriotic Front leaders who represented the ZANU PF delegation during the Lancaster House talks.

⁹ Joshua Nkomo was part of the Patriotic Front leaders who represented the ZAPU delegation during the Lancaster House talks.

rise to the conflicted position on the land question in Zimbabwe that led to the FTLR invasions of 2000.

According to Mamdani (2008) the question of who was to own the land became the toughest of the issues to be addressed at Lancaster House because the 5% Whites owned 80% of the 33 million hectares of the arable land against millions of Blacks who scratched a living from the remainder. This issue was critical for Mugabe and Nkomo to resolve in their lifetime as committed leaders of the armed liberation struggle as Nkomo (representing the Patriotic Front) revealed in his opening statement at the Lancaster House talks (Report of the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference, 1979:9-11).

The draft constitution contained no reference to the land issue, a scenario that brought the conference to a collapse until a secret promise by the USA to provide a large sum of money for the development of land redistribution and undertaking to urge the British government to provide related guarantees led to its signing (Plaut 2007). The then President of Tanzania, the late Julius Nyerere, during a press conference on 16 October 1979, opined that the land issue would be impossible for an independent government in Zimbabwe if Zimbabweans were to be taxed in order to compensate people who took it away from them through the gun. Really the British cannot have it both ways. They made this an issue and were now making vague remarks, mixing rural development aid with the question of land compensation.

This study observes that the assurances given by the British government for part financing the land reform conditioned on the 'willing buyer willing seller' policy, ensured the continued landholding by the Whites. The willing buyer willing seller concept became an important inherent safeguard for kith and kin that ran for the period between 1980 and 1990. Because of this clause land could only be transferred from the Whites to the Blacks on the willingness of the Whites to sell at the agreed market price. The land holder chose to release the land only if the going price suited them.

The willing buyer willing seller requirement directed the Zimbabwe government to acquire land for redistribution from only those Whites who were willing to offer their land for sale at the market determined price. Unsurprisingly, as fate would have it, over the next decade only a few White farmers came forward to sell their land to the government. This means that the skewed land ownership pattern that had favoured the privileged

Whites since 1890 continued well into the period after independence. This unchanged landholding profile perpetuated White domination in Zimbabwe by default up to and including the land invasions period beginning February 2000. The same land clause remained a main reason that led to the unchanged land position to the post-independent Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2000.

Ndulo (2010) observes that Britain in addition to the 'willing buyer, willing seller' policy clause in the constitution, had reserved 20% of seats in the envisaged Parliament of the Republic of Zimbabwe for Whites another safeguard for their kith and kin. Considering the country's population profile in 1980, with around 220 000 Whites from a population of about 7.3 million, the Whites' representation in Parliament of 20% being 8% of the population presented another anomaly in the new nation. One possible reason for the limited number of Whites willing to sell their land could have been the fertile and rich land the White farmers possessed and the handsome foreign currency earnings from the agricultural production especially in tobacco, cotton and beef (Nyabeze 2015). As a result, the few farmers willing to sell their land to the government for resettlement purposes did not match the demand for land for resettlement of the landless Blacks.

The competing reflections between the moral need to share against the rewards obtaining from building profits accruing from the market played out (Mamdani 2008). This study notes that it was more rewarding to maintain the status-quo than to share the benefits accruing from the productive land under the hands of the Whites in Zimbabwe. The economic benefits outweighed the moral obligations that would have minimised the conflict that brewed after the land invasions of February 2000 and the subsequent land acquisition Act that sanitised the occupations of the White-owned farms.

Nyabeze and Ndulo (2015) note that, the Lancaster House Constitution, a derivative of an Act of the British Parliament, was not a product of a participatory process by the affected people. It was a diplomatic work in progress document that was given to Zimbabwe, as a starting point for its activities as a newly-found nation in the international arena. Even though it envisaged the removal of the autocratic and undemocratic Smith regime rule, it maintained the unequal distribution of land ownership between the Black and White communities and ensured the sustenance of minority Whites' domination on the Black majority ruled Zimbabwe (Nyabeze 2015). The Patriotic Front, in its opening statement at the Lancaster House Conference raised nine questions that they wanted to be addressed by

the agreement if real peace was to return to the nation at war. The ninth question that was to address the land redistribution issue read; ‘what will be the future of the people's land?’(Nkomo1979). This study can deduce that the Whites’ domination on land created an untenable scenario that clearly triggered the land invasions of February 2000.

The invasions of White-owned farms provided the landholding for the indigenous Blacks in Zimbabwe because the Lancaster House Agreement had failed to seize the opportunity to address the outstanding liberation struggle land imbalance concern. The 7-year period between 1980 and 1987 for the White-only electoral roll was another Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement outcome that entrenched White domination in Zimbabwe (Constitution of Zimbabwe, Act no. 4, 1979 Article 38 (1) (a) and (b)). The 20% seats reserved for the Whites in Parliament were important in sustaining the continued landholding of the Whites.

The willing buyer willing seller concept drawn from the Lancaster House talks became the flashpoint for future interactions between the Blacks and the Whites in Zimbabwe. The intervening scenario gave sufficient room and compelling reasons to the majority Black ruled government of Zimbabwe to challenge and effect substantial amendments to the 1980 Lancaster House Constitution each time an opportunity arose (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, 18 (61), col. 4405, 12 March, 1992 and Land Acquisition Act, 1992, S. 12 (1) and 12 (2)). The inherent fault-lines in the negotiated document provided scope for the simmering disgruntlement that manifested itself in 1998 and more profoundly in 2000 when the leadership pronounced the policy of taking the land without compensation because the armed liberation struggle had been fought to acquire the land as shall be discussed in the next section. The time to repossess land could not be delayed any further.

2.3 THE LAND QUESTION AND THE ARMED LIBERATION STRUGGLE

The documented crucial driver for the armed liberation struggle that witnessed its first shots during the Chinhoyi Battle ¹⁰ in 1966 was the land question (Lancaster House Agreement 1979). This armed struggle between the ruling White minority and the Black

¹⁰ The Battle of Chinhoyi was the first armed engagement that took place near Sinoia (modern-day Chinhoyi) between a small unit of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrillas and the Rhodesian police force on 28 April 1966 which marked the start of the armed encounters with the Rhodesian Security Forces.

majority was concluded at the Lancaster House Conference as discussed in the preceding sections. The December 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement had the 'willing buyer willing seller' clause that restricted the land redistribution programme for the first ten years of Zimbabwe's independence (between 1980 and 1990).¹¹

Zimbabwean nationalist leader Chitepo, a proponent of land repossessions had at a conference in Australia in 1973, shared a telling story of the attachment of the land to indigenous Blacks when he noted the inseparability of the Zimbabweans to their land (Chitepo 1973). Chitepo revealed his capacity to reflect on theories of discrimination in legislation, residency, economic opportunities and education, but, restricted himself to the question of land because he strongly felt and believed that, land was the very basic requirement for humankind development in Africa and elsewhere in the world. As Chairman of the ZANU Party Chitepo had noted and clearly articulated that there was to be no talks, negotiations or discussions involving the armed liberation struggle until Smith had recognised the right to immediate majority rule and that the war was to rage-on until every acre of the country was liberated, noting that the essence of exploitation and White domination was over land.

This study observes that the land domination as a concept, assured the Whites in Zimbabwe the power and authority to determine how land was to be acquired and the parameters for its use. The Whites established rules for land use through enacted laws that deprived the majority indigenous Blacks of any role in the land reform dialogue to safeguard their interests. Among other laws was the Land Husbandry Act of 1951.

The Rhodesian laws that established the rules for the citizenry need to be appreciated because they reveal the historical realities that were resisted by the indigenous Blacks (Palley1966). The historical realities on the land imbalance in Zimbabwe have become the basis for the competing value systems associated with the neo-liberal, neo-colonial and the pan-Africa standpoints. The armed uprisings of the 1960s came not out of choice but out of the demands for humankind emancipation in a wave that affected the SADC sub-region

¹¹ The policy of willing buyer willing seller was a voluntary process that allowed a buyer and a seller to agree on the terms of the exchange of land for some prescribed value. In this instance the principle accurately denotes the lack of compulsion on landowners. The compelling notice was that there were available buyers and sellers who were involved in the transaction process in the market place on an equal basis. In regard to Zimbabwe it was clear that the willing buyers were those who needed land, who were landless as well as resource-less who relied very much on the rule of 'double coincidence'.

for the period between 1960 and 1994 when South Africa got its independence from apartheid.

The exodus of both the young and the aged male and female Zimbabweans alike to wage the armed liberation struggle for land reclamation became the last resort for the indigenous Zimbabweans (Ranger 1985 and Muzvidziwa 2020).¹² The resolve to repossess the land through an armed liberation struggle is important to validate because the land beholder had huge benefits that accrued from the continued possession of the land resource. Curtis (2018) observes that a human's country did not refer to an area of land, mountains, rivers and woods but, that it was a principle and patriotism and loyalty to the principle. Curtis reveals that the value of ownership of one's land is associated with knowledge of possession as an imperative. In relation to the knowledge of possession people need to possess that inherent devotion of their association with the land to sustain the attachment to the possession.

Douglas (2018) argued that the deep respect for the land and its harvest was the legacy of generations of farmers who put food on tables, preserved the landscape and inspired humanity with a powerful work ethic. Here Douglas understands the need for hard work to derive the fruits abound in the possession of land. A piece of land that is kept idle does not give any value to the beholder. Maslow (2018) in his link of life to land despised the one who stopped swimming a thousand miles of sea to get to the land if dropped out of a plane into the ocean.

The importance of land was identified by Maslow as the basic right that humanity must be prepared to safeguard once possession was achieved. The basic right was to be acquired at all cost as it was the insurance for humankind's existence. Tutu (2018) reflects that when missionaries came to Africa they had the Bible and Africans land, and it was at the time when Africans were asked to close their eyes in prayer that they woke up holding the

¹² Here see T Ranger 1985. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study. James Currey, London and Joe Muzvidziwa a witness and researcher of this study is the former liberation war fighter who left Berejena Secondary School with six of his colleagues for Mozambique in 1976. Joe Muzvidziwa met more young adults who had left school from then Rhodesia who formed the nucleus of the combatants who received military training in Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and other countries outside Africa such as Yugoslavia and Romania. Muzvidziwa trained in Tanzania at Nachingwea Camp with a group of about one thousand from June 1977 to June 1978 and deployed in Gaza Province in the Matebeleland South Province up to the Ceasefire of December 1979. Joe Muzvidziwa joined the Zimbabwe National Army at independence in 1980 as one of the founding members that integrated the three former factions of ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Former Rhodesian Army.

Bible without the land. Tutu's reflection of how Africa lost its landholding highlights the need for continued protection of the land once acquired because any lapse would result in a loss of landholding that will require some painful liberation process to redress.

The concepts on the need for landholding discussed above reveal the seriousness of the attachment of humankind to land and the compelling reasons for its continued protection by the one who holds it. The dignity and respect of nations derive from their ability as individual nations to possess the land and the capacities and capabilities to defend that land. The sovereignty of the nation is determined by how the nation utilises the land it is obligated to defend. Defending the land is an important concept that nations are expected to uphold at all costs. Thus, having everything else but without land, Zimbabwe lacked in the core area of her sovereignty in the community of nations as prescribed in the UN Charter of 1945.

Without the responsibility to determine the land use at its 1980 independence and for as long as land activities were governed by the Lancaster House Agreement, its sovereignty was deficient. The Lancaster House Agreement failed to utilise the potential it controlled to address the land imbalances that were colonially induced. However, for Britain (the former colonial master) addressing the imbalance meant disadvantaging her kith and kin. There is therefore no denying that Zimbabwe at its inception in 1980 as a UN member state was devoid of full sovereignty.

Zimbabwe as a territory is one of the cases where land possession and repossession led to an intractable conflict between the majority Blacks and minority Whites that date back to the First Chimurenga of the 1890s (Ranger 1985). It became intractable because of the attachment of land to power, politics and the compelling reason for human existence as discussed above. A reflection on the definition of a nation must of necessity include some presence of a community, its ownership and the ability to protect such designated piece of land. That geographic space acquired through some historical setting as agreed through the 1963 African Charter in the case of all the African countries who got their designated spaces as determined by the former colonisers (MacKenzie 2005). This historic gathering determined the course African states chose in addressing the inherent challenges of the arbitrary boundaries drawn by the Europeans at the Berlin Conference.

At their meeting in 1964, the African leaders agreed to accept the sanctity of the boundaries as spelt out at the Berlin Conference of 1884 – 85 (Methuen and Brantlinger 1985 and MacKenzie 2005). The decision to accept the European prescribed boundaries addressed possible conflicts that would have arisen from the arbitrary nature of the Berlin Conference's national boundaries. The decisions set sights for nations to concentrate on developmental agendas noting the historical imperatives that bounded all Africans as one and not identified by imaginary lines that had been prescribed for them by foreigners.

However, one of the overhangs of the arbitrary boundaries remains the artificial separation of communities which has become a security concern for neighbouring states across Africa. The arbitrary and artificial nature of the colonial boundaries remains the cause of conflict because of the inherent fault-lines that continue to divide the same people that happen to live across a river or some imagined line along a stretch of some land that became a shared boundary between two or more nations as apportioned by the Berlin Conference.

The border has remained an important aspect always in African peace and security strategies; resulting in African leaders adopting decisions to deal with the border issues as a key security concern. In their wisdom, the Founding Fathers of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), decided to retain the boundaries as inherited when each of the Member States of the Organisation attained independence by ensuring that in both the Charter of the OAU Resolution AHG/R.S. 16 (1) and the Constitutive Act Article 4 (b) of the African Union (AU) African Countries' borders took cue from the Berlin Conference prescribed boundaries.

Typical cases of the chiefs along the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border that have jurisdiction across the international border between the two sister nations (Mabee, Zamuchia and Muzite) are a living testimony of the abstractive nature of the European-given boundaries.¹³ The same scenario obtains along Zimbabwe's border with all its other

¹³ The communities along the border between Mozambique and Zimbabwe at times shift their citizenry according to the foreseen benefits at a point and are not bounded by the existing border. Cases of dual citizenship are many along the border and pose some security challenges for the two nations where cases of criminality are reported. The Musanditeera area in Chimanimani and Ngomoyedhuna in Chipinge are among areas with very difficult terrain that had become safe havens for deviant characters on both side of the border. Agriculture field and cattle pastures are utilised either side of the border because members share everything in common for their livelihoods. Non-classified Manicaland JOC Reports 2018 – 19.

immediate neighbours. Communities along these stretches of the border-lines experience challenges of choosing where their allegiance must align. In the majority of cases they acquire dual citizenship in contravention of the applicable national laws as a safeguard. They elect to align according to the obtaining benefits from such an alliance. This study observes that the boundary issue was a deliberate European strategic measure that allowed for inbuilt fault-lines that would be exploited in future interactions with the Africans, a long tried and tested *modus operandi* of colonial masters.

Fjader (2014) defines a nation as a large body of people associated with a particular territory that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or possess a government peculiar to its own. The aspect of territory which amounts to land and the consciousness of its unity and the possession of a government specific to its own, are key drivers that attach a people to its own territory. The territory has boundaries that distinguish nations and it is from these boundaries and endowments that accrue from the territory that become triggers for intractable conflicts (The Berlin Conference of 1884-85). Zimbabwe was included in the profile of the community of nations when it attained its political independence on 18 April 1980.

However, its sovereignty was achieved after the FTLR programme of 2000; because two decades into its nationhood, Zimbabwe had no control over its land and by definition was not sovereign. Without the control of land, which regulated the economic growth of the nation's agriculture-based economy; it could not have been counted among sovereign states of the world in real terms before 2000 when it chose to revolutionarily retake the land. The Lancaster House Agreement had the opportunity to address this anomaly but chose to be obligated to the service of kith and kin in order not to set a wrong precedent. Precedence weighed over reality from the attendant overhangs.

Aside of the boundaries, where the colonisers identified land that suited them; they elbowed out the indigenous people of such places and created conflicts that led to the armed liberation struggles across the region. Elbowing the majority Blacks from the land, this study can infer, became an important strategy that Carrington had to sustain by whatever formulae. The occupations arising from the colonial activities set the tone for the possessions and repossessions as fruits of unjustified programmes that favoured those in authority at a given period in the history of the nation (Report of the Constitutional Commission 1969, Chapter 16:143).

This study can conclude that the conflict between Zimbabwe and the West did not arise because of the lack of democracy or abuse of human rights, neither the absence of the rule of law nor any other explanation as expounded by the West's propaganda machinery, but rather, the resolve by the indigenous Blacks to vouch for land reform before any signatures could be appended on the Lancaster House Agreement.

This became the unusual threat Zimbabwe posed that had to be delayed for two decades between 1980 and 2000 by utilising initially the leverage of Mozambique's leadership to rein on Mugabe for him to agree to whatever deal Britain availed (End of Empire Chapter 14 1985). This study can infer that the choice of empowering the majority indigenous people by allowing the ownership of a very important land-source and resource, Britain would have propelled outsiders to unimagined economic independence and by default choked the raw material arteries that fed the West's industries from Zimbabwe.

Historically, the nation of Zimbabwe had suffered White domination from 1890 up to 2000 even though it got majority rule in 1980, which was negotiated out of the armed liberation struggle.¹⁴ Its independence and sovereignty were only concluded when it declared the land reform fast-track after the 2000 land invasions and the enactment of the law that legalised the invasions.

Armed liberation struggles by nature are the highest form of conflict which accepts the shedding of blood to gain that which led to the struggle. This is the highest form of sacrifice that humanity continues to offer. The trigger of the armed liberation struggle was the need to regain the ill-gotten land at the hands of the Whites in Zimbabwe. The question of land became an important rallying point during the armed liberation struggle anywhere and it was no surprise that the 2000 invasions came to happen, anytime and in whatever form, since the day the Pioneer Column set out to repress indigenous Blacks of their lands in 1890.

Chitepo (1973) spoke about the fact that White domination was about land and that land was the source of the dispute that needed to be addressed before any negotiations were agreed upon between the majority Blacks and the minority Whites who governed the

¹⁴ For more information see Law and Order Maintenance Act 50 of 1967 and The Racial Discrimination and Repression in South Rhodesia, International Commission of Justice Report.

country from 1890 to 1980.¹⁵ Tongogara noted the disparities in the Zimbabwean society, where colour determined one's destiny, and ascribed this as his reason for fighting a system to gain equality.¹⁶ As he reflects in his speeches, Tongogara's vision was not based on what he was to become in the hierarchy of society at independence, but a free society that was going to allow the young to enjoy life, blind to the colour of their skins. This was his vision, a vision of a place that was to become Zimbabwe where colour or creed did not matter.

The removal of an unjust system was the trigger that urged him to join the armed liberation struggle and pushed him to surrender his life to change an unjust system. He held the zeal to remove a discriminatory structure that was perpetuated by the minority on the majority, a system that rated and allocated human beings places of residence according to the colour of their skin, a system that divided own population into first and third class citizenry. The Lancaster House Agreement failed to address these important concerns and by implication set the stage for the February 2000 White farms' invasions.

These huge political and policy positions by Zimbabwe's liberation war icons mark important turning points that shall remain very inspiring as Zimbabwe develops its capacities and capabilities into the future. The statements give hope to the community of Zimbabwe for a future whose sovereignty shall not be challenged; a future, that guarantees equitable land ownership to the people; a future that upholds the sanctity of land as embedded in the constitution; that guides and interprets the laws of the land; and that, which knows no colour; that where communities shall prosper guided by the laws of the land. The reflections attest to the envisioned future of Zimbabwe which is full of hope, as a critical driver for development across societies.

Why has land remained a contested issue between the Black and White communities in Zimbabwe? One possible explanation could be the realisations of the colonial hangover

¹⁵ Herbert Wilshire Chitepo as the chairman of the ZANU held the vision for the armed liberation struggle and his strategic policy statements gave the movement the energy to execute the struggle convinced of the cause for the struggle. Besides, the proclamations spelt out the end-state of an assured victory for the liberation struggle.

¹⁶ Josiah Magama Tongogara "What some of us are fighting for is to see that this oppressive system is crushed. We don't care whether, I don't even care whether I will be part of the top echelon in the ruling, I'm not worried but I'm dying to see a change in the system, that's all, that's all. I would like to see the young people enjoying together, black, White, enjoying together, in a new Zimbabwe, that's all" <https://www.africalexponent.com/post/7-quotes-from-zimbabwes-liberation-heroes-2851> accessed: 22 June 2018.

where during the period of the conflict, the Whites declared that ‘never even in a thousand years that Black rule will be imagined in Rhodesia’¹⁷ and an appreciation of the fact that the soul of humankind can never settle outside the land where it rests and recovers from, reveals the natural contest. Colour had never been the issue but the acquisition of the land and the capacity to defend the landholding legally are the important concepts.

Humankind will perish and remains fully prepared to pass away to possess and own some piece of land that they shall call theirs. Nations have gotten to wars because of some disputed boundaries. Such boundaries at times, at places along some piece of land whose size and the endowment associated with that piece of land was unknown and at times in the eyes of the world are insignificant.¹⁸ The size and endowment are elementary to the possession and it remains the ownership of land as the core that becomes the determinant for the ultimate choice for war; possessions as both physical and psychological are important determinants. The Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement allowed the perpetuation of White domination in Zimbabwe to serve the Whites’ kith and kin.

This study can premise from the above arguments that if Zimbabwe had not taken the important decision to fight for the recovery of its lost land, seized by force by the colonisers through an armed liberation struggle she would not have been allowed a hearing that almost stalled the signing of the Lancaster House talks because the land question had not been addressed. This study can also infer that, that is why the West will continue to fight for the land that did not belong to them historically but, the land they acquired through White-domesticated laws during their period in governance.

The USA sanctions on Zimbabwe through the 2018 revised ZIDERA, after one of the country’s most peaceful harmonised elections, remains an indication of the sustained neo-

¹⁷ Here see Ian Douglas Smith. 1970. Smith did not imagine Black majority rule in Rhodesia— in his life time but working together for as long as the Whites were in charge. He envisaged a failed state once the nation gave the Blacks reins of power. Press Conference, 2 March. Pushing people forward simply because of their colour, irrespective of merit, would be most unfortunate and would of course lead to disaster. Reaction to the 1977 general election in which his government was re-elected overwhelmingly: On the end of White minority rule in 1979. Smith believed in the benefits of colonialism, noting that it brought civilization to written language, the conventional wheel, schools, hospitals and normal clothing <http://spotlight-z.com/news/end-empire-1985-chapter-14-rhodesia/> accessed: 14 May 2018.

¹⁸ M Mitchel Brainyquote.com; Land is the only thing in the world that amounts to anything, for this is the only thing in this world that lasts; this is the only thing worth working for, worth fighting for - worth dying for. <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/h/henrylouis465257.html?src> accessed: 29 November 2018.

liberal preferred land reform programme. The West will strive to establish rules and procedures outside the normal, to paint a sorry state of whatever endeavour Zimbabwe shall attempt, in order to address its challenges for as long as they are absent in such processes. Land ownership based on the FTLR programme remains at the core of Zimbabwe's rough relations with the West because the leadership in Zimbabwe chose to defy neo-liberal rules in addressing land challenges. This reality has to be told.

Humankind has fought to acquire even other people's land and humankind continues to demand land from the weak by hook or crook, regardless of the agreed norms in the international system. Future conflicts will therefore, one way or the other, continue to be linked to the land disputes between and among societies and shall remain a cause for humankind's delayed development agenda. The concept of regime change is in no way related to the removal of an office bearer but rather the removal of the idea of governance in a society. The West is fighting the idea of Black empowerment that arose from the radical land reform in Zimbabwe that will pass from the current generation to future generations. National ideas are an important pointer for national survival and once these are dismembered then the nation is easily subjected to the whims of the powerful others.

Whilst the Lancaster House Constitutional document set the pace to end the armed liberation struggle, it delayed the sovereignty of Zimbabwe not only by the appended 10 years to 1990 at the expiry of the willing buyer willing seller policy clause, but up to 2000 when eventually Zimbabwe took it upon itself to repossess its land. In the anarchical international system, members have to wrestle for sovereignty and show the capacity to defend it at every turn.

The processes of defending sovereignty are not only complex but costly as well due to the attendant conflicted selfish national interest concerns between and among the powers that struggle for dominance. Zimbabwe's struggle to exert its sovereignty on the land was very costly as the country continues to attract unwarranted sanctions for its resolve to empower the Black majority community in Zimbabwe. Sovereignty is not cheap; sovereignty is a very heavy load that nations have to shoulder, regardless.

2.4 THE LAND QUESTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE AGREEMENT

The negotiated settlement was an anti-climax not only to those who represented the liberation movements of ZANLA and ZIPRA but to the indigenous people of Zimbabwe who perished during the protracted armed liberation struggle that raged for about a decade and half during the Second Chimurenga. The people who had been convinced that it was necessary to fight and die to reclaim the land taken away from their forefathers by the colonisers, faltered at the crucial point; the last huddle. To settle for anything outside a return of land to the rightful owners or at least some option that ensured that the land was equitably distributed among all Zimbabweans considering the torturous journey that had been trodden, could now be easily judged as completely selling out. This was a failure by the team whose mandate was to align an equitable land profile for the future of Zimbabwe; it was a huge let-down.

Considering that land was at the core of the armed liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, how then did the negotiators agree to a settlement that allowed a clause that relegated the land issue to the periphery that needed to be considered once the nation had experienced its first ten years of independence? Who introduced the concept of the ‘willing buyer willing seller’? Why did the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ policy take precedence over others including the one that could have provided a win-win scenario that could have equitably redistributed land to both the Blacks and Whites in correcting the inherent land imbalance as a genuine compromise? Why did the negotiators weigh down the importance and the correlation of land to the armed liberation struggle?

These are critical questions that demand some analysis to allow for an appreciation of the complexities and negative impact surrounding the outcomes of the Lancaster House negotiated settlement. Answers to these questions should give indications of whether the negotiations were done in good or in bad faith by the parties whose task was to come up with a settlement that assured harmonious coexistence among the Zimbabwean societies.

Some of the answers to these questions are in the findings of the All Africa Parliament Committee (2009) which noted that the land issue never became an issue until late into the conclusion of the conference when it became apparent that Mugabe and Nkomo were not going to sign the document until the land reform aspect was agreed upon. The Committee pointed to the intervention by the Americans who offered to fund Zimbabwe’s land reform

and also to encourage Britain to do the same as the event that allowed the signing ceremony to take place as discussed earlier (Muzvidziwa 2020). This observation is very important to appreciate as it exposes the self-serving diplomatic endeavours that took effect at the time.

Magaisa (2016) observed that the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement perpetuated racial divisions when it reserved exclusively for Whites 20 seats in the Assembly and 10 seats in the Senate.¹⁹ Magaisa concludes that the concept of earmarked seats was intended to protect the White minority whose figures would be dwarfed by the Black majority in a one-humankind one-vote structure. This arrangement gave the White minority foothold in the political arrangement which could have been used to prevent passing of constitutional amendments in case Zimbabwe chose to correct some provisions requiring a 2/3 majority in both Houses (the Senate and the Assembly). Why diplomacy?

Diplomacy was required to buy time for the continued emancipation of the White kith and kin, it now can be concluded. Land was an important resource that guided the economic survival of the nation and was to be addressed without hurting the kith and kin. The proceeds from the same land sustained the Centre, North. Therefore, the land issue had to be addressed without compromising the benefits of the kith and kin that prospered and served the North from the utilities of the land.

The fact that the intervention by the Americans saved the day, raises questions as to why Britain was reluctant in the first place before it was encouraged to become part of the funders of the land reform when they were the ones on the firing line for any failures arising from the negotiations they chaired? This study can deduce that Britain as the chair of the deliberations was very conscious and deliberate on how they were to manage the politics of Rhodesia. If the objective was to create a future that was to be accepted by all in the new republic, then the outstanding land profile was an issue that required a resolution before the final draft of the constitution was agreed upon.

¹⁹ For more information see Constitution of Zimbabwe, Act no. 4, 1979 Article 38 (1) provided that “the House of Assembly shall constitute of one hundred members qualified in accordance with schedule 3 for elections to the House of assembly, of whom: (a) eighty shall be elected by voters registered on the common roll for eighty common roll constituencies, (b) twenty shall be elected by voters registered on the white roll for twenty white roll constituencies; and A Magaisa, 2016. Big Saturday Read: Zimbabwe and the Lancaster House’s faulty foundations <https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2016/04/15/The-Big-Saturday-The-Lancaster-House-Agreement-a-state-built-on-a-faulty-foundation> accessed: 22 November 2018.

Britain had a clear strategy that allowed its kith and kin to hold-on to the land for as long as was possible because there were direct benefits accruing from the status-quo. That is why the hide and seek raged on until sanctions were imposed at the behest of the United Kingdom after the 2000 FTLR programme as a fighting-back to sustain their failed strategy. Britain imagined a disposed kith and kin and holding the key, sustaining the status-quo for as long as it took became an important gamble.

Rewinding back, it should be remembered that when Rhodesia declared unilateral independence in November 1965, Britain did not intervene as expected by the majority in the international community because it could not fight its kith and kin. This is the same consideration that continued to guide Britain at the 1979 Lancaster House Conference. Solving the land issue at the Lancaster House in favour of Zimbabwe's majority Black population would have seen Britain assisting the Blacks in Zimbabwe to impoverish its kith and kin, an undertaking that would have set a wrong precedent.

Britain deliberately chose to delay addressing the inherent social disparities created by colonial rule because it was going to disadvantage its own Whites in a new Zimbabwe. Mamdani (2008) observes that although the extensive grievances about the theft of land – a development begun in 1889 and completed in the 1950s – drove the guerrilla struggle against the regime of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front opposed black majority rule, the economic and the other political provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement reflected the short-termism of the willing buyer, willing seller policy. This was strongly anchored on the fact that, British would be funding the scheme (willing buyer willing seller) and the reserved 20% seats in the House of Assembly for Whites which gave the settler community an effective veto over any amendment to the Lancaster House terms. The issues bordered on deliberate lack of will and drive in effecting real changes in the constitution.

In perpetuating the skewed landholding by the minority Whites, Britain preferred a managed weak majority rule in Zimbabwe. The approach deliberately skirted around the equitable land reform question that would address the historical land imbalances as a temporary safeguard for Britain's kith and kin. It was naturally not in favour of Britain as Chair to disadvantage its own (Zimbabwe's minority White population). True to the adage; blood, clearly remained thicker than water. The Whites in Britain had to serve the Whites in Zimbabwe for posterity.

The above reflections demonstrate that diplomacy carried the day in protecting kith and kin interests. However, diplomacy also carried with it the unresolved land issue that would haunt the Whites in Zimbabwe later in 2000 when they woke up to noises of the land invaders chanting liberation war songs day and night outside the gates of their farm houses for weeks on end. The delayed decision to tackle the land issue responsibly and appropriately for the benefit of all at the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement, led to the heightened tension between the Blacks and Whites in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2000, two decades into Zimbabwe's independence.

A lesson that arises from this experience is that, real issues are never wished away but would rather be debated and resolved at the time they are put on the table, if they are to address real challenges abound in societies. If challenges are wished away, they will rest latently creating in that state sentiments which would be triggered later during the human interactions through unimagined circumstances. Once triggered, they disadvantage the contenders in equal measure regardless.

By relegating the major cause for the armed liberation struggle in Zimbabwe to the periphery, the negotiations left a ticking time bomb and one may not be sure whether it was fortunate or unfortunate that it took 20 years to explode. The simmering voices from about 1998 when the Svosve community took the bull by the horns and started resettling themselves in the White-owned farms in the Marondera area was clearly an ominous warning of the impending explosion that demanded some immediate attention. Paying a blind eye to the developments of 1998 led to the unnecessary loss of life during the land invasions of 2000 whereas the proverbial, stitch in time would have saved nine.

Had the British sincerely addressed the land issue at the Lancaster House Constitutional debate, Zimbabwe would have lived in harmony with itself and prospered in the international system due to its abounding human and resource endowment. Taking the black majority community population for a ride, even though it gave the West a buffer for a market-driven land reform process projected by the British, the February 2000 land invasions which were followed by the amendment Act 16A, were a rude awakening to the West. The scenario would have been much better for all had the negotiators chose to tackle the land issue that would have allowed equity rather than the subsequent compulsory acquisition approach that resulted after some rough episodes between Zimbabwe and Britain.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The icons of the armed liberation struggle went into the Lancaster House negotiations to address the land imbalances between the Whites and Blacks in Zimbabwe as a core issue, but, left the conference with an agreement that allowed a willing buyer willing seller policy that was to run for 10 years up to 1990 as a compromise. This untenable position was arrived at after the Patriotic Front leaders sought for the land issue to be resolved as no mention had been put in the initial agreement. This Lancaster House Agreement provided the land reform template that hamstrung the new nation to deal with the land issue during the first 10 years of its existence. The negotiated settlement was a let-down to those who represented the armed liberation movements and to the indigenous people of Zimbabwe whose sons and daughters paid the ultimate price during the protracted struggle that lasted for about a decade and half. To settle for anything outside a return of land to the rightful owners or at least some compromise that would have allowed an option for some equitable redistribution among all Zimbabweans considering the tortuous journey was a total let-down that attracted much more pain inevitably leading to the 2000 land ‘invasions’.

The 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement failed to direct appropriately, the land redistribution question in Zimbabwe but, used it as a temporary conflict resolution option that became by extension the permanent option the West trusted as it assured the rights of their kith and kin in Zimbabwe’s land reform road map. Service for kith and kin overshadowed the long term benefits that were to accrue for all from the conclusive resolution of the land question. The Lancaster House Agreement established and perpetuated an unsustainable land situation for the new nation.

The next chapter addresses the inconclusive land reform in the post-colonial Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1998.

CHAPTER THREE
THE INCONCLUSIVE LAND REFORM: POST - COLONIAL
ZIMBABWE 1980 - 1998

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The genesis of the land question in Zimbabwe from the Lancaster House Constitution and the changing landscape from 1980 highlights the flashpoints that led to the Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A. The 2000 Act ignited the mixed reactions from the international community. National survival is measured by the stability of a state's economic activities and for the agro-based economy of a developing country such as Zimbabwe; the landholding matrix is an important measure of national sovereignty and internal socio-political stability. Zimbabwe's economy being agro-based, feeds directly from the land. The mineral wealth which remains one of the huge economic growth contributors for Zimbabwe derives as well from the same land.

Ownership of land under such circumstances, by default becomes not only contested but, controversial as well. The one, who holds and utilises it, has a say in the economic activities of the nation and by extension wields immense power (Brown 1974, Dean 1988:14. and Newman 2014). Why was the land reform delayed beyond 1990 as agreed at Lancaster? The delayed revolutionary land reform was a regional geostrategic decision that eased the processes of the majority rule for South Africa. The 2000 land enactment process brought with it mixed reactions from the international community and is the basis for this study which argues that kith and kin and inter-state engagements informed these reactions. Land as a source of wealth and resource transcends the boundaries set in the meaning but its efficacy is governed by the groups' reflected parameters.

3.2 THE LAND PROFILE AND THE NEW NATION

The unchanged land distribution among societies in Zimbabwe arising from the Lancaster House Constitution and the changing landscape from 1980 to 1998 is replete with conflicted approaches that led to the constitutional amendment Number 16A. This constitutional amendment remains a contested issue between Zimbabwe and Britain. Two land reform amendments to the constitution took effect, one in 1992 and the other in 2000.

The 1992 amendment failed to address the land disparities between the Black and White communities in Zimbabwe due to the contested compulsory outlook that challenged the neo-liberal market-led approach. Throughout history, the ownership of land has always been an indicator of the power and effectiveness of any ruler-ship. Respect was measured by the amount of land one possessed and defended. Writers in this field therefore, bring to the fore one of the most contested resources. Nations have chosen to go to war to maintain in some cases very small disputed pieces of land along shared boundaries because territorial integrity has remained a vital interest of states and the reasons for their survival. As a vital interest if challenged, nations are compelled to use hard power to protect the territory.

At Lancaster House in December 1979 Carrington noted the centrality of the land issue and the huge resource requirement that was needed to redress the colonial legacy. He acknowledged the need to change the land ownership pattern in Zimbabwe; outlining that the envisaged costs were beyond any individual donor nation; and the British government's preparedness to support the efforts of the government of Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for the burden that laid ahead (Lancaster House Conference Press Statements Lord Carrington as the Chair). Noting the huge land redistribution burden that Zimbabwe was to address was important in prioritising the funding component necessary for addressing the challenge.

However, the efforts to solve the envisaged challenge were insignificant and deliberately aligned to ensure that nothing tangible came out of the process. Whereas the statement appealed very well to the majority Blacks listeners in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, Britain walked very slowly in owning-up to its pledge. Instead, the majority Blacks in Zimbabwe woke up to experience sanctions instigated at the behest of Britain once they decided to recover their land through the FTLR programme of 2000.

Besides the assurances raised by both the Americans and the British governments to fund the land reform programme as a compromise to allow for the signing of the Lancaster House Constitution as noted in the last chapter, the realities for the funding from 1980 to 1998 reveal that, the assurances were diplomatic nuances that kept Zimbabwe hoping for a change in the land ownership profile that remained a pipe dream up to 2000 when the majority Blacks revolted and liberated the land. The major revelation that comes out of this process is that, land cannot change hands unless some form of force has been exerted

on those holding on to it. Zimbabwe had to fast-track land reform and fight spiritedly to reclaim its lost land. It is this study's argument that no other way would have changed the land ownership profile in Zimbabwe outside the FTLR programme. Any other undertaking different from the FTLR programme, could have allowed a different profile that remains assumptive, speculative and academic.

The 1980 land ownership structure reveals that, there were about 33 million hectares of prime farming land in Zimbabwe. Out of this land, about 6 000 White commercial farmers owned 45%. This constituted about 11 million hectares of the most prime land in Zimbabwe. At the Blacks' end, 8 000 mainly small scale commercial farmers possessed 5% of the land in the drier regions of the country and some 700 000 black families occupied the remaining 50% of the poorest unfertile land in the designated Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) and other communal areas (Moyo 2000 and Mamdani 2008). The land profile clearly favoured the minority Whites who were protected by the laws of the land, a scenario that attracted the backlash from the Blacks once they obtained the reins of power.

At its inception the Zimbabwe government made a commitment to resettle about 160 000 Black farmers by 1990 at the expiration of the 'willing buyer willing seller' Lancaster House Constitutional arrangement. However, the government had not reached 50% of its target for reasons of limited financial resources, corruption, the general bureaucratic nature of the process, and the 'willing buyer willing seller' concept itself among others. Britain had provided 47 million Pounds²⁰ for resettlement support by 1990.

The IMF and the World Bank suspended aid for land reform in 1989 citing corruption. These Bretton Woods institutions went on to impose the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP), which had very strict budgetary guidelines and where land reform was not part of the supported portfolios (Moyo 1995, Moyo 2000, Chitiyo 2000 and Muzvidziwa 2020). Land reform in Zimbabwe had become a conflicted issue because of the conflicted approaches by the contestants for its process.

²⁰ For more information see Robert Mugabe who said "During the first two to three years there were significant flows of funding from the USA. The British started playing cards when they reluctantly proposed funding on a 50/50 basis and Zimbabwe putting its money first and this was a gamble in reality. End of Empire Chapter 14: Rhodesia <http://spotlight-z.com/news/end-empire-1985-chapter-14-rhodesia/> accessed: 14 May 2018.

Agriculture was a thriving foreign currency earner for Zimbabwe from the production of tobacco, cotton, alongside beef and horticulture. Earnings from these portfolios accounted for 15% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990 and 40% of the foreign currency earnings (Campbell 2004). Zimbabwe's economy was growing steadily and so were the agricultural returns. Taking stock of the land redistribution profile, where the White minority community owned about 50% of the best land available, the majority Blacks did not enjoy these returns besides providing the much sought-after labour force accounting for 25% of the national requirement predominantly in the White-owned commercial farms. The new nation was hamstrung in its efforts to achieve land equity.

3.3 THE LAND REFORM POLICY 1991 - 1998

The Zimbabwe government came up with a revised land reform policy after 1990, passing the land acquisition Act in 1992. The compelling objective was the speeding-up of the land reform process through land designation and compulsory acquisition (Zimbabwe's Land Acquisition Act 1992 and Fisher 2010). The Act empowered the government to acquire land that it deemed unproductive. Studies conducted by the World Bank during the 1990/91 period had shown that large-scale commercial farmers were utilising less than 50% of the 11 million hectares of prime land under their possession (Moyo 1995 and Roth 2005). The land profile was tilted in favour of the minority Whites who were protected by the established domestic laws that were sustained by the 'willing buyer willing seller' rule up to 1992.

Derelict land or underutilised land, land owned by absentee or foreign landlords mainly from land owned by farmers with more than one farm and land adjacent to the communal areas was targeted for acquisition. By July 1997, the government of Zimbabwe had only acquired 3.5 million hectares, resettling 71 000 Blacks families out of the targeted 162 000. About 4 000 Whites still owned over 50% of land at an average of 2 000 hectares each (Campbell 2004). Over 1 million Black community families were still living in overcrowded communal land on an average of 3 hectares per family (Nyabeze 2005 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). Overcrowding was the challenge that was to be addressed by the land reform and was important in solving the armed liberation struggle's pledge for indigenous Blacks land ownership.

This land reform phase once again failed to address the land disparities in Zimbabwe for a number of reasons. The compelling one being that the British, the USA governments and other donor countries informed by the neo-liberal ethics had stopped supporting the land reform programme, deeming it corrupt and unfair because they did not agree with the government's concept of compulsory acquisition.²¹ The Zimbabwe government's approach had run contrary to the rights to private property concept, an important anchor in the neo-liberal theory's set of critical values. The challenge was huge and the neo-liberals had to find ways and means of failing the FTLR programme.

According to Laakso (1997) the government of Zimbabwe, which was also now facing other economic hardships linked to ESAP, was incapacitated to single-handedly fund the land reform. The resettled families had not gotten much assistance from the government. With the obtaining pressure from the landless Blacks who wanted to be settled and those resettled but lacking resources to develop their capacities, the Zimbabwe government convened the Land Reform Donor Conference in Harare in 1998 in an attempt to secure funding to improve its outstanding and overdue land resettlement drive (Masiwa 2004). This was an all-encompassing conference that sought to address the land reform challenges that had arisen from the previous troubled land redistribution attempts. However, this conference became yet another talk show that failed to address the landholding challenges between the White and Black communities in Zimbabwe.

3.4 HARARE LAND REFORM DONOR CONFERENCE 1998

The government of Zimbabwe developed and implemented a policy framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme which required financial support from the donor community in the spirit of the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement. The budget estimate was US\$2 billion for the land reform process and other essential services (Marongwe 2002:33). The government also needed financial support to provide credit facilities for the resettled farmers because the commercial banks in Zimbabwe, unlike in

²¹ Here see Robert Mugabe who said "When Carter lost to Reagan things changed. Reagan was a difficult ignorant character who thought that we were diehards. From the British side after Thatcher, Major meant us well but when he lost to Blair things changed when after the Scotland CHOGM he abrogated the colonial responsibilities". End of Empire Chapter 14: Rhodesia <http://spotlight-z.com/news/end-empire-1985-chapter-14-rhodesia/> accessed: 14 May 2018.

the Smith regime era, were unwilling to participate in the envisaged Blacks' managed land reform.

The land acquisition had targeted for compulsory acquisition about 5 million hectares from the 11 million owned by Black and White commercial farmers, Parastatals, Corporations and Multinational Companies across the country. About 1 million hectares had been projected to be acquired annually for a period of five consecutive years commencing in 1998 (Moyo 2004 and Campbell 2004). This was a golden opportunity for Zimbabwe to address the land question guided by the views of the international community as represented by the donor community that took part in the conference. The expectations were high as judged by the number of both regional and international organisations that convened in Harare to contribute in addressing the challenges of land reform in Zimbabwe.

3.4.1 The Donor Conference Outcomes

Britain, the United States and other donor countries from the SADC, the Middle East and the Asiatic states as well as other agencies including the UN, AU, IMF and World Bank attended the conference. All the participants agreed and passed a resolution that, land reform was essential for poverty reduction, economic growth and political stability. They also appreciated the urgency and fast-track nature of the programme. However, there was little commitment financially, with the donors only pledging US\$100 million against the budgeted figure of about US\$2 billion (Marongwe 2002). Besides the pledges falling far short of the requirement, they came with conditions that were to address the concerns of the neo-liberals who demanded a land reform process that was to be conducted on the basis of a willing buyer willing seller concept.

Masiwa (2004) notes that Britain insisted that the land acquisition was not to be compulsory but, that it was to remain on the basis of a market-oriented approach. On a positive note, the Commercial Farmers Union offered some land freely, but, were slow to avail specific areas identified for land sale, the same scenario that obtained in the 1990's. The conference outcomes and the entrenched positions again created a stalemate that stalled progress on the land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe. The contenders stuck to their established value systems and stalled the land redistribution efforts.

These entrenched views by the neo-liberals must be understood as important pointers to the future behaviours by the West on the contested formula of land redistribution as a generic rule or any other area that challenges the neo-liberals' embedded norms and values in the international system. In their cherished view, what was concluded by the 1992 Act violated the rights of the Whites to have the opportunity to decide to sell at the market determined price their land and before this was addressed, sanctions became the only alternative. The remainder in the international community had to get the message loud and clear for them to take into account, for their future land reform interactions with the West.

The case of Zimbabwe remains a clear precedent for the international system not only to know but also to think about the magnitude of the associated costs for such undertakings running contrary to the neo-liberals. Compulsory acquisition by nature became a challenge that was directed at the neo-liberals' hegemonic tendencies in the international arena to direct land redistribution activities in the global village using their own value systems. Western domination had been seriously challenged and such a challenge to the dictates of the West approved views had to be foiled at whatever cost.

The West, as assumed by this study, will remain unhappy and continue to frustrate whatever progress and the potential fruits envisaged from Zimbabwe's land produce if the West does not direct or is not involved in such endeavours. It can also be concluded that with the same developments in mind that, that is why Britain ran very slowly in funding the land reform programme, allocating a mere 42 million Pounds from 1980 to 1998 that came with conditionalities.

This they did, it can now be strongly vouched, to ensure that nothing came out of Zimbabwe's land redistribution programme; this they did to frustrate whatever fruit that would have given some indication of some progress on the pieces of the land taken back by the Blacks from White farmers. Anything that was good, arising from the Blacks' efforts, would have sent the wrong signals across the international community, of the growth potentials arising from a programme that ignored the neo-liberals' land reform interests and guidelines.

3.4.2 Donor Conference Resolutions

An evaluation of the three essentials arising from the resolutions of the Harare Donor Conference of 1998 is noteworthy. When one discusses the causes of conflict in the developing nations historically, poverty ranges high on the scale hence the special need to reduce it in communities in the international system. Poverty reduction has become one of the UN Millennium Development Goals that member states are expected to attain by 2030. Attaining an upper middle income economy by 2030 is the current goal for Zimbabwe.

This UN objective reveals the importance of fighting poverty as a conflict driver in the international system that must be achieved by capacitating national programmes that enhance the growth of economies. Africa's livelihood for the majority peasant population derives from the returns gotten through subsistence farming in the main. This could only be made possible from the equitable land redistribution hence the compelling need for equity in this resource. Without this resource, reduction of poverty for the majority of the peasant communities which had been targeted for decongestion would not have been made possible. Poverty reduction would have remained a pipe dream for the nation of Zimbabwe.

The second issue that dealt with the economic growth results from the collective employment generated from the land distribution as Zimbabwe's economy is largely agriculture-based. Outputs arising from the majority's involvement in the agriculture-based economy entailed wealth for the nation. Land as both a source and resource needed to be equitably shared to allow for the communities to work and recover from poverty by tilling the land. Zimbabwe's history has provided facts about the capabilities of the majority Blacks to earn a living from the land. Land for the majority Blacks entailed wealth and without land one became a nonentity. So, without addressing the landholding challenge, the majority Blacks in Zimbabwe remained marginalised.

Political stability as the third resolution remained the crucial driver to the growth of the economy and by extension poverty reduction as a major goal. The stability of nations is measured by how the various political persuasions interact and align their national discourses. Harmonious interactions attract naturally important game-changers from within and without the nation, elements that assure economic growth. Peace is a huge

commodity that assures the thriving enterprises. Harmonious interactions among the governing political parties and the opposition mould respect among communities of different political parties which breeds national cohesion on national imperatives.

The opposite is true when rivalry is the practice on everything and anything that is under discussion. This fault-line inherent in the Zimbabwean scenario has been exploited by the West in a bid to effect regime change from the confusion created by the obvious enmity between the governing party and the opposition parties, the case of Zimbabwe among other third-world developing nations enmeshed in colonial relationships. Ethnic divisions continue to be the card that has been played to separate the same people across Africa.

3.5 THE GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES OF THE LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE

Mutsvangwa (2020) notes that it was out of deferment to Frontline States that the First Republic of Zimbabwe had shelved its plans to forcibly recover stolen land until the final victory of the national liberation movement in South Africa. The day Zimbabwe got political independence in 1980 through the Lancaster House Agreement; the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, met Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in Salisbury to deliberate about the creation of the movement's operation structures in Zimbabwe. The ANC established operational structures in Zimbabwe, when Zimbabweans working or studying in South Africa also joined the ANC for human emancipation.

As talks to end apartheid started in 1990, the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, persuaded Mugabe not to continue with any plan to device deep-seated land reform, given that the Lancaster House Constitutional 10-year prohibition caveat was over. According to Evans (2016) and Mbeki and Guvamombe (2019) Chief Anyaoku and the Commonwealth Secretariat were concerned that any deep-seated land restructuring in Zimbabwe at that point would have frightened the White South Africans and thus suggestively complicate the process and progress of talks underway. Mugabe and the Zimbabwe government acceded to Anyaoku's proposal and thus deferred for about a decade the required land reform which had been a crucial goal of the political and armed liberation struggle of Zimbabwe.

The ANC's establishment of operational structures and Zimbabwe's deferring of its land redistribution plan for the sake of the South Africa's independence created strong brotherly relationships between the ANC and the ZANU PF. These historical underpinnings played into the decision to delay the radical land reform where a committee was established to regulate the flow of arms and equipment from Zambia through Zimbabwe for the liberation cause, undetected. Mbeki reveals that during the years of interactions and collaborations with President Mugabe, the Government of Zimbabwe and ZANU PF, they appreciated the commitment to the improvement of the livelihood of Zimbabweans, protecting the independence of the two nations and propelling the pan-Africanist objectives.

However, Mbeki further notes that these achievements required that Zimbabwe remained a self-governing and peaceable nation with a rising economy of commonwealth, and a nation which was to endure to do all imaginable to eliminate the inheritance of colonialism. There existed a catch twenty-two scenario. Democracy and peace were threatened by the land profile imbalances arising from the colonial rule. Both were important components that needed to be sustained. Peace was a necessary condition but because the country lacked shared wealth, peace was threatened by the land imbalances.

When difficulties increased over these goals, the ANC wrote and gave Mugabe's ZANU PF a paper titled "How Will Zimbabwe Defeat Its Enemies!" critiquing the developments in Zimbabwe and suggesting what was to be done. The paper dealt with varying aspects on the factors that required attention. However, the ANC and ZANU cadres did not convene to deliberate on the paper, which Mbeki thought was huge let-down. Mbeki noted that when the veterans of the liberation struggle and others started to invade White-owned farms, South Africa engaged Tony Blair in 1998 to inspire the British government to respect the promise that had been completed at Lancaster House in 1979 for land restructuring without reimbursement.

This headed to the September 1998 International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and Resettlement in Harare, which the British government joined but crucial conclusions were not executed by the British government. Different to what the Conservative Party throughout Thatcher and Major's had decided, Tony Blair of the Labour Party disavowed the obligation to respect the undertakings completed at Lancaster House Constitutional debate (Marongwe 2002). This fallout and the disregard for the international provisions

that compel succeeding governments to honour agreements entered into by the preceding regimes escalated the land reform issue in Zimbabwe.

By choosing to disregard what the Conservative Party agreed upon, Blair closed the crucial window of diplomacy that allowed room for continued negotiations for some compromise outcome on land reform. This disregard for the international rules infuriated the government of Zimbabwe who responded by taking the radical approach to the land reform, heightening the gulf between the Whites and Blacks in Zimbabwe and elsewhere on the best method to resolve the obtaining land imbalances.

3.5.1 Zimbabwe Government's Geostrategic Relationships

In the SADC sub-region, Zimbabwe's political independence of 1980 came before Namibia and South Africa who were reeling under the White Apartheid regime's domination. The Smith regime's struggle got some direct assistance from Apartheid South Africa throughout its armed resistance which lasted for about 15 years from 1966 when the first shots were fired to December 1979 when the ceasefire was announced. The armed liberation movements of SWAPO, the PAC and the ANC had shared trenches with the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolution Army (ZIPRA) cadres for the armed liberation struggles of the region in various fronts. Some fought alongside each other and shed blood for the independence of Zimbabwe and her neighbours.²² These relationships got polished-up as the region noticed

²² For more information see T Shihepo, 2019. Former liberation movements promise economic prosperity; Sydney Sekeramayi of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) said the sister parties had been together for a long time through a difficult period. "Your elections are our elections; the only difference is that we have not been registered to vote otherwise we would have lined-up in the morning to vote". "Your leadership is a continuation of the leadership we had through the liberation struggle. As we talk, our forefathers, who are in graves in Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique expect us to fulfil the promises we made during the hard liberation struggle. This is whether it is in the field of agriculture, health or education, we need to fulfil this. People have a lot of hope in us and they expect us to deliver employment creation. In Namibia, the hopes of the nation rests on your shoulders, Mr President," he said; Nozabelo Bhengu of the African National Congress (ANC) said Namibia and South Africa shared a painful experience of being colonised by the South African apartheid government; "Your independence came before ours and it gave us hope. So when Swapo wins the elections it is an important milestone and very significant to South Africa. We are in the new era for economic development. It's very important to share information the same way we shared the trenches together. We ought to learn from Namibia and we hope that you will learn a lot from South Africa," she said. Dr Abdallah Sadalia of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) said Tanzania believed that the only way to remember the legacy of blood, sweat and tears was to make sure that the sister parties win. "That's why the president of CCM, John Magufuli, ordered us not to leave until Swapo is victorious. We join our hands and believe that our dreams will continue to become true for the benefit of Africa through economically upholding human rights, and uplifting the standards of living. To the sister parties who are here and those who are not here, we must always remember to join forces towards economic development,"

the onslaught on Zimbabwe after the 2000 land invasions and witnessed the creation of the former armed liberation networks that sat annually to discuss the threatened survival strategies that affected the former armed liberation movements in the sub-region.

The pan-African mind-set urged the governments of the former liberation movements to support Zimbabwe in whatever endeavour that had a bearing on the attainment of independence of both Namibia and South Africa. They had developed a shared common approach that appreciated collective views and collective ownership of the armed liberation struggles' imperatives among the sister movements. Zimbabwe's internal programmes took cue from the compelling need to forego the land reform programme for the outstanding armed liberation struggle of South Africa in particular. The neighbour's freedom took precedence over the outstanding land ownership issue. The delayed land ownership reform that resulted from the decision was a mature sign of the inherent pan-African ideals within the leadership of the ZANU PF led government that chose to delay an important outstanding land redistribution programme that was the cause for the struggle for the freedom of Zimbabwe to allow for the neighbour's liberation.

At the conclusion of the 10-year clause of the willing buyer willing seller policy, South Africa was still under apartheid, so, hurrying the land reform in Zimbabwe could have had a direct negative impact on the reactions of the Apartheid regime as discussed earlier. The shape the land reform programme in Zimbabwe was to take, had a direct correlation to the efforts the Apartheid regime was to exert in delaying majority rule in South Africa. It should as well be recalled that at its attainment of majority rule, Zimbabwe became a natural springboard for the continued armed liberation struggle of the cadres from South Africa. Besides according sanctuary to the liberation forces, political leadership found space in addition to facilities to plan and launch their operations against the Apartheid regime from Zimbabwe.

At the instigation of other regional leaders, the ZANU PF government was encouraged after the expiry of the 10-year freeze on land reform to hold the process in abeyance until

he said; Swapo party president Dr Geingob said: "It is a great honour. We feel the solidarity that we maintained during the liberation struggle. We are now in the second phase, which is economic struggle. Let's deliver it to our people." <https://southerntimesafrica.com/site/news/former-liberation-movements-promise-economic-prosperity> accessed: 10 December 2019.

South Africa attained its independence. Mbeki reveals that in 1990, as negotiations to end apartheid began, then Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, tried to persuade Mugabe to withhold any programme to implement radical land reform, given that the Lancaster House Constitutional 10-year prohibition of this had expired. Chief Anyaoku and the then Commonwealth Secretariat feared that any radical land redistribution in Zimbabwe at that stage would frighten White South Africa and thus significantly complicate “our own process of negotiations”, explained Mbeki.

President Mugabe and the Zimbabwe government agreed to Chief Anyaoku’s suggestion and therefore delayed for almost a decade the needed agrarian reform, which had been a central objective of the political and armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe (Evans 2016). As a result of this compelling gesture, Zimbabwe suffered numerous sabotage attacks by the apartheid regime forces, desperate to disrupt any attempts to allow the fighting to be taken across the Limpopo because of the decision to host the ANC movement in its quest to remove apartheid.²³ The decision to delay land reform was a direct cost to Zimbabwe in terms of delayed benefits from the land produce and the sabotage attacks carried out by the apartheid regime in Zimbabwe, notwithstanding the delaying of the country’s sovereignty.

Considering that the ANC cadres had shared trenches with their sister organisations during Zimbabwe’s armed liberation struggle and that Zimbabwe was among the champions of anti-apartheid at independence as the immediate neighbour, the gesture to delay the radical approach to land reform until South Africa attained its independence could not have become a surprise. The independence of Zimbabwe made no sense without the freedom of its sister neighbour, South Africa. Zimbabwe’s leadership therefore, took cue from Nkrumah, who regarded the independence of Ghana as of no effect unless all of Africa was liberated (Nkrumah 1957).

²³ Here see South African History Online: the cross border activities of Apartheid in Zimbabwe post 1980; On 24 February 1981 a bomb was discovered in the car of the ANC’s Chief Representative in Harare, Joe Gqabi. Despite this failed assassination attempt, the agents of the apartheid government ambushed and shot Gqabi – 19 times – on 31 July 1981 as he reversed down the driveway of his Harare home. In May 1987 Tsitsi Chiliza, a Zimbabwean citizen married to an ANC member, was killed by a booby-trapped television set intended for Jacob Zuma. Later, in October of the same year, Jeremy Blackhill, a ZAPU member married the ANC’s Joan Freeman, was severely crippled in a bomb blast that injured 17 other people in a shopping complex in Harare. Also in 1987, Leslie Lesia was arrested in Zimbabwe in possession of a small bottle of poison given to him by the SADF’s Department of Military Intelligence to poison ANC members and officials. <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk-exile> accessed on 18 December 2018.

Because the humanity for Africans is measured by the collective efforts of all, it made no value to advance the issues of Zimbabwe if these had a negative impact on the neighbour in bondage. The delayed joy for the good of the sub-region had to be honoured by those convinced by the values of pan-African ideals. Zimbabwe had to forego a little leisure of farm-holding to allow for the independence of South Africa. The delay was for the liberation cause of the Africans across the Limpopo River. The delay was therefore, for human emancipation which took priority over landholding for the majority Blacks in Zimbabwe.

3.5.2 A Bilateral Issue Internationalised

In a 1997 November letter to the Zimbabwean Minister of Agriculture and Land Kumbirai Kangai, Clair Short declined Britain's obligation to account for the costs of land acquisition in Zimbabwe, delinking the Labour Party government from the colonial past. Mbeki indicates that during his later discussion with Blair, the British leader revealed his government never officially chose to reject the Lancaster House Agreement. Blair was sorry for it, since Short had thrived in convincing the British community that it was certainly government strategy to help conclude the land challenge. South Africa as well received promises from three other administrations to sponsor land purchase by the Zimbabwe government for distribution to those who had occupied White-owned farms. At the proposal of the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) took the task to complete the land purchase and relocation efforts in Zimbabwe. Regrettably the UNDP performed in a fashion which ran to the failure of this process according to Mbeki.

The developments prepared the ground for direct confrontation as the sides took positions on the manner the land issue was to progress. Without the involvement of Britain as agreed during the Lancaster House Conference, Zimbabwe had to take a huge decision to proceed on its own terms. Zimbabwe viewed Britain's stance as a challenge to the international norms that directs succeeding governments to uphold national obligations from the former governments as a standing practice.

Becoming indifferent created new challenges in the bilateral relationships between Britain and Zimbabwe. The British government chose to internationalise the land issue through its neo-liberal relationships with the EU and America (Mumbengegwi 2016). This study

construes that this was a strategic manoeuvre that shifted the outlook of the land issue in Zimbabwe, drastically shaping the mixed reactions in the international community of nations to proportions as shall be analysed in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Once the allies were taken on board and utilising the powerful media houses under their tutelage, Zimbabwe was declared an outcast that could only be realigned through sanctions.

3.6 AMENDMENT BILLS PRE - 2000 FAILED TO ADDRESS THE LAND IMBALANCE

At the conclusion of the 10-year willing buyer willing seller period, the expected land redistribution target was revealed to be below 50%. Britain had provided about 47 million Pounds for resettlement support (Background Briefing 2000 – Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe). When the government enacted the compulsory acquisition Act of 1992, it met with opposition from the funders of the reform programme who preferred the neo-liberal approach. At the core of the disagreement was the form the land reform was to assume. The West preferred a market-driven process aligned to the sanctity of property rights as a neo-liberal structured norm.

The willing buyer willing seller concept secured the rights of property to the kith and kin because selling occurred only when the White farmer, the seller, was willing to give up on a piece of land of their choice and determining the land surrender price. It was noted above that by the close of this phase less than 50% of the land demanded had not been given up for sale.

This became an important indicator of the Whites' resolve to hold-on to the land for as long as it took. The evidence was that even though the majority of the Whites utilised less than 50% of the land, they still retained their land possibly for speculative purposes. However, it is worth noting that those among the Whites whose vision was clear and had offered part of their land for the land redistribution purpose, had continued to enjoy their farming activities and among them some had been given the 90-year leases like any other indigenous Zimbabwean. They retained portions of their choice at the farm as long as they retained one farm according to the proclaimed one-humankind one-farm requirement.

During the same period when the willing buyer willing seller policy clause expired, Zimbabwe went through the IMF Staff managed Economic Structural Adjustment

Programme (ESAP) that had no support for the land reform. Realising the pressure arising from the immediate demand for land reform, the government convened a Donor Conference in September 1998 which came up with pledges to fund the land reform process which were not honoured. Out of an expected budget of about \$2 billion, about \$100 million that never came was pledged (Marongwe 2002). It is debated that corruption within the government structures and the need for a market-driven approach to land reform were the issues that constrained the uptake by those to be funders of the land redistribution programme. However, it can be observed that the behaviour by the international donors cued from the EU and the American blocs' market-driven orientation an indication of the colluded position by the West on the preferred type of land reform in Zimbabwe.

The ensuing impasse and the reluctance by the donors to fund the programme compelled the war veterans of the armed liberation struggle to spearhead the land invasions of 2000 which the government legalised by enacting the compulsory land acquisition Act 16A later in the year. Chikuvanyanga (2018) argues that if the Whites had taken notice of the impatience that was building up from the majority Blacks as witnessed in 1998 when the fed-up Svosve people decided to take back their land and came to the table genuinely, we all could be enjoying farming as a collective effort as the Zimbabwe citizenry.

Chikuvanyanga chronicles the prevailing harmonious coexistence that existed between the new farmers in the likes of Peter and others in the dairy farming industry who had chosen to share the unused part of their farms. Peter (2018) said that he was a long time farmer currently specialising in the dairy farming and was not affected by the FTLR programme directly. He was still enjoying his farming and had added value to the enterprise by venturing into sour milk production. Peter, was however, disheartened by the removal of his then neighbour Bob Smith whose farm had been taken away during the FTLR programme in Beatrice.²⁴

²⁴ Here see Personal interview with Jones Chikuvanyanga in Beatrice, 31 August 2018 on the FTLR programme experiences in Beatrice who said: "Indicators were very clear that at some point *Shumba dzaizo paza* (adage) (Lions would get lose at some point and roam around in society creating some unusual danger to all). *Shumba dzakapaza* (the lions got out) and the Whites are crying foul"; and Personal interview with I Peter Beatrice, 22 September 2018. *Jambanja* experiences.

The Act of 2000 apportioned the land compensation component to Britain but took up the challenge to compensate the farmers for the improvements made on the land on farms which was to be provided as and when the country's financial resources improved. The compensation decision infuriated the West which responded by evoking punitive measures aimed at aligning Zimbabwe with the neo-liberal dictates and sending to the world a clear message of the potential backlash that may befall those nations who may be tempted to challenge the neo-liberals' established status in the international system.

The willing buyer willing seller policy profile championed by the British and Zimbabwe's compulsory acquisition concept of 1992 did not solve the land imbalances in Zimbabwe. It was only after the land invasions of 2000, which came to be known as the FTLR programme that the imbalance was addressed. The sovereignty and independence of Zimbabwe was for all intents and purposes concluded by the land invasions of 2000 as legalised by the Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A.

What the people of Zimbabwe had fought and died for, was eventually forcibly given back after some more souls were lost during the invasions period. This study can conclude that human beings will continue to fight and die for land ownership as a final sacrifice and that land cannot change hands without some struggle at the highest tier if its origins are disputed. Time alone cannot resolve the land imbalance issue among humanity but hard debates that identify what's best for the nations. Zimbabwe remains a current testimony whose growth and potential has been retarded by delayed land reform resulting from the contested options.

3.7 CONCLUSION

The attachment of humankind to land and the compelling reasons for its continued protection by the one who holds it remain important concepts that assure national sovereignty. Nations derive their dignity and respect from their ability and capability to possess and defend that land in their possession. The capability to defend outweighs the ability to possess. The Lancaster House Constitutional document set the pace to end the armed liberation struggle, but delayed the independence of Zimbabwe not only by the 10 years to 1990 at the expiry of the 'willing buyer willing seller land reform clause but up to 2000 when eventually Zimbabwe took it upon itself to repossess its land. The delay in providing the promised funding of the land reform by the West in the management of the

land question in Zimbabwe remained the stumbling block in achieving a lasting solution for the contestants of the land redistribution post-2000.

The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992, which allowed and attempted compulsory acquisition failed to meet its targets mainly for the reason of inadequate funding. The funding challenges were compounded by the general resistance for financing land reform from the 1998 Harare Donor Conference. The Donor Conference appreciated the urgency and fast-track nature of the programme but there was little commitment and the West insisted that the land acquisition was not to be compulsory but, that it was to remain on the basis of a market-driven process. The absence of funding from the Donor Conference became an indicator for the entrenched position for market oriented land reform. The West's stance catalysed the revolutionary posture chosen by the Government of Zimbabwe in the 2000 Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A.

The next chapter reflects on the conduct and articulations of the Third Chimurenga.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE THIRD CHIMURENGA: ZIMBABWE ‘TAKES BACK ITS LAND’

4.1 INTRODUCTION

When the Lancaster House Constitution’s mandated ‘willing buyer willing seller’ concept ran its 10-year course up to 1990, a compulsory land acquisition Act was promulgated in 1992 as outlined in the previous chapter. The 1992 instrument guided the land redistribution exercise whose outcome did not change the landholding profile in Zimbabwe up to 2000. In September 1998 the Government of Zimbabwe convened a Donor Conference which attracted many donor nations where the urgency and need for land reform in Zimbabwe was given prominence as debated earlier.

However, like the period 1992 to 1998, the concept of compulsory acquisition stalled any perceived changes in Zimbabwe’s land redistribution agenda for another two years into 2000. Incidentally, in September 1998 the people of Svosve, in Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe had illegally resettled themselves in some White-owned farm because it belonged to their community before the colonial period of 1890 to 1980. This vivid ominous warning was not heeded by the contestants. In February 2000 spontaneous invasions of farms predominantly owned by White farmers took place across the country. This became known in Zimbabwe as the ‘Third Chimurenga’ which by all standards ushered Zimbabwe’s true independence and sovereignty.

The nature of activities the nation experienced when the spontaneous farm invasions took effect in 2000 answers the question why there had to be invasions and the debates that have raged around the FTLR programme reveal that the process needed to be sanitised to meet the expected international standards. Through the promulgation of the Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A which legalised the FTLR programme, the nation of Zimbabwe became truly sovereign. This historic enactment became the nation’s safeguard when the conflict was internationalised through the SADC Tribunal hearings as shall be discussed in later chapters.

4.2 THE IMPACT OF DOWNPLAYING THE LAND QUESTION

When the liberation war nationalist leaders took part in the 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, the conclusion for the immediate land redistribution to the

majority Blacks in Zimbabwe was a major contested issue to be addressed as discussed in earlier chapters. However, the draft constitution made no mention of the land redistribution, an anomaly that brought the conference to a near collapse until a secret promise by the USA to provide a substantial amount of money for land redistribution and an undertaking to persuade the British government to provide similar guarantees was made.²⁵ It was only after the financial commitments by both the American and the British governments that the signing of the Lancaster House Negotiated Settlement was concluded.

However, without specific financial figures pledged, it would be safe to conclude that, there was no agreement on the land reform and it was predictable that Zimbabwe's land question remained a contested issue between Britain and its former colony over 30 years after the conference (Moyo 2000, The All Africa Parliamentary Group 2009 and Ndulo 2010). This reflection is important when analysing the inherent land redistribution challenges that arose between Britain and its former colony. Without statistical figures on the financial agreement and the required timelines by the funders to have met their obligation, only time was to reveal the hidden challenge and the manner it was to be addressed. Timelines and the amounts to be disbursed towards land reform could have been very important pointers to the sincerity of the promised contributions.

It can also be argued in this study that, for as long as their kith and kin held on to the fertile land in Zimbabwe, it was well with the British government and no urgency for the equity on land between the Blacks and the Whites in Zimbabwe was necessary. Land remained an important source and resource that shaped the economic development of Zimbabwe which had a direct link to the British economy. Aside of these assumptions the Zimbabwean economy was being run by mostly West-driven entrepreneurs (Plaut 2007). Major companies that drove the economic activities of Zimbabwe were directed by the West and naturally these served the neo-liberal interests as the crucial stockholders and stakeholders, hence the natural drag in addressing the land issue.

²⁵ Here see M Plaut, 2007. US backed Zimbabwe land reform <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6958418.stm>: accessed on 16 August 2018 and Robert Mugabe -The deadlock on the land issue was resolved after Carter's promises of funding the land reform resettlement and development and the promised assistance from the EEC commission which agreed on the proposal after Nkomo and I paid a visit to the Commission in Brussels on the advice of Carrington as the Chair of the Lancaster House Conference <http://spotlight-z.com/news/end-empire-1985-chapter-14-rhodesia/> accessed: 14 May 2018.

It is crucial to notice in this study that Britain included the willing buyer willing seller clause in the constitution, besides having earmarked 20% of the seats in the envisaged Parliament of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the minority Whites (Ndulo 2010). The ‘willing buyer willing seller’ land clause remained a major reason that led to the unchanged land imbalance two decades into Zimbabwe’s independence (Moyo 1994 and 1995). In effect for 20 years from 1980, the concept restricted the Government of Zimbabwe’s land acquisition for redistribution outside the willingness by mostly the White farmers to offer their land for sale until the year 2000 when the FTLR programme took effect. The attendant results of the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ policy and the 20 seats reserved for Whites in Parliament were strategic manoeuvres that assured the minority Whites in Zimbabwe not only relevance but the capacity to determine the changes in the constitution that passed and not passed in Parliament during the same period.

At this stage, this study addresses why the land remained a contested issue between Blacks and Whites in Zimbabwe by appreciating the colonial hang over and the fact that the soul of humankind can never settle outside the land where it rests and recovers from. These are important parameters that reveal the inherent natural contest among humankind now and into the future. Humankind has died and shall remain fully prepared to pay the ultimate price to possess and own some piece of land that they shall call theirs. Nations have gotten to wars for among other reasons, disputed boundaries. Such boundaries at times and at places along some piece of land whose size and the associated endowment was unknown (Mitchel 2017). Land as a source, resource and a store of wealth among people becomes the most important component to possess and defend as a means of production and a permanent store of value, more so for the Africans.

The possession and defence are essential components that are acquired through some legislation under normal circumstances. The notion of landholding remains an important issue for Africans. There will most likely arise future conflicts if the holder acquired such land unjustly, such as in the case of Zimbabwe’s colonial experience. The legal possessions and processes of acquisition are aspects that shall be debated in detail when we explore the SADC Tribunal’s involvement in the land issue of Zimbabwe later in Chapter Seven. Suffice to say that it became an unbearable undertaking for the Whites in

Britain to address the land question for as long as it disadvantaged their kith and kin in Zimbabwe.

The West will remain unhappy as shall be revealed later in the study, about whatever progress and the potential fruits envisaged from the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme and any engagements and re-engagements, if these are not guided by the neo-liberal imperatives. As long as the land issue is not addressed according to the Western dictates ('willing buyer willing seller' and the market-driven methodology) of the sanctity of private property it will remain a process that will not attract the West's buy-in, which incidentally directs huge resources in the form of the foreign direct investment (FDI).

The West's perceptions on the land issue in Zimbabwe have to be addressed before some meaningful progress is made. It should be noted that Britain ran very slowly in funding the land reform programme allocating a mere 47 million Pounds from 1980 to 1998. This they did expertly to ensure that nothing grew out of the Zimbabwean guided land redistribution efforts. This they accomplished to frustrate any fruits that gave some indication of progress on the pieces of the land taken by the bona-fide majority Blacks from their kith and kin.

Humankind has fought to acquire even other people's land and humankind continues to demand land from the weak by hook or crook regardless of the agreed norms in the international system. Future conflicts will most likely, one way or the other continue to be linked to the land disputes between and among societies and shall remain a cause of concern for humankind's delayed development, contrary to the world's Sustainable Development Goals.

Whilst the Lancaster House Constitutional talks effectively ended the armed liberation struggle, there is no denying that the talks delayed the real independence of Zimbabwe not only by the 10 years to 1990 at the expiration of the willing buyer willing seller policy but for 20 years up to 2000 when eventually Zimbabwe took it upon itself to repossess the land through the FTLR programme. The disparities arising from the 'willing buyer willing seller' clause were huge and no amount of effort less than the FTLR programme could have been sufficient to wrestle the stolen land from the Whites in Zimbabwe. Even though the 'willing buyer willing seller' clause had a prescribed period of 10 years, this approach remained the only option preferred by the West which they stuck onto even after its

expiry. The concept became one of the reasons for the failed land redistribution in Zimbabwe up to 2000. The market-oriented debate gave the entrenched value to the holder of the land and any changes to the land profile naturally disadvantaged the kith and kin, so became unreasonable and unprofitable to execute or sponsor.

4.3 THE THIRD CHIMURENGA - ARTICULATIONS AND CONDUCT

Championed by the war veterans of the Second Chimurenga, beginning in February 2000 the landless majority Blacks invaded mostly Whites-owned farms in Zimbabwe and seized about 1000 of them in a space of three months (Berry 2002 and Freeth 2011). Quoting Bob Smith previous farm owner verbatim during interview on 22 September 2018 at Beatrice Welcome Home Farm:

“This was a dark period of the country. Farming is not a hobby but a vocation. I was born and bred in Beatrice and imagine, without notice a group of agitated people gathered at the mine area and pitched shacks in my farm singing revolutionary songs on end. I was yet to harvest my seed maize crop so I requested to be allowed to do so before vacation from those who appeared to be leaders of the group present at the time. I have been part of this community and it was hard to imagine that one day it would end abruptly like it did. Seed maize was my specialty but now I earn a living through renting my tractors for land preparation wherever there is demand”.

The government of Zimbabwe ran slowly in guiding the process but, later enacted a law that authorised the occupations and seizures of the Whites-owned farms across the country midway into the year. Among the about 300 000 farm workers living and working on these farms, about 50% of them lost their jobs, and homesteads during the FTLR programme (Freeth 2011). These were the only homes they had known in their lives. Most of these farm workers, who had been born and worked on the same farms, were the ones who knew how to run the farms and the associated farm equipment efficiently (Sachikonye 2003:3-13). On the contrary, the majority of the new settlers had no knowledge or training in commercial farming and did not have the necessary capital required to purchase the necessary inputs required for farming and other expensive inputs necessary to ensure success in the new farming venture.

The invaders drove them off the farms and they became the landless Blacks who formed squatter camps wherever they found space. There was no coordination or cooperation whatsoever between the settlers, who farmed their own little pieces of land, underutilising them due to various reasons including those mentioned above. The apparent missing link made the land unproductive as new farmers utilised inefficient farming methods through trial and error (Masiwa 2004). The government in the meantime had not planned or put into motion any programme to assist the new farmers because it did not have the financial and human resources for the initial intervention that would have positively impacted on the output per hectare at the start of the resettlement programme (Muzondidya 2007, Howard-Hassmann 2010 and Matondi 2012). The urgency of reclaiming land and the process the FTLR programme took, did not allow planning and as an emotional undertaking it would be amiss to have expected a smooth transition anywhere. The farm labourers became the collateral damage arising from the Third Chimurenga.

This disadvantaged group of farm workers by default became a source for research work that gained huge attention from the neo-liberals who exploited their misery to portray a negative picture of Zimbabwe's FTLR to the international community. In international relations, perceptions are critical as they guide and influence inter-state interactions. It therefore follows that if these perceptions are negative then hostility arises between states with opposing views. Enduring perceptions arise from evidence and that which is driven by research is more appealing which is why during the FTLR programme Zimbabwe saw an increase in Western-sponsored fact-finding missions. However, it is this study's contention that these researches were hugely self-serving endeavours meant to confirm predetermined neo-liberal biases against Zimbabwe's FTLR programme.

The Western-sponsored research works based on the neo-liberal concepts of the rule of law, democracy and property rights which were reflected as the major shortcomings that arose from the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe served the neo-liberals. Some of these researches shall be discussed later in this study. The land question in Zimbabwe attracted research work from across the political divide and laid bare the contradictions arising from the neo-liberal and pan-African schools of thought. However, the politics of race and ideological connections remained important drivers for the reflections communicated in all the studies.

The FTLR programme became a battle ground for human rights proponents who wrote strongly against the government of Zimbabwe, persuading the international community to condemn the late Mugabe's regime for destroying the once prosperous agriculture driven economy, the unfolding human rights abuses and violations of the tenets of democracy – including disregarding the rule of law. These neo-liberal themes played very well into the Western-dominated international system.

Some writers characterised the land reform from a crisis perspective Fisher (2010), Howard-Hassmann (2010) and Sachikonye (2011) while others chose the identity politics and the question of belonging (Chiumbu 2004, Meredith 2005 and Pfukwa 2017). The FTLR programme that the land occupations epitomised developed on the managed chaos. Groups of varying sizes and composition set out to occupy pre-chosen farms, mostly those from the White farmers whose history with the Blacks was conflicted. These groups carried with them jingles, drums and other musical instruments and sang revolutionary songs throughout the unending nights for weeks into months. These seemingly choreographed activities annoyed and upset most White farmers who chose to abandon the farms whilst others set up armed vigilante groups from the former Black labourers to defend the Whites' farms from invasions by other Blacks. Muradzikwa and others (2018) vividly describe these farm occupations as follows:

“I was a team leader during the *Jambanja* and my command post was at Joyce Mine compound. This is the period I appreciated the obtaining structures and the perfect farming equipment at this farm that we took from Bob Smith who was into seed maize production. I got this land based on my first choice as one of the team leaders of *Jambanja* in the Beatrice locality. We operated permanent *Pungwes* (overnight activities) here until the White farmers abandoned the farms. In the case of Bob, we had been briefed earlier to the effect that member was one of the rough *muzungu* (Whiteman) who had to vacate the farm without anything because of his previous conflicted interactions with the Blacks in the area”. Others who preferred anonymity said; “This period was devastating to say the least. As farm workers we lost job opportunities and now rely on contract labour that comes in a blue moon, how does one fend for their families under such conditions? I was one of the most trusted senior tractor drivers and now all

is gone. No one among the new farmers can trust in us who were pillars in the White-run farming engagements. We are now counted among those considered as traitors who served the interests of the White farmers and by association delayed the armed liberation struggle.” Seeing it differently, an anonymous ex-freedom fighter said: “There are White people with resources but farmers have always been the indigenous people of Zimbabwe.”

The neo-liberal print and electronic media stationed in and outside Zimbabwe during this period was in overdrive mode highlighting the chaos the FTLR programme had brought to the nation. It propagated negative perceptions of the programme to the world.

This was ironic turn of events considering that at independence Zimbabwe won the hearts and minds of the West when the late Mugabe proclaimed national reconciliation between erstwhile warring parties, the former White colonial rulers under Ian Smith and the Black freedom fighters under his leadership and Joshua Nkomo. He had even gone to the extent of appointing a White Army Officer to head the Zimbabwe Defence Forces during the 1980s.²⁶ However, two decades later the unresolved land issue had caught up with Zimbabweans. The long standing discontent among the majority indigenous landless Blacks had reached the boiling point. The backlash of the unresolved land issue of the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement revisited the nation in a very disruptive way that was never anticipated. The indigenous people’s patience had run out and incensed by the West’s interference into the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe, the Blacks had chosen the revolutionary way to address a long standing grievance.

4.3.1 The Nature of the Third Chimurenga

The Third Chimurenga has been defined as both physical and ideological. It was viewed as physical because it represented the continuation and the completion of the armed liberation struggle to redress the colonial land distribution imbalance (Maposa 2014). The process was the vehicle that provided land ownership to the previously disadvantaged

²⁶ The late Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe in 1980 retained General Walls and Flower to lead the Defence Forces and the Republic Police respectively among other appointments as a gesture of goodwill for the reconciliation efforts for the new Zimbabwe. The decolonisation of White identity in Zimbabwe - ANU Press <http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p77371/pdf/Ch02.pdf> accessed: 27 May 2017.

majority indigenous Blacks who had taken up arms to get their land back addressing what Chitepo termed ‘White domination’. Even before title was passed to the Black farmers through the offer letters given at a later date, the fact that they had now physically occupied a piece of land previously owned by a White farmer was a huge achievement any Zimbabwean could have ever imagined or dreamt about. The promises of the armed liberation struggle had become a reality in a dramatic manner.

The Third Chimurenga was symbolically an extension of the other two Chimurengas that had been fought, first in the late 1890s led by Nehanda and secondly starting from the 1960s, to independence in 1980. Nehanda had predicted this at her defeat by the Whites then when she foretold the Second Chimurenga. Nehanda had predicted upon her defeat by the Whites, she proclaimed that even if she was killed, her bones were going to rise again and repossess the lost land.²⁷ When it appeared like the land repossession had failed, 20 years into the independence of Zimbabwe, what Nehanda foretold came to pass in a manner and style unimagined. It became a feat anyone who participated directly or otherwise during the armed liberation struggle would have wished for in their lifetime.

That which Nehanda died defending was what the Third Chimurenga of 2000 came to restore through the FTLR programme that has not only jolted the world but, spawned mixed reactions from the international community. Force begets force. It is clear from this analysis that what Zimbabwe independently or collectively had set to achieve; that they would achieve in the passage of time. The rare episode shall remain an important area of study for now and into the future.

4.3.2 The Third Chimurenga’s Idea Proclaimed: Nehanda Relived

Mugabe (2002) vowed that Zimbabweans were no longer going to ask for land but to take it without negotiation because the armed liberation struggle had been fought for the land; Mugabe also revealed that Zimbabweans “have fought for our land, we have fought for

²⁷ Admin, 2011. My Bones Shall Rise Again. Rain Queens of Africa - The inspiration of Nehanda was important during the execution of the liberations struggle. The rule was that regardless of the peril and facing death each combatant swore to the team members by urging them to continue with the war efforts until victory was attained. Also in the war-songs, ‘Nehanda kufa vachitaura shuwa, shoko rimwe ravakatiudza, tora gidi uzvitonge!! Meaning Nehanda proclaimed at the death point that, “we were compelled to ‘take up arms and liberate Zimbabwe from the shackles of colonialism for you to determine your destination’ [https:// rainqueenofafrica.com/2011/03/mbuya-nehanda-aka-charwe-nyakasikana-%E2%80%9Cmy-bones-shall-rise-again%E2%80%9D/](https://rainqueenofafrica.com/2011/03/mbuya-nehanda-aka-charwe-nyakasikana-%E2%80%9Cmy-bones-shall-rise-again%E2%80%9D/) accessed: 25 July 2018.

our sovereignty, small as we are have won our independence” and were “prepared to shed our blood” to protect the nation. Mugabe denounced Britain’s Tony Blair, famously telling the British leader: “So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). Mugabe swore to press with the expulsions of 2 900 of the 4 500 remaining white commercial farmers notwithstanding legal contests at home and disapproval in the West, predominantly from the country’s former colonial ruler, Britain.

Equally another prominent Zimbabwean nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo had articulated the centrality of the land issue to the security of the country and the need for its equitable redistribution among Zimbabweans as a crucial national security safeguard.²⁸ It is not surprising that the man who succeeded Mugabe as President of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (2018) does not regret the land reform programme and views it as a long-concluded issue that must be supported fully by all and sundry for posterity. He notes that the decision to quit the Commonwealth of Nations was an important one that was arrived at, out of knowledge and ushered Zimbabwe’s sovereignty; describing Zimbabwe as a moving train whose destination was determined by those Zimbabweans aboard it.

The above proclamations reveal the overarching issue of sovereignty of a people once they are able to direct their destiny clear of the constituencies of the enablers. Without the land which directly influenced the economic progress of the nation, independence and sovereignty could not be talked about in full measure. These statements, which the Western neo-liberals would want to interpret as radicalism, reflect the people’s concerns and national march towards the land whose long awaited redistribution eventually took effect after the land invasions of February 2000.

The idea and vision had been spelt out and the correct interpretation concluded on the need to reclaim the lost land with immediate effect through whatever means. A definite grand strategic position had been decided and refined indicating that there was no going back on the land recovery process. Nehanda’s prediction became a reality at the

²⁸ Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo was a pillar in the annals of the struggle of Zimbabwe from the early fifties up to independence. The call for the equality of the Blacks’ contribution to the economic development of the nation was at his heart. He was an important player throughout his life in the profiling of Zimbabwe as an independent nation in the community of nations and viewed equity in landholding as a key contributor to national security.

pronouncement of the idea by the late Mugabe at a grand strategic level. Therefore, the ideology was physicalised by the spontaneous movement of the people into White-owned farms where song and dance reminiscent of the days of the armed liberation struggle took centre stage. Once the ideas sank into the Zimbabweans the philosophy played out spontaneously where each activity led easily to the other even if there appeared to be no plan or a prearranged process for the retaking of the lost land.

Just like in the days of the armed liberation struggle, song and dance carried the day. Statements attaching the Zimbabweans to the land and the land to the economic wellbeing of the people were imbedded in the songs. The idea was expounded to reflect on the reality and the compelling need for the conclusion of the black empowerment drive that required urgency and action to conclude. The agriculture-based economy demanded the land repossession that had taken too long a time to address. The entire process created a total relief for the liberation war fighters and those who had followed history from the pronouncement by Nehanda in the 1890s.

Land empowerment-related songs were composed and went on air. A number of revolutionary songs to motivate the process were sung in vernacular languages as outlined in the following sentence; '*Hondo yasara muZimbabwe, ihondo yeminda*' (the outstanding war in Zimbabwe was that for the land) was among such songs that became instant hits (Chingaira and Sibanda 2001). These songs were effective in raising the emotions and zeal for participants to find a farm they could call their own to settle on.

4.3.3 The Third Chimurenga was a Revival for Artists

The Third Chimurenga boosted the musical creativity of the local musicians in a big way. Those sponsored by the state, sang pro-state songs while those who were free to compose did so provided that they were not conceived as the anti-ZANU PF. What was apparent as the Third Chimurenga gathered momentum from the state's perspective was the justification by songs that the land reform was an extension of the Second Chimurenga; that independence had only given people political rights and not economic freedom; and that the search for sovereignty and control over all resources was founded on the acquisition of the stolen land as a starting point (Mugabe 2000 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Williams 2009).

On the opposite side were protest songs which created space for oppositional consciousness. The anti-Mugabe stance by the likes of Mapfumo (Rise Up) became, by contrast hit songs despite being denied airplay on government-run radio and television stations (Mutukudzi 2000 and Mapfumo 2004). The process heightened tensions and polarised the communities in Zimbabwe, a scenario the neo-liberals continued to take advantage of in their quest to frustrate any developmental prospects associated with land reform in Zimbabwe post-2000.

4.3.4 The Models of Resettlement

The FTLR programme was premised on two resettlement models. Model A1²⁹ was for the decongestion of communal lands adjacent to the White-owned farms and Model A2³⁰ created capabilities and capacities for aspiring black commercial farmers. The A1 Model simply identified farms adjacent to the congested rural areas, formerly Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) and parcelled these out on an average of six hectares per family. This process attracted a lot of takers due to congestion that was apparent in the TTLs. It also became a telling reality for the urgent need for land reform in Zimbabwe.

According to White (2003) the A2 Model addressed farmers' requirements and ran on the plan of full cost recovery from the beneficiaries where uptake was based on settler selection from applications submitted through the then Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. Like the A1, this Model continues to have a lot of deserving applicants on a waiting list that continues to grow as the majority who initially thought that land reform was a political gimmick now appreciates the process as key to Black empowerment. Readjusting the farm areas to the ceiling levels according to the regions remains an option that will reduce the waiting list. These structures of the land models arose from the revealed gaps in the resettlement requirements and the need for improved land based commercial activities across the country.

²⁹ A1 farms were the decongestion strategy for the landless Blacks based on the villagized and a self-contained option whose hectares were around six per family.

³⁰ A2 farms aimed at establishing a cadre of small to medium scale indigenous Black commercial farmers whose hectares went beyond twenty.

4.3.5 The Third Chimurenga Loopholes

Whilst the models and ideas were in place, what unfolded on the ground attracted numerous positive and negative observations. These observations applied generally in all provinces across the country. More telling were those for the A2 Model. Priority for allocation was regionalised besides the 20% statutory portion reserved for the former liberation war combatants. The Provincial Land Identification Committees (PLIC) gave preference to members domiciled in their provinces which could be easily noticed from the applicant's national identification documents. Interviews conducted with a number of beneficiaries in Mashonaland East Province, where the researcher originally from Masvingo was allocated a plot after some pushing and jostling indicate that, it was not easy to be allocated land outside one's province of origin. Below are the reflections by Chikuvanyanga (2018) Gwarada (2018) and Shiri (2020) during separate interviews:

“I was not only a member in the Lands Identification Committee at district level, but also was born and bred in Seke District and am a representative of the detainees of the armed liberation struggle for Zimbabwe's independence. I admired the type of soils in this area and chose to be allocated land at this farm in the district of my origin”. Another beneficiary of Welcome Home Subdivision Seven, Wellington Gwarada reiterated the importance of the land reform to the researcher when he said, “I am a civil servant working in the Ministry of Lands, the Extension Services Department. I was lucky to be working in the Ministry of Lands and was privy to the gaps that were revealed by the first land audit and I chose Mashonaland East Province Beatrice area for its soils and good rainfall pattern. Its proximity to Harare as well allows for easy of administration of the activities at the farm before we retire to take up farming as an enterprise. I can easily dash in and out at short notice whenever there is a requirement. Shiri, said “the chaos that was experienced during the *Jambanja* programme's approach in Zimbabwe created in the mind-set of some among us in the society who breed on the prevalence of some commotion of some kind: receiving inputs and selling has become an inherent behaviour drawn from the mind that does not appreciate the importance and overarching goal of the Command Agriculture initiative

whose target is addressing the food insecurity challenge in the country. If the inputs provided are utilised prudently, this food security gap can be closed easily.”

On noticing this researcher’s identification number, one of the PLIC members asked why this researcher needed land in Mashonaland East instead of Masvingo where naturally he should have been allocated some piece of land without some hassles. Such question was not uncommon to those seeking land outside their provinces.

One possible explanation for this trend could have been the cultural background component. The natural link with (*Kumusha*) my home area encouraged most land seekers to prefer farms in their general areas of natural domicile. Another explanation was that most of the PLIC members domiciled in the same province saw no anomaly if they were not from the former combatants grouping to be persuaded to remain regional in their allocations.

The danger that arises with the natural domicile approach is that, it suffocates the liberation war tenets that were blind to regionalism. Rallying points for national cohesion are lost if communities are clustered according to places of birth and associations based on regional groupings. Unity is measured where people collectively align issues with national lenses than regional ones. Further studies may be needed in this area to appreciate the tendency and its impact on national cohesion in the face of national calamities nations are likely to encounter in the future.

Besides the natural domicile issue, close associations with either a member in the PLIC or such other provincial eminent persons became an added advantage. One had to provide proof of belonging to access land in the prime areas of the provinces, besides being allocated a subdivision that housed state of the art farmhouse/s or such other farming facility. Again only those with the capacity to challenge the committees, succeeded in being allocated on places of their choice.

However, this was different for those who took part in the FTLR programme where initial allocations were based on the names as provided by the FTLR programme leaders in particular districts and provinces. These leaders were spoilt for choice because they were in charge of the FTLR programme activities in different farms across districts. These

outlined loopholes resulted in the allocation of not only multiple farms to some individuals but clans occupying stretches of land at the expense of more deserving others.

The unplanned clustering can easily become a security challenge for the nation into the future. Nepotism can be a serious drawback in national development because it disregards capacities and capabilities of the affected individual since natural relationships take precedence over all. The same fault-line can be exploited to divide the nation and weaken national cohesion.

4.3.6 Was the Third Chimurenga Planned?

Since the spontaneous occupations of the commercial farms in the beginning of 2000, there remains need for research to establish whether the process was planned even though a lot was said about its chaotic nature. If at all there was some planning then, it was kept a very guarded secret up to the day of the invasions. Zhou, Muradzikwa, and Gwarada, (2018) seem to be in agreement on the fact that the FTLR programme started like a rumour but as they got organised people were grouped in clusters to direct activities at the farms assigned to each group. The leadership met periodically to get updates on events and where there were challenges with other violent White farmers, reinforcements were brought in to compel targeted farmers to give in to the people's demands. Whilst the FTLR programme was benefiting the indigenous black that was not the case with the former White commercial farmers, as one former White commercial farmer Dreah (2018) said:

“I am one of those disadvantaged White Zimbabwean after our farm was taken for targeted decongestion purposes because it lay adjacent to the Seke community who were given some 6 hectares each and that was it. I now basically am into some hired ploughing wherever it is required for my living utilising the tractors I salvaged from our earlier farming activities. But I am still hoping that I shall get an opportunity to continue farming if I get someone among current farmers who is ready to do a joint venture with me. Farming is all I have known in my life and I am still hopeful that my second life will see me back into tilling the land for my survival.”

The FTLR programme which literally means chaos of the highest order, revealed the emotive and physical nature the process took. There were no negotiations, no time frames given to land owners to cease operations and evacuate their farms. Every activity was immediate and spread across the breadths and lengths of Zimbabwe on mostly White-owned farms whose historical relationships with the Blacks had been soured over a long period of time. The systemic nature however, requires some empirical study to establish how this was managed and coordinated.

Revolutions by their nature are rough and unpredictable but their evolution can be traced. Chaos is a key component of a revolution because it sets the parameters and raises emotions of the contenders. The chaotic process prepared the nation for the road that lay ahead as it was legalised through constitutional amendment number 16A and B. The songs and dance revitalised the memories of the communities of the yesteryear armed liberation struggle where overnight vigils rallied people to continue fighting until victory was achieved. Once the groups set foot on the identified farms, order was established through the leadership that was present in all the farms. Leadership structures reminiscent of the armed liberation struggle were created to manage the unfolding chaos.

4.3.7 The Third Chimurenga Outcomes

This study argues that the best thing that has emerged out of Zimbabwe's FTLR programme is the creation of an empowered Black population living as equals with Whites in a sovereign Zimbabwe state of the international community of nations. Sovereignty is an important concept that nations at times have to fight for. Zimbabwe had to *Jambanja* to attain that status even though there were costs involved in the process. One of the huge costs was the divided society whose views on national development were split along party lines (Ncube 2013). The opposition sponsored MDC challenged the process at every opportunity and got direct funding from the West to discredit the FTLR programme.

This polarisation has continued to retard united developmental goals for a better Zimbabwe throughout the period of this study. This process divided not only Zimbabwe but, the international community on an unusual path set along regional value systems (Security Council/9396: 2008). The inherent fault-lines in the majority of the African countries continue also to be exploited by the West to divide and rule Africa in all areas of endeavour.

Another outcome of the FTLR programme was the emergence of new artists who told the process in song and dance that revived memories of the armed liberation struggle. This was crucial in creating the rallying points for the communities who had become desperate for decongestion from the TTLs. The inseparability of humanity to their land and the land to the economy remained the important message that rang in the songs that will continue to inspire Zimbabweans regardless of the pain associated with the FTLR programme. Land ownership concluded the dreams that had remained in the pipeline, well after the armed liberation struggle was concluded in 1980.

An important philosophy for the Zimbabwean emerged as well from the FTLR programme's activities that attest to the fact that once the Zimbabweans had agreed upon to accomplish something and set their minds to achieve that which they set their minds to achieve, that they achieved some day in the future. Tracing the history of the land issue in Zimbabwe from the First Chimurenga based on the pronouncement by Nehanda of a future that would allow Zimbabweans to repossess their land, indeed the generations after Nehanda took up the challenge for the repossession of their stolen land to finality in a way never imagined given the contending odds.

4.4 THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS AN INDEGINOUS POLITICO-MILITARY INITIATIVE TO ADDRESS LAND IMBALANCE

Zimbabwe was reborn out of the armed liberation struggle; it suffered White domination from 1890 to 2000 even though it got majority rule in 1980. Its independence and sovereignty were concluded when it undertook its FTLR programme after the 2000 land invasions and the enactment of the law that legalised the process. Armed liberation struggles are the highest tier of any conflict which accepts the shedding of blood to gain that which led to the struggle. It is not disputed that Zimbabwe was born out of the armed liberation struggle whose trigger was the need to regain the stolen land from the minority Whites. However, it remained the problem of Zimbabwe for as long as it sought consensus from the White the landholders on how best to address the inherent land imbalance.

Chitepo spoke about the fact that the White domination was about land and that land was the source of the dispute and that it needed to be returned to the indigenous people of Zimbabwe before any negotiations were agreed upon between the majority Blacks and the

minority Whites who governed the country between 1890 and 1980.³¹ This is a crucial issue to appreciate in the land debate of Zimbabwe. Without the land, the independence of Zimbabwe meant nothing. In effect there was no independence in 1980 but, a political institution set up to guide the nation into its independence that came two decades later. Majority rule had to be measured by the Blacks ownership of land rather than their presence in Parliament. Without land ownership independence remained lip-service.

Tongogara (1979) noted the disparities in the Zimbabwean society where colour determined one's destiny and ascribed this to his reason for fighting a system to gain equality.³² As Tongogara's vision was not based on what he would become in the hierarchy of society, but envisioned a free society that was going to allow the young to enjoy life blind to the colour of their skins. This was Tongogara's vision, a vision of a place that was to become Zimbabwe where colour or creed did not matter. The removal of an unjust system was the trigger that urged him to join the armed liberation struggle. Tongogara fought to remove a discriminatory social system that was imposed by the minority on the majority, a system that rated humanity according to the colour of their skin.

Nkomo (1989) talked about the centrality of land to the security of the country and the need for its equitable distribution among Zimbabweans as a crucial national security safeguard. The imbalance in the land profile was a huge insecurity that needed to be addressed at all costs. Relegating this process to the back burner led to the demonised land invasions of 2000. Had the nation taken time to interrogate the insecurities related to the land imbalance and debated these earnestly to address the immediate challenge, the nations would not have plunged into the mess it became after the FTLR programme.

³¹ In his prominent speech during the conference in Australia in 1973, then Chairman of the ZANU, Herbert Chitepo, pointed out that he could go into the whole theory of discrimination in legislation, in economic opportunities, in education. He could go into that, but restricted himself to the question of land because he thought that was the very basic human requirement. The essence of exploitation, the essence of White domination, was domination over land. That was the real issue, the essence for survival <https://www.africanexponent.com/post/7-quotes-from-zimbabwe-liberation-heroes-2851> accessed: 29 November 2018.

³² When interviewed in a documentary what he was fighting for in the liberation struggle, Josiah Magama Tongogara's response was vivid clear, forthright and put across with disarming conviction: "What some of us are fighting for is to see that this oppressive system is crushed. I don't even care whether I will be part of the top echelons. I'm not worried. I'm dying to see a change in the system, that's all ... that's all! I would like to see the young people enjoying together – black, White – enjoying together in a new Zimbabwe – that's all!" <https://www.africanexponent.com/post/7-quotes-from-zimbabwe-liberation-heroes-2851> accessed: 29 November 2018.

What is apparent from Nkomo's observation is that for as long as the nation negated the aspects of land imbalances obtaining, it remained open to threats that came after the 2000 land invasions. Lives were lost and continue to be lost to the offshoots of the FTLR programme that include sanctions; poverty driven diseases, economic migration and stagnation. These were among Nkomo's worries when he proclaimed the unresolved land reform a national security threat. The country is now food insecure yet it had been the Food Basket of the SADC sub-region.

Mugabe (2002) concludes that Zimbabwe's struggle was against an unjust system: a system of exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination.³³ Without the repossession of land there was no independence and delaying the land reform would have made him a failed leader in all respects. The notion that Mugabe wanted to appease the rural electorate when he ignored international calls to deal with the land invasions ignores the role Mugabe played in inspiring the invasions in the first place.

Mugabe was aware and convinced that the Whites were not going to give up easily on the landholding and that these skirmishes revealed the desperate nature of the unfolding land issue. The 2000 referendum could have also energised his efforts because the 'NO' vote sponsored by the West became a direct challenge to the status-quo. The leader had to show his resolve to address an outstanding landholding issue without further delay. The opportunity had availed itself and the Blacks had regained their land rights they had lost upon the defeat of Nehanda in 1890.

Bwititi (2018) records that Mnangagwa does not regret land reform and views it as a concluded issue that must be supported fully by all and sundry. He notes that the decision to quit the Commonwealth of Nations was an important decision taken out of knowledge that ushered in Zimbabwe's sovereignty.³⁴ These huge policy positions by Zimbabwe's

³³ Robert Gabriel Mugabe Speeches. "The struggle in Zimbabwe and indeed in Southern Africa as a whole has never been against the White humankind per se. It is not a struggle for exclusive African rights. On the contrary our struggle is against an unjust system a system of exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination. It is a struggle for human equality and dignity. The struggle as we see it is fundamentally between the exploiting class and the exploited class. The exploiters who control political, military and economic power are wholly White and the exploited and powerless are wholly Africans. Because of this racial division our struggle tends to be confused and often misinterpreted as a racial one. We do not accept this. We believe that White racism is only the result of the irrationality of imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism": Accessed: 23 June 2018.

³⁴ Here see K Bwititi 2018. ED Meets White Community: "the new political administration believes in an inclusive society that does not countenance racial discrimination and is working with the White former

liberation war icons mark important turning points that shall remain very inspiring as Zimbabwe develops its capacities and capabilities for economic growth.

The statements give hope to the community of Zimbabwe for a future whose sovereignty shall not be challenged, a future that upholds the sanctity of land as embedded in the constitution; that guides and interprets the laws of the land. Zimbabwe's decision to quit the Commonwealth of Nations signposted her resolve to conclude the land question in the manner that had been directed by the amended constitution.

It appears from the preceding events that if Zimbabweans had not taken the important decision to fight for land through the radical land invasions of 2000, they still could be stuck in White domination. It can be argued, that is why the minority Whites elsewhere will continue to fight for the land that does not belong to them historically. This is also the reason why America continues to sanction Zimbabwe through the 2018 revised ZIDERA even after one of the most peaceful harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. The verdict to respect Whites' land rights would have reversed the land reform for the benefit of the minority Whites and kept Zimbabwe in perpetual insecurity mode.

It was noted in Chapters Two and Three of this study that the disparities arising from the 'willing buyer willing seller' land clause were huge. Besides, the assurances raised by both the British and the Americans to fund the land reform as a compromise to allow for the signing of the constitution, was a diplomatic manoeuvre that kept the majority Black Africans hoping for change in the land ownership profile. What can be deduced from that process is that, land cannot change hands unless some form of force has been exerted to the possessor. Zimbabweans had to *Jambanja* and shed more blood to reclaim their lost land. No other way would have changed the land ownership profile in Zimbabwe outside the FTLR programme. Any other undertaking different from the FTLR programme, could have allowed a different profile that remains assumptive, speculative and academic. The FTLR programme gave back land to the rightful owners; the FTLR programme birthed the sovereignty of Zimbabwe.

commercial farmers to see how they can contribute to the development of the country. And we are saying many of the White commercial farmers who remained behind, who did not go away, we are very grateful for accepting this change and they must come on board and they must be issued with the 99 year leases wherever there are pieces of land which they hold": The Sunday Mail 22 July.

4.4.1 The Idea of Land Ownership Post 2000

As has been emphasised in this study, land ownership was the cause for the armed liberation struggles of the First and Second Chimurengas. Aligning the Second Chimurenga and the FTLR programme of 2000 is crucial if we are to appreciate that which was at stake during the two earlier struggles. The idea in the two earlier cases remained true for the FTLR programme was a landholding war. Landholding was a crucial component to guarantee continued ownership which directed the economic endeavours of the agriculture-based economy. In this regard, the economic prowess remained in the hands of the minority Whites in Zimbabwe up to the year 2000.

The Lancaster House Constitution established a timeline of 10 years for any land debate in Zimbabwe to be guided by the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ concept. This was besides another caveat that gave the Whites in Zimbabwe 20 seats in a 100-seat Parliament that was to run-up to 1987.³⁵ The representation of the Whites in Parliament constituted a 20% share and a whopping 50% ratio in the Senate, which was a deliberate move by the British government to ensure that the status quo remained, thus perpetuating White privilege in independent Zimbabwe. Sustaining the landholding for the kith and kin was strategic, given its direct link and input into the British economy. Zimbabwe provided the important raw materials for the British economy. Even after 1990 when the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ arrangement expired, deliberate efforts were made to frustrate any other plan that ran contrary to the market-driven approach to landholding.

Warfare ensued on both sides of the divide for landholding. Each side aligning every effort to sustain the ingrained values but as the patience of the Black majority snapped, that which the Whites in Zimbabwe thought and understood was theirs, changed hands dramatically and divided the international system forever. For the Zimbabweans and the generality of Africans, the recovery of land marked the advent of independence that allowed the indigenous people of Zimbabwe to determine their destiny through working

³⁵ For more information see S Kraft 1987. Zimbabwe's White minority, representing less than 2% of the population, had 20 reserved seats in the 100-seat House of Assembly and 10 of 40 seats in the Senate in a British-drafted agreement, the Lancaster House constitution. It marked the end of a long guerrilla war against the White-led government and ushered in the 1980 Black majority rule. The provision, intended to assure Whites of a political role in the country they once ruled, called for White members of Parliament to be elected on separate, White voter rolls. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancaster_House_Agreement accessed: 15 May 2017.

on their land unperturbed by the legalities. The FTLR programme as enshrined in Chapter 16 of the Zimbabwe Constitution is a concluded process that put to rest the challenges of land redistribution and set parameters that guide policy on agricultural land in Zimbabwe. All agricultural land by definition continues to be vested in the state and any change must be guided by only the state.

The huge task for the West was to kill the idea of Black empowerment. In addressing the land issue Zimbabweans did so without paying compensation. It can be concluded that the process has remained a huge embarrassment to the privileged White race. This remains the major reason for the conflict between Blacks and Whites not only in Zimbabwe but wherever an issue of land ownership has arisen in the international system.

The radical process Zimbabwe opted for in its land redistribution mechanism, was in part a reverse replay of the slave trade where this time the Whites were chained and force-marched into courts where they were subjected to the Blacks' justice system which was exercised in full glare of the international community in real time. One compelling example was the case of a group of farmers in the Chinhoyi area which became instant international news after White farmers were arraigned before the courts for contempt of the country's land acquisition laws (Astill and Beaumont 2001).³⁶ The Chinhoyi event demonstrated that when people in authority establish rules and laws to protect an injustice, over time such rules often-times catch up with them. Injustices cannot be perpetuated forever; at some point the disadvantaged will rise to challenge the prejudices by enacting laws that address such inequality.

The scenes in Chinhoyi at that time clearly depicted a life and death for land. Land was at the core of the Whites' survival, just as it was for the Blacks, to the extent that they were prepared to give what it takes to resist dispossession. In this case the White farmers were prepared to fight to the end in a bid to protect what they thought and believed was their

³⁶ Here see. Sixty White families, including five British passport-holders, dramatically fled their farms in the Chinhoyi area of Zimbabwe yesterday in fear for their lives. Despite pledging that they would stay and 'fight to the last humankind' to protect their property, most of the Chinhoyi farmers piled the few possessions they could into their vehicles and fled from gangs of looting 'war veterans' who have already attacked 19 farms. A handful of men, gathered in groups of three for safety, said they planned to 'laager-up' - stay and defend their property. The exodus followed the arrest last week of 23 farmers for retaliating against the state-sanctioned invaders, and was essentially recognition that White Zimbabweans are no longer protected by the laws of their land: The Guardian 12 August.

property. However, the fight these White farmers attempted was clearly ill-fated as the tables had since changed. The reclamation of the land by the majority Blacks was backed by the laws of the land and the laws of the land caught up with the lawbreakers.

What was also instructive in this case was the issue of the Blacks dispossessing the Whites and that the laws of the land appeared to be tilted towards the restorative justice that the now ruling Black majority was pursuing through the FTLR programme. Naturally the programme disadvantaged Whites who sought to whip up international kith and kin sentiments by appearing to be innocent victims of racial persecution. And indeed their tactics worked as this resulted in the polarisation of not only the Zimbabwean society but the international community at large. Colonisation had given the Whites the right to own land, which was now being reversed through the FTLR programme, thereby making it untenable for the Whites and Blacks to co-exist on the same pieces of land which each group claimed ownership.

The same laws enacted to disadvantage the Blacks during the colonial era were reversed to disadvantage the Whites two decades into independence. However, unlike in the colonial era, the White neo-liberal bloc cried foul and labelled the enforcement of the law as human rights abuse and a disregard for the rule of law. The question that needed to be answered in this instance would be whose rule of law was being violated considering that laws are interpreted according to the domestic permutations as directed by the national legislations. Whites domination had run its course and time had come for the majority Blacks in authority to align laws with their aspirations in addressing the injustices of the yesteryears.

4.4.2 The Fast-Track Land Reform Attractions

The Zimbabwe's FTLR programme attracted a lot of research work from within and without Zimbabwe. Most who had been schooled in the neo-liberal institutions associated the land reform with economic meltdown; human rights abuses and failure to uphold the rule of law by the ZANU PF led government (Muzondidya 2007, Howard-Hassmann 2010 and Matondi 2011). The economic message was very important to propagate because of the historical underpinnings of the economic activities of the nation and how it competed in the international arena before the invasions.

The Whites in Zimbabwe were honoured for commercial farming even though they exploited the cheap labour from the Blacks through established laws to grow the agriculture based economy. Aligning the redistribution of the land to Blacks with reduced yields by the new land owners underplayed the role the Blacks had played in the prosperity of the Whites' commercial farming enterprises. The Blacks, for all intents and purposes, were, through their sweat and back-breaking but often underpaid labour, the main players in the development of commercial farming programmes in Zimbabwe.

The concept of human rights violation arising from the acquisition of farms from the Whites in Zimbabwe is clearly a misplaced argument. Rights as a rule are spelt out in the obtaining constitution of the specified nation. The Parliament of Zimbabwe set to enact laws that guided the land reform programme and these informed the process through which land was to change hands. For as long as the acquiring authority utilised the enacted laws to the letter, and defended the application of the same laws by structured institutions, then no one can claim any human rights abuses arising from a legal process. Chapter Seven addresses the issues of human rights in more detail by analysing the SADC Tribunal's findings on Campbell and others versus Zimbabwe and ZIDERA's continued demand that Zimbabwe must respect the Tribunal's findings for the sanctions to be lifted.

The rule of law has become another concept that continues to attract contradictory interpretations. A generic interpretation of the rule of law attests to the primacy of the domestic regulations in dictating behaviour of the citizenry and visitors alike. The primary source document for a country's laws is the national constitution. Any rules that contravene the nation's constitution become null and void and must be aligned with the constitution. Laws prescribe parameters for behaviour and associated remedies for misbehaviour. When misbehaviour is assumed to have occurred the applicable sanctions are meted through set structures independent from the law makers to ensure fairness. For all meanings and determinations, this study argues strongly that Zimbabwe continues to follow its laws that were established appropriately by the authorised structures to the later.

As has been discussed earlier, the neo-liberal writings on the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe were on the whole negative and meant to create and amplify negative perceptions. Once the negative perceptions were established, the pre-planned sanctions were sanitised and accorded credence in the international system. The Western-sponsored media never attempted or saw any positives regarding Zimbabwe's land reform even

though implications of land reform to Zimbabwe's peace and security were quite clear during seminars and conferences dating as far back as the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement of 1979 and as recent as the Harare Donor Conference of 1998. Carrington (1979) noted the huge demand for land reform in Zimbabwe and the magnitude of the enormous funding that was required for the success of the process as revealed in earlier chapters. The Harare Donor Conference appreciated the correlation of peace and the land reform and the urgent requirement for the process to be concluded.

Whilst the West sponsored the negative perceptions about the FTLR programme as chaotic and out of step with the norms in the international system, the opposite was true of the SADC sub-region member states especially those governed by former armed liberation movements. These appreciated the milestone of the land repossession, declared and celebrated the victory as the final achievement that would give the majority Blacks in Zimbabwe not only their sovereignty but dignity that was lost during the colonial era (Sibanda and Maposa 2014). They announced these positions during international fora in meetings at the SADC, the AU and the UN level (Ramaphosa 2019). These became fruits of the solidarity networks established during the armed liberation struggles of the region. The SADC sub-regional mechanisms had to be redirected to address the land redistribution challenge that had the potential to destabilise the sub-region and by extension reverse the gains of the sub-region's integration.

The SADC sub-regional mechanisms shaped the reactions the regional bloc member states took in addressing the topical land redistribution issue that attracted international observations. The concentric circle concept revealed the influential impact from the centre and attests to the need for nations to appreciate that the neighbour's challenges are potentially theirs. (*Kutswa kwendebvu tinodzimurana*, meaning the neighbour's concerns are mine).³⁷ The pan-African philosophy upholds that which subordinates the individual's views to the group views, bodes well with the collective norms and value systems that guide nations' interactions.

³⁷ The Ubuntu philosophy attests to the need for collective protection and collective ownership of both profits and losses. The community has a collective role to uplift each other from troubles that bedevil the societies. The collective effort by SADC member states under the guidance of the Inter State Defence and Security Committee, Zimbabwe succeeded in dealing with its internal challenges. On the same note, SADC's involvement in finding solutions to other SADC member states bears testimony to the concept of Ubuntu.

For SADC member states it was a case of being better and stronger together than being divided and isolated. The long established relations forged and cemented in the trenches of the arduous liberation war period provided a rich background that allowed the region an appreciation of the bigger regional goal and the importance of sustaining a coherent regional collective security mechanism that had been threatened by the SADC Tribunal's proclamations on Zimbabwe's FTLR programme.

These conflicting standpoints attest to the imperatives of kith and kin which are established through the inherent collective regional norms, values and beliefs systems that abound in different communities in various regions. Societies align with these norms, shared values and beliefs that are established over long periods of time through objectification and anchoring. For the West, any move to address the land question in Zimbabwe was viewed as a direct challenge to the ethics of democracy, property rights and the rule of law as dictated by the neo-liberal hierarchy of norms whereas for the African governments, taking over the land through whatever formula was important to restore the dignity that had been shattered under the West's colonial rule.

Zimbabwe's repossessing of the land from the White farmers represented a democratic right that had taken effect after too long a time to address. It took too long to address because the Whites perpetuated a system that accepted that there was a special White race that could not be challenged by the inferior Black race at any point in the relations between these two races. The statutes on White-only hotels, food outlets, shops in parts of most colonial cities, White-only toilets and such other reflections divided the nation along the racial lines. In businesses, the Blacks were not allowed to venture into established ring-fenced White-only zones. The Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement perpetuated these divisions once it failed to address the land redistribution issue.

The discrimination experienced and painfully endured during the White rule inevitably established a minority White superiority complex among the White community and inferiority complex within the majority Black population. It was only that, which was determined from the personality of the Whites that was considered to be the best for the country as the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement proved. The colonial period with its distortions, hangovers and human made reflections prepared the ground for the

Whites to not only feel superior, but established and armed the minority Whites to defend their superiority at every opportunity, everywhere and every time.

When the Blacks got hold of the reins of power they borrowed and perpetuated the Whites' concepts to determine the future of the country as they addressed the historical imbalances including through the FTLR programme. The laws enacted in 1992, which introduced the resisted compulsory acquisition of land for redistribution and the 2000 amendment 16A and 17 of 2005 that shut the door for possible recourse to courts of law prepared the ground for the legal battles that followed. Whites who felt chastised by the policy contested internationally through the SADC Tribunal whose findings were thrown out by the sub-region.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The FTLR programme was reactive in nature and both ideological and physical. After the pronouncement by the policy makers on the need to reclaim the lost land and that the economy was land-based spontaneous moves into targeted White-owned farms started. The seemingly choreographed activities across the entire country left the Whites overwhelmed. The 1979 Lancaster House Charter had failed to articulate workable land redistribution for the indigenous Zimbabweans. The willing buyer willing seller clause established as a temporary conflict resolution option in the constitution became the permanent position the West trusted as it assured the rights of the Whites in the land redistribution road map.

The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992, which allowed and attempted compulsory acquisition, failed to meet its targets because of inadequate funding besides the challenge it had to the neo-liberal preferences. The West's view that any land resettlement was to be market-driven and non-compulsory became entrenched and shared by the White kith and kin. The 1998 Harare Donor Conference gave a huge indicator for this uncompromising position by the White humankind, which arguably birthed the revolutionary position taken by the Government of Zimbabwe in the 2000 Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A and 17 of 2005.

The next chapter discusses the American, European and Asian regions' reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INTERNATIONAL INFLECTIONS OF ZIMBABWE'S FTLR PROGRAMME: – THE EURO/AMERICAN AND SINO/SOVIET'S REACTIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The crucial position the state holds in development debates is under attack from the neo-liberal theorists. They overplay the power of market forces and advocate for a minimal role for the state (Locke 2002, Harvey 2003, Wright and Wolford 2003 and Wolford 2007). For the proponents of the free market economy, any land acquisition must be seller-driven and the buyer or any authority acquiring the land must pay the market value of the property.

Further the neo-liberals opine that calls for correcting historical injustices are less persuasive than the demonstrations of economic inefficiency that would arise from subversion of the market forces (Wolford 2007). It is in this vein that Tobaiwa (1998) predicted that Zimbabwe's GDP would be split into two parts and official sector employment would reduce by at least fifteen per cent due to decreases in agro-based activities and the downstream jobs, whilst reduced exports would lead to further current account shortages such that import protection would be abridged to less than one month if large-scale commercial farms were to be acquired.

According to McCormick (1997) the investment climate in Zimbabwe was projected to deteriorate due to doubt among investors concerning the non-adherence to property rights and the declining collateral value of land. In addition, McCormick further notes that the government's fiscal burden and deficit were expected to increase due to farm purchases, resettlement and extension services. The neo-liberal, epitomised by the Western bloc, further argued that national survival is measured by the stability of a nation's state of economic activities as a general rule and economic power once developed can support the achievement of stable welfare, cultural harmony and peace. Distortions induced or otherwise to the structures for the agro-based economies can therefore easily trigger inefficiencies that result in the collapse of the economy and the benefits of economic stability.

5.2 NEO-LIBERAL'S MECHANISMS FOR THE DEFENCE OF SHARED NORMS

Zimbabwe's economy is agriculture-driven; it feeds and grows directly from production on the land. Therefore, the beholder of the land resource, who utilises the resource efficiently, has a say in the economic activities of the state and by extension wields power (Brown 1974 and Dean 1988). Ownership of land with the potential for varied economic benefits remains not only contested but, controversial because historical and racial issues are replayed each time change of ownership takes effect.

According to Ranger (1985) and Kriger (1992) the struggle for the ownership of land between the Black and White communities dates back to the time of colonialism and became the rallying point for the Blacks' armed liberation struggles. Land remained a topical issue as Zimbabweans negotiated the final huddle in addressing the disparities arising from the colonial era. The radical choice chosen by the Black majority government of Zimbabwe to address the imbalances attracted huge research work and sanctions from the West because the process had challenged the dominant neo-liberal ideals.

The call for the advocates of the market-determined acquisition is that any acquisition must be seller-driven and that the land market value must be paid for land redistribution to take effect. This study observes that the market-informed land redistribution remained the entrenched positions derived from the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement that attracted the punitive sanctions because Zimbabwe had disregarded the golden rule. The major point of departure was the process the FTLR programme took. When the Blacks chose to ignore a norm understood and spelt out by the West as an international norm, it broke the rules and obviously created an unexpected challenge which was likely to haunt the West into the future if it was left to succeed. To address the challenge in a smart way, the West deployed its massive print and electronic media and scholarship in setting the tone in managing the perceptions around Zimbabwe's FTLR programme in the international system.

It unleashed well-funded and guided research to direct and influence negative opinions in the international community on the topical issue of the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe. Thus, Western experts became the authoritative voices that set the agenda and managed the neo-liberal message which was given sufficient space in the Western global media

conglomerates such as BBC, CNN and Bloomberg among others to ensure and reinforce the buy-in of their traditional allies as well as persuading dissenting voices and those sitting on the fence to review their reactions. This strategic approach harnessed opinion makers in a process that shaped the views of the players in the international system. In the neo-liberal pronouncements, Zimbabwe had become a rogue state that neglected all rules of the game and something had to be done immediately to deal with the misbehaving state.

Van Horn (1994) notes the entrenchment of property rights as a social construct which is not based on natural or neutral principles. He points to the Rhodesia order in Council of 1898, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969 as series of statutes enforced by the Rhodesian government to perpetuate Whites property rights in the country. These observations are shared by Chiwenga (2016) in his reflections on the historical journey of the Blacks in Zimbabwe under the yoke of White domination. The torturous journey brings with it very sad memories in the history of Zimbabwe.

The land issue is replete with laws that governed the interactions of the Blacks and Whites in Zimbabwean for the period between 1890 and 2016. All the land laws spelt out the power of the state to appropriate the resource and the obligations available to the parties. Remedies to the expected disputes always lay with the judiciary system of the time. Zimbabwe approached the land issue through the normal internationally recognised law amendments by changing the relevant statutes once it ventured into the FTLR programme.

The land ownership profile of Zimbabwe up to the year 2000 was glaringly skewed in favour of the Whites, even though the envisaged programmes from 1980-90 had the potential to resolve the imbalance. The compulsory acquisition of land by the government of Zimbabwe for redistribution to the landless indigenous Blacks remained arguably one of the most important but contested reasons why the West continued to punish Zimbabwe through collective measures at various groupings in the international system (All Africa Parliamentary Group 2009, Ndulo 2010, Freeth 2011 and Mumbengegwi 2016).

The FTLR programme brought with it disputed positions which were kith and kin driven. The kith and kin affinities have remained an anchor for behaviours across the political divide as this study reveals. Internationally the land laws are governed by the domestic laws which are passed by domestic legislative institutions. In order to nullify this reality in

Zimbabwe, the West had to raise the race flag through neatly sponsored works into the SADC region's Tribunal, whose findings aligned with the neo-liberal norms.

The West's sponsored research work and the Western-run media onslaught on Zimbabwe became very effective tools that continued to be utilised to align the international system against any land based programme anywhere in the world arising from or mirroring the compulsory acquisition process of Zimbabwe (Alden and Makumbe 2001, Taylor and Williams 2002, Berry 2002, Sachikonye 2003, Muzondidya 2007 and Matondi 2012).

It is important to note that Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular played second fiddle in the battle of the minds against the West. They were sluggish in articulating their point of view regarding land redistribution. Zimbabwe's land redistribution story was therefore left to be told mostly by outsiders under Western tutelage. Land redistribution decisions had been impromptu in Zimbabwe and driven from limited facts, elements that the West continuously took advantage of. Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular have to awaken to the reality of resourcing the safeguard of ideas. Guarded ideas are the backbone of national survival. A sample of studies in the section below attest to the level of challenges neo-liberals have regarding Zimbabwe's revolutionary land redistribution programme post- 2000.

5.3 NEO-LIBERALS' VIEWS ON THE COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND

Proceedings at the Namibia-based SADC Tribunal provide a compelling story regarding the case of Mike Campbell and seventy-seven other White former landowners, after it had postponed hearing the appeal in May 2008 because of the harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. The regional court had earlier temporarily barred the Harare government from repossessing Campbell's land pending the hearing of an application by the farmers questioning the legality of the programme to seize White-owned land for redistribution to Blacks. Article 6 of the regional Treaty bars member states from discriminating against any person on the grounds of gender, religion, race, ethnic origin and culture so the White farmers wanted the Tribunal to declare the land reform programme racist and illegal under the SADC Treaty (Zim Online – Campbell and 77 others versus Zimbabwe).

In its deliberations and applications, the Tribunal downplayed the historical underpinnings of the regional armed liberation struggles that shaped the developmental programmes of the SADC member states queuing for the legalities to disrupt land acquisition in Zimbabwe and by extension any future land reforms elsewhere once they won this case. Getting the case through the Tribunal became the last hope for neo-liberals to internationalise the process using the colour lens which clearly generated a lot of emotions. The outcome of the Tribunal's intervention is interrogated in detail in Chapter Seven.

Taylor and Williams (2002) reveal that, irritated over the failing economy, increasing levels of corruption, and Zimbabwe's expensive participation in the Democratic Republic of Congo's civil war, a majority of those who voted in Zimbabwe's 2002 elections were unwilling to increase the President's powers, even if they supported the cause of the land reform. Taylor and Williams observe that when Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans seized the land issue into their own hands and occupied White-owned farms, Mugabe lost no time in associating with their cause.

Western governments, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the international press accused Mugabe of sacrificing the rule of law in order to save his own political skin. Described by *The Economist* as a coup by ballot-box, Zimbabwe's presidential elections in March 2002 were only the most recent sign of a deeper crisis. Four major aspects underpinned Zimbabwe's crisis: a dwindling economy; the question of land restructuring; Zimbabwe's participation in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and what can be called the nation's democratic discrepancy (Taylor and Williams 2002). This study observes that the neo-imperialism governance debate reveals the importance of the neo-liberal norms in shaping international norms.

Any other opposing view that challenges the established norms runs the risk of the attendant backlash. Even if these observations had a bearing on Zimbabwe's faltering economy, the regional imperatives expounded in the SADC regional defence mechanism were at play when the region decided to assist a member state DRC who had called out for help. However, their resolve to stand by the regional norms spelt out in the sub-regional protocols naturally challenged the preferred norms in the international system. Besides, the land invasions of 2000 had only remained a matter of when they would happen after

the Svosve experiences of September 1998 had sent out very visible pointers on how the land question would likely pan out if delayed any longer.

The media coverage and the political discourse in Zimbabwe on the land redistribution revolved around the country's commercial farming sector where the land distribution debate provided vivid testimonies of the continuing racial structure of landholding in the country (Alden and Makumbe 2001, Moyo 2004, Campbell 2004 and Mabaye 2005). The government's failure to address this landholding issue adequately became another bone of contention because, by 2000, it was grappling with growing discontent and electoral challenges posed by the MDC.

A caveat smuggled in late, in the referendum campaign would have, if ratified, absolved Zimbabwe from paying compensation for the acquired White farms. In April 2000, the constitutional amendment number 16A was passed, permitting the government to expropriate land without paying compensation for the land component. The land component funding was apportioned to the British government. The fast-track procedures for land alienation and resettlement which followed, Sachikonye (2003), Muzondidya (2007) and Matondi (2012) observe that the process was executed between 2000 and 2002 with vigour, considerable violence and chaos.

The Third Chimurenga was indeed violent and chaotic as observed but one wonders how any other processes would have achieved effective land reform considering the stakes at hand. It can be argued that outside Chimurenga, Zimbabwe would still be under White domination of a special kind. The violence and chaos were the mechanisms that ushered in the indigenous empowerment project that had remained a pipedream for the majority of Zimbabweans until they woke up one morning owning a farm after the White owner had abandoned it in a hurry. The physical presence of the Blacks on the formerly White-held fertile land was important at the time as it marked the dawn of an important epoch in the history of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had, against all odds, opened another window in human emancipation in the 21st century.

The long hoped for and fought for landholding had, at long last been achieved. There is no denying that the relentless barrage of negative media coverage and expert opinion-making instigated by the West against Zimbabwe were meant to create an impression of a nation in turmoil where the international community needed to intervene and in typical

Whiteman's burden guide the Black-led nation out of the turmoil according to the dominant neo-liberal dictates. Strictly speaking, perceptions had to be created to pave way for the intervention by the West to protect their kith and kin.

5.4 THE POWER OF MARKET-DRIVEN LAND REDISTRIBUTION DEBATE

Zimbabwe's land redistribution journey was a rough one. This study has argued the 'willing buyer willing seller' approach and how the West was determined to sustain this position regardless of its lack of empiricism created the deadlock that culminated in the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe. Although the facts on the ground had from 1980 to 1998 pointed to the failure of the approach, neo-liberals maintained that the market-approach was the only reasonable way to resolve the land question whose distribution profile in Zimbabwe was skewed in favour of the Whites. Prophecies of economic meltdown were given as the major reason why land reform demanded the market-driven route.

Nonetheless, after the willing seller willing buyer approach had run its course, reality on the ground revealed that the policy would not adequately address Zimbabwe's complex land issue. The challenge with the market-driven notion was that those who determined the market value were the capital providers and therefore became both the player and referee in the game. However, as they do say that if you can't beat them join them; Zimbabweans inevitably soon realised that they had also to play the game in the manner the Western liberals were playing – as both the player and referee. Thus took the radical fast-track approach to land redistribution where one piloting the activities determined the outcomes of the journey.

This study argues that land was at the core of the conflict between the Blacks and Whites during the colonial era, leading to the protracted armed liberation struggle. Land was therefore a political issue rather than an academic issue. Land was at the core of the sovereignty of Zimbabwe. Driving the market-driven concept on an issue that constituted a matter of life and death for the people of Zimbabwe was stretching the levels of tolerance of the Black people too far by the West. The debate that continued after the failure of the provisions of the 1992 Act to address the land dispute in Zimbabwe was clearly some deliberate drag intended to ensure that land remained in the hands of the Whites' kith and kin.

Democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and private property as defined by the neo-liberal theory, are milestone activities which leaders of developing nations need to uphold in order to be touted in the international media as shining examples that must be emulated by all and sundry. Where nations fail to align themselves to the West's values and interests, then the dominant West invokes UN mechanisms such as the responsibility to protect or such other arrangement as decided by the permanent members of the Security Council or any other combination by any of the five in the absence of a veto by any of the five or a combination of them, to disguise their regime change agenda.

When Zimbabwe decided to take back its land and redistribute it according to its appropriately enacted laws, the West-led asymmetric warfare process was invoked and it ran its course. This process, now known as the regime change agenda, became a process steered by a well-orchestrated Western-sponsored system. Land ownership in Zimbabwe as a contested concept invokes memories of previous injustices perpetrated in the colonial past. The pan-African reactions by the Zimbabwe government in addressing a longstanding colonial injustice is unsurprisingly viewed as a direct challenge by the Whites, hence the invocation of the rights issue in an attempt to maintain and sustain the status-quo. The issue of human rights only favours the beholder. When not in favour, they become human rights abuses that must attract some immediate sanctions from the big powers that are expected to interpret the conditions for such rights.

In protest against Zimbabwe's move to expel foreign journalists, alleged attacks on the judiciary and failure to restore law and order, Britain recalled a team of military trainers it had seconded to Zimbabwe's army in the past 21 years. The planned withdrawal of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) was part of a variety of new and tougher measures London adopted against its former colony (Financial Gazette Staff Reporter 2001).

This was the declaration of the conflicted position which amounted to the declaration of war which was to be fought in defence of kith and kin. All this was because; by taking the radical approach to its land reform, Zimbabwe had challenged the status-quo and by extension broke the rule of law by the British's standards.

Britain had to respond forcefully to show that it was ready to exert its influence on Zimbabwe. The BMATT became an important tool that was at its disposal and using it

early was meant to prove that the dispute had escalated and now needed to be dealt with urgently. Britain had to come out clear in order to appeal to its neo-liberal allies and show the way in which its bilateral dispute with its former colony needed to be addressed. Ruthless punitive actions needed to be taken as a matter of urgency.

Thus following the cue from Britain, the European Union (EU) foreign ministers decided to enforce shrewd sanctions on Zimbabwe and to remove the EU election monitors after the leader of the monitoring team had been ejected from the country. The EU stopped 128 million Euros in improvement aid for the period 2002-2007. Foreign ministers of the 15 European nations made the choice after hearing a report on the condition in Zimbabwe from Pierre Schori, the leader of the EU's elections monitoring group. Schori had been ejected from Zimbabwe after being blamed by President Mugabe's government of political conceit (Udwin 2002). In all this it is important to note that Britain was directly influencing the decisions of the EU in order to protect its kith and kin in its former colony.

The EU foreign ministers indicated that Mugabe's government had prohibited the placement of the EU election observer mission and remained seriously concerned with the political viciousness, serious abuses of human rights and the limitations on the media which called into query the projections for free and fair elections. Zimbabwe had refused to accept the observers from Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, which Harare accused of sponsoring opposition movements in Zimbabwe. However, it is pertinent to question why it had become a democracy issue for nations to be forced to accept observers, who judged the status of human rights in any country and which particular foreign ministers concerned these issues regarding the elections in Zimbabwe. It is this study's argument that there must have been bigger interests at stake for the EU to be concerned about the political violence in a small nation of Zimbabwe.

In the international system, nations are at liberty to invite other nations or institutions to witness or observe internal elections. There is no rule that binds nations not to expel those they feel are behaving outside the dictates of the domestic laws that govern domestic elections besides the rule that observers must appeal to the major parties contesting in an election (Declaration of principles for international election observation and code of

conduct for international election observers 2005).³⁸ Once the position of Zimbabwe and the West became conflicted because of the FTLR programme, the presence of the EU team became conflicted also, resulting in the expulsion of the EU team leader from observing the elections. Why this became the trigger for sanctions remains a mystery. The foreign ministers indicated that the EU sanctions were designed not to harm ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe or her neighbours.

The 15 EU governments decided that, it was desirable to remove all the observers and enforce economic sanctions on Zimbabwe. The pronouncement trailed weeks of pressures by the EU officials that Europe would enforce sanctions against Mugabe and 19 other elites, including a visa prohibition and embargo on their foreign assets, if Zimbabwe hindered the effort of its elections observer group. The EU ministers had also threatened to take action if Zimbabwe deprived of the global media free access to cover the impending March 9-10 presidential elections.

President Mugabe's ZANU-PF party was alleged to have orchestrated political bullying and viciousness aimed at shielding-off opposition to its rule over several years. Shortly before the EU ministers extended their decision, Mugabe's faction threw stones at the main office of the Zimbabwe's opposition MDC in Harare, destroying windows. The nation's economy was ravaged and whirled under food and fuel deficiencies with diminutive external money to finance imports.

Portugal and Greece opposed the imposition of sanctions favouring the continued pressure with the EU monitors inside Zimbabwe (Udwin 2002). The activities of the opposition party were choreographed to coincide with developments in the EU and other international gatherings, a strategy that helped keep the Zimbabwe issue on the radar of the international community. Once this negative perception sank, then whatever programme to be directed against Zimbabwe would easily receive the full support from the Western bloc.

³⁸ Here see the International election observation must be conducted with respect for the sovereignty of the country holding elections and with respect for the human rights of the people of the country. International election observation missions must respect the laws of the host country, as well as national authorities, including electoral bodies, and act in a manner that is consistent with respecting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. International election observation missions should seek and may require acceptance of their presence by all major political competitors. <https://www.ndi.org/DoP> accessed on 13 August 2017.

Denmark shut down its embassy in Zimbabwe over long-running political differences with the government. Relations between Denmark and Zimbabwe had become frosty in recent years, with the Nordic country accusing Mugabe's government of gross violations of human rights through its controversial land policies. Harare, on another side, accused the Danish government of interfering in Zimbabwe's internal affairs by funding opposition parties (Xinhuanet 2002). Denmark was an important player in the alignment of Zimbabwe to the neo-liberal requirements.

Therefore, taking its cue from Britain, Denmark prepared the ground for other players in the West to tour the line. The stage had been set for the skirmishes to begin on the conflicted land question in Zimbabwe. Every effort was made by the West to soil the reputation of Zimbabwe in the international system. The collective onslaught on Zimbabwe was raised to influence the negative views and pile pressure on the regime to rethink its land reform programme. The debate was never about promoting governance or multiparty democracy, but, the neo-colonial agenda – the anti-land reform stance.

Nevertheless, there still existed fissures within the European community grouping on how states were to relate with Harare. For example, the French President Jacques Chirac angered the governments of Britain and the US in February 2003 when he requested the late President Mugabe to a Franco-African conference on Africa, convened in France. The Government of Britain had tried to get the EU to deny the late Mugabe the right to come to Europe citing human rights abuses in Zimbabwe (Brown boycotts summit over Mugabe – BBC News 7 December 2007). The intra-regional confliction created some hope for Zimbabwe in its interactions with the EU. There were sympathisers, at least, among the West who had positive views on what Zimbabwe had concluded in its land reform programme, members in the community that saw a window for continued dialogue.

5.5 THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS' REACTIONS

The activities of the Commonwealth of Nations were guided on the whole by the British's diplomatic outlook - taking cue from the developments in the EU. Like in the case of the EU, the kith and kin concept played a crucial role in impacting the processes the Commonwealth members undertook to address the bilateral dispute between Zimbabwe and Britain. Once the matter was discussed at the EU level, activities in the Commonwealth took up the challenge and systematically ran parallel programmes aimed

at aligning Zimbabwe with the dictates of the majority neo-liberals in the grouping. Britain had a huge hand in the outcomes of all deliberations in the Commonwealth because of its status as the host of the queen.

Australia, Canada and New Zealand the most vocal in the grouping spearheaded the demand for Zimbabwe's alignment with the Commonwealth of Nations principles as enunciated at the 1991 Harare Declaration. These included promotion of democracy, good governance, rule of law, human rights, gender equality and sustainable economic and social development (The Commonwealth of Nations Principles – Harare declaration). The 2000 FTLR programme provided by the constitutional amendment number 16A had been viewed as a national document that impinged on the established and declared Commonwealth set of norms. Zimbabwe's Act of Parliament became a direct challenge to the norms in the international community as perceived by the neo-liberals. This misalignment had to meet the sanctions as prescribed in the accepted group rules.

When the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) met in March 2002 in Coolumb, Queensland, on the Zimbabwe, it focused on the forthcoming 2002 presidential elections. The meeting established an observer team for the pending elections and tasked the Troika led by Australian Prime Minister John Howard as chair with, Mbeki and Obasanjo as members to review the observer mission's report and effect necessary reactions based on the Millbrook Programme (the compulsory adherence to the Harare principles by the member states and the attendant punitive measures for intransigent members).

The initial report received on 14 March stated that, the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for free expression of the will of the electorate. Barely five days later on 19 March 2002, had the Troika announced the immediate suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth of Nations (Derek 2002 Commonwealth Update – The Round Table). The urgency of the procedure clearly indicated a pre-planned manoeuvre to align Zimbabwe to the dictates of the neo-liberals in the grouping. A rich opportunity to regulate the neo-liberals' preferred programme for Zimbabwe had availed itself and the message had to be swift and emphatic to send the appropriate signal across the grouping and elsewhere.

At the 2003 Commonwealth of Nations Abuja meeting, Zimbabwe's earlier suspension dominated the debate and ran to a disagreement over the re-election of Don McKinnon as the Secretary General. Before the conclusion of the meeting, Zimbabwe announced its withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Nations with immediate effect nullifying the planned Commonwealth of Nations' direct encounters with Harare on the land issue. Some African members had raised some concerns earlier and spoken against what they perceived as the undemocratic suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth (Editorial CHOGM, 2003 – The round Table). Within the Commonwealth of Nations group were the SADC sub-region member states whose reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme post 2000 highlighted the mixed reactions within the sub-region.

These reactions attest to the value attached to the concentric circles as nations relate in the global village. The determinations informed by the elites outlined the national interest that guided the reactions at bilateral and multilateral levels. Such reactions may be in conflict at times but are regulated by the elites in offices at a given time. The relationships among the elites are critical in appreciating and cuing behaviours within regions. Their collaborative efforts and the solidarity networks, establish norms and behaviour patterns that guide interactions at both the bilateral and international levels.

5.6 THE AMERICANS' REACTIONS

The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001 was the blueprint of the American government's reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme post-2000. In fact, it became the pillar of the neo-liberal's challenges to Zimbabwe's Black empowerment drive. The document spelt-out the maintenance and sustenance of the United States of America's sanctions on Zimbabwe until the United States President certified that the rule of law had been restored, including respect for ownership and title to property and an end to lawlessness. Until such satisfaction was proved, the President was to instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee or any termination or discount of obligation owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the USA or any other global financial institution (Public Law 107-99-Dec.21, 2001 - Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act).

This approach ensured that Zimbabwe was completely cut off and suffocated from world resources so that she could not access favourable lines of credit to grow its agro-based economy (Manzou 2020).³⁹ As discussed by Rice later in this section, Zimbabwe had become part of an axis of evil and posed a special threat to the interests of the USA. There was need for a special programme to whip Zimbabwe into line or at least find a formula to dissuade any other nation from taking cue from Zimbabwe's radical approach to land reform. The costs for the FTLR programme had to be huge and very painful for the Zimbabweans to stomach.

ZIDERA proved to be the most detailed instrument that had a huge bearing on the crippling of the agriculture driven economy of Zimbabwe. It has been revealed in a number of studies that ZIDERA's cost implications to Zimbabwe from 2001 to 2015 scaled above USD 40 billion (Portela 2014 and Ruwende and Chigogo 2016). The costs arising directly and indirectly from ZIDERA induced strained interactions of Zimbabwe's economic and diplomatic pillars with the international system. The influence of the USA government and its directives to the Bretton Woods institutions dried-up the arteries that sustained Zimbabwe's economy.

Outside of the ZIDERA, the USA funded NGOs to run opposition programmes aimed at crippling activities by the government. Much has been written on ZIDERA that gives credence to its effects on the generality of the poor in Zimbabwe and how it has impacted negatively on the growth of the agriculture-based economy. The ultimate objective of ZIDERA was to kill the inherent idea of the Black economic empowerment programme in Zimbabwe's institutions which challenged the neo-liberal ideals in the international system. Aligning the thinking to personalities and the concept of isolating such personalities is targeted at dividing the communities and frustrating approaches that bring cohesion in a nation.

The West has drawn up governing parameters for nation relations through the activities of UN institutions. However, there remain some gaps in the interpretation of the concepts

³⁹ The sanctions remain a huge work-up call for the small developing nations of the world who decide to determine that which is good for its people outside the dictates of the neo-liberals. All the survival strategies were informed by the reality that the nation was at war and needed to tell its story and align with those of like-mind in the international system; interview on Zimbabwe's survival strategies under the sanctions by the West. 9 July 2020.

that guide such relations. Democracy continues to attract varied interpretations according to the beholder. Also the concepts of the rule of law and human rights are applied invariably depending on the historical values and the selfish interests attached to the relationships. These concepts have attracted huge resources from the West and by default became the internationalised norms to the detriment of competing cultural values in other regions.

The magnitude of the resources marshalled to the Western sponsored non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the name of civil society advocacy is indicative of the long term nature for the entrenchment of these concepts across the globe. Zimbabwe alone tiny as it is, boasts over 30 000 of these NGOs deployed across the length and breadths of the country. The names attached to some of these are clearly suggestive and point to what they intend to achieve. The Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe, the Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Lawyers of Zimbabwe are among the groups that continue at every opportunity to query every activity by the government of Zimbabwe that impinges on the aspect of rights, democracy and rule of law. However, in doing so it has been noticed they pay a blind eye to the activities of those alleged victims in their abuse of other people's rights.

Rice (2005) borrows from Natan Sharansky 'the town square test' arguing that countries where individuals cannot go into the city centre to protest and say whatever they chose without fear of arrest and intimidation, were not democratic nations but rather fear societies that needed to change and align to neo-liberal tenets of democracy. The following is Rice's statement;

“To be sure, in our world there remain outposts of tyranny – and America stands with oppressed people on every continent - in Cuba, and Burma, and North Korea, and Iran, and Belarus, and Zimbabwe. The world should apply what Natan Sharansky calls the ‘town square test’: if a person cannot walk into the middle of the town square and express his or her views without fear of arrest, imprisonment, or physical harm, then that person is living in a fear society, not a free society. We cannot rest until every person living in a ‘fear society’ has finally won their freedom.”

The neo-liberal foot soldiers were deployed in the form of these NGOs and civil society advocates to protect the West's interests because these interests address their values and norms. Zimbabwe had disregarded these and had to be whipped into line by ZIDERA became a perfect strategy to align Zimbabwe to the dictates of the neo-liberals.

5.7 THE SINO/SOVIET'S REACTIONS

Whilst the West came together to sanction Zimbabwe for its land policy of 2000, Russia, China and other Asian nations such as Malaysia and Pakistan continued economic activities with Zimbabwe unfettered. In fact, Russia and China were very vocal in the international community to an extent of failing a planned UN Security Council Chapter VII intervention in Zimbabwe in 2008 at the peak of the dispute between Zimbabwe and the West.

By about 2004 Zimbabwe adopted the 'Look East' policy. This approach minimised the impact of the Western sanctions on Zimbabwe by creating a fall-back position for sustaining a previously West-run economy. A number of important economic deals were signed at the highest levels of government between Russia and Zimbabwe and China and Zimbabwe.⁴⁰ Joint ventures in mining, agriculture and power generation were established during this period between Zimbabwe and Russia and Zimbabwe and China that cushioned Zimbabwe from the negative impact of sanctions.

The Look East Policy was politically inspired and responded mainly to the economic requirements in the absenteeism of donor funding from the traditional West. The Chinese's responsiveness should however be appreciated from the wider ingenuity that was started by China's initiation of the China-Africa Collaboration Forum in 2000. This was part and parcel of an international policy that emphasised multilateralism which saw the built-up of the South-South partnership as a route to achieving transformations in the international system. Multilateralism attests to the need for the appreciation of the global view of issues and ownership of decisions that affect member states in the international

⁴⁰ Here see J Nkomo 2007. According to the Speaker of the House of Assembly Harare - China was the biggest single investor in Zimbabwe accounting for more than US\$600 million; Ambassador J Manzou Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 2020. The Look East Policy became one of the survival strategies which were informed by the reality that the nation was at war and needed to tell its story and align with those of like-minded in the international system: Interview on his experiences of Zimbabwe's interaction with the international community after the 2000 FTLR programme, Harare 9 July 2020.

system. The guiding principle is that nations are better off cooperating than competing, that is the proverbial: united we stand but divided we fall tenet.

Zimbabwe was never a visible partner in these considerations. However, by engaging with China bilaterally, the Zimbabwean government benefitted in political terms both internationally and domestically (Stiftung 2004). The notion of having an all-weather friendly relationship with China allowed Zimbabwe some fall-back position considering the enormous challenges arising from its conflicted position with the West who had a strong hold in the economic activities of the nation. Besides the fall-back, the approach deflated attention on negativities arising from the strained relations with the West.

China incidentally attracted economic relations with every other player in the international system, including the economic giants in the West. Economically the anticipation was that China would substitute the Western donors and plug the gap for the assets that were no longer forthcoming from them. Such positive prospects do possibly disregard the fact that unlike the arrangements with the West, the Chinese method does not come covered in moral standards and world-wide values but is rather rooted on clearly defined economic objectives (Tatjana 2007). Conditional relations that reflected those of the horse and rider were viewed by the developing nations as untenable hence the option for the South-South cooperation that the Asian community offered. The Look East policy created a diversionary route as well that challenged the expected outcomes from the West-induced sanctions.

The decision left the EU, for example, questioning the wisdom of allowing China a lion's share in the immense resource endowment of Zimbabwe. This shift became visible from the flurry of reengagements efforts by the West that ensued when Zimbabwe opted-out of the Commonwealth of Nations in 2003 and after the 2013 harmonised elections which were won resoundingly by the ruling ZANU PF party. The cooperation however, was only to be sustained if Zimbabwe delivered on what it promised to offer.

Without the leverage provided by China during the period of sanctions, Zimbabwe's agriculture-based economy would have collapsed. The Look East Policy was a strategic masterpiece that gave Zimbabwe another day to adjust its approaches to address the challenges that were Western sanctions engendered. The coal industry and power generation were important in propping up Zimbabwe's agriculture and the mining sectors

across which needed reliable power supply and China took on board to address these through joint venture programmes.

5.8 CONCLUSION

Neo-liberals overplay the power of the market forces *vis a vis* state intervention in the economic sphere in general and the land redistribution discourse in particular. They believe that land acquisitions must be seller-driven and that the land market value must be paid for redistribution to be successful. They also argue concerns with historical injustices are less persuasive than the demonstration of the economic inefficiencies arising from non-market led redistribution options. The land ownership profile of Zimbabwe up to the year 2000 was skewed in favour of the White population, even though the envisaged programmes from 1980 had the potential to address the imbalance.

The compulsory acquisition of land by the government of Zimbabwe for redistribution remains one of the most important but contested reasons why the West continued to punish Zimbabwe through collective sanctions measures at various groupings in the international system. West-sponsored research work and the media onslaught on Zimbabwe were effective mechanisms utilised to align the international system against any land based programme anywhere that appeared to take cue from the case of Zimbabwe. Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular have lethargic in articulating their land redistribution cases and shaping debates in the development of appropriate mechanisms to address their land challenges.

The next chapter will evaluate the competing national and regional interests that informed the African region's reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme.

CHAPTER SIX

THE INTERNATIONAL INFLECTIONS – THE AFRICAN ALLIANCE’S REACTIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Sanctions have remained a weapon of choice that nations resort to for aligning behaviours of targeted misbehaving members in international relations and have become fashionable for the West in the recent past.⁴¹ Busting of such sanctions is an enticing option for survival of such targeted nations in addressing the sanctions induced challenges.⁴² Appropriate diplomatic manoeuvres and national policy positions that divide the sanctioners and unite the community of the sanctionees are important tools in sanctions-bursting.

The concentric circle approach remains a useful concept that sanctionees use in their fight for survival. The effectiveness of the inner circle determines not only the survival of the sanctionees but the reactions of the outer circles as they grow outward. The endurance of the driving economic factors is an important indicator of the efficacy of the sanctions-busting option. Also, efficient diplomatic machinery influences the reactions of other players in the international system. Zimbabwe had to address in its diplomatic discourse, the centrality of land to the country’s economic development and national stability besides highlighting the need to correct historical imbalances in landholding. These became Zimbabwe’s diplomatic standoff issues that had strained its relations with the West. On

⁴¹ For more information see United Nations Charter Chapter I Article 2 (7) which states that; Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII; Staff and agencies. 2002. EU Sanctions Zimbabwe; T Pontecorvo 2019 - Five Key Facts on Western Sanctions against Russia. <https://mycountry europe.Com/author/shep/> accessed: 22 December 2019; US Dept of State invokes travel ban on Zimbabwean government minister. The US State Department has imposed a travel ban on Owen Ncube under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. The reasons were alleged gross disregard for human rights as the State Security Minister. Anselem Nhamo Sanyatwe was also slapped with the same sanctions under Section 7031(c) <https://www.europeansanctions. com/ region/ zimbabwe/> accessed: 22 December 2019.

⁴² Here see R Barrett 2010. Sanctions-busting is in Dubai’s DNA. The Dubai connection with Iran has morphed into a \$10bn-a-year import/export industry vital to both parties. For about 30 years, US-sponsored efforts to isolate Iran from the international economy have met a constant weakness: the Dubai connection. Dubai – removed from Iran by the Gulf waters – has prospered as a channel for busting the variety of global sanctions that have built up over the decades. <https:// www.the guardian.com/ commentisfree/2010/apr/20/iran-sanctions-busting-dubai> accessed: 22 December 2019.

one hand, the West questioned the approach and process Zimbabwe's land redistribution exercise had taken whilst on the other Zimbabwe accused Britain of deliberately reneging on its promise to fund the land redistribution programme.

6.2 THE SADC ALLIANCE'S REACTIONS

The African region generally took cue from the dictates of the SADC sub-region whose interactions with Zimbabwe was governed by the long standing history of the armed liberation struggles of the sub-region and the attendant solidarity networks. Moyo (2020) reveals that the Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe was premised on three concentric circles; the immediate geographical region within which Zimbabwe was situated, the African continent and the entire international community and seeks to deepen and transform relations with members in these circles into mutual beneficial economic ties.

Moyo notes that the thrust was based on the creation of a robust transactional economic diplomacy on image construction, partnership of old friendships, introduction of new frontlines of mutual valuable cooperation and rapprochement and re-engagement. What is instructive from the policy as this study observes is the need to appreciate the behaviours of the immediate circle because it informs the reactions of the outer circles. Winding back to 2005, the SADC sub-region had opted to forgo the assistance of its Western cooperating partners because of its solidarity with Zimbabwe when the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Centre (RPTC) was affected by the withdrawal of funds by Denmark the main financier then, due to the EU-imposed restrictive measures.⁴³

Directed by the neat sub-regional networks Zimbabwe continued to align its land reform vision that was appreciated by the sub-region first leading into the same being appreciated at the African region. Unlike the reflections of the Euro-American alliance governed by and large by the neo-liberal dictates, the African alliance was a mixed bag. There were circumstances where bilateral relations conflicted with the regional outlook. However, member states were on the whole influenced by the sub-regional views at the international level.

⁴³ Here see Joe Muzvidziwa, then Commandant SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre for the period between 2004 to 2007 was a member of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation Secretariat that generated resolutions for the statutory Organ meetings.

An examination of Zimbabwe's immediate neighbours Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia gives an interesting account on the need to balance the domestic views with the regional reproductions. Whilst Mozambique reacted to the Zimbabwean land policy liberally on the basis of former liberation movements' ties, Botswana was more forthright in demanding Harare to align with the neo-liberals' desires. The authorities in Gaborone were critical of Mugabe, whilst those in Maputo invited the alienated White farmers to relocate in their land and continue farming in areas of their expertise.

Peters (2002) reflects that, where Zimbabwe alienated its largely White commercial farming sector through land invasions and the government's gazetting of farms, Mozambique granted these Zimbabwean farmers some 50-year leases to farm commercially. Botswana on the other hand experienced xenophobic attacks on the Zimbabwean immigrants as a backlash for the FTLR programme. The contradictory intra-regional reactions like for the EU, reveal the balancing matrix that existed within regional members on the approaches used to address domestic policies where these conflicted with the regional position.

Peters (2002) notes that the White farmers ejected from the Zimbabwean land discourse amongst sympathetic noises from numerous African capitals have been presented land in Mozambique, a country that justified the Third Chimurenga, as an operation to reinstate land to the Africans. Marini (2001) observes that while Botswana criticised Zimbabwe, Mozambique took advantage of the knowledge and expertise of foreign farmers to independently farm in the Niassa and Zambezia Provinces. It took the obtaining development of the farming sector-gap of Mozambique in the sugar and tobacco plantations by allocating land to displaced farmers from Zimbabwe.

According to Thielke (2004) Zambia had taken advantage of the displaced White farmers from Zimbabwe to improve its farming in its tobacco and maize production enterprises. Whilst Mozambique was clear and supported the process of the land reform in Zimbabwe, like Zambia it took advantage of the obtaining situation to address the inherent gaps in its food security situation. Agreeing with Zimbabwe on its goal for equity in landholding, its vast untapped land required the expertise of the White farmers who had lost land through the FTLR programme of 2000.

Contrary to other Southern African states, Botswana's land utilisation profile had not been developed with the primary aim of land redistribution, but rather to increase agricultural productivity, conserve range resources, and improve social equity in the rural areas (Donnet 2009). Both Mozambique and Botswana renewed their commitments to land tenure, although it is unclear whether these countries had the capacity to implement such policies. The demand for land has never been an issue for Botswana with vast region five reserves that are for ranching purposes.

In Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, where most of the large-scale South African White farmers have established themselves, the future of the customary tenure areas remains doubtful. Botswana was seen amending existing or drafting new policies where necessary, to ensure that the prevailing institutional frameworks to improve tenure security and transparency in the land administration and management was guaranteed.

Unlike in Zimbabwe and any other Southern African countries, land reform in Mozambique centred on tenure reforms. Several tenure policies were enacted, for example, the land law which aimed at protecting both customary rights of existing occupiers on communal land, as well as strengthening the rights of private companies and individuals wishing to acquire access to land and natural resources for commercial purposes (Hanlon 2002 and Lahiff 2003). The variation in the urgency of land reform informed the approaches nations took. The domestic imperatives dictated the approaches that individual nations decided upon.

In Botswana, Malope and Batisani (2008) argue that land policies had not been developed with the primary aim of land redistribution, but rather to increase agricultural productivity, conserve range resources and improve social equity in the country's rural areas. Thus the government introduced varied agricultural policies such as the Tribal Land Grazing policy, National Policy on Agricultural Development as well as the Land Boards. In Mozambique, Palmer (2004) says that the enactment of the land law was followed by a comprehensive public awareness campaign, the Land Campaign (*Campanha Terra*) that aimed to help people understand their rights under the new law.

The African Union Commission, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and African Development Bank define land tenure as the nature of and the process, in which land rights and interests over various categories of land are created or determined, allocated and

enjoyed by the affected people (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank 2010a). Land rights and land tenure varied from country to country and these guided decisions on the manner nations appropriated their land. Zimbabwe had a unique case that must be looked at through the historical lens because since colonisation, the tussle for land between Blacks and Whites was centred on the climate conditions and soil fertility that one race determined to deny access to the other.

In Botswana local Land Boards were established to deal with land issues and these were integrated with the traditional leadership in the new structures (Land Boards) to bring transparency in the customary land administration, whilst in Mozambique Land laws were enacted to deal with land matters. Although Botswana used local Land Boards to ensure land productivity, it should be noted that Mozambique used the land law to prevent conflicts and protected investors as a result.

Tanner and Baleira (2006) add that the Land Law in Mozambique was made to ensure that large areas of unused land, even where it was in the hands of the private sector were allocated to major investors, for forestry plantations. In this case, the Mozambican government suggested a more direct approach to reform, where it sought to find land for large-scale investors, and reasserted its control over the land owner. Small scale farmers in Mozambique were losing land to well-placed individuals and foreign investors who were acquiring state farm land lawfully. It was more of redistribution as opposed to the land productivity in Botswana which had no extensive motives for land distribution. Martins et al (2003) say that Botswana is believed to have managed the process of reducing the powers of traditional leaders by dealing with the issue in a measured way, over a long period of time. The processes varied due to the needs assessments of each member state.

The outcomes of the land tenure systems of both Mozambique and Botswana received much criticism from various stakeholders in their respective countries. As regular policy reviews have been enacted by the government to identify specific problems and respond to them with specific tenure innovations in Botswana. White (2009) notes that the Land Boards have been criticised for the failure to meet the needs of service users, but rather satisfied their own agendas instead of addressing issues of social equity across the rural areas. Similarly, Lahiff (2003) reflects that the Land Law in Mozambique is seen as not having delivered significant benefits to the rural population as the natural resources remained in the hands of the elite groups.

Hanlon (2002) argues that consultations done with the communities and the agreements made did not secure the best deal for the community, as communities ended up losing their valuable land permanently to the investors. As if that was not enough, the Independent News Letter (2004) postulates that the land question in Mozambique continues to be shaped by a history of dispossession, exclusion, and exploitation and so shares much with neighbouring Zimbabwe and South Africa. Private investors benefitted most and continued to capture best land and valuable resources with little or no returns to the communities who hold nominal rights over the resources. The choices within the individual national structures guided the processes of land redistribution.

Nevertheless, it needs to be highlighted that although both Botswana and Mozambique renewed their commitments to land tenure, they both took different routes. Mozambique used the liberal approach to the resolution of land crisis, through land nationalism with even more intensive attempts at socialistic transformation of land, through state and cooperative farms. This included the redress of unequal land distribution reforming their dualistic tenure systems and improving administrative and legal capacities to manage land reforms.

Thus, the nationalisation of White settler lands and foreign commercial structures of capital was pursued in Mozambique where Botswana adopted a total free trade and free market option which resulted in the growth of direct foreign investment and laissez-faire capitalism. Land expropriation was used sparingly in the smaller areas of White settler settlements. Thus, the government's strategy had been one of careful change, responding to specific tenure innovations. This strategy remains relevant today. However, whilst recognising its relevance and the fact that it has delivered significant success in land administration, it is necessary to come up with new approaches to address contemporary challenges facing the land sector in view of the colonial driven land imbalances that continue to haunt the SADC sub-region.

The remaining countries in the region experienced less expropriation and occupation, yet they suffered colonial land-related domination. The challenges in land governance in these countries therefore differed from those of countries that were heavily settled by White colonialists as a preferred place to domicile. In the latter group, there was a need to redistribute land from minority Whites to the majority Blacks who were dispossessed of their land during the colonial period. Still, for other countries in the region, such as

Mozambique and Angola, the post-independence period saw internal conflicts in the form of civil wars that displaced many people from their land. These countries also had to deal with land governance issues, as they had to redistribute land to displaced people in their societies.

6.3 THE LAND REPOSSESSION BACKLASH: ZIMBABWE'S DEFENCES

Mumbengegwi (2016) highlights that Zimbabwe had over the last 15 years faced challenges in its relations with some Western countries, which arose primarily due to its standoff with the British over the land reform programme. He indicates that the country had been reeling under illegal and unjustified sanctions instigated by the UK and the USA and supported by the EU and its allies such as of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. His conclusion is that combating the Western onslaught had been a foreign policy priority for the government of Zimbabwe over the period. The government's effort to address the onslaught mirrored the pain associated with the impasse that set the pace for the continued engagements and reengagements

Zimbabwe does not regret embarking on the land reform programme, although it has attracted debilitating economic sanctions from the West, because it is a principled nation that knows its destiny (Mugabe 2018). Mnangagwa (2018) noted the importance of Zimbabwe's decision to quit the Commonwealth of Nations, pointing to the need for all to accept that the land reform in Zimbabwe was a concluded undertaking and that farming activities needed to be modernised and mechanised to achieve more output per hectare. Gwaradzimba (2018) notes the centrality of equity in the land redistribution efforts in Manicaland Province and warns of future land-based wars from the disadvantaged if the redistribution was not done equitably and transparently.⁴⁴ These policy statements outline the Second Republic's clarity on the centrality of the land issue to the survival of Zimbabwe as a sovereign nation and give guidelines on the management of the land question into the future. Equity would become the anchor for all future redistributions.

⁴⁴ Here see personal interview with the late Ellen Gwaradzimba Minister of State for Provincial Affairs Board Room, 9 October 2018. The then Chairperson on the Provincial Land Identification Committee said; "We can only avert future wars on land if we emphasize on equity in our land redistribution profile in the province". Also the Minutes of the Manicaland Provincial Land Identification Committee Meeting, (the researcher was then the Commander 3 Infantry Brigade, a member of the provincial land identification committee that allocated land to the deserving members in the province).

ZIDERA, the American sanctions cocktail that targeted primarily the agro-based economy of Zimbabwe as discussed earlier was a more focused economic sanctions regime unlike the restrictive measures propelled through the EU. The compelling idea of ZIDERA was to collapse the agriculture-based economy in order to force the citizens to revolt against the government and result in a regime change. Zimbabwe was declared a tyrannical state and classified as an unusual threat to America's national interest (Rice 2005). Due to Zimbabwe's huge reliance on agriculture, suffocating this area in achieving the set objective for the sanctioners made strategic sense. Against the stated background, mapping sufficient safeguards by Zimbabwe in the economic arena was very important for its survival. From a distance one wonders how a small country like Zimbabwe could become a threat to the USA.

The idea of taking back the land without compensation was a radical approach that was to sent ripples across the world and has become a direct challenge to the neo-liberal world order. If it was allowed to succeed in Zimbabwe it would naturally have spelt the death of the West's influence on how property changes hands, which clearly from this analysis, became a special threat to the USA's national interest. The special threat became a reality once Zimbabwe proved its capacity to enforce the idea through its national structures (the police force). This capability to enforce the land laws became the unusual national security threat to the big powers whose reactions had to send the appropriate message across the world.

When ZIDERA was enacted, the Agriculture Bank of Zimbabwe was among the most important institutions profiled for the sanctions. This bank was directly associated with the government and had become a crucial player in financing the agricultural mechanisation activities in Zimbabwe, a crucial driver for the empowerment programme.⁴⁵ Alongside the economic route, the West purposively financed research work to build a case against Zimbabwe's land reform in order to discourage any other nation aspiring to address the colonial land imbalances

⁴⁵ For more information see the ZIDERA sanctions list. 2011. The United States' central bank and the Federal Reserve Bank have frozen two Zimbabwean accounts belonging to Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) and Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC); the late Minister of Foreign Affairs S B Moyo Welcomes UN call for sanctions removal: The Herald 1 April 2020.

The anticipated disastrous economic results associated with Zimbabwe's land reform and its link to the economic downturn arising from the purported chaotic nature and the disregard for the rule of law in the redistribution, were among important themes that ran in the land reform discourse that attracted a slew of Western-sponsored experts (Tobaiwa 1998, Meredith 2005 and Howard-Hassmann 2009). These themes were magnified and perpetuated by the West-sponsored electronic and print media to establish and sustain negative perceptions about the land reform in Zimbabwe and any other similar interventions the nation undertook.

Tibaijuka (2005) noted in her report on Operations Murambatsvina that there was an instant need to reinstate a climate of confidence and negotiation between diverse spheres of government and between management and civil society in Zimbabwe. This process was to develop from a broad-based discussion among all Zimbabwean participants and facilitated by the UN. The report noted that the government of Zimbabwe was accountable for what had transpired. However, it looked that there was no shared decision making regarding to both the formation and application of the process of Restore order the report further revealed.

Tibaijuka (2005) suggested that Murambatsvina was founded on inappropriate advice by a few designers of the operation who should be held to account for the damage triggered by the operation. The result was a polarised society that appreciated the internal national challenges in a confrontational way, a divided society that identified activities based on party dictates rather than national interest. In the absence of an important rallying point like land, the nation became divided to the extent of perpetuating the negative perceptions from within.

The targeted institutions were strategically and appropriately selected to frustrate internal mechanisms that created capacities for sanctions-busting. The economy was isolated, starved of the much needed balance of payment support and could not feed from the international resources through the American managed Bretton Woods institutions.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ The IMF and the World Bank are key players in the interaction of nation states creating lines of credit and infrastructural development across the world. These institutions have a strong capacity and capability to guide funding for developmental programmes and influence other lenders across the international system. Once a member has been considered rogue by these institutions, association with such shunned member becomes problematic.

Zimbabwe had to reset its survival antennae to deal with the sanctions-induced challenges locally and internationally. Both the internal and external publics had to be sensitised and guided on the obtaining activities and mechanisms aimed at reducing the impact of the sanctions on Zimbabweans.

The office of the President and Cabinet of Zimbabwe spearheaded and monitored the effectiveness of such strategies. The internal activities were targeted at creating rallying points for Zimbabweans to ensure cohesion in dealing with the anticipated challenges. Regionally and internationally the nation had to manage the battered image by telling the compelling and historical need for land redistribution, indicating that the land reform in Zimbabwe was irreversible and had been embedded in a number of amendments to the Lancaster House Constitution and the country's 2013 home grown national law.

The historical underpinnings became the key rallying point for Zimbabweans as they told their story at every opportunity. Internal measures aimed at cushioning the suffering poor population were introduced as empowerment mechanisms that had to militate against the impact of the unilaterally imposed Western sanctions. Externally at the UN General Assembly level the debate dealt with the manner powerful countries disregarded the approved norms of behaviour as spelt-out in the Charter of the United Nations.

6.4 THE DIPLOMATIC MECHANISMS

The UN Charter defines matters that constitute threat to international peace and it is through the interpretation of the Charter that matters pass for deliberations whose outcomes arise as resolutions.⁴⁷ Such resolutions are administered by a 15 member Security Council, composed of the permanent five (P5) and the rotational 10. This Council is the most important operational arm of the UN that directs and administers all activities from the statutory annual meetings of the General Assembly (the highest policy making body of the UN) that addresses threats to international peace and other UN supporting agencies. The UN Security Council is mandated as well to bring matters that threaten international peace for its consideration or for consideration by the UN General Assembly

⁴⁷ The General Assembly may deliberate on any questions related to the sustenance of international peace and security set before it by any Member of the Community of Nations, in accordance with Article 35, section 2, and, except as provided in Article 12. A question on which action is required shall be directed to the Security Council by the General Assembly.

as and when such assessments are convened by special structures under the UN Security Council's guidance between the statutory and ad-hoc meetings.

An overview of international relations reveals that, the effectiveness of a member state's diplomacy is judged by the positive or negative reactions of the P5. Even though the views and norms are developed through discussions at the UN General Assembly level, any dissenting voice attracting a veto ⁴⁸ from any of the P5 individually or in combination stalls progress on such issues. The debate on the need to democratise this institution rages on and is likely to go on without conclusion for the foreseeable future due to the centrality of its operations in the international system and the competing national interests of those wielding the veto power. Interests are at the core of the choices nations make as they interact in the international system and it is generally agreed that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies but rather, enduring national interests.

Sharp (2009) defines diplomacy as the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations. Diplomacy aligns both the domestic and foreign policies of member states and ensures sustained communication on pertinent issues of national survival among nations and is an important vehicle that diffuses potential conflicts if managed timeously and appropriately. Policy on the other hand is defined by Sharp (2009) as a certain course or way of accomplishment selected from among substitutes and in light of given circumstances to guide and regulate present and future choices. This is the road map that addresses and measures the attainment of set objectives in manageable chunks that address the national interest. Such objectives are guided by the foreign policy positions which must align with the enduring national interest (domestic policy).

The crown of diplomacy as a generic rule is vested in the head of state and/or government and is expounded by ambassadors or head of missions at the international level. Zimbabwe's foreign and domestic policies were spearheaded by the late former head of

⁴⁸ For more information see the UN Security Council, Voting System: The creators of the United Nations Charter conceived that five countries; China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) [which was succeeded in 1990 by the Russian Federation], the United Kingdom and the United States of America, because of their key roles in the establishment of the United Nations, would continue to play important roles in the maintenance of international peace and security. They were granted the special status of Permanent Member States at the Security Council, along with a special voting power known as the "right to veto". It was agreed by the drafters that if any one of the five permanent members cast a negative vote in the 15-member Security Council, the resolution or decision would not be approved and no further debate on the issue would be entertained.

state and government, Robert Gabriel Mugabe who, at every turn reminded all and sundry of the torturous sanctions journey Zimbabwe was negotiating since its unlawful imposition by Britain and its allies as a reaction to the FTLR programme of 2000 (The Guardian staff and agencies, 3 September 2002). Continued re-engagements and engagements became important in sustaining positional debates and appreciating the standpoints of others. It was through such engagements that perceptions were revealed and distortions discussed and new positions on Zimbabwe's FTLR programme established.

Cognizant of the importance and centrality of the inner circle, Zimbabwe carefully appraised and apprised its immediate neighbours within the SADC sub-region on the land redistribution challenges it had with Britain, stressing how the British government had reneged on its 1979 Lancaster House promises. Zimbabwe's position was well received by most of the SADC member states who took responsibility to speak on Zimbabwe's behalf at every forum and that was escalated to the African region and the international community.⁴⁹ Worth noting is the fact that, most governments established from the former liberation movements were more forthright in their uptake and the sharing of Zimbabwe's struggle to redress the land redistribution question at every forum. This club shared the notion that the West's entrenched position against land redistribution in Zimbabwe was a negation of the reasons the armed liberation struggles had been fought.

Nujoma (2002) noted that Southern Africa had one big problem, created by the British when the EU imposed the sanctions against Zimbabwe. He called for the removal of the sanctions, indicating that the British colonial settlers in Zimbabwe owned 78% of the land in Zimbabwe, and that Zimbabwe was a tiny country with 14 million landless indigenous people that needed land. This became the chorus of the front line states in their

⁴⁹ Here see S Nujoma 2002. Earth Summit – Blair has created problems for Southern Africa. <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/namibia-blames-blair-for-africa-s-troubles-1.10> accessed: 25 June 2019 and Personal interview with Ambassador J Manzou, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Zimbabwe Staff College, 9 July 2020: The sanctions remain a huge work-up call for the small developing nations of the world who decide to determine that which is good for its people outside the dictates of the neo-liberals. The Look East Policy approach allowed another day for the nation of Zimbabwe to soldier on. See also ZBC Staff Reporter, 2020. In her address to SADC citizens and the world at large ahead of the regional bloc's second Anti-Sanctions Day, SADC Executive Secretary Dr Stergomena Lawrence Tax, said the region was being weighed down by the economic embargo placed on Zimbabwe by the West as punishment for the land reform programme. The Islamic Republic of Iran through their Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed solidarity with Zimbabwe following SADC's declaration of October 25 as the SADC Anti-Sanctions Day to oppose sanctions against Zimbabwe. The Iranian government equated the sanctions to economic terrorism, saying the embargo puts pressure on ordinary Zimbabweans. <https://www.zbcnews.co.zw/africa-stands-in-solidarity-with-zimbabwe-against-sanctions> accessed: 25 October.

appreciation of the regional challenges arising from the regional armed liberation struggles.⁵⁰ These ideals shape the uniqueness of the SADC sub-region as it interacted with other regions in the international system.

Once the debate was understood and appreciated at the sub-regional level, the same approach was repeated at the regional and international levels. Like at the regional level, the head of state and government alongside the country's diplomatic representatives spearheaded the strategic policy pronouncements Zimbabwe was taking to address its colonial disagreement with Britain. Also, all the Zimbabwe diplomatic missions across the regions were tasked to preach the story of the negative impact of the unilaterally induced West's illegal sanctions from a harmonised standpoint.

It made strategic sense at the UN General Assembly for Zimbabwe to identify itself with one veto carrying member or a combination as an important national security safeguard. Because of this status, Zimbabwe secured both China and Russia to its side on all matters of national survival. One of the most dramatic events in the history of the UN was a double veto following the West's push for the UN Chapter VII deployment after Zimbabwe's 2008 disputed presidential elections. When Zimbabwe experienced a Cholera outbreak in 2008 the USA sponsored a foiled Chapter VII deployment.⁵¹ The logic of deploying hard power for a medical emergency remains a mystery. The normal UN responses for medical emergencies are doctors and vaccines alongside resources that address the cause of the particular medical emergency.

This study observes that, what transpired was one of Zimbabwe's diplomatic acumen that foiled a planned West-led mission under the banner of medical emergency that had been brewed to punish Zimbabwe for not toeing the neo-liberal line. Zimbabwe's arrogance as interpreted by the neo-liberals created a special threat that required urgent and decisive action utilising whatever excuse as revealed by Rice as discussed in section 5.6 above.

⁵⁰ The Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FLMSA) is an association of six political parties which were involved in the nationalist movements of Southern Africa. It has its roots in the Frontline States (FLS). The FLS were a loose coalition of African countries from the 1960s to the early 1990s committed to ending apartheid and White minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia.

⁵¹ Here see N MacFarquhar 2008. A rare double veto to quash a resolution that they said represented excessive interference in the country's domestic matters. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/africa/12zimbabwe.html> accessed: 26 June 2019; Senior Colonel Lyu Zhiong, Visiting Chinese Military Training Team Leader. China will always remain on Zimbabwe's side as a sovereign state. The nation must be given the opportunity to address its internal issues without undue influence from external powers. Interview on the Zimbabwe's Relationship with the West after the FTLR programme. Harare, 10 July 2020.

6.5 POLICY DISPOSITIONS

Allied to the development of the diplomacy pronouncements, policy positions to deal with the negative impact of sanctions took their cue from the highest office of the land as well. These were outlined at different fora and platforms within and without Zimbabwe (Youde 2013). The perceptions of the sanctions cocktail were varied; reflective of the conflicting norms prevailing in the international system and the apparent polarisation of the Zimbabwean community. Chingono (2009) reveals that the prevailing consensus among the West and its allies is that the fundamental objective of the sanctions on Zimbabwe is to restore normalcy according to the Western modern standards of democracy.

On the contrary, the Zimbabwe government perceives the economic sanctions as an illegal tool meant to destabilise the internal political affairs of the country (particularly the land reform exercise) and a serious contravention of the principle of non-interference in a country's political internal matters which is a subversion of Zimbabwe's sovereignty (Chingono 2009). Policies as guidelines that outline parameters in addressing foreseen challenges arising from conflicts in international relations regulate the reactions. If structured appropriately and debated at opinion leadership platforms, they can standardise harmonious national reactions to national challenges including sanctions.

Zimbabwe's policies arose from the unilaterally Western-driven sanctions that were targeted at crippling the agro-based economy. Land as the key source and resource repossessed from the minority Whites became the battleground between Zimbabwe and the West. The Look East, Indigenisation and the Sustainable Socio-Economic policies, the continued engagements and re-engagement and rapprochement efforts were policy measures established to address the negative impact of the West-imposed sanctions during the period 2000 to 2016.

6.5.1 The Look East Policy: An Option for Survival from the Neo-liberal Backlash

The Look East Policy was born out of necessity to starve off economic strangulation of a plucky Zimbabwe by the Western bloc. Mutsvangwa (2020) notes the important offshoots from the policy as Zimbabwe's national airline, Air Zimbabwe, launched the first ever African flight to China in March 2004. This unlocked commercial links at bilateral and continental scale; Zimbabwe's Approved Tourist Destination status; and the top prize

being the China Tobacco Company which addressed the tobacco sales that had plummeted to a low of 30 000 tonnes from 219 000 tonnes per year.

This saved the land reform from catastrophic failure. In the infrastructure and mining areas, Mutsvangwa reveals that the Chinese companies were addressing the national energy deficit with the Kariba and Hwange projects and Tsingshan Steel had established five chrome furnaces in Selous and new 300 000 coke oven batteries in Hwange. Regarding airport infrastructure, the Victoria Falls Airport runway and Harare International Airport were upgraded to accommodate larger aircraft.

Historically, the colonial economy was skewed in favour of the White settler minority and remained predominantly governed by the same up to 2000. Human-made obstacles were crafted to elbow Africans out of any meaningful participation in the country's economy except as cheap labour. Africans could not legally own land in parts of the country which included all urban and mining centres and areas where commercial agriculture was possible. They could not become owners of manufacturing businesses, mines, or commercial farms.

Mlambo (2017) reflects that the colonial financial institutions as well would not provide loans to African entrepreneurs who were regarded as high risk because they did not have collateral. Africans could only operate eating houses, small retail shops, grinding mills, tuck shops and bars in the African townships and in the African Reserved Areas. This afforded the minority White a stronghold on the economy of the country at every level including the education sector. These structures continued in 1980 when Zimbabwe opted for reconciliation and coexistence with the White minority.

Thus Zimbabwe was a country that had a highly sophisticated and thriving manufacturing sector which had emerged out of a century of colonial rule making it a country dotted with prosperous enclaves in a sea of poverty. Zimbabwe's economic foundation had been laid only by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) whose brief was to further England's colonial interests. Berry (2005) reveals that between 1890 and September 1923 the land was managed by BSAC in terms of a Royal Charter authorized to Cecil John Rhodes by Queen Victoria.

The Charter empowered the BSAC to, *inter alia*, make agreements, enact laws, preserve the peace, uphold a police force, obtain new enterprises and commonly provide, at the Company's expenditure, the infrastructure of a new colony. After being repossessed of its political responsibilities, the Company continued to accomplish a varied range of agricultural, mining and commercial ventures in both Southern and Northern Rhodesia until it incorporated with the Anglo-American Corporation in 1965 (Berry 2005). According to Seidman (1982) the independence government of Zimbabwe inherited in 1980 a highly unequal economy in which the country enjoyed one of the highest average per capita incomes in sub-Saharan Africa, but the majority of its population remained among the most impoverished in the world.

How to address the imbalance whilst maintaining the country's position as a premier manufacturing economy was the major challenge the government faced at independence in 1980. The expansion of education and health services and the return of the ordinary people's access to these services at independence are well documented milestones that the government achieved (Mlambo 1997 and 2005). The thrust in these selected areas was to address the equity component to the citizenry where land became both a huge source and resource for all to appreciate.

According to Raftopoulos (2000) Zimbabwe's industrial economy and commercial agriculture remained in the hands of the minority Whites and their transnational corporate partners, who co-opted a few African elites in junior positions, becoming a link to the post-colonial ruling elite policy makers. In the manufacturing sector, there were several carryovers into the independence period. The remnant disparities led to the expansion of numerous indigenous lobby groups challenging for a portion in the country's cake. These lobby groups became an advocacy for the country's Indigenisation Policy in 2008 (Mlambo 2015). These groups educated the indigenous community on the space created for equity in development of the economy and raised hope for a prosperous future for the previously marginalised majority Blacks. However, tangible programmes were required to reveal the obtaining possibilities for the indigenous communities.

Muzondidya (2007) observes that the land invasions of 2000 which are associated with the government's unplanned FTLR programme accelerated the country's economic decline. This was mostly driven by perceptions arising from the neo-liberal sponsored researches

because the impact of the activities, both positive and negative, could not have been empirically established in a period of six years between 2001 and 2007 to correlate the economic decline to the FTLR programme. Perceptions in the international system are an important indicator for sustained relationships that project predictability. Predictability being a critical driver of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was affected by these perceptions driven by the West and sustained through the Western electronic and print media. Asymmetric warfare took shape and was ignited by the land invasions of 2000. In 1998 the Svosve people's resolve to the takeover land signalled the beginning of a radical approach to land redistribution in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the 2000 eruptions should not have come as a complete surprise to the international community.

McNeil (1998) noted that the endless war over land that began when Whites seized the country in 1890 was fuelled by the government of Zimbabwe's unfulfilled promises through the 1992 land Act to redistribute the land to poor farmers. McNeil noted a new front that had opened when hundreds of subsistence farmers from 20 villages in the Svosve communal area left the rocky lands their families had been pushed into and moved onto three farms in the Marondera area.

This was a serious indicator for the upcoming violent invasions that would have guided future genuine interactions between the government and the land owners who were predominantly from White. However, due to the entrenched positions and arrogance from the Whites and the Blacks, the opportunity to resolve the simmering conflict was ignored. Barely two years later in February 2000 in a dramatic fashion, Zimbabwe woke-up to the realities of the challenges of the land imbalance had that been wished away during the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement and at the Harare Donor Conference of 1998.

6.5.2 The Indigenisation Policy: A Misunderstood Internal Intervention Mechanism

The Indigenisation Policy was one of the most misunderstood internal interventions that the government of Zimbabwe established to align the people in the fight for survival under the punitive economic sanctions by the West. What was at the core of the contention was the 51/49% share ratio in favour of indigenous Zimbabweans in joint ventures by foreign

nationals who were expected to bring-in the FDI.⁵² The explanation was that the Zimbabweans owned the resources which were important in the sustenance of enterprises yet, the value of an untapped resource remained at zero without the input by the enterprises.

The indigenous empowerment programme drew mixed reactions both externally and internally as government ministers showed ignorance in the manner they interpreted the policy. This disharmony from the government ministers who were expected to be more knowledgeable created suspicion and doubt on the sincerity of the policy. None could have expected positive uptake from the external publics once the internal system was contradictory. Polarisation can also be blamed for the mixed interpretation of the Indigenisation Policy as the ruling party and the opposition parties disagreed on everything and anything presented by the other side. The adage that when brothers fight to death, the neighbour takes the loot was apparent in Zimbabwe.

The inconsistencies in the interpretation of the policy revealed the apparent lack of oneness and ownership which further created doubts among potential investors who were undone by the clause that made them minority shareholders in their own companies (Bloc 2013). Even though the empowerment law was not peculiar to Zimbabwe, its timing left more questions than answers. Coming in 2008, about eight years after the FTLR programme and in a year when there was a hung Parliament and a contested presidential election. The FTLR programme was viewed by the opposition MDC as a rushed policy position meant to appease the indigenous people who supported the ZANU PF led government and not a national priority. The divided views by the Zimbabweans based on the divided sympathy along party lines, resulted in a very low uptake by foreigners and important national programmes failed to attract sufficient funding that would have generated jobs for the growing numbers of jobless youths.

The fact that government officials failed to speak with one voice, coupled with the limited campaigns to educate the internal and external publics degraded an otherwise well-meaning pro-people programme that could have changed the economic profile of the indigenous Zimbabweans forever. What was needed was to initiate debates with opinion

⁵² For more information see The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act 14 of 2007 provided for a 51% indigenous shareholding in all business with net asset value of USD500 thousand and above: Government Printer.

leaders, the public and academia prior to the launch of the indigenisation policy and this would have provided sufficient scope for a more informed policy initiative that could have attracted ownership by the generality of the Zimbabweans. Once ownership was achieved by the majority, the programme could have attracted more takers who would have generated employment that could have led to economic growth.

6.5.3 Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio - Economic Transformation Policy

The competing party manifestos in the run-up of the 2013 Harmonised Elections gave serious indications of the intentions the main opposing political parties had for Zimbabwe in addressing the socio-economic challenges bedevilling the nation. ZANU PF party produced the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset). This policy document identified activities in four clusters that were to drive the economy of Zimbabwe in a double-phased 'Quick Wins' for a five-year period from 2013 – 2018. Phase one of the programme was to run from 2013 – 2015 and the second from 2016 – 2018 (Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation – "Towards an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy" October 2013 – December 2018). The phased programme was envisaged to allow for progress reviews that would have guided the actions for the upcoming period. These reviews were necessary in regulating the efforts to address the foreseen gaps.

Zim-Asset was developed to attain sustainable development and social equity based on indigenisation and enablement creation, which were to be catapulted by the efficient utilisation of the country's abounding human and natural resources.⁵³ This required a complete change of mind-set within management and demanded coordinated activities across ministries spearheading the different policy clusters. Besides the mind-set alignment, the plan sought to propel and bear the pro-people driven programme to cement the indigenisation prospects that had met with some misgivings in previous attempts.

The policy document was anchored on the Results Based Management System covering; food security and nutrition, social services and poverty eradication, infrastructure and utilities and value addition and beneficiation. The resource base and the huge comparative advantage Zimbabwe had over other regional and international players were to be the key

⁵³ The endowment of Zimbabwe cut across the high literate rate huge and varied minerals which if utilised appropriately provided comparative advantage in the SADC sub-region.

success enablers that the nation needed to take on board. The key enablers were to be guided at revamping and guiding the activities of the clusters to produce in excess and to grow the stagnant economy. Producing in excess was to be a critical driver for all the targeted activities and an anchor for economic growth.

The four clusters formed the basis for growing the economy providing linkages among them. Monitoring was to be done at the highest level on results-based deliverables set for short-term periods. Chitiyo and Kibble (2014) note that for the country to attract investment it needed to demonstrate that it was a worthwhile business destination and a serious partner in a competitive global economy. It also needed to demonstrate its competitive advantage as an investment destination, with emphasis on establishing stability and certainty (Chitiyo and Kibble 2014).⁵⁴ Certainty and stability remained key deliverables that would have attracted the much needed FDI and the necessary confidence of the returns for the capital injections into the economy.

Certainty breeds perceptions that are important and necessary for meaningful dialogue that guides continuous interactions on areas of mutual benefit. The basis was to identify local capabilities that would have created sufficient springboards for the economic growth. However, due to the obtaining negative views by the dominant neo-liberal donors on the rule of law and property rights, FDI inflows remained very low. The internally generated finances were not sufficient to uplift the expected growth burden for the economy which had taken a huge bettering from the West-induced sanctions for more than a decade.

6.6 THE ENGAGEMENTS, RE-ENGAGEMENTS AND RECONCILIATION EFFORTS

Zimbabwe as a member of the UN and other international organisations, subscribes to the IMF and the World Bank, institutions Zimbabwe has had frosty relations with from the late 1990s. However, these institutions have maintained an oversight role on the country's economic profile because Zimbabwe is intrinsically part of its system. The concept of re-engagement entails the process of restoring Zimbabwe's relations with mainly the West which were strained, since 2001 when the EU, USA and other Western countries imposed

⁵⁴ In a sign of thawing relations, Denmark has re-established its embassy in Zimbabwe, 12 years after it was shut down in protest at the land redistribution programme which the government implemented. Harare, 20 May.

economic sanctions. The process entailed the return of Zimbabwe to the multilateral institutions and the clearance of a USD10 billion debt due to the IMF, the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB) and other bilateral lenders. The IMF led the negotiations for the resumption of business terminated in 1999 over the debt overhang (Mandaza 2016). Engagement on the other hand entailed breaking new ground in the socio-economic relations with new partners in the international system.

The 2002 presidential elections marked the fallout between Zimbabwe and the West. However, the withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth of Nations in 2003 witnessed the re-engagement of Zimbabwe with the West, facilitated by Mbeki under the aegis of SADC sub-region. The process got the blessings of Blair and Bush and support from Nigeria's Obasanjo (Chitiyo and Kibble 2014). When Zimbabwe disengaged from the Commonwealth of Nations, other members in the grouping felt that Australia was to blame for the eventual and unexpected position Zimbabwe had taken.⁵⁵ The disengagement of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth of Nations was a surprise to many in the grouping. However, the intra-grouping's mixed views revealed the influence of kith and kin and the competing domestic and regional priorities during the interactions.

Chinamasa notes that re-engagement wanted to allow impetus to a presumed political and economic programme with those Zimbabwe had strained relations (Chinamasa 2014). The 2014 conference sought to renew the declining hope which had witnessed a slow re-engagement due to political and economic factors in the US-led Western bloc, insisting on concrete evidence of political reform and human rights before any possibility of full re-engagement. The position of the EU however, remained flexible (Moral 2015). The IMF was working with Zimbabwe on the resumption of a Comprehensive Country Finance targeted as follow-on to the rolling out and conclusion of the Debt Arrears Clearance Strategy (IMF/World Bank Annual General Meeting 2015). The continued interactions at both the regional and international levels were a strong sign of the effectiveness of the diplomatic machinery within the groupings and Zimbabwe without which the impasse could have taken long to ease.

⁵⁵ For more information see SADC Barometer, January 2004 edition. Following the CHOGM, the SADC provide a communiqué in which it expressed their worry regarding the 'intolerant, dismissive, and inflexible attitude' represented by some Commonwealth members regarding Zimbabwe's land reform case. The SADC has continuously pleaded for greater patience and appreciation of Zimbabwe, and warned against lecturing and hectoring.

The end of the inclusive government in 2013 marked the end of the interparty politics of accommodation and negotiation that had coexisted in the historic inclusive government era. Under the arrangement, despite serious interparty differences, the ministerial stakeholders, the Prime Minister and President had managed to establish a working relationship that enabled the March 2013 Constitutional Referendum to materialise (Zimbabwe Constitutional Referendum 2013). A home grown constitution was established and paved the way for the 2013 Harmonised Elections, which were overwhelmingly won by ZANU PF. ZANU PF's victory created a changed environment that attracted more engagements from the international system at various levels. Having anticipated a popular vote for the opposition political parties in the 2013 harmonised elections, the resounding defeat for the opposition created some option for more dialogue by all.

Balancing the concerns of the citizenry and the international norms poses challenges especially for small and weak states. Zimbabwe is not an exception. In its efforts to appease those nations whose land was covered under the bilateral protection agreements, Zimbabwe published statutory instrument 62 of 2020 to address the attendant challenge of compensation (Statutory Instrument 62 (4)). The current policy position does not discriminate on those farmers who were left with farms to acquire the 99-year lease agreements from the government through the Ministry of Lands, Water and Rural Development. However, the statutory instrument indicates the delicate balance needed in the process for it not to be viewed as a reversal of the FTLR programme. Comprehensive debates are required to find some common ground on the best way to address the inherent challenge of revisiting the land issue that was concluded by the constitution, the supreme law of the land.

6.7 KITH AND KIN: THE DRIVER OF THE MIXED REACTIONS

The Zimbabwe's FTLR programme attracted a lot of research work from within and without Zimbabwe. Most who had been schooled in the neo-liberal institutions enquiring or doing any work that told a negative story on the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme did so with vigour. The view that linked economic meltdown to the post 2000 reform land gained traction. This was linked to allegations of; human rights abuses and failure to uphold the rule of law by the ZANU PF led government, and this attracted a lot of research work (Astill and Beaumont 2001, Sachikonye 2007, Shaw 2003 and Howard-Hassmann 2010).

Nothing positive concerning the FTLR programme in Zimbabwe was raised in the neo-liberal writings.

Whilst the West sponsored the negative perceptions about the FTLR programme as chaotic and out of step with the norms in the international system, the opposite was true of the SADC sub-region member states (Chaumba, Soones and Wolmer 2003, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006 and Ndlovu 2020).⁵⁶ These appreciated the milestone achievement resulting from the repossessed land, declaring and celebrating the final victory that gave the majority Blacks not only their sovereignty but dignity lost during the colonial era. They announced these positions during international fora and in meetings at the SADC, AU and UN levels. As discussions ensued at these platforms, the lens used by both sides reflected the inherent influence of regional perceptions. The debates were awash with the interpretational innuendoes that buttressed the preferred intra-region norms.

These conflicting standpoints attest to the imperatives of kith and kin. There are established, inherent norms, values and beliefs systems that abound in different communities. Societies align with these norms, shared values and beliefs that are established over long periods of time. For the West, any move to address the land issue in Zimbabwe was viewed as a direct challenge to the ethics of democracy, property rights and rule of law whereas for the African community, taking up land through whatever formula was important to restore the dignity that was long-lost under the colonial rule.

Zimbabwe's retaking of land from the Whites represented a democratic right that had taken painfully long to address because the Whites had perpetuated a system that accepted that there was a special White race that could not be challenged by the inferior Black race at any point in the relations between these two races. The statutes on Whites-only hotels, food outlets, and shops in parts of a city, Whites alone toilets and such other reflections proved the supremacy of the governing laws then. In businesses, the Blacks were not allowed to venture into established ring-fenced Whites-only areas.

⁵⁶ Masisi calls for Zim sanctions removal. The Botswana President said that, "Sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the United States and its Western allies are not only suffocating Harare's economy but also regional development and should be removed. I also reiterate that Botswana, specifically Botswana, strongly appeals for the repeal of the Zimbabwe Recovery and Economic Act and the targeted sanctions programme imposed by the United States. We do so fully cognizant of the debilitating impact of sanctions on the economy of Zimbabwe and undoubtedly the economies of the neighbouring countries such as Botswana. It is hypocritical for the world leaders to expect Zimbabwe to transform the economy when it remained under the yoke of illegal sanctions"

The scenario evidently allowed a long period in the relationships between the White and Black communities that established the notion of superiority of the colour White, over Black. It was only that, which was determined from the personality of the White that was considered to be the best for the country. The colonial period with its distortions and human-made reflections, prepared the ground for the White men to not only feel superior, but established and armed the minority with laws to defend the superiority at every opportunity, everywhere and every time. As the Blacks got hold of the reins of power they ironically applied the White humankind's concepts to determine the future of the country in an endeavour to address the disparities between the races in Zimbabwe.

6.8 CONCLUSION

Sanctions have become a tool of choice in the interactions of nations in the anarchical world system. However, due to the concepts of national interests and the dependency theory, targeted nations have always found sympathisers within the community of nations who become an important leverage in militating against the negative impact of such sanctions. Africa's reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme were informed in general by the SADC's sub-regional position, which on the whole stood by Zimbabwe in the fight for the removal of sanctions besides the continued interaction with in all areas of endeavour.

The aim of ZIDERA was to collapse Zimbabwe's agro-based economy in order to force citizens' revolt which could have resulted in regime change. After being declared a tyrannical state and becoming an unusual threat to American national interest, suffocating the agriculture sector was a strategic way to align behaviour and frustrate any positives accruing from the contested pro-people land reform process. Studies sponsored by the West created negative perceptions about the land reform in Zimbabwe. However, Zimbabwe directed its survival strategies the East, to deal with the sanctions-induced challenges locally and internationally. Zimbabwe's highest office sponsored, spearheaded and monitored the effectiveness of such strategies. The internal activities were targeted at creating rallying points for the needed cohesion in dealing with the sanctions challenges.

Regionally and internationally, Zimbabwe managed the battered image by telling the compelling historical story of the colonially-induced land ownership imbalances and the need for land redistribution that assured national security. Mindful of the importance and

centrality of the inner concentric circle, Zimbabwe carefully appraised and apprised its immediate neighbours within the SADC sub-region on the land redistribution challenges it had with Britain stressing on how the British government had reneged on its 1979 Lancaster House promises. This position was well received by most former liberation war movements of the SADC member states who spoke on Zimbabwe's behalf at every gathering.

The next chapter analyses Zimbabwe's land question in the context of international laws by reviewing the SADC Tribunal's reflections on the FTLR programme.

CHAPTER SEVEN
ZIMBABWE'S LAND QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAWS – THE CASE OF THE SADC TRIBUNAL

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the SADC Tribunal's findings on the land question in Zimbabwe by revealing the inherent contentions, arguing that, land was a political issue and that the land issue was better addressed politically rather than legally. Further, it reflects that the historical underpinnings of the land issue in the sub-region should have guided the Tribunal's debate instead of the more obvious legal route that led to its demise.

Even if human rights voices created a lot of noise in the run-up to the decisions, the inherent regional undertakings in dealing with the outstanding land issue that was bedevilling not only Zimbabwe but other SADC member states should have informed the Tribunal in addressing the conflict without creating challenges for itself. The Tribunal not only underplayed the role of politics in regional relations but also read much into the human rights voices and chose to appeal to the international system rather than addressing the outstanding survival concerns of its sub-region that was under attack from the neo-liberal Western bloc.

The SADC Tribunal's engagement with the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme activities created challenges of interpretation and unravelled the attendant foreign and domestic policy imperatives that struggle for dominance in the anarchical international system. After the domestic processes failed to address what the Whites in Zimbabwe believed was an unjust eviction order arising from a colour-based human rights process, they escalated their search for recourse to the sub-regional legal mechanism. Whilst they got the decisions in their favour, the government of Zimbabwe disregarded the Tribunal's directions, setting in motion the chain events that that restrained the role of the SADC Tribunal in 2012.⁵⁷ This development challenges the legal norms in the international

⁵⁷ Here see The Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Maputo Mozambique, 18 August 2012. Summit considered the Report of the Committee of Ministers of Justice/ Attorneys General and the observations by the Council of Ministers and resolved that a new Protocol on the Tribunal should be negotiated and that its mandate should be confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States. https://www.sadc.int/files/3413/4531/9049/Final_32nd_Summit_Communique_as_at_August_18_2012.pdf accessed: 3 June 2019.

system and highlights the supremacy of solidarity networks in regulating activities at sub-regional levels. The process also reveals the power of the political factor over all else.

7.2 THE TRIGGER FOR THE TRIBUNAL'S INVOLVEMENT

As the land laws were enacted in Zimbabwe, legal institutions were established to address the expected challenges arising from the processes of land redistributions. These institutions had decided that the land issue was political, arguing that the processes and challenges arising therefrom were to be addressed utilising the same political route. The most problematic issue within SADC sub-region mechanisms was not only how to compel the member state to meet the Tribunal obligations without the capacities and capabilities to force the sanctions but, also reaching consensus on the decision at every level in SADC's sub-region conflict resolution mechanisms, along its road to effect such outcomes.

Inherent as well was the moral position of the region burdened by the outstanding overhang of the land issue across the sub-region. The unfolding developments in Zimbabwe challenged the norms in the international relations arena where established protocols and treaties cascade to supranational by interpretation. Within the SADC sub-region, for example, treaties and protocols take effect on the date of signing for some member states who apply the Monist Theory⁵⁸ whereas in others utilising the Dualist Model,⁵⁹ internal mechanism must domesticate such before they become locally applicable laws and obligations. Zimbabwe uses the Dualist Model. When the domestic and foreign interests clash the domestic position normally takes precedence over the foreign dictates as revealed by the test case of Zimbabwe.

This study can conclude that the elite group, whose guidance carry the day in regional groupings in the political hierarchy, can bring-in surprises in the manner that challenges

⁵⁸ M Chiam 2018 - Monism and Dualism in International Law: Monism stipulates that in international law national law forms part of a single global legal system. Monism's most famous proponent, Hans Kelsen, provided that there was a hierarchical relation within the monist legal system, under which international law was superior to national law and thus took precedent in any conflict between the two laws. [https:// www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0168.xml](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0168.xml) accessed: 21 June 2019.

⁵⁹ M Chiam 2018. A dualist approach took the international and domestic systems of law as different and independent of each other. In a dualist domestic system is determined by a rule of domestic law giving authority, the application of that international provision and in cases of conflict the national law is superior over the international norm.

can be addressed. The same interpretational tools can at times establish deferent outcomes for similar challenges among regions. In the case of the SADC sub-region, the decisions by the Tribunal led to its demise after the heads of states' meeting questioned the original role for its creation. As well, the backlash that could have arisen from the Tribunal's reading of its mandate and the attendant ramifications expected from the decisions, led the Heads of States and Governments to activate an internal process that became a safeguard for the sovereignty of the member states in the SADC sub-region for the foreseeable future. The outcome from the internal mechanism surprised even some among the internal system of the SADC sub-region that had predicted an outcome that would compel Zimbabwe to deliver on the Tribunal's findings or at least face some sanctions of some kind within the confines of the region.

The conflict between politics and law at regional level continues to align with the collective benefits of the regions rather than the established legal parameters that play out under the rule of precedence. This aspect was not peculiar to the SADC sub-region but has become a standard measure across regions where issues of interpretation on concepts suites the interpreter. Bojang (2016) notes that the basic tenets of the just war tradition in the Iraq war does not meet any of the *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, or *jus post bellum* and therefore its justification is invalid or null and void (Bojang 2016). The SADC Tribunal's venture into the untapped land reform issue in the sub-region demanded legal interpretations of the relationship of the protocols and whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to address the conflict of the land issue between individuals and a member state. The legal route appeared obvious even though it was engulfed by the inherent sentiments that had built over the intervening period.

Once the Blacks in Zimbabwe chose to appropriate land to address the historical land imbalance, they had to find such land from the Whites who possessed the land. Getting land from the Whites disadvantaged them and in the eyes of the world, managed by the popular Whites' views it naturally became a race issue hence the racial connotations that immediately arose. Even though the need for land redistribution was evident and not disputed from previous discussions between the contenders, the fact that it disadvantaged in the main, the Whites in Zimbabwe, it therefore became an international issue that had to be addressed at the international platform.

Section 111B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe regulates the reception of international law in the domestic laws of the nation. It provides that, any convention, treaty or agreement acceded to, concluded or executed by or under the authority of the President with one or more foreign states or governments or international organisations — (a) shall be subject to approval by Parliament; and (b) shall not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated into the law by or under an Act of Parliament. The Dualistic Model of Zimbabwe became a safeguard in its interaction with the SADC Tribunal. Besides saving the difficult day, it gave the domestic provision oversight on its important land question which had become a very delicate national security issue to address over the whole period of Zimbabwe's existence as a nation in the community of nations.

In 2007, seven years into the farm repossessions in Zimbabwe through the land invasions of 2000 which were authorised in retrospect by the Constitutional Amendments Number 16A, the Whites escalated their fight by taking the land issue to the SADC Tribunal. The Whites took this route cognizant of the reactions that were expected internationally. Initially Williams Michel Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Mike Campbell, in his capacity as the farm manager were alone but before the court hearings started, 77 others joined the lobby in preferring their land dispute with the government of Zimbabwe addressed by the Tribunal. Apparent was the attention seeking given to the court process and the impressions by human rights activists from across the world during the run-up to the first session which made the court case an international matter by any standards on the first day of its hearing.

This study observes that Zimbabwe was going to set a precedent and that precedent had to be managed appropriately to guide the international behaviour into the future. Any success or failure had a huge bearing on the future relationships in land redistribution endeavour internationally. The outcomes of the SADC Tribunal therefore became an important battle that had to be won at all costs.

Ndlovu (2011) examines whether the SADC Tribunal's mandate had legal force considering the noncompliance with its decision by the government of Zimbabwe; the lack of concrete action by the SADC member states, and the Summit's decision to review the Tribunal's role. Ndlovu outlines aspects of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, access to justice by the applicant, whether there was racial discrimination and the expropriation of land without compensation.

Phooko (2015) debates and clarifies the human rights jurisdiction of the Tribunal and elaborates the concept of implied powers as an important area that must guide courts in determining their jurisdictions. Cowell (2013) concludes that a disregard for the rule of law had become a regrettably common feature of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe which attracted sympathy from the kith and kin in the region. The observations reflected above are accurate but one-sided because, human rights and the rule of law are guided by a country's domestic laws which must remain blind to colour and creed at every level in their interpretations. They must always be universal in intention and deed at all levels if they are to align behaviour in the international system. Laws must regulate behaviour of the citizenry first and guide the activities of the aliens as visitors.

The observations by Ndlovu (2011) Cowell (2013) and Phooko (2015) were indeed relevant and constituted the parameters to analyse and place legal opinion-upon. The discourses as well aligned the dispute with the role of the SADC Tribunal in the execution of its mandate and answered the legal grounds for the trial. But if the Tribunal failed to articulate the historical underpinnings of the land issue in the SADC as an entire region as the cause for the armed liberation struggles of the region as well as the influence and effectiveness of the solidarity networks of former liberation war movements, one needed to understand why scholars would continue to tell the world the obvious legal issues instead of analysing why the legal interpretations played second fiddle to the regional political realities. Yes, the legalities are in conflict with the norms, but what would be derived from the contradiction for us to inform the parameters for future interactions?

This study asserts that the kith and kin concept has huge influence in decision making at regional levels across the world. The effects of the concentric circle follow that the decisions of the inner circle determines the outcomes of the direction the outer circle takes. The diplomatic effort of the government of Zimbabwe proved to have been effective in this case as well because it influenced the regional behaviour when and where it mattered most. There is no doubt that Zimbabwe's FTLR programme is likely to influence in strong way future regional undertakings. Already there are comparative studies for Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Mutune (2011) compares the dilemmas that the three countries face and discusses the way they have managed land reform. Mutune notes that land reform was a driver for obtaining social harmony in communities where land hostility predestined life-threatening forms of land division by race. Lessons from the

experiences of Zimbabwe that were shared at the Summit level are becoming important in shaping future land reform in the region.

The legal provisions were appropriately debated and that the legal interpretations met the parameters that informed the decisions that found the land reform in Zimbabwe to be in conflict with the international law. However, the natural stance taken by the government of Zimbabwe and correctly so presented a new unexplained and unexpected reality check arising from the decisions of the Tribunal which was directed to the highest body (the Summit) in the SADC mechanisms.

What was clearly considered by the applicants and the generality of the publics in the international system as a legal battle between parties to the conflict became a very technical and complex political issue that raised pertinent emotional discussions at the Summit level and beyond. The process now reveals the huge impact of kith and kin in regional interactions. Whilst the Tribunal raised the race flag as wrongly used by the Zimbabweans in their journey to attain land equity and equality between races, the region saw no fault in the process by acknowledging the route pronounced by Zimbabwe in its statutes and how it resolved to address an internal land challenge between its communities.

The Zimbabwean government had communicated that the ruling by the Tribunal was worthless and invalid of any legal effect and that she was not bound by the regional court's rulings. Nathan (2013) notes that in 2011 the Heads of State of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) suspended the SADC Tribunal after the regional court pronounced that the Zimbabwean government's land invasions violated the rule of law. The suspension reproduces SADC's ladder of values, in terms of which the organisation's official pledge to human rights and a regional lawful order is secondary to the political necessities of regime harmony and respect for sovereignty.

Nathan (2013) argues that the SADC Tribunal story establishes that the authority of regional courts stems not simply from their authorised mandates but from the interaction between national and regional law and politics. The interplay between domestic and regional law has to be read with the sovereignty element in mind. This is crucial because nations are sensitive to trade their sovereignty interplay on the platform that threatens their

sovereignty. Likewise, the interplay between the domestic law and politics demands caution because laws are inherently determined by the politics.

The stance taken by the Zimbabwe government became the natural option because sovereignty had been threatened. Zimbabwe's option became an instant reality check to the anxieties that had been created by the Tribunal's findings and the expected end to the much talked about chaotic invasion of White-owned land in Zimbabwe. A completely new ground to be negotiated had emerged that dampened the spirits of the Whites across the world who clearly thought that they had won the challenge and set a firm base for the continued uninterrupted farming programmes in Zimbabwe; this time around guided and protected by the international law that would have overridden the domestic law in the process. The uninterrupted farming programme was to be done at the cost of land reform unfortunately establishing another period of insecurity that would have continued in the watchful eye of the international community. The outcome would have as well become for SADC a serious regional insecurity issue that needed to be addressed.

The concept of sovereignty notes that the state is all inclusive and the autonomous power is unanimously applicable. Every individual and every relationship of individuals is subject to the dominion of the state. No relationship or group of persons, however, rich or influential can fight or contravene the sovereign authority. Sovereignty makes no exclusion and awards no immunity to anyone. It awards exemptions only in the case of overseas embassies and diplomatic councils of foreign nations on a reciprocal foundation. However, this does not in any way restrict the sovereignty of the state in the legal sense. The state can abolish and withdraw the diplomatic privileges granted to foreigners. This clearly reveals the reason why Zimbabwe chose to disregard the SADC Tribunal's directions when it found Zimbabwe's FTLR programme law in conflict with the international law.

In its wisdom, the Summit suspended the Tribunal up to August 2012. Implicitly when the doors of the Tribunal closed to individuals, it effectively came to a standstill. This non-activity of the Tribunal up to 2012 was instructive of the SADC sub-region hierarchy of values, where commitment to human rights and regional legal order was subordinated to the rights and primacy of land reform in the region. SADC's sub-regional process assured the rights of all and not one group. The political imperatives of regime solidarity and the respect for national sovereignty won the debate and shaped the future of the region

(Communiqué of the 30th Jubilee Summit of the SADC heads of State and Government Windhoek, Namibia 16 – 17 August 2010).⁶⁰

The Treaty stipulates that SADC and its members must act in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality of states; solidarity, peace, and security; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; equity, balance, and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes (The SADC Treaty of 1992). The neatness of SADC's sub-regional mechanisms and the consensus at the Summit level reflected a mature integration that took an important and outstanding regional land issue with the bird's eye-view. The regional outlook assured the survival of the key tenets of regional ownership of important decisions maintained and sustained the primacy of politics over other competing factors and the triumph of the armed liberation struggles of the SADC sub-region over the neo-liberal sponsored neo-colonialism.

The creation of the Tribunal, it may easily be forgotten, was a political decision, and that the land possessions and repossessions were issues that led to armed liberation struggles across the SADC sub-region. All the regional armed liberation struggles were incidentally and appropriately politically decided and driven. Whilst it was noble for the majority of the legal minds to spend their time in analysing jurisdictions of the Tribunal to deal with the Campbell and Others versus Zimbabwe matter, they ignored the realities underpinning the land reform issue in Zimbabwe and the huge unresolved land issues across the region.

If the land issue was at the core of the signatures of the liberation movements' leaders at the Lancaster House conference, why would it have appeared unfamiliar if the same leaders disbanded their institution when it failed to serve them at a turning point in their journey? Why would accurately interpreting the law become more important when that law had trampled on the very rights, these regional leaders had fought to address and establish in the region? Through a well-orchestrated mechanism, the SADC sub-region protected its own programme to address a critical land rights issue for the indigenous communities in the sub-region in a way that reveals both wisdom and maturity.

⁶⁰ Here see. Summit decided that a review of the role, functions and terms of reference of the SADC Tribunal be undertaken and concluded in 6 months; The Final Communiqué of the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Maputo Mozambique, 18 August 2012. Summit considered the Report of the Committee of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General and the observations by the Council of Ministers and resolved that a new Protocol on the Tribunal should be negotiated and that its mandate should be confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States.

The political pillar proved in this case, that it is the most sensitive and does not always follow prescribed formulae when its existence is threatened. It is the political factor that establishes the rules of behaviour. The huge test on regional unity and solidarity within the SADC hierarchy gave the region a rare window to display collective ownership of challenges that affect the region by those who fought and dislodged colonial regimes in the region.

Besides external forces' concerted efforts to compel even the small states in the sub-region to pronounce on the contrary, Ubuntu was demonstrated in addressing the land question in Zimbabwe at the sub-regional level. The burden of the unresolved land redistribution would have remained a very painful programme that would have created a very unstable region into the future had the opposite taken effect. Reversing the land reform in such a fashion would have overturned the ideals of the liberation struggle ideals of the entire sub-region and marked the failure for all liberation struggles across the world.

Asmelash (2016) identifies the SADC Tribunal as the latest chapter in the sub-regional courts' struggle for legitimacy in Africa drawing parallels with the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in their rulings against Kenya and Gambia respectively. Asmelash notes that whilst the cases of Kenya and Gambia failed to have a negative impact on the regional courts, the Zimbabwean saga crippled and destroyed the Tribunal altogether.

Asmelash lists the tensions between politics and the rule of law and the ambiguities and vagueness in the SADC's instruments as problematic factors that led to the unexpected outcome, noting that, the huge determinant of the outcome was the primacy of politics over the rule of law in the region. Again, the regional leaders colluded effectively to address the regional challenge. This revealed the imperatives of regionally established norms and their impact on decisions at regional platforms.

Where the world anticipated sanctions to be imposed on Zimbabwe for what they had canvassed and continued to canvass as untoward behaviour of minority Whites land grabs by the majority Blacks in Zimbabwe, the mandate of the SADC Tribunal, which technically had become the last gateway to reverse the land reform in Zimbabwe and effectively elsewhere, was instead curtailed. At least for now land redistribution in the

region shall be guided by the national imperatives and never the world's views about what is best or otherwise for the nations addressing their land imbalances.

7.3 THE SADC TRIBUNAL AND THE CHALLENGE OF ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTES

The major takeaway from the Campbell and Others versus Zimbabwe case was the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with the human rights issue specifically the land reform as determined by the amendment number 16B of the Zimbabwe Lancaster House Constitution. It is reflective from the debates that the interpretation of the rights concept as prescribed by the neo-liberals had been challenged.

As a point of departure, land as an important and the core enabler of human survival in Africa and elsewhere has always been a contested source and resource from time immemorial. In Zimbabwe the armed liberation struggle that led to the Lancaster House Agreement was based on the land issue. Zimbabweans died for political independence and galvanised their political independence for the repossessions of land to take effect. During the colonial era the White minority possessed and systematically got land promulgating domesticated laws that gave them the rights for ownership that was perpetuated up to 2000.

Roschmann and Brandmeier (2012) conclude that the land redistribution exercise was a matter of just distribution because 50 per cent of the land of what was then Southern Rhodesia belonged to the White settlers, who constituted 5% of the total population. Roschmann and Brandmeier observe that during the negotiations with the UK for the independence of Zimbabwe, the land issue was afforded relatively little importance. However, Roschmann and Brandmeier agree that the Campbell case demonstrated particularly clearly the extent to which the statutory embargo of *ex post facto* laws was dishonoured because Campbell was not capable to claim the defence of trust in the legitimacy of current law.

It was revealed in Chapter Three of this study how land became an issue that triggered the initial invasions of 1998 by the Svosve community and the wide-spread 2000 invasions that ushered in the FTLR programme. How one hoped to address a political issue through the regionally established courts (legal remedy) raises more questions than answers. It can

be distinguished from the above review that there is a tendency in the international system to believe that regions must take cue from the norms and values established under the tutelage of the Western bloc. However, the SADC sub-region proved its worthiness in addressing its land redistribution challenge, informed by its own established rules even under the unrelenting eye and unending voices from the West. Progress must not be informed only by those who think they must guide activities in the global village, but, should arise from an unbiased analysis of competing and at times topical issues at play.

Motsiri (2020) reveals that broadly speaking the sanctions were not really about Zimbabwe but to influence behaviour of small nations across the world. The ultimate goal of sanctions was to serve kith and kin ties wherever these were threatened globally. He further notes that there was huge ignorance among communities on the background that informed Zimbabwe's processes of the FTLR programme, noting that if one debated the shortcomings of the Lancaster House Agreement, people raised questions related to the timing and why the FTLR programme took place after 20 years.

These questions, Motsiri concludes, were clear reflections of the lack of knowledge in societies across the regions. Regions need to take up the challenges of properly analysing issues and live guided by the regionally developed norms, value systems and behaviours, regulated by own internally driven mechanisms regardless of the backlash when kith and kin interests are challenged. Africa must arise not only to tell its story, but to guide its own route to success by analysing the values of its interactions in the international system.

The contempt for the rule of law had become a collective feature and the world was alarmed by how Zimbabwe had managed a regional consensus on weakening the appeal of this concept among the SADC governments. This assertion lacks an understanding of the historical underpinnings of the sub-region. How the region continues to fund its regional activities of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Sectors should be an important indicator to the region's need for independence. Politics, Defence and Security clusters are the most important drivers in all developmental programmes in the region.

As well, the rights issue must, of necessity be supported by the governing laws of the land at any given period. These laws are established to create harmony between and among communities through established procedures of enactment. Once laws are created, they bind their communities and those relating with the communities. Zimbabwe's

Constitutional Amendment Number 16 became an important piece of legislation that all must have appreciated to the letter if they did not expect some penalties for law contravention.

The main idea for the regionally induced funding in the politics, defence and security spheres in the SADC region bears testimony of the member states' alertness to the challenges inherent in programmes that are donor driven. The old adage, he who pays the piper determines the tune rings true. For regional values to have a positive imprint, it is important for them to align the costs of the activities they guide and must guarantee such values through the established internal mechanisms. Africa continues to falter in advancing the idea of developing its important internally funded programmes and has continued to retard its growth and ownership of such programmes as a result. No nation or region can drive its own agenda from funding resourced by competing regions.

The regional institutions must be sensitive by design to established internal instruments that defend the original ideals of the grouping; if they are to be of service to the communities they represent. In the case of the SADC Tribunal, the rights to equitably address the land imbalances arising from the colonial injustices should have become an activity that demanded a balanced view of the obtaining land scenario in the region. The excitement of reading correctly the implied mandate utilising only the legal lens was a faulty undertaking that served the external publics, which unfortunately attracted the Tribunal's demise that was executed by the internally regulated regional mechanisms. Regions have the obligation to address internal challenges by reviewing the internal factors.

While one may receive accolades from the West managed systems, these must not come at the cost of forgetting to interrogate history and the overhang of colonial systems that dominate debates in the international system. Africa must liberate itself from the huge yoke of neo-liberal thinking that tends to align rights or talk about rights when the West's kith and kin have a case to answer. Rights must be neutral if they are to regulate behaviour of nations in the international community. Nkrumah was right when he observed that the independence of Ghana was not worthwhile for as long as the rest of Africa was under colonialism; when he chose for Ghana to withhold the independence benefit for Africa.

Lumumba had the vision for the land that provided for its own people.⁶¹ These icons truly deserve our collective respect if we are to be guided by their vision (ideas) going forward as a united continent. They foresaw a United States of Africa with a huge capacity to determine its destination, interacting with other regions as an equal partner.

The Euro-centric view of dictating concepts as determinants of African independence must not guide philosophy but, rather the Afrocentric which pays tribute to the collective views and collective ownership of everything within communities. Nations are better together than as individual states. Gaddafi died a very painful death for his vision of a united Africa competing on equal terms with other regions of the world. The Monrovia/Casablanca debates remain overhangs of the drag in progress for Africa into real independence. Williams (1966) postulates that the Casablanca session brought on board some of the continent's most noticeable statesmen like Abdel-Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sékou Touré of Guinea. What unified them was a confidence in the essential for African political amalgamation or federation.

The Casablanca Group was failed since most other African leaders did not prescribe to such radical change. The thoughts of its rival, the Monrovia Group which also understood in pan-Africanism but not at the disbursement of nationalism and independent nation-state, won the day (Williams 1962). The independence of the sub-regions of Africa must arise by ensuring the correct regulations of the political, economic, military, social and environmental activities, because threats in each of these or a combination of these results in regional insecurity.

Insecurities retard growth that leads to poverty, which is and has continued to be a major insecurity trigger in Africa and the developing nations of the world. But first, our minds must be independent as we interrogate issues of bread and butter in our interactions with the international community. Our minds must be liberated from the colonial overhangs that challenge some among the African societies. Africans have equal rights to choose their destination and create institutions that serve their collective interests. These rights can only be realised if Africa speaks as a unit in all issues that constitute their survival.

⁶¹ Here see K Nkrumah on the need for Ghana to die a little for the independence of the rest of Africa under colonial rule and P Lumumba we are going to keep watch over the lands of our country so that they truly profit her children. We are going to restore ancient laws and make new ones which will be just and noble.

Mude (2018) hypothesises that the Direct Effect of International Law is compelling in securing the welfare of individuals in domestic affairs, but political interests present a major obstacle to compliance with international law's efforts to achieve its objective. The second part of the hypothesis is important as it attests to the notion of sovereignty that is governed by the executive's interpretation of what is best for the state. It should always be noted that the international acts and foreign policy issues are the preserve of the political executives. Their guidance in this important area is informed generically by the collective good. The benchmark should remain that which addresses the collective societal good.

7.4 POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTESTATIONS ON THE RULE OF LAW

One of the debates on Zimbabwe's FTLR programme was on the alleged disregard for the rule of law. In this regard, the findings of the Tribunal desired to stop the land reform and redistribution programme in Zimbabwe because it found the process in conflict with the determinants of the rule of law as recited by the West. In allowing an interdict, the Tribunal saw the need for the protection of the complainants, Campbell and Others; the retention of the land that had been gazetted under Zimbabwe's established laws for land acquisition and allocation to the land-hungry majority Blacks.

What arises from this interpretation of Zimbabwe law is that, it violated international law hence the decision to warrant the interdict (Article 4 (c) of the SADC Protocol).⁶² The initial question would be whose law was violated once the Campbell and Others' farms were acquired? Which law governed the acquisition and why did it now become an issue, seven years since the law was in use? The answers to these questions address the imperatives of kith and kin and the danger of interpreting laws as both the judge and the jury.

When the Zimbabwean Parliament amended the land law in Zimbabwe, it created the rule of law according to the dictates of the nation of Zimbabwe. This is the international practice where the separation of powers is practiced among the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Executive. The law was established by Parliament to guide the land reform activities in Zimbabwe, which was applicable for all Zimbabweans regardless of

⁶² Here see Article 4 (c) of the SADC Protocol which reflects that the Member States shall act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

dispositions. The effectiveness of the rule of law is measured by the efforts and structures established to compel compliance to the gazetted laws. Those in violation of the established laws were obviously subjected to the remedies to the extent of such violations.

Challenging the land law outside the borders of Zimbabwe was a mischief and a clear disregard for the rule of law. This in effect was a violation of the national law of Zimbabwe which was bound to have serious backlash as it eventually did. States are bound by their own laws as prescribed in their constitutions, which are the highest law-making documents, universally. No amount of effort can detract nations from abiding by the laws they create to account for their activities.

Domestic laws are created to regulate internal activities that guide the growth of the communities and it is from these domestic laws that foreign interactions are guided. One such law was the Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Number 16, which birthed rights for the government of Zimbabwe to acquire land compulsorily without compensation. Once it was passed, it did not matter who opposed it. Its sanctions were in effect on the date of gazetting regardless of its appeal to the opponents to its founding rules and regulations. Whilst it may have sounded and appealed as draconian from an outsider's viewpoint, it was a very appropriate and proper piece of legislation according to the dictates of the prevailing land imbalances in Zimbabwe at the time. Creating such a law, as long as it was done by the competent institution, became an appropriate and necessary process that was concluded once that law was assented to.

Rewinding back, it is reflective to note that the Rhodesian government created the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) Act, that effectively side-lined the majority Blacks from the land. Other statutes including the Land Husbandry Act were established to protect the ruling elite then. Respect for such laws became very important because any dissent was met by appropriate sanctions (Duggan 1980, Nyambara 2001 and Zhiong 2020). These very effective laws were created to align behaviour and they achieved what was intended of them, effective from the dates prescribed and ran their course until they were made redundant by the creation of the current laws that govern land redistribution in Zimbabwe.

The rule of law, as interpreted by the neo-liberals, is violated every time when the odds are against kith and kin and in the case of Campbell and Others versus Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe violated the rule of law by not adhering to the dictates of the Tribunal's

findings. No issue was raised at the time when the dispossession took effect under the Whites' elite prescribed laws in the history of the country. It only became an international issue this time around because the Whites in Zimbabwe were disadvantaged. Whose law then must be applied?

It is this study's argument that only laws created by competent national institutions must be respected by both the nationals and the international community without fear or favour. The Parliament of Zimbabwe was such an important and appropriately established institution that amended the land law in Zimbabwe to guide the land reform policy for the citizenry. The amendment bill number 16 became the law that guided land reform activities in Zimbabwe, which must have been respected by all and sundry. Where people chose to circumvent laws by whatever formula, it becomes them who are violators and not the law enforcers. The law enforcers were compelled by the same law to arraign the offenders to answer for their contraventions. They performed their duties to the letter.

7.5 THE DEMOCRACY DEBATE: WHOSE DEMOCRACY IS TO BE SERVED?

Democracy has become another concept that has caused a lot of debate in Africa and the world. What has remained the challenge are the context it has been discussed and the varied interpretations. What Africa as a region has tended to do is to define democracy as informed by the neo-liberals. This definition has challenges in that it is applied invariably across the world without taking into consideration regional or national peculiarities from historical circumstances.

Chiwenga (2016) notes the rapid convergence of the world's economy under the flagship of neo-liberal capitalism reflecting that embedded in the economic system are the West's democratic values as individualism is translated into democratic political practices in the international relations that do not take into account the competing cultural variations present in other communities. Democracy from the neo-liberal standpoint refers to a scheme of government in which highest power is bestowed in the people and applied through an arrangement of direct or indirect representation chosen through periodic free elections (McGlinchey et al 2017).

Recent election results even in the mature democracies of the West have proved that the notion of power being vested in the people has remained a mirage. What has become a permanent feature in the concept is the ritual of periodic elections and those that declare such elections as credible, transparent, free and fair. If such elections are not declared by the West as being free, fair and transparent then such elections do not pass the mark to constitute the reflection of the peoples' rights in those nations. This is the irony. If elections provide the people with supreme power that they surrender to those elected to govern why have there been concerns from the losing parties after the elections?

The concerns have been that of having preferred candidates in an election that will protect their interests. Name-dropping has become a useful strategy as candidates prepare for elections through set campaigns. The challenge for Africa and those in the developing world is to agree to have the elections monitored by institutions from the West because the reports produced after elections are respected. This compromises the sovereignty of nations especially where there is lack of reciprocity in the monitoring and reporting of these elections.

The African context of democracy does not contradict with that espoused by the neo-liberals, because Africans believe in the adage that the value of a person is established by the collective effort of others where a family is established from the collective effort of the family members and the king established from the combined effort of its communities (*munhu, munhu navanhu*) an individual is given value by the involvement of others. Afrocentrism respects collective decisions which account for collective ownership of both pain and gain.

In the case of the SADC Tribunal's findings, once consensus was reached and guidance at the SADC Summit level, precedent had been set that gave the political arm primacy over others. The process that led to the revision of the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal is not in conflict with the democratic tenets even as defined by the neo-liberals. If a member has issues that they feel are not addressed appropriately, they resort to appealing, as a rule, to higher authority. Where the higher authority is the ultimate authority, then decisions coming out of such ruling have no further recourse; the ball stops there, the contest is over. Campbell and others should have remembered this important rule when they sought remedy outside Zimbabwe.

In consensus, the SADC Summit decided to align the work of the Tribunal, cognizant of the collective responsibility of the outcome that was going to haunt the region into the future. Also, noting the outstanding challenges of the regional land profile imbalances and the attendant backlash from the global neo-liberals, the decision had to send the right message internationally if it was to be sustained in the future. The stability of the region became a more important issue than the legal battles that would have seriously alienated the region. The instability of a divided region would have opened doors for insecurity in the region, which would have stalled progress on regional integration which would have resulted in stalled regional economic growth. Applied democracy must be a safeguard of regional security anywhere.

The activities of the neo-liberals through the human rights groups abound in the sub-region had taken over the task to rebut the land redistribution policy in Zimbabwe. They had established a notion that painted the exercise; a violation of human rights, rule of law and out of step with the democratic dictates of the international system. Perceptions are an important pointer to realities but if fraudulently created, they divide communities and this is what happened in Zimbabwe. Had it not been for the effectiveness of the SADC internal mechanisms, the neo-liberal tools of warfare had almost won the day. One wonders what the region would have become had the Summit been persuaded to sing the neo-liberal's tune. In its own processes SADC followed its democracy to the letter and found no fault in the process Zimbabwe enacted its land laws that assured equity in the land redistribution programme post-2000.

The concepts of democracy, human rights and the rule of law debated above have become tools of choice to align the behaviour of nations in the international system. For Africa, these concepts shall continue to invite varied interpretations and continue to challenge the sovereignty of nations if interpretations are not Africanized. The West continues to determine the accuracy of the interpretations and partiality has resulted each time White kith and kin are at a disadvantage. The amount of funding accorded these advocacies in the region demands some critical evaluation.

In Zimbabwe alone, over 30 000 NGOs whose staffing levels vary considerably from a one-person-band to as many are accredited. Their activities become more visible during election periods where they align mostly with the West-established opposition movement as noted by Dorman (2001) who reflects that the establishment of the National

Constitutional Assembly by some Non-Governmental Organisation, churches and trade unionists in 1997 became a turning point for the tense engagement between the NGOs and the state. NGO politics became more polarised as the ruling ZANU PF party attempted to retain control over the political sphere and the constitutional debate and noting that the emergence of the Movement of Democratic Change with the prominence of NGO activists within its leadership escalated the conflict.

The alignment with opposition movements has left those in office linking most NGO activities with the neo-liberal regime change agenda, a view that has gained traction across Africa and elsewhere. Wherever and whenever the opposition lost elections, such elections were considered rigged and not free and fair. The legitimacy issues are then raised through the Western media houses that leave communities in perpetual elections mode that detract nations from pursuing pertinent national issues. As a result, nations address challenges lacking consensus and without consensus cohesion is lost and resultantly, economic growth is retarded.

Having been let down by the processed leading to the Harare Donor Conference of 1998 that created a stalemate, Zimbabwe was left with no option but to go radical in the implementation of land redistribution. Once the UK and the allied donor community operating under the neo-liberal lens not much would have been expected by delaying the land reform that gave Zimbabweans their sovereignty back. Zimbabwe was found itself between the rock and a hard surface. The operational environment demanded that the nation takes the bull by the horns.

7.6 CONCLUSION

The regional structures that are established and guided by the political pillar run the risk of falling out of favour if decisions they take threaten the pillar that created them in the first place. The historical underpinnings of regions ought to have determined the bearing the communities should follow as pillars for regional integration. The institutions that regions establish should appreciate the foundations of their creation and matters they should protect to safeguard the regional values. The land issue that was at the core of the armed liberation struggles across the Southern African region should have guided the SADC Tribunal in its rare hearings that attracted a lot of attention from the international system.

The struggle for primacy between the legal and the political pillars in SADC proved that politics determines the operating parameters of other pillars. Whilst the SADC Tribunal was commended for a job well done by the international system generally, the regional mechanism dampened its findings and foiled a neo-liberal plan to derail the land reform programme not only in Zimbabwe, but the region at large. The outcome had a huge bearing on other outstanding land redistribution policies in the region. The liberation war solidarity networks in the region became crucial, in creating consensus on a topical issue that had attracted world attention from its inception. The conception of the rule of law serves the creators of the law should of necessity be colour blind in its reflections and application.

This study's final chapter draws on the established conclusions from the discourse by revealing the emerging impact of kith and kin affinities in relations among nations.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND EPILOGUE

8.1 CONCLUSIONS

This study sought to unpack how the international community reacted to Zimbabwe's post-2000 FTLR programme. The discussion opened a window to appreciate statecraft revealing that the development of rules of behaviour in the international system is regulated by regional norms driven from the attendant regional value systems. The overarching issue in Zimbabwe's FTLR programme remains the resolve by the government to repossess land from the minority Whites and its decision to allow its institutions to align the Whites' misbehaviour when they disregarded the land reform provisions. The manner and approach chosen by the Zimbabwe government remains a huge shocker. This was an unimagined direct challenge by the Government of Zimbabwe to the West's norms in the international system which required an immediate robust approach to dissuade potential others in the global village.

This unusual challenge Zimbabwe had posed, demanded an appropriate response to address and Smart Power became a useful option that directed the regime change agenda that continued to run beyond the period of this study. The West's agenda had no relationship to the office bearers but was a tool deployed to kill the Black economic empowerment agenda. The struggle was about the need to exterminate the inherent ideology and not the persons in office at whatever period in the interactions between Zimbabwe and the West. The Black empowerment idea became a huge threat to the West's value system internationalised at the exclusion of other competing regional values.

The period of the inclusive government that ran from 2009 to 2013 in Zimbabwe should have witnessed a shift to the positive from the West, given the direct role of the opposition members who had joined the inclusive government. However, the antagonism did not change during the inclusive government. Even after the fall of the late Mugabe from power in 2017, the regime change agenda did not stop because ZIDERA was renewed after the 2018 harmonised elections which were considered credible by the SADC observers whose standards the elections were measured-upon.

The regional appraisals were dissimilar in some peculiar cases from the bilateral engagements in Africa and the EU where national interests guided the reactions as a generic rule. The sub-regional positions however, created the common viewpoints and guided the approaches other regions took in dealing with Zimbabwe's radical land redistribution policy hence the varied regional reactions. The regional views drew from the African sub-regional observations.

There were varied observations on the decisions within the sub-regions but, the primacy of the political pillar overshadowed other pillars during regional interactions. The effectiveness of the solidarity networks developed during the liberation struggles of the respective regions informed and guided the decision-making processes and the mechanisms that were developed and deployed to address the collective regional challenges. The mechanisms became important safeguards for national sovereignty, an important right that nations continue to protect at all cost.

The outputs from the 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement on the land reform anchored on the willing buyer willing seller concept and supposed to run up to 1990 became a permanent feature the West trusted as it assured the rights of their kith and kin in Zimbabwe's land reform programme. However, this willing buyer willing seller approach failed to guide the equitable land redistribution process in Zimbabwe. The intervening period from 1980 to 1990 noted in the Lancaster House Constitution allowed the West sufficient time to strategise and formulate appropriate reactions to safeguard their kith and kin as proved by the sanctions route chosen after the February 2000 FTLR programme.

The funding assurances by both the USA and the UK governments for land reform as a compromise to allow for the signing of the 1979 constitution, was a diplomatic manoeuvre that allowed the Whites kith and kin in Zimbabwe a stronghold on landholding for as long as it took. The promises gave and sustained hope for future change in the land ownership profile for the Blacks but this remained a pipedream until 2000. It was after Zimbabwe resolved to redistribute the land through the FTLR programme that started in February 2000 and the resultant sanctions by the West, that it became clear that the funding promise was just another empty promise meant to delay land reform for the benefit of the White farmers in Zimbabwe.

Land does not change hands and will unlikely change hands into the future unless some form of force has been exerted to the one holding on to it. Zimbabweans had to *Jambanja* to reclaim land lost during the colonial period and outside the FTLR programme, willing buyer willing seller concept was going to reign as prescribed by the neo-liberals perpetually. Without addressing the inherent land disparities between the indigenous Blacks and the Whites in Zimbabwe who had established laws to safeguard themselves for continued landholding in Zimbabwe, White domination was going to be perpetuated.

The Lancaster House settlement was a let-down to the generality of the indigenous people of Zimbabwe and to all those who participated in the protracted armed liberation struggle. Settling for anything outside the return of land to the previous owners or at least some equitable redistribution option of some kind among all Zimbabweans was a disillusionment that attracted much more pain from the 2000 land invasions and the attendant Western backlash that retarded the economic growth of Zimbabwe. Important national issues are never wished away for whatever reason because they will lie dormant only to erupt at a later date to the disadvantage of all.

Britain, the USA and other donor countries from SADC, the Middle East and Asia as well as other agencies including the UN, AU, IMF and the World Bank who attended the 1998 Donor Conference in Harare agreed and passed resolutions that observed that land reform was essential for poverty reduction, economic growth and political stability. The Donor Conference also appreciated the need for urgency and fast-track nature of the programme.

However, the Donor Conference produced little commitment financially, with the donors pledging US\$ 100 million against the budgeted figure of about US\$2 billion. Besides the pledges for the envisaged land reform falling far short, the pledges came with conditions where Britain insisted upon the land acquisition following the willing buyer willing seller-concept. The 1998 Harare Donor Conference confirmed the entrenched position for the market-oriented land reform by the donors which catalysed the revolutionary position taken by the government of Zimbabwe, in their 2000 Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A.

The Lancaster House Constitution pushed the Whites versus the Blacks viewpoint and when the Black-led government got into office, it took up the challenge and applied the

same concept in reverse. These are the fruits of social constructs as explained by the Social Constructivism Theory. The same tools were applied to solve the land issue in Zimbabwe during different epochs. Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular have been very slow in articulating the land redistribution activities in the national institutions and are deficient in the establishment of encompassing debates in the development of appropriate mechanisms to address the abounding land challenges. The absence of debates at national level in Zimbabwe has been exploited effectively by the neo-liberals in directing negative perceptions in the international community.

The period 1990 to 2000's delayed land reform was a deliberate regionally agreed decision taken to address SADC's geostrategic imperatives. The decision to delay the radical land reform allowed a smooth transitional debate and the uninterrupted period for the independence of South Africa. Pursuing the radical land redistribution roadmap for Zimbabwe before the freedom of South Africa would have had severe repercussions on the stance the White Apartheid South Africans would have taken. The delayed process assured regional stability and gave hope for the Whites in South Africa to expect smooth coexistence in the new rainbow nation that attained majority rule in 1994.

However, the land redistribution decisions for Zimbabwe were ad-hoc and driven from limited facts. This crucial deficiency on facts in the internal mechanisms of Zimbabwe provided the West the leeway to advance their arguments for the market-driven approach through the West's sponsored research network which offloaded negative perceptions in the international community about Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. These research findings by default justified the West's sanctions on Zimbabwe. The relationships within and between communities and between communities and the state arising from the realignment of the land laws will always be strained as the new land reform profile challenges the existing ones. Any revision of a country's land laws is a huge political decision that must ascend from a desperate situation which demands a process of debates at all levels to ensure buy-ins.

Zimbabwe's FTLR programme brought with it racial and class connotations, issues that attracted attention from across the international system. The land question was a huge national security matter that attracted controversial debates across the nation among and between the political divide, besides its conflicting reflections from the observers in the international system. The land question was fittingly exported to the international arena

and created a polarised Zimbabwean society whose cohesion on national issues created a gulf in interpretation in discussions that followed after the enactment of the 16A Act. This fault-line was utilised by the neo-liberals in their efforts to impose own norms to protect their kith and kin. They identified with those of like minds in Zimbabwe and divided the communities in the manner they interpreted the chosen land reform approach permanently.

Zimbabwe's FTLR programme was labelled chaotic, radical, lacking the adherence to the rule of law. It was characterised by a network of civil society groups and sponsored researchers from the neo-liberal schools as trampling on human rights and seriously lacking democratic credentials. The USA and the EU alliances condemned the process whereas the SADC sub-region and the generality of Africa did not find fault in the FTLR programme. The choice Zimbabwe had selected for its land redistribution programme that addressed the land imbalance created during the colonial rule was considered the only reasonable and available option.

There was no consensus within the international community over Zimbabwe's FTLR programme of 2000. Neo-liberals purposefully overplay the power of the market penetration in the land redistribution discourse. They believe strongly the notion that land acquisitions must always be seller-driven and that the land market value must change hands for the redistribution to take effect regardless of the obtaining competing alternatives. They are convinced that reflections on historical injustices are less persuasive than the demonstrations of the economic inefficiencies that arise from other land redistribution options.

The attachment of humankind to land and the compelling reasons for its continued protection by the one who holds it are important concepts that assure and ensure national sovereignty. Sovereignty has remained a huge struggle to sustain under the anarchic international system which is regulated by the competing national interests which are at times challenged by the hegemonic tendencies propelled by the powerful North. Nations derive their dignity from their abilities and capabilities to possess and defend the land in their possession. The capability to defend is a primary focus to be achieved if sovereignty is to be sustained. Defending is an important attribute that outweighs the ability to possess.

The Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement ended the armed liberation struggle, but delayed the true independence of Zimbabwe for 20 years up to 2000 when eventually Zimbabwe repossessed the land through the FTLR programme. Without the ability to determine its land use, Zimbabwe lacked in her sovereignty. The storytelling and the dragging in the provision of the promised funding for the land reform by the West in the management of the land question in Zimbabwe remained the stumbling block that delayed the achievement of a lasting solution for the contestants to the land redistribution programme.

The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 that allowed and attempted compulsory acquisition, failed to meet its targets as a result of inadequate funding. The established view from the West remained that which emphasised that any land resettlement was to be determined by the market forces and that it was to be non-compulsory. These were the key neo-liberal concepts that failed the land reform under the 1992 Act. These entrenched views were recreated once Zimbabwe amended the constitution to allow for the compulsory acquisition through Act 16A of 2000 that triggered the fallout between Zimbabwe and Britain.

Britain internationalised a bilateral relationship with Zimbabwe, its former colony, and this saw the USA sanctioning Zimbabwe through ZIDERA and the EU utilising the restrictive measures approach. ZIDERA and the restrictive measures imposed by the West and its allies suffocated Zimbabwe's agriculture-based economy and increased poverty in Zimbabwe in particular and across the SADC region in general. The poverty situation provided the basis for the West to fund the regime change agenda process taking advantage of the hungry people to rise against the government on the notion that the Zimbabwe government had failed in its governance activities.

The land redistribution decisions in Zimbabwe were impromptu and driven from limited facts, elements that the West took advantage of in their arguments for the market driven approach to any land redistribution. Land was an important political issue rather than an academic one. Driving the market-driven concept on an issue that constituted life and death for the people of Zimbabwe was a huge mistake by the West given the backlash that followed after the 2000 Act.

The debate that continued after the failure of the 1992 Act to address the land dispute in Zimbabwe was clearly some deliberate ploy intended to ensure that land remained in the hands of the White humankind for as long as it took. The projected economic meltdown resulting from the FTLR programme was given as the major reason why any approach to land reform needed to be implemented through the market-driven route. The EU expressed its misgivings to the FTLR programme by withdrawing bilateral activities, including diplomatic missions, from Harare. The imposition of sanctions was decided upon by a 15-member team even though there were voices within the EU that preferred more dialogue with Harare. Like the EU, the Commonwealth of Nations was divided on the measures the grouping had taken on Zimbabwe.

The West's reactions to Zimbabwe's revolutionary stance of addressing the land question bordered on the rule of law and the sanctity of private property debates. When Zimbabwe spelt-out its resolve to deal with the land imbalances, colour flags were raised to deflect attention to the challenge at hand. The concepts of property rights and how property changes hands have been the key challenge that has stalled any progress in the land redistribution discourse in Zimbabwe. The neo-liberals' belief in the market forces as the only channel to drive property changes and that any change must be based on an economic analysis, are entrenched concepts that shield-off other competing options given the historical underpinning of the land issue in Zimbabwe.

Viewing Zimbabwe's historical concerns as out-dated and out of step with the international norms by the West set aside other conflict resolution mechanisms that would have solved the land challenge. The neo-liberal writings sanitised the sanctions and other diplomatic initiatives that deliberately tarnished Zimbabwe's land redistribution process in the international system. The West had to find value of their reactions from the chaotic situation they overplayed through fact finding teams from the EU, the Commonwealth of Nations and other UN sanctioned teams which replayed the neo-liberal writings. Besides the writings, civil society groups were developed and deployed with the West-sponsored non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the name of civil society advocacy.

The reactions were mixed within the SADC, an important sub-regional bloc Zimbabwe had to rest her hope upon. Member states who shared Zimbabwe's historical armed struggle such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa respected the choice

Zimbabweans had taken whilst Botswana took the West's stance. Mozambique even though it sided with Zimbabwe, took advantage of the dispossessed White farmers from Zimbabwe by giving them land to develop their capacities on long term leases reflective of the national interest imperatives. Zimbabwe's retaking of land from the Whites represented a democratic right that had taken too long to address because the Whites had perpetuated a system that accepted that there was a special White race that could not be challenged by the inferior Black race at any point in the relations.

The White-only established statutes entrenched a White superiority mentality. The colonial period, with its distortions and human made reflections, prepared the ground for the White men to not only feel superior, but established and armed the minority to defend the superiority at every opportunity, everywhere and every time. The imperatives of national interest had a huge bearing on the mixed reactions in the international system. Some members within the regional grouping chose to dialogue with Zimbabwe outside the bloc and this gave Zimbabwe some breathing space as it sought to address its challenges with the West.

The concentric circle where the inner was stronger than the outer guided the bilateral and multilateral reactions but, at times the bilateral activities took precedence over the regional. Whichever direction the reactions took was clearly kith and kin driven. The government decisions were guided by the elite in positions of authority, the respect accorded to the norms within the inner concentric circle influenced the final decision. Kith and kin impacted.

When Zimbabwe enacted the Land Acquisition Law Amendment Number 16A that changed the Lancaster House Constitution, after the invasions by the Blacks of mostly Whites owned farms the international community reacted indifferently. The West under the guidance of the British government imposed sanctions but the generality of Africa and some Asian nations sympathised with Zimbabwe's efforts to address the colonially driven land distribution injustice. The radical choice chosen by the Black government to address the imbalances attracted huge research work and sanctions from the West because the process had challenged the dominant neo-liberal ideals. The costs for such an unlikely choice had to be huge and clearly measured to dissuade others in the international system from adopting the Zimbabwean approach.

The established groupings were exploited to align with the group's expected behaviour. Whilst there appeared to be individual views within the groupings, the regional norms were followed once the group position was sought. The withdrawal of the embassies and other diplomatic engagements from Harare was meant to attract international observations and negative emotions on the activities in Harare. However, at the UN level, the Western onslaught on Zimbabwe met with unusual resistance from the Sino-Russia alliance which shielded Zimbabwe from the relentless attacks. The neo-liberal's writings were an important and efficient combat tool that sanitised the sanctions and other diplomatic initiatives that tarnished Zimbabwe's land redistribution process as out of step with established international standards. The chaotic situation that obtained during the *Jambanja* period was overplayed through research replayed and relayed by the neo-liberal writings at every opportunity.

Besides the writings, civil society groups were developed and deployed to West-sponsored NGO groups in the name of advocacy. Zimbabwe boasts over 30 000 of these deployed across the length and breadth of the country, about 90% of which specialise on governance issues. The names of these groups are suggestive and point to their assigned tasks in the regime change agenda. Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe, Human Rights Watch and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights are among the groups that continue at every opportunity to query every activity by the government of Zimbabwe that appears or is judged by these groups to impinge on human rights according to their interpretation. In doing so they pay a blind eye to the activities of those persons they protect in their abuse of other people's rights. The selective interpretation of concepts remains a huge challenge in the international system.

The reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme were mixed within SADC, an important sub-regional alliance Zimbabwe had to rest her hopes upon. Predictably aligning with Zimbabwe was evident from the member states who shared Zimbabwe's historical armed liberation struggle episodes such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Botswana as an outlier, took the West's stance by forthrightly condemning the FTLR programme as out of step with international norms. Mozambique and Zambia even though they sided with Zimbabwe in principle, took advantage of the dispossessed White farmers from Zimbabwe by giving them land to develop their capacities on long term leases.

This position by Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, Zimbabwe's immediate neighbours was reflective of the national interest imperatives. The domestic requirements guided the national programmes whilst the sub-regional values were taken on board. The regional consensus however, favoured Zimbabwe's approach of aligning its land redistribution policy even though there were variations at bilateral levels. The sub-regional mechanisms gave Zimbabwe's FTLR programme the green light as the same story was told at the African regional level. Zimbabwe's repossession of land from the Whites in Zimbabwe represented a democratic right that had taken a very long time to address. It had taken long because the Whites during the colonial period had perpetuated a system that accepted that there was a special White race that could not be challenged by the inferior Black race at any point in their relations.

The statutes on White-only amenities, salaries and other benefits established and entrenched a Whites superiority complex. The colonial period with its distortions and human made reflections prepared the ground for the Whites in Zimbabwe to not only become superior, but established and powered the minority to defend that superiority at every opportunity, everywhere and every time through laws that gave the Whites entrenched landholding. The essentials of national interest had a huge bearing on the mixed reactions in the international system.

Some members within the regional grouping chose to dialogue with Zimbabwe outside the alliance and this gave Zimbabwe some space as it sought to address its challenges with the West. The concentric circle approach, where the inner was stronger than the outlying circles guided the bilateral and multilateral reactions, but at times the bilateral activities took precedence over the regional. Whichever direction the reactions took, these were kith and kin driven. Government decisions were and are guided by the elite in positions of authority. The respect accorded to the norms within the inner concentric circle influenced the final decisions within the regions as regulated by the elite. Kin came before kith as blood is thicker than water.

The FTLR programme was ideological, physical and reactive in application. Sentiments heightened and generated spontaneous deployments into targeted White-owned farms across the country after the pronouncement by the policymakers on the need to reclaim the lost land and the proclamations that the economy was land based. The White famers in Zimbabwe were overwhelmed by the articulations across the country, as song and

dance that reminded the contestants of the days of the armed liberation struggle raged on relentlessly. The process and activities established the hope for the pending victory for the FTLR programme participants and doom for the Whites in Zimbabwe.

The seemingly unplanned and chaotic manner of the land invasions created a fertile ground for the negative writings championed by the neo-liberals, which attracted varied reactions in the international system. The obtaining chaotic redistribution scenario shaped the opportunity for nepotism and multiple farm ownership because the FTLR programme structures were varied in terms of composition and mix. In some cases, the leadership structures were drawn from the history of the combatants who operated in a given area whilst in others teams were selected on the knowledge of the prevailing situations of the farmers' previous interactions with the adjacent communities. Where the history of the farmer was conflicted, very strong-willed characters within the ex-combatants spearheaded the FTLR programme operations. The hide and seek tactics employed by the West in the management of the land question in Zimbabwe remained the stumbling block that dragged the resolution of the contested land redistribution programme post-2000.

The 1998 Harare Donor Conference gave a huge indicator for this uncompromising position by the Whites, which arguably birthed the revolutionary position taken by the Government of Zimbabwe in the 2000 Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A. These entrenched positions have created a polarised society which was taken advantage of to establish a wedge between Zimbabwe and Britain in concluding the land redistribution effort. In the international sphere, Zimbabwe's choice was judged as out of step with the neo-liberal ideals whose preferred outcome did not anticipate disadvantaging Whites in Zimbabwe who owned vast tracks of land even though much of the land was underutilised. The basis for the struggle for the ownership of land remained that of colour which was perpetuated from the colonial era.

The Lancaster House Constitution propelled the Whites versus black outlook by establishing rules that perpetuated the veto of the Whites population in nation survival issues and when the majority Black government got into office it took up the challenge and applied the same concept in reverse. These are the fruits of social constructs as explained by the Social Constructivism Theory. This is the internal outlook of rights. Whatever is better must be ours not yours, whatever is good must come from our contributions not yours. Rights associated with enhancing internal individual interests in

a nation that must live in harmony will attract some backlash from the disadvantaged in the long run.

If Zimbabweans had not taken the important decision to fight for their long-lost landholding through the radical land invasions of 2000, it can be concluded, the nation could still be stuck in White domination which was expounded by Chitepo in his 1973 speech in Australian. However, this time it was to be a new and special kind of White domination; that which was to be perpetuated under the watchful eye of the international community. From this kind, it was unimagined how a people were to liberate themselves. It was going to be a permanent reversal of the cause and ethos of the armed liberation struggle, shattered by interpretation of rights as dictated by the neo-liberals.

The land ownership profile of Zimbabwe up to the year 2000 was skewed in favour of the minority White population, even though the envisaged programmes from 1980 had the potential to address the imbalances. The compulsory acquisition of land from the White kith and kin by the government of Zimbabwe for redistribution to its own kith and kin remains one of the most important but contested reasons why the West continued to punish Zimbabwe through collective measures at various groupings in the international system for decades even after some internationally recognised periodic elections that the nation has continued to honour.

The West-sponsored research work and the West-run media onslaught on Zimbabwe were effective mechanisms that were utilised to align the international system against any land based redistribution programme anywhere in the world that was to be informed by the compulsory acquisition concept with a pro-people outlook. This outlook set a dangerous precedent that challenged the neo-liberal norms. The entrenched market-driven approach to land redistribution assured profit to the seller and could still be dragged once the price mechanism was in contest. The landholder was the kith and kin.

This concept suited the land holder; the Whites in Zimbabwe and for the West the Zimbabwe approach disadvantaged kith and kin and allowing it to succeed was untenable. Land was an important political issue rather than an academic or legal one and driving the market-driven concept on an issue that constituted life and death for the majority people of Zimbabwe was a huge gamble the West undertook. The debate that continued after the failure of the 1992 Act to address the land dispute in Zimbabwe was a

deliberate ploy intended to ensure and assure that land remained in the hands of the Whites for as long as it took.

The projected economic meltdown occasioned by the FTLR programme was given as the major reason why any approach to land reform outside the market-driven route would fail. The economic route appealed and safeguarded the kith and kin and became an important pointer to the like-minded in the international system. The predictions for the economic meltdown were developed without taking into account the impact of climate change that has become cyclical and affecting the SADC sub-region systematically. The EU escalated its misgivings to the FTLR programme by withdrawing bilateral activities, including diplomatic missions from Harare. The imposition of restrictive measures was decided upon by a 15-member team even though there were voices within the EU that preferred more dialogue with Harare. Like the EU, the Commonwealth of Nations was divided on the measures the group had taken against Zimbabwe.

The conflicted positions were huge indicators of the influence kith and kin in relations between nations. The West's reactions to Zimbabwe's revolutionary stance of addressing the land question bordered on the rule of law and the sanctity of private property. When Zimbabwe spelt out its resolve to deal with the land imbalances without further discussion with the Whites, colour flags were raised to deflect attention to the challenge at hand. The concepts of property rights and how property changes hands was the key difficulty that stalled any progress in the land redistribution discourse in Zimbabwe. The neo-liberals' entrenched belief that the market-driven approach must and should have remained the only channel to drive property changes and that any change to land redistribution must have been based on an economic analysis, are entrenched concepts that shielded off other competing options for land redistribution that safeguarded kith and kin in Zimbabwe.

The Look East Policy created a route that challenged the expected outcomes from the West-induced sanctions and left the EU divided on the integrity of permitting China a lion's share in the immense natural resource endowment of Zimbabwe. This position became visible from the re-engagements when Zimbabwe opted-out of the Commonwealth of Nations in 2003 and after the 2013 harmonised elections which ZANU PF won resoundingly after a five-year marriage with the MDC formations in the inclusive government. The Look East Policy that the Zimbabwean government adopted

was politically inspired and responded mainly to the economic inevitabilities in the absence of donor support from the West. Taking advantage of the launch of the China-Africa Co-operation Forum in 2000, the Look East policy became part and parcel of a global strategy that emphasised the multilateralism and witnessed the build-up of South-South cooperation as a route to achieving reforms in the international community.

The diplomatic acumen of Zimbabwe secured both China and Russia to its side on all matters of national survival, including among others the double veto following the West's push for the UN Chapter VII punitive deployment into Zimbabwe after the 2008 disputed presidential elections and her resolve to discount neo-liberal dictates in its land redistribution policy. After correctly sensitising the SADC circle, activities at the AU and the UN were managed without much strain leading to one of the unusual double vetoes in the history of the international community under the Charter of the UN.

The Indigenisation Policy was one of the most misinterpreted internal interventions that the government of Zimbabwe established to align the people in the fight for survival under the punitive economic sanctions by the West. The 51/49% share ratio in favour of Zimbabweans in joint ventures by foreign nationals who were expected to bring-in their FDI found little takers. The policy drew mixed reactions not only from the external, but internally as the government officials reflected lack of awareness in interpreting the instrument whenever they were called upon to clarify the policy. This created suspicion and doubt on the sincerity of the Indigenisation Policy.

The Zim-Asset policy was developed to attain sustainable development and social-equity based on indigenisation, empowerment and employment creation, which were to be propelled by the efficient utilisation of the country's abounding human and natural resources. The plan sought to grow and sustain the pro-people programmes and to cement the indigenisation prospects that had met with misgivings in previous attempts. The 2002 presidential elections marked the fallout between Zimbabwe and the West. However, the withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth of Nations in 2003 witnessed the re-engagement of Zimbabwe with the West facilitated by Mbeki under the aegis of SADC. The process got the blessings of Blair and Bush and the support of Obasanjo.

When Zimbabwe disengaged from the Commonwealth of Nations, other members in the grouping felt that Australia was to blame for the eventual and unexpected position

Zimbabwe had taken to quit the grouping. The re-engagement sought to give impetus to an assumed political and economic agenda with those Zimbabwe had strained relations and new players as part of a process. The 2014 conference sought to renew the declining hope which had witnessed a slow re-engagement due to political and economic factors in the West, led by the USA, which insisted on concrete evidence of political reform and human rights before any possibility of full re-engagement. However, the position of the EU remained flexible. The IMF was working with Zimbabwe on the resumption of a Comprehensive Country Finance targeted as follow-on to the rolling out and conclusion of the Debt Arrears Clearance Strategy.

The version that the SADC trampled and continues to trample on the rule of law concept in achieving consensus to curtail the mandate of the Tribunal is reflective of the neo-liberal notions that tend to interpret the violation of rules as a preserve of specific groups in the international system. Where activities are governed by national institutions established to do so, a violation of such law must be met with the remedies of such laws for predictability in international relations. The rule on the concept of consensus, a mechanism of decision making in the SADC, is one of the most democratic ways of establishing principles and procedures at regional level. The rule allows everyone to be heard and ensures ownership of both pain and gain.

Once consensus was attained, ownership as an important enabler was achieved. Those affected by the dictates of such laws must introspect first before they raise objections to the rules that must govern them. The only available remedy in the case of Campbell and Others was negotiations in good faith, within the confines of the internal political mechanisms in Zimbabwe or some recourse in the SADC political arena, exploiting the eminent persons as one of the established mechanism in the region. Reading much into the international voices created a wedge that gave the SADC Summit little room to manoeuvre. The stake of losing sovereignty was too big to allow at the delicate stage of the regional integration.

Noteworthy in human development in the interaction of nations is that issues of national survival are never wished away but rather, debated and resolved at the time they are put on the table, if they are to address real challenges abound in societies. If wished away and held in abeyance, they will rest latently creating in that state, mutating sentiments which are triggered later during the human interactions by seemingly trivial concerns. The costs

of the results that arise after the trigger outweigh the efforts that should be employed to sustain the negotiations to address the seemingly insurmountable challenges. Holding challenges in suspense and hoping that time will address such challenges delays the fruits of growth for the contestants. Zero sum outcomes should not be allowed to inform societies' engagements in matters of existence.

The undertakings in the international relations arena are guided by the values and norms established at sub-regional levels from inputs and outputs of the domestic imperatives that are kith and kin driven. Kith and kin were the reasons for the failures in addressing timeously the land imbalances in Zimbabwe and it was through kith and kin affinities that Zimbabwe was shielded in its efforts of resolving the land imbalance utilising the radical approach, even after the land issue was internationalised by the Whites through the SADC Tribunal hearings.

The collective regional interests reflected in the interactions of nations at the highest level are important pointers to recognise in the decision making processes in the international relations arena. The values regulated by the elite are important feeders to the collective efforts of the regions and must be recognised for their worth. Beliefs, values and norms objectified and anchored from the inner circle of the elite, supersede other competing reproductions that arise from outside the regions and if conflicted they are adjusted to adhere to the domestic rules (inner circle) to the extent of their variations.

The determinants of the inner concentric circles are important in guiding the behaviours of the members in respective groupings. The reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme by the international community were better addressed by the Constructivist Theory which attests to the effectiveness of values and norms driven from regional interactions. The mixed outcomes in the international community were traceable from the SADC sub-regional community's Summit deliberations that deployed its internal mechanisms to address an unusual challenge that had a huge potential to divide the sub-region. Zimbabwe's FTLR programme became an unusual test case for the international community.

The Constructivist Theory lens exposed the impact of kith and kin affinities in inter-state engagements. The behaviours of the states in their engagements with Zimbabwe from across the regions revealed the primacy of the regionally established norms over other

competing variables outside the regions. The neo-liberals purposefully overplay the power of the market penetration in the land redistribution discourse, as a generic rule and this informed their reactions. They strongly believe the notion that land acquisitions must always be seller-driven and that the land market value must change hands for the redistribution to take effect regardless of the obtaining competing alternatives. They are convinced that reflections on historical injustices are less persuasive than the demonstrations of the economic inefficiencies that arise from other land redistribution options. On the other hand, the pan-African belief in the collective ownership of issues and their reactions were informed on the basis of the SADC's sub-regional collective good.

8.1.1 Outcomes of the Research Objectives

This thesis sought to review the international community's reactions to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme during the period between 2000 and 2016; identifying and exploring the specific factors behind the international community's mixed reactions. The study also sought to evaluate the survival strategies adopted and implemented by the Zimbabwean government to militate against the impacts of the West's negative reactions to the FTLR programme and assess the implications and limits of the international law in resolving the domestic policy orientations. The study's objectives were addressed as follows;

8.1.1.1 Regional Values and Norms are Central to National Reactions

Chapter 1 set the parameters for the study and outlined the procedures and processes utilised. Chapter 2 revealed that the events in the international relations arena were guided by the values and norms established at sub-regional levels from inputs and outputs of the domestic imperatives that were kith and kin driven. The study concludes that the reactions were mixed and aligned to the regional norms. The 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement convened by the British government relegated the land issue to the periphery and failed to address Zimbabwe's land question although this was at the core of the liberation struggle.

The agreement availed a compromise which was the willing buyer willing seller policy that ran for the period between 1980 and 1990, although it set a weak foundation for Zimbabwe that perpetuated White domination it gave Zimbabweans a huge political space that it used later to greater effect. Under this policy the land redistribution relied on

the availability of the White farmers willing to sell the land at the prevailing market price. The willing buyer willing seller was the West's value-driven option that allowed kith and kin continued landholding that legalised White domination as expounded by Chitepo.

The White domination continued at independence from 1980 up to 1992 when a land Act was promulgated that attempted compulsory acquisition after Zimbabwe witnessed limited sellers during the period set by the Lancaster House Constitution. The failed 1992 Act drawn by the Zimbabwe government to address the limited land sales that occurred between 1980 and 1990 was meant to allow Blacks landholding which did not materialise because the process was going to disadvantage the White farmers who belonged to the neo-liberal bloc.

The seats reserved for Whites in Parliament in independent Zimbabwe was another concept that assured White domination because it provided the Whites the veto power for the period of the willing buyer willing seller policy. This Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement clause established a weak state that continued to operate divided along racial fault-lines. The willing buyer willing seller concept that failed to address the land issue was a British-driven concept enforced by the West to safeguard their White kith and kin.

Chapter 3 tackled the unresolved Lancaster House Agreement which expired in 1990 when the compulsory land reform failed after running for 6 years from its enactment in 1992. The major reasons for the failure was the compulsory nature of the process that challenged the neo-liberals' dictates. As the main sponsors of the process, the neo-liberals deliberately underfunded the programme, again as a safeguard for the kith and kin's continued land-holding in Zimbabwe. The Bretton Woods-sponsored ESAP did not allocate any funding for land reform, thereby giving the White farmers more time to continue enjoying landholding in Zimbabwe undisturbed. The Donor Conference of 1998 failed to rally any funding for land reform a stance by the West that allowed no other land reform options for the Zimbabwe government. In 2000 the enacted FTLR programme law and the revised Act 17 of 2005 met with mixed reactions from mainly the West, the anchor for neo-liberal thinking because the laws did not only disadvantage their White kith and kin but had shut the door for recourse in Zimbabwe's courts of law.

Chapter 4 revealed the internal reactions in Zimbabwe as the FTLR programme unfolded. There were mixed views on Zimbabwe's FTLR exercise which were ideology driven. For

those behind the programme land reform allowed Blacks to access land while for those opposing the FTLR programme, the exercise was a miscalculated endeavour that unnecessarily set Zimbabwe along an economic meltdown route. The path Zimbabwe had chosen was to disturb the established status of White domination in the international system, driven by the neo-liberal dictates.

Chapter 5 discussed the reactions from the international community. The West sanctioned Zimbabwe for the FTLR programme mainly through ZIDERA, the USA sanctions package, and the restrictive measures from the EU. On the other hand, China, Russia, Pakistan and Malaysia supported Zimbabwe's FTLR programme and continued to trade with Zimbabwe in all areas of mutual benefit, taking cue from the long established relations dating back to the liberation struggles of the sub-region. This contrast revealed the mixed nature of the reactions that were alliance-driven.

Chapter 6 presented the positive reactions from the SADC sub-region in the main and the generality of Africa. The chapter outlined the survival strategies both internal and external that Zimbabwe employed. The reactions across the regions were regional value driven and kith and kin influenced. Where there were bilateral variations, sub-regional positions took precedence over domestic options.

8.1.1.2 Values of the Elite are Important to the Collective Good of Nations

Running across this thesis is the centrality of the collective regional interests that were reflected in the interactions of nations at the highest level. The national interest factor remained the most important pointer that attracted serious attention in the decision making processes in the international relations system. The values regulated by the elite were the crucial drivers to the collective efforts of the regions and must be recognised for their worth.

Beliefs, values and norms objectified and anchored from the inner circle of the elite, superseded other competing reproductions that arose from outside the regions and if conflicted they were adjusted to adhere to the sub-regional rules to the extent of their variations. Kith and kin were important factors that guided the reactions in the international community. The Constructivist Theory lens exposed the impact of kith and kin affinities in inter-state engagements. The behaviours of the states in their

engagements with Zimbabwe revealed the primacy of the regionally established norms over other competing variables.

8.1.1.3 The Values of the Inner Circle Impacts the Outer Circles

The determinants of the inner concentric circles were revealed in Chapter 6 as important in guiding the behaviours of the members in respective groupings. The reactions of the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR programme revamped the internal sub-regional mechanisms that sought to limit the negative impacts of the Western sanctions. Zim-Asset was an internal mechanism that harnessed internal resources to militate against the negative sanctions-induced challenges whereas the Look East policy gave Zimbabwe some international leverage against the debilitating effects of the sanctions.

At the UN Level Zimbabwe got the support of China and Russia who came to her rescue at very crucial moments in her sustained conflict with the West since the start of the FTLR programme. The double veto that foiled the USA-sponsored UN Chapter VII intervention in Zimbabwe in 2008 attests to the mixed reactions at the highest levels of the international community.

8.1.1.4 The Sub-Regional Values Outweigh Domestic Imperatives

Chapter 7 observed the implications and limits of international law and norms in resolving domestic policy orientations. The SADC's sub-regional appraisals established a common viewpoint and guided the approaches other African sub-regions adopted in dealing with Zimbabwe's radical land redistribution policy. The African regional views drew from the SADC sub-regional observations. In all circumstances, the primacy of the political pillar was revealed. The effectiveness of the solidarity networks developed during the liberation struggles of the respective regions informed and guided the processes that regions followed in their reactions.

The regional mechanisms became important safeguards for national sovereignty, an important right that nations continue to protect at all costs. An issue that appeared as a foregone legal conclusion in the international eye became a very complex issue that stunned the neo-liberal group once it was concluded. The West continued to sanction Zimbabwe after the 2013 elections because the elections were won by a party that was not going to address the land issue in Zimbabwe according to the neo-liberals' dictates.

The West-only supports candidates who are prepared to further the West's neo-liberal views.

8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations arise from the study:

8.2.1 Develop Effective Communications in National Programmes

The challenges that arose and those anticipated to arise from the land redistribution programme must be communicated effectively to ensure that the efforts to address the shortcomings get consensus from the opinion leaders and the generality of the public across the political divide to address the national consensus gap. Deliberate debates in Parliament, the academia, opinion leaders and other such fora on land as an important bond for national survival must be convened to allow for the crucial buy-ins on key national issues that will create rallying points for the nation.

This approach would help protect nations against covert and overt interference by the powerful nations in the international system. National cohesion must arise out of informed debates that align a collective appreciation of challenges that face nations in the ever competitive and self-serving global environment. The diversified views that arise from such interactions would help reveal areas of common understanding which should be given prominence and analysed in their own right to give value to the possible solutions to national challenges.

8.2.2 Create and Promote Internal Capabilities for the Defence of National Programmes

The nation's weaknesses in articulating its land reform programme that created the fertile ground for the studies championed by the neo-liberals, which attracted negative reactions in the international system should be a wake-up call for Zimbabwe. The establishment of national think-tanks to forecast and recommend on activities that govern national cohesion should be prioritised for national development into the future. Zimbabwe must guarantee growth through the creation of institutions that regulate the national purpose and the national objectives that allow for national cohesion.

The Third Chimurenga requires empirical studies so that Zimbabweans can draw lessons on how to handle national challenges. These studies should reveal the impact of landholding to future interactions among the Zimbabwean communities; regulate strategies to heal the wounds that arose from its articulations and give indications on how best it could have been structured in addressing the challenges that befell the nation. The period when stories are told by the outsiders should be closed by this approach.

Zimbabwe needs to tell the Zimbabwe story and arrive at decisions on national survival issues derived from empirical evidence. Decisions must as a rule, arise from established facts. Those Zimbabwean researchers who manage to come up with concrete solutions to national challenges must be accorded the necessary recognition so as to motivate others to pick up the baton and continue with research and development work that would assure Zimbabwe's successes in the anarchical community of nations. Targeted studies on Zimbabwe's potential, capabilities and endowments must be funded from public funds where studies that guide the growth of the Zimbabwe economy must be prioritised.

8.2.3 Convene Studies for Land Reform Sustainability

The current land ownership profile established from the FTLR programme of 2000 demands dedicated studies on its sustainability, considering the emergence of the young generation that is ready to take up the challenges in the agriculture industry. The current agricultural regions' productivity ceilings require continuous assessment and review so as to continuously improve and move with the times. The soil types and the rainfall patterns across the five regions demand new scientific profiles and these must be related to farm sizes and the optimum productivity levels.

Equity in terms of family holdings rather than individual holdings should be considered seriously for those in the commercial landholding areas, as demand for land will certainly continue. The redistribution biases on the kin component that featured in the FTLR programme needs immediate redress and the one-humankind one-farm concept should be respected. Adjustments in this area will allow for more family involvement in the empowerment drive through effective land utilisation.

8.2.4 Develop and Propagate the Pro-people Empowerment Idea to the Nation

Zimbabwe's FTLR programme is most likely to continue to attract opposition from the neo-liberals who are unlikely to remove sanctions on Zimbabwe as they continue to demand that the SADC Tribunal resolutions be adhered to. The productivity issue through internal mechanisms should be targeted for all the models of land reform. Tertiary institutions should create capabilities and capacities through their innovations hubs and come up with solutions that add value to productivity at the household level to guarantee food security.

Output per hectare should become the benchmark for future land uptakes which should be guided by the revealed potential and capability. The production of staple food should attract appropriate hectares or some agreed ratio of the total hectares that must be met by each farmer as an obligation. Serious farmers need to be supported fully to maximise output per hectare. Improved early-warning mechanisms should be put in place to project on the seasonal variations in all the agricultural regions. It must be noted that it's only through the citizenry's collective efforts that nations prosper.

With the correct grounding, Zimbabwe and its huge potential to grow should easily surpass the national vision of attaining an upper middle income economy by 2030 if priorities are appropriately set and resources given to align the farm activities to the anticipated annual growth trajectory. Zimbabwe needs to base its development trajectory on the efforts of its citizens first and players from the outside will only come in to add value or improve the growth sprung by the citizens of Zimbabwe. The nation's cohesion arises from the people's realisation that they constitute an important component for its survival and that their collective input is noticed and appreciated.

8.2.5 Improve Sub-Regional Interactions and Internal Mechanisms on Lessons Learned from the SADC Tribunal's Engagement on the Land Issue in Zimbabwe

Lessons need to be drawn and internal safeguards developed from Zimbabwe's conflicted engagements with the SADC Tribunal on the contested FTLR programme. Those lessons should guide the country's relations with those nations that stood with Zimbabwe during trying times, and Zimbabwe's position should be clearly spelt out to those whose views were indifferent. Further, solidarity networks established during the liberation movement period need to be refined to have safeguards for the future onslaught by the neo-liberals

as the new generation takes over in the sub-region. Regional norms on the land question in the sub-region must be developed to sustain the gains achieved on the conclusion of Zimbabwe's land reform programme and by extension throughout the SADC sub-region. The precedent set should be strengthened by establishing regional mechanisms that monitor possible land conflict areas and ways they should be abated regionally as a collective effort for regional integration.

8.2.6. Establish Structures to Analyse and Guide the National Reconciliation Efforts

The reconciliation efforts to soothe Zimbabwe's relations with those it had disengaged with and open doors for new players in the international community need to be pursued with seriousness and insight. These undertakings afford Zimbabwe and other nations in the international system the opportunity to derive economic growth on a united front. As Zimbabwe engages with new players, the parameters for land use must be clearly spelt out to guide appropriate behaviours that take notice of the ethos of the liberation struggle as pronounced in the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

The requirement to address the issue of farms that fall under bilateral protection arrangements and such other conditions needs a well thought out strategy that does not appear as if Zimbabwe was reversing the land reform. Whatever discussions that may arise with the affected in this cluster, should seek to solve the issue without creating any doubt on what the land reform has already achieved for the nation in its current form.

Any approach that possesses a hint of reversal of what has been achieved by the current land reform will attract misgivings and create friction between the government and its citizens who appreciate that the land reform was a concluded matter as registered by the constitution and the empowerment it brought to the generality of Zimbabweans. A correct interpretation of the constitution in its current form has to be done to align whatever thinking on the rapprochement efforts. Besides the Parliamentary debates, the nation must allow debates at every level of society before conclusions of Statutory Instruments that are developed on important national issues such as the land question.

8.3 EPILOGUE

Zimbabwe's FTLR programme of 2000 attracted varied reactions from the international community. While it prompted imposition of punitive measures by the West, the Africans seized the moment to build and cement greater solidarity. There were also non-committal members in the international community. Zimbabwe continued to engage and reengage and these efforts have created important platforms that are closing the gulf that existed between Zimbabwe and the West after the radical land reform programme. Issues reflecting on the realities of the need for equitable land redistribution for the disadvantaged majority Blacks considered taboo earlier in the interactions have become the benchmarks for discussions at official platforms. The facts arising from the realisation that the continued antagonistic approach failed both parties and that growth was retarded across the divide were keys to unlock the prevailing engagements re-engagements and rapprochement efforts. The SADC Tribunal's decisions on the land issue in Zimbabwe opened a new epoch that attests to the important role of the elites in politics for directing and guiding events at regional levels. Whilst there were varied observations that could have attracted a divided SADC sub-region, the Summit's pronouncements proved the neatness of the sub-regional mechanisms which relied on consensus to align the regional direction on matters of regional survival. Zimbabwe's land issue set an important precedent that will be useful in addressing the land imbalances across the SADC region which could attract others in similar circumstances internationally. The decisions at regional level are becoming more important benchmarks for predictability of events among the regional groupings. These decisions continue to be arrived at on the basis of regional values and norms which are objectified and anchored at regional levels through the inherent governing treaties and protocols. These decisions continue to be driven by the solidarity networks abound in regional groupings. Kith and kin affinities shall continue to play out and possess huge influence in international relations. They have become linchpins in regulating behaviour at every concentric circle within the regions as nations engage and interact.

8.3.1 Areas for Further Research

After this study, it remains unclear whether Zimbabwe's FTLR programme was planned or not. The land invasions of February 2000 are not linked to any sort of orders that directed the activities that spread across the nation. The benefits and or shortcomings of

the tendency by the provincial and district lands identification committees to allocate land to land seekers based on one's original place of domicile and what the future holds if the concept is sustained require further analysis. Another question to be addressed revolves on how the land reform can cement the cohesion among Zimbabweans on issues that should constitute national rallying points going forward. One is persuaded to think that the land issue should be among the important national rallying points which should not reflect political party positions engendered by the polarisation that was driven by the FTLR programme.

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10. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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APPENDICES

11.1 ETHICS LETTER OF ASSISTANCE

RESEARCH PROJECT ASSISTANCE REQUEST

This letter serves to confirm that Joe Muzvidziwa (R178447F) is a student at the Midlands State University pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and Public Management. In fulfilment of his studies, he is expected to submit a thesis entitled “**Kith and Kin Affinities and Inter-State Engagements: An Analysis of the International Community’s Reactions to Zimbabwe’s Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (2000-2016)**”.

The Midlands State University would appreciate and be grateful for any information you may provide the student to enable him carry out his academic studies ethically.

Yours Sincerely

Signed.....

For Politics and Public Management Department



11.2 LETTER OF PARTICIPANTS CONSENT

Dear Participant

My name is Joe Muzvidziwa, a student at the Midlands State University pursuing PhD studies with the Department of Politics and Public Management. My thesis is titled;

Kith and Kin Affinities and Inter-State Engagements: An Analysis of the International Community's reactions to Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform Programme.

The background to this study arises from the observed mixed reactions from the international community where on one hand we witnessed the West punishing Zimbabwe through the ZIDERA, the USA induced sanctions regime and the EU utilising the restrictive measures route. The SADC sub-region members and the generality of Africa supported the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme efforts. From the Asiatic region we witnessed some nations which were non-committal and those which supported the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme. This study aims to analyse the reasons behind these mixed reactions.

The objectives of my study are as follows:

- a) To review the international community's reactions to the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme for the period between 2000 and 2016.
- b) To analyse and explore the specific factors behind the international community's reactions to the FTLR programme.
- c) To evaluate the survival strategies adopted and deployed by the government Zimbabwe to mitigate the impacts of the international community's negative reactions to the FTLR programme.

- d) To assess the implications and limits of the international law and norms in resolving domestic policy orientations.

You are being requested to participate in the interview because you are one of the established diplomat, politician, scholar, former farmer, current farmer, former farm worker or former combatant or employee from the relevant ministry with knowledge on the Zimbabwe's FTLR of 2000. The interview will last between 45 and 60 minutes. I will be asking you a question and request that you are as open as possible in answering these questions. If you feel uncomfortable with some of the questions you may choose not to answer such questions. I will be asking some questions that you may not have thought about before which involve thinking about the past and the future. Please be informed that there is no right or wrong answers. I shall be taking down notes in order for me to gather your views on the topic to allow me to carefully analyse the information collected and write it down in a more detailed presentation.

Your participation is voluntary and you can choose to withdraw from the interview at any time. There will be no penalties if you wish to withdraw. The results of the study may be published in a journal article and presented at the postgraduate conference. The university may also use the findings for future studies of similar interest but confidentiality will be maintained by not referring you by your real name. No personality identification information will be released in any form and the interview scripts will be kept under lock and key and will be destroyed after five years once data capture and analysis has been completed.

If you have any questions regarding any aspect of this study, you may contact the researcher on number +263-712870420 or Dr Mashingaidze at the Midlands State University +263-716800129 or Dr Zengeni +601-74490287.

Your participation will be highly appreciated.

Sincerely

Joe Muzvidziwa

Consent Section

I.....

Names of the respondent

Hereby confirm that I understand the contents and the nature of this study and I agree to participate. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced to do so. I as well understand that I can withdraw from this interview at any point should I wish not to continue. I understand that my name will remain confidential or anonymous if I choose so.

Signature of respondent.....Date

Signature of researcher.....Date



11.3 FACE TO FACE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Can you share your experiences in what has been termed the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe?
2. How did Zimbabwe navigate the international relations terrain after embarking on its Fast-Track Land Reform (FTLR) programme?
3. In what ways did the international community react to the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme and what factors, histories and ideologies informed their differing positions?
4. What strategies did Zimbabwe adopt and deploy to overcome the Western sanctions which were imposed against the country for embarking on the FTLR programme?
5. Can you comment on the history behind the SADC Tribunal?
6. Why did the White farmers litigate against the FTLR programme through the SADC Tribunal?
7. Why did the Zimbabwean government oppose the SADC Tribunal?
8. Why did the West sustain its anti-Zimbabwe sanctions after the 2013 Harmonised Elections which were within the parameters of the SADC sub-region's dictates?
9. What did you discover as the main shortcomings in the process?
10. What has been the impact of 'kith and kin' ties in the reactions to the Zimbabwe's FTLR programme?
11. How can the West's concerns be addressed without reversing the concept of black empowerment?
12. Can we learn anything from what happened in 1998 when the Svosve community invaded the Whites farms in the Mashonaland East Province?
13. In your views how best could the land issue been addressed?

The follow-on questions on when, why, how, who, etcetera were based on the respondent's reflections on the first question.