

**CONTESTING GENERATIONAL AND ETHNIC DISCOURSES IN HISTORICAL
ACCOUNTS OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE. A CASE STUDY OF *THE SUNDAY
MAIL* COLUMN, CHRONICLES FROM THE SECOND CHIMURENGA.**

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GWERU

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DEDICATION

This is to wifey Linda and the kids – Aysha, Silas and the drama queen Alysha. Your level of understanding as the books “stole” me away from home, your support when the chips were down and your prayers lessened the burden. Thanks a million times good people.

DECLARATION BY STUDENT

I, **MUNYARADZI ELIAS HUNI, REG. NUMBER R14419W**, do hereby sincerely declare that this dissertation is my original work that has not been previously submitted to any other academic institution in pursuit of any academic qualification. In writing this dissertation, I duly complied with ethical issues and laws governing intellectual property.

DISSERTATION TITLE:

Contesting generational and ethnic discourses in historical accounts of the liberation struggle. A case study of *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga.

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CERTIFICATE OF SUPERVISION

I hereby certify that I personally supervised this dissertation in accordance with the Department Regulations and the University's General Academic Regulations. On that basis, I confirm that this dissertation is examinable.

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Matthew 19 verse 26 says: Jesus looked at them and said, “With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.” Indeed, the Almighty God made this research possible and Glory be to Him.

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ABSTRACT

Since the attainment of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe's historiography has been dominated by what Byrnes (2012:3) refers to as "Big History." This Big History, authored by self-glorifying former nationalists and complemented by willing commissar intellectuals of the early 1980s, silenced the narratives of former fighting forces from the Second Chimurenga, which brought the country's independence. However, studies utilizing a bottom up approach that is capturing the voices of the less celebrated or rather marginalized former fighters are scarce. Zooming on the narratives of these silenced former fighting forces, this study deploys Maurice Halbwachs' concept of collective memory fused with Terrance Ranger's patriotic history approach and post-colonial theory in examining the generational and ethnic contestations coming out of *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga. Utilizing a qualitative research approach and deploying archival research in data gathering, the study also examines how the liberation war account has been constructed in the midst of the generational and ethnic contestations in the column. Through critical discourse analysis and the presentation of data thematically, the study indicates that generational and ethnic contestations started way before the commencement of the Second Chimurenga. Furthermore, the study indicates that throughout the liberation struggle, there was mistrust between the former nationalists and the former fighting forces. The mistrust derailed the liberation struggle and the consequences are still being felt in Zimbabwe, 38 years after the attainment of independence. This study is an approach and a perspective from the silenced former freedom fighters who claim that their victory and history was stolen in 1980. Critically, the study shows ethnic and generational contestations defining Zimbabwe's nationalistic history.

ACRONYMS

AFP - Agency France Press

ANC - African National Congress

AP - Associated Press

BSAC - British South African Company

CDA - Critical Discourse Analysis

CEO - Chief Executive Officer

MDC - Movement for Democratic Change party

MIT - Multimedia Investment Trust

NDP - National Democratic Party

OAU - Organisation of African Unity

RPPC - Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company

SAPA - South Africa Press Association

ZBC - Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services

ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union

ZANLA - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZANU-PF - Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZIPRA - Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

ZATU - Zimbabwe African Tribal Union

ZARU - Zimbabwe African Regional Union

Zimpapers - Zimbabwe Newspapers

ZMMT - Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust

ZTN - Zimpapers Television Network

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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was characterized by "dissension, division and internecine conflict" that gained visible momentum from 1963 when the concept of the armed struggle was mooted by the leaders of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Joshua Nkomo and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Ndabaningi Sithole (Warner, 1981:2). These challenges adversely affected the armed struggle as nationalists and the fighting forces in these two political parties fought for survival.

This study explores intersections of politics, ethnicity and generational tensions in Zimbabwe's war discourses. The study analyses a column 'Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga' in the state-controlled weekly newspaper- *The Sunday Mail*. In this column, Munyaradzi Huni (author of this dissertation) interviews selected freedom fighters from the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of (ZANU) in an attempt to bring out their experiences, challenges and success stories during the war. The media's obsession with publishing war accounts demonstrates the argument by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) that Zimbabwe's national identity and history continues to be constructed around war narratives. Significant literature (Lindgren, 2002; White, 2003; Bhebhe, 2004; Msindo, 2004; Mandaza, 2005; Msindo, 2006; Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2007) examine intersections of the liberation war and national identity politics in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Some of the studies (Msindo, 2007; Holland, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008a, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008b; Ndlovu-

Gatsheni, 2009; Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009) examine the connections of ethnicity, national identity and the war of liberation in Zimbabwe.

However, fewer studies have examined generational and ethnic contestations in chronicles of the war from a media studies perspective.

Utilizing an eclectic approach, borrowing theoretical strands from French socialist Maurice Halbwachs' concept of collective memory fusing them with Terrance Ranger's concept of patriotic history and post-colonial theory this study examines the generational and ethnic contestations coming out of the silenced liberation war narratives of the forgotten former freedom fighters who directly engaged the Smith regime at the war front. I am reflexive in this study given I am the author of *The Sunday Mail* Column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*. According to Davies (1999: 7) "reflexivity expresses the researchers' awareness of their necessary connection to the research situation and hence their effects upon it." On the other hand, Reay (2007: 611) argues that reflexivity entails giving as "full and honest an account of the research process as possible, in particular explicating the position of the researcher in relation to the research." As the author of the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*, I will continuously self-introspect so as to be able to examine and appreciate how the "self" affects the research process.

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Its 38 years after the attainment of independence, but as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 57) argues, "...there is still too much continuity from the nationalist struggle ... (and this is) haunting contemporary politics." One cannot define Zimbabwe without linking the definition to war narratives. The liberation struggle remains a key defining principle of the country's identity and this historic phase remains a

source of pride for many (Msindo, 2007). The moment one attempts to de-associate himself or herself from the liberation struggle, he or she risks being labelled a sellout. This explains why in the midst of current internal politics in Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), all the contesting factions have resorted to the liberation discourse for legitimacy. Even the opposition political parties have realized the significance of the liberation struggle in presenting themselves to their supporters.

As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 21) observes “contested pasts and contested memories rather than edited singular versions of history have continued to work as connecting tissues across the past and present in Zimbabwe. So despite the generational and ethnic contestations, Zimbabwe as a nation derives its identity from the liberation war narratives.

Zimbabwe’s war of liberation was fought on a polarized front (Warner 1981; Chung 2006; Msindo 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). This polarization was a result of generational and ethnic struggles which have prevailed from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times (Msindo, 2007).

From 1963 when the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) split into two with Joshua Nkomo remaining to lead ZAPU and Ndabaningi Sithole leading the new political formation, ZANU, generational and ethnic contestations have remained a dividing issue in Zimbabwe’s politics (Warner, 1981; Kriger, 1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). In this study, ethnic rivalry is examined at two levels – Ndebele against Shona; and Shona sub-group against Shona sub-group. The Shona are a collection of different dialect groups that include Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Korekore, Ndau and Kalanga among others (Warner, 1981).

However, from the early 1960s onwards, ethnic divisions started due to fight for positions (Msindo, 2004). This led to the split of ZAPU in 1963 when many Shonas decided to form ZANU (Sithole (1984). After the 1963 breakaway, Msindo

(2006) notes that the two parties tried to maintain ethnic balance but to no avail. As Chung (2006) asserts, the Nhari-Badza Rebellion, the death of Chitepo and the Vashandi Rebellion of 1978 could all be attributed to ethnic rivalry in ZANU.

Besides the ethnic rivalries, the liberation struggle was also blighted by generational contestations leading to the breakup of ZIPRA. The breakup followed the Wankie Battle that saw quite a number of ZIPRA forces massacred with the young ZIPRA fighters blaming the massacre on bad planning by old-style politicians who were stationed in Lusaka.

After crossing to ZANLA, these ex-ZIPRA comrades started questioning the authority of the senior commanders in ZANLA who had few years of education, whereas some of these ex-ZIPRA comrades were graduates from the best Soviet military academies (Chung, 2006).

For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that the liberation struggle was fought at two fronts – there was the rear, which constituted areas like Lusaka, Zambia and Maputo, Mozambique. It was at the rear where war strategies and tactics were formulated mainly by nationalists and military commanders. Then there was the war front right inside Rhodesia where ZIPRA and ZANLA engaged in battles with Ian Smith's army.

There is abundant literature, in the form of biographies and autobiographies from former nationalists (Muzorewa 1978; Mawema 1979; Nyagumbo 1980; Sithole 1980; Mugabe 1983; Nkomo 1984; Chiwewe 1989; Sithole 1999; Tekere 2005; Chung 2006 and Mhanda, 2011) that has narrated discourses on generational and ethnic contestations during the liberation struggle. However, most of the literature was from former nationalists whose narrations tendered to focus more on the politics of the struggle from the rear in Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. These nationalists gave their perspectives on the contestations and ignored the views of the freedom fighters who were at the war front in Rhodesia. In a way, in their

narrations, these nationalists “Othered” (Sartre, 1943) the fighting forces by silencing their voices as if this was a war with no fighting soldiers.

Also, when one takes an analytical look at the researcher position, the narratives by these nationalists tended to exhibit personal vendettas against perceived rivalries and show personal glorification that was never subjected to any criticism or challenge. For example, Muzorewa (1978), Mawema (1979), Sithole (1980), Nkomo (1984), Tekere (2005), Chung (2006) and Mhanda (2001) in their narrations exhibit one-sidedness and anger towards those they thought had contributed to their demise during and after the liberation struggle. On the other hand, Nyagumbo (1980) and Mugabe (1983) glorify their participation during the liberation struggle in a way that gives the impression that they were faultless nationalists who contributed immensely to the struggle. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) describes these biographies and auto-biographies as celebratory narratives in need of deconstruction and re-construction.

On the other hand, several academics, (Warner 1981; Martin and Johnson 1981; Lan 1985; Ranger 1985; Ranger 1989; Mombeshora 1990; Manungo 1991; Kriger 1992; Ranger 1994; Robins 1996; Bhebhe and Ranger 1996; Vail 1997; Alexander 1998; Bhebhe 1999; Raftopoulos 1999; Lindgren 2002; White 2003; Bhebhe 2004; Msindo 2004; Mandaza 2005; Msindo 2006; Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2007; Msindo 2007; Holland 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008a, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008b; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009) have also written extensively on the liberation struggle highlighting a wide range of issues. The issues revolve around the struggles within the struggle, the political construction of war veterans, ethnic clashes during and after the liberation struggle, nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the construction of the Second Chimurenga narrative.

While these studies indeed covered issues related to generational and ethnic contestations during the liberation struggle, they relied more on narratives from nationalists during the liberation struggle, ignoring the narratives from the fighting forces. Some of the studies, Martin and Johnson (1981) and Bhebhe (1999) lack the critical eye as the researchers seemed to focus more on just chronicling events without interrogating the forces behind different clashes that took place during the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Furthermore, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) notes that these first historians were willing scribes who celebrated African nationalistic history rather than interrogate it.

Since the generational and ethnic contestations will be studied from interviews published in a newspaper column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*, the study also takes into cognizance the role of the media in constructing political identities. Media representations are crucial in this study since the research examines who, through the generational and ethnic contestations, are the people emerging as patriots from the selected interviews.

This study proposes to give a voice to the forgotten and somewhat forsaken fighting forces from the liberation struggle. These fighting forces were in the thick of things during the liberation struggle and from their experiences at the war front, they must have rich and fascinating narratives that give the generational and ethnic contestations a fresh perspective. This is an area that is clearly in desperate need of research. From this viewpoint, therefore this study examines how the liberation war account has been constructed in the midst of the generational and ethnic contestations.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There is abundant literature on the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe from former nationalists (Mawema 1979; Sithole 1980; Nkomo 1984; Tekere 2005; Chung 2006; and Mhanda 2001) and academics (Warner 1981; Martin and Johnson 1981; Lan 1985; Ranger 1985; Ranger 1989; Mombeshora 1990; Manungo 1991; Kriger 1992; Ranger 1994; Robins 1996; Bhebhe and Ranger 1996; Vail 1997; Alexander 1998; Bhebhe 1999; Raftopoulos 1999; Lindgren 2002; White 2003; Bhebhe 2004; Msindo 2004; Mandaza 2005; Msindo 2006; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; Msindo 2007; Holland 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008b; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009; and Ncube 2014) but this literature to a larger extent excludes and omits the narratives of the fighting forces during the liberation struggle. There is too much emphasis on the generational and ethnic contestations from the perspectives of nationalists. This study therefore examines these generational and ethnic contestations from the view point of this forgotten group which played a pivotal role during the liberation struggle.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Examine the generational and ethnic contestations coming out of the liberation war narrative in *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga.

Examine how the liberation war account has been constructed in the midst of generational and ethnic contestations in the column.

Examine the forces that were behind the generational and ethnic contestations in historical accounts of the liberation struggle in the column.

Examine who are emerging as patriots of the liberation struggle in the midst of the generational and ethnic contestations in the column.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.4.1 Main research question

What are the generational and ethnic contestations coming out of the historical accounts of the liberation struggle in *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga?

1.4.2-Sub- research questions

How has the liberation war account been constructed in the midst of generational and ethnic contestations in *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga?

What forces are contributing to these generational and ethnic contestations in the historical accounts of the liberation struggle in column?

Who are the people who are emerging as patriots from these generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation struggle in column?

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

This study is in agreement with Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009: xvii-xxvi) who argue that the “making of a national identity known as Zimbabwe is still in a state of construction, a state of becoming national.” Due to the fact that the voices of the fighting forces during the liberation struggle have largely been ignored, it therefore follows that the construction of the Zimbabwean identity is not complete.

As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) and Msindo (2007) posit, Zimbabwe borrows its identity in part from the liberation war discourses and so if the dominant discourses from this era have been one-sided, giving prominence to nationalists and silencing the fighting forces, it means the identity of Zimbabwe is still in a state of

becoming. In this regard, this study is important as it will contribute to the construction of the Zimbabwean identity by giving the forgotten fighting forces a chance to give their perspective.

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) and Vesser (1989) the cultural turn in the humanities and social sciences has inaugurated what has been termed new historicism which is steeped in the postmodern deconstruction of master-narratives and singular versions of history. New historicists have concentrated on re-writing and re-interpreting recorded histories as part of their protest against hegemonic, unitary, and objective histories as offspring of a small group of intellectuals, rich and powerful who dominated political and socio-economic spheres of life (Vesser 1989). The work of new historicist is both deconstructive and constructive as they are determined to deconstruct the dominant discourse and exposure of instrumentalities of power and critiquing the ideological motivations of those historians whose versions are readily reproduced, legitimised and circulated for public consumption (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010).

Borrowing from Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) and Vesser (1989), this study is significant as it is aimed at deconstructing the singular versions and dominant discourses by the nationalists. The study focuses on re-writing and re-interpreting recorded histories and challenges the elitist construction of the Zimbabwean identity. After deconstruction, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) the new historicist rebuilds on the platform of a new alternative story of history—one that advocates for justice, empowerment, tolerance, inclusivity, plurality and social change. In short, new historicism seem to represent what Michel Foucault (1980) termed ‘subjugated knowledges’ as well as the poor,

the marginalised, excluded and dissenting voices (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010).

Since the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe, the elite nationalists due to their privileged positions in life have given war narratives that present them as the owners of the struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). This study challenges this monopolization of the liberation struggle by this elite group.

The monopolization of the liberation struggle by the nationalists, according to Mlambo et al (2010: 89) has left Zimbabwe “fractured along historical, spatial, political, racial, ethnic and personal lines”. Social and political conflicts in Zimbabwe are partly rooted in and generated by a problematic formulation and articulation of national history and reluctance by professional historians to refute outright some ‘erroneous’ and ‘false’ views of history that have percolated into popular imagination.

There are a number of popular but sometimes inaccurate and incorrect accounts of national history that have been allowed to percolate into the minds of the people and in the process spoil human relations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

Through giving a voice to the silenced fighting forces, this study challenges some of the inaccuracies and incorrect dominant discourses that have been allowed to become truths without question. The voice of the fighting forces could put the liberation war narrative in proper perspective such that some of the social and political conflicts are well understood and therefore can be avoided. For example, the denigration and undermining of war veterans seems to stem from the fact that

the fighting forces from the liberation struggle have never given their side of the story.

What has escaped scholarly analysis, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) warns is that these historically false views circulate as truth in popular imagination and are open to manipulation by politicians as well as deployment by ordinary people for favours and discrimination. Mbembe (2002: 239-273) observes that the real danger is for countries like Zimbabwe falling into “the power of the false” where powerful but false narratives from history creates a crisis of identity.

Over the years, Zimbabwe has grappled with issues to do with identity and seems to confirm views by Tandon (2005) that soon after the attainment of independence, most postcolonial African states found themselves struggling for identity. “After independence, however, matters became complicated. People who fought and won independence, involving huge sacrifices...began to ask their political leaders and intellectuals some critical questions: Where do we go from here? Who are we as a ‘nation’? How do we forge nationhood out of disparate ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, regional and sub-regional groupings? (Tandon, 2005: 67).

Zimbabweans are still asking these pertinent questions about their identity and nationhood. This confirms that the singular version and the dominant discourses given by the nationalists have failed to construct an agreed Zimbabwean identity, giving credence to this study.

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) Zimbabwean historiography has undergone a number of turns beginning with increasing deconstruction of older versions that installed ‘praise-texts’ by Martin and Johnson (1981) that set the

stage for the official history of the liberation struggle. Martin and Johnson (1981), Ranger (1985), Lan (1985) and Bhebhe (1999) became the earliest willing ‘commissar’ intellectuals who helped to produce official nationalism as they served nationalist power instead of critiquing it (Robins, 1996; Chomsky 1967).

In short the majority of the works produced within the postcolonial euphoric period assumed the format of ‘praise texts’ that accepted the victor’s version of history and ignored the activities of such nationalists as Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole, James Chikerema, George Nyandoro and others who were active in the nationalist struggle throughout the 1970s but failed to come into power in 1980 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010).

This study is in partial agreement with Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) in the sense that while the researchers are correct that the dominant discourses have largely ignored narratives by nationalists like Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema, Nyandoro and others, their analysis falls short in the sense that it continues to advocate for the inclusion of voices of more nationalists and not the forgotten fighting forces. From this perspective, this study is not only pertinent but is long overdue because Zimbabwe’s historiography has been monopolized. Those seeking to pluralize the historiography seem to be falling into the same trap of focusing on nationalists and not the fighting forces.

This study is part of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) calls revisionist historiography that seeks to democratize historical knowledge, liberating it from dominant and hegemonic nationalist historiographies. Just like Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) this study also deploys a Derridean deconstructive approach in a bid to understand why the fighting forces have been “Othered” to the periphery in a war that they were at

the forefront in executing. This study is an answer to calls by Cheru (2008) calling for the reconstruction and renewal of the African national project as a society that ignored its past, gets lost in its future endeavours.

In addition, this study is significant because Kriger (1988) has re-presented the fighting forces as savages who tortured and killed innocent people during the liberation struggle. What is unfortunate is that Kriger (1988) without giving the fighting forces a chance to give their side of the story relied more on narratives from some peasants and nationalists to come to the conclusion.

According to Schneeberger (2009: 87) media narratives build the boundaries inside which “national identity, the construct of us and feeling of attachment are constructed.” In that vein, this research studies interviews from the column. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) has been at the forefront of deploying what Terrance Ranger calls “patriotic history.” The selected interviews suit requirements of this study as they give voices to previously marginalized fighting forces from the liberation struggle and cover different generations from the war.

The fighting forces played a crucial role during the war as they are the ones who directly fought the Smith regime. In addition, these fighting forces actually participated in some of the generational and ethnic clashes like the 1974 Nhari-Badza rebellion and the 1978 Vashandi rebellion. Since the attainment of independence in 1980, the voices of these crucial players in the liberation struggle has been silenced by nationalists whose narrative gives the impression that they owned the war and academics who fell into the trap of the nationalists by excluding the liberation account of this important group.

Despite the pioneering role that they played in executing the war, the fighting forces have largely been excluded in the construction of the liberation war account. Maybe this explains why over the years, the role that these fighting forces played was down-played leading to their ridicule in some spheres, yet nationalists were revered as the vanguards of the liberation struggle.

Due to these varied reasons, I content that this study was long over-due as it is now 38 years after the attainment of independence. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) argues, it is high time that Zimbabwean nationalism be exposed to Fanon-style analysis with a view towards constructing an all-encompassing national identity.

1.5 DELIMITATION OF STUDY

This study focuses on selected interviews that were published from July 2012 to March 2018 as they capture the different phases of the liberation struggle. Since the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga* started in April 2012 up to August 2018, over 90 former freedom fighters have been interviewed.

When the column started in 2012, there was no consistency in the publication of the interviews in *The Sunday Mail*. However from October 2015, following requests from many readers of the newspaper who had fallen in love with the narratives from the liberation struggle, the column was now being published weekly without fail. This followed an arrangement where *The Sunday Mail* was assisted by veteran freedom fighters, Norman Bethune and Joseph Khumalo to identify comrades who had participated during the liberation struggle from the early 1960s.

As a result, this study focusses mainly on interviews that were published from October 2015 up to August 2018. These are narratives by freedom fighters who were deployed to the war front in the early 1960s until the 1966 Battle of Chinhoyi that saw ZANU putting on hold the deployment of freedom fighters in Rhodesia. The interviews also include narratives by the first freedom fighters to be deployed into Rhodesia in 1972 when the Second Chimurenga started in earnest and narratives by those comrades who led ZANU as it relocated from Lusaka to Maputo in 1975.

Interviews from commanders from ZIPRA are also included as ZIPRA fought side-by-side with ZANLA during the liberation struggle.

1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Some of the selected interviews have larger portions where the interviewees presented their narratives in Shona and these sections were not transcribed into English. According to Rossman and Rallis (2003) in the use of interviews, transcribing and translating text have become salient issues in the discourse of qualitative research. This is due to the fact that once data has been translated and transcribed, they are not raw data anymore as they are now referred as processed data.

There are so many pitfalls in assuming that the spoken word closely parallels the written word. Translating from one language into another is more complex as it involves more subtle issues of connotation and meaning. Generating more accurate data through translation is important (Venuti, 1998). According to Rossman and Rallis (2003: 260) some of the issues of concern regarding translation include

questions such as “if you have translated from one language to another, which language constitutes the direct quotes? Can you use translated words as direct quotes? How do you signal that a translation is accurate and captures the subtle meanings of the original language?”

While indeed transcribing and translating present challenges, what is fortunate is that the researcher is the one who conducted the interviews and is well-versed with the Shona language. The generation of more accurate data from the selected interviews is to a larger extent guaranteed.

On the other hand, the researcher of this study is the author of the selected interviews under the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*. This is like researching the “self” and according to Mboti (2012), Denzin (2013) and Tomaselli (2014), the researcher position can be problematic if not taken into consideration during research. Cognizant of this, the researcher will be self-reflexive, mindful of the challenges and opportunities that come with the fact of being the authorship of the column.

As Ruby (1980: 153) posits, self-reflexive researchers not only reflect upon their own subjectivities and how these affect research practices, but are additionally “mindful of the scholar’s connection to the research situation and influences upon it. In self-reflexivity, researchers “systematically and rigorously reveal their methodology and themselves as the instrument of data generation.”

1.8 STRUCTURE OF STUDY

Chapter One introduces the topic under study, providing background and justification for the study. Chapter Two focusses more on literature review and principal theories that inform the study. Chapter Three discusses research methods and methodology with attention being given to data gathering and data analysis techniques. Chapter Four provides a historical background to the column under study, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga and brief liberation war backgrounds of the comrades in the selected interviews. Chapter Five deals with the presentation of data and provides a detailed discussion of research findings. Chapter Six concludes the research and provide recommendations.

1.9 CONCLUSION

The research examines the generational and ethnic contestations coming out of the historical accounts of the liberation struggle in *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga. Furthermore, the research examines how the liberation war account has been constructed in the midst of the generational and ethnic contestations by the forgotten fighting forces. It is against this background that Chapter One provided an analysis of the core arguments of the study. The Chapter introduced the topic under study, the objectives and research questions which inform the study. Chapter Two presents and discusses related literature that informs the study and the theoretical framework.

CHAPTER TWO - Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter reviews literature that has been produced by nationalists and scholarly works from different academics within the context of the generational and ethnic discourses from Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Principle theories related to the study are to be outlined and evaluated in relation to the topic under study.

2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This study reviews literature produced by nationalists and academics in relation to generational and ethnic discourses from the liberation struggle. Opinions and debates by the nationalists and academics related to the topic under study will be the major highlights of this Chapter. A thematic approach will be deployed in the research.

2.2.1 Revenge biographies and glorifying the “self”.

Soon after the attainment of independence in 1980, there was a sudden interest in using “auto/biography as the lens through the making of history, identities and even imaginations of the nation” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010:2). The first body of literature which sought to make history and create the Zimbabwean identity comprises narratives by former nationalists during the liberation struggle (Mawema 1979; Sithole 1980; Nkomo 1984; Tekere 2005; Chung 2006 and Mhanda 2001). By and large, this literature is dominated by narratives where these

former nationalists glorify their participation during the liberation struggle while also legitimizing and de-legitimizing the participation of others.

In their narrations, these former nationalists give their perspectives on the generational and ethnic contestations during the liberation struggle but one gets the feeling that the narratives are to an extent subtle efforts to have a go at those they clashed with during the war. For example, Nkomo (1984) tells the story of his life during the liberation struggle but whenever the opportunity presented itself he would attack his perceived enemy at that time, Robert Mugabe and ZANU. “Robert Mugabe had decided to have me out of the way, and he evidently did not care what method was used (Nkomo, 1984: 3).

Due to the fact that the genesis of ethnic rivalries is always attributed to the split of ZAPU in 1963, it is important to understand the perspectives of the ZAPU leader at that time. Nkomo (1984) traces the reasons for the split to the late Tanzania leader Julius Nyerere whom he accused of lacking the confidence in the ability of Africans to rule themselves. Furthermore, Nkomo (1984: 111) asserts that Nyerere “had a special problem with me personally” adding that the former Tanzania leader always sought to dominate the policies and personalities of the liberation movements to which he gave hospitality. Nkomo (1984: 111) brags that his contacts with the outside world were older and independent of Nyerere’s patronage adding that “perhaps he saw me as a threat to the leadership he wished to assert.

In addition to Nyerere, Nkomo (1984) goes on to blame Leopold Takawira, Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole for fanning tribal and ethnic divisions leading to the split of ZAPU and the formation of ZANU in 1963. According to Vambe (2009) while an autobiography is a useful entry point into issues of self-

representation, individual self-portrayal, and resistance to some external representations, it remains a polemic in which the self is suppressed. In Zimbabwe, major nationalist political actors have used autobiographies to continue the competition for power, making them more of sites of power rivalries that must be used with care. In his analysis of Nkomo's autobiography, Vambe (2009) notes that we learn more about Robert Mugabe rather than about Nkomo himself. This is the deficiency that most autobiographies by former nationalists suffer.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) concur with Vambe (2009) observing that whereas ZANU-PF had constructed Nkomo as 'Father of Dissidents' and a threat to Zimbabwe, in his autobiography Nkomo emphasised his contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe as a clear rebuttal to criticisms levelled against him by his opponents. Nkomo (1984) emphasizes his political seniority in the nationalist struggle, and justify why he deserved the title 'Father Zimbabwe.' Throughout the biography Nkomo suppresses certain memories that would present him in different light.

Not surprisingly, the narrative by Nkomo (1984) is disputed by Chung (2006) who observes that the ZAPU split was caused first by Nkomo's decision to agree to a power sharing agreement with the colonial government, the failure of his war strategies and his over-reliance on white advisors such as Terrance Ranger, John Reed, Leo Baron and Peter Mackay. These differences in the narratives by these former nationalists give credence to the need to give the forgotten fighting forces a voice.

The tone in Nkomo's narrative, which is full of blame and hate against those he blames for his misfortunes is also found in Muzorewa (1978); Mawema (1979);

Sithole (1980); Chiwewe (1989); Tekere (2005) and Mhanda (2001). While their liberation war accounts are fascinating to read, an element of what Sartre (1943) calls “Othering” is very evident since most of these nationalists gave their accounts after facing problems either in ZANU, ZANU-PF and Government.

For example, Chung (2006) presents herself as one of the nationalists whose efforts in 1974 to assist the freedom fighters were scuttled by conflicts in ZANU. She accuses leaders such as Henry Hamadziripi and Rugare Gumbo of frustrating her efforts to introduce educational programmes in ZANU. According to Chung (2006) nationalists like Hamadziripi and Gumbo scuttled her efforts as they sought to oust ZANU’s external wing leader Hebert Chitepo whom they feared could win elections that were scheduled in 1974. The 1975 elections were not held following the death of Chitepo.

However, through her narrative, one can see an attempt by Chung (2006) to position herself in the liberation war account. Further, one has to take the accusations against Gumbo with a pinch of salt as from 1973 up to 1977, Chung had an intimate relationship with Gumbo that saw them giving birth of a daughter they named Chipo.

According to Chung (2006), soon after the birth of their daughter Chipo, relations between the two deteriorated as it became apparent that Gumbo was not interested in giving her any form of child support. This makes her liberation war account with regards to Gumbo quite questionable. Even her efforts to present herself as an advocate for the rights of women during the liberation struggle becomes questionable because her narrative exhibits a feeling of anger against male commanders in general and Gumbo in particular.

This trend of revenge biographies started way back when Sithole (1975) mocked ZANU after being expelled from the party through the Mgagao Document that was signed by ZANLA commanders at Mgagao Training Camp in Tanzania. According to Sithole (1975) when they formed ZANU it later changed to what he called the “Zimbabwe African Tribal Union” representing what he termed the Zimbabwe African Tribal Union (ZATU) or Zimbabwe African Regional Union (ZARU).

Through this narrative, Sithole (1975) is glorifying himself that soon after being expelled ZANU had been reduced to a regional and tribal grouping. His ZATU and ZARU characterizations of ZANU were a way of getting back at the new leaders of ZANU. Sithole (1975) re-presents himself as the best leader of ZANU and wants to give the impression that his expulsion was merely on regional and tribal grounds, yet other narratives expose his shortcomings as a leader.

This revenge approach to historiography adopted by Sithole (1975) is prevalent in many biographies and auto-biographies by former nationalists (Muzorewa 1978; Mawema 1979; Sithole 1980; Chiwewe 1989; Tekere 2005 and Chung 2006) who shift the blame to others and present themselves as the “saints” during the liberation struggle.

One can classify the accounts by these former nationalists as “revenge biographies and autobiographies.” With this in mind, it becomes very difficult for one to trust the accuracy of their narratives since they are coming out more as aggrieved parties. As a result, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) argues that since 1980, Zimbabwe has been antagonizing under a nationalist regime whose political essence was found on the history and memory of these skewed and partisan narratives by the former

nationalists. These former nationalists presented the liberation struggle in romantic and heroic terms, suppressing some truths and ignoring the perspectives of the fighting forces.

A critical look at most of the auto/biographies (Muzorewa 1978; Mawema 1979; Sithole 1980; Nkomo 1984; Chiwewe 1989; Tekere 2005 and Chung 2006) show that each account contributes a different version to the multiple Zimbabwean narratives and that the subjective nature of these discourses opens them to serious factual challenges. Each of the auto/biographies gives a version that seeks to position the writer in the broader context of Zimbabwean history but all the versions can be challenged. This poses a serious challenge to the use of such self-centred narratives in defining a nation like Zimbabwe due to complications arising from the multiplicity of ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

The biographies especially (Muzorewa 1978; Nkomo 1984 and Tekere 2005) gloss over serious disparities and contradictions during the liberation struggle and privilege the authors as the centres of apprehending historical reality. These nationalists re-present themselves not only as the main actors but as the owners of the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

Although Muzorewa (1978), Nkomo (1984) and Tekere (2005) produced narratives that can be described as nationalist biographies, the differences in their narratives confirms that Zimbabwe is an imagined community (Anderson, 1983). The identity of Zimbabwe becomes fluid as it is impossible to pin it down from the different versions produced by these nationalists. Fanon (1968) refers to these challenges as the pitfalls of national consciousness.

As Zimbabwe grappled with the pitfalls of national consciousness, nationalists like Ndabaningi Sithole, Abel Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo among others resorted to writing their biographies since those nationalists who had gotten into power in 1980, presented themselves as the real and authentic nationalists.

So while the making of history, identity and even imaginations of the nation through the auto/biography lens has been a fascinating exercise from the perspective of former nationalists, the accounts fall short of re-presenting the full liberation war story. Through their auto/biographies, the nationalists positioned themselves as the main drivers of the Second Chimurenga without exercising self-reflexivity. Their narratives do not hide the fact that they never went to the war front as they focus more on the politics in ZAPU and ZANU in Lusaka and Maputo.

While the nationalists produced revenge auto-biographies and biographies to glorify the self (Muzorewa 1978; Mawema 1979; Sithole 1980; Nkomo 1984; Chiwewe 1989; Tekere 2005 and Chung 2006), their narratives have dominated liberation war discourses since 1980, giving the false impression that their accounts constitute the full liberation war story. As a result, over the years, nationalists have been viewed as people who played a more crucial role than the fighting forces during the Second Chimurenga. While nationalists from the liberation struggle are revered in Zimbabwe, the fighting forces are rebuked.

This study challenges this one-sided nationalist history which is celebratory and self-congratulatory, bringing to the fore the selections, omissions and silences that have been deployed by the former nationalists as part of their hegemonic project. Furthermore, this study debunks the romanticization of Zimbabwean history as the narrative of the victors, the nationalists.

This study challenges the narrative by the nationalists who have deprived the fighting forces their historical past and consequently their identities. In addition this study places the forgotten fighting forces in their rightful place in history by bringing out their narratives, not the present scenario where they are placed outside of history and are re-presented as the defeated Others while the nationalists presents themselves as the victorious Self (Simour, 2014).

The fighting forces from the liberation struggle have failed to get access to telling, recording and writing of history and this study gives them that platform so that their contribution during the war is factored in in Zimbabwe's quest for a national identity. As Byrnes (2012:3) notes, since the 1960s, some historians have been concerned with the "silences and the pieces in-between Big History." Big History in Zimbabwe has been the narrative of the former nationalists and so this study in concerned with the lives of the ordinary men and women who fought at the war front during the liberation struggle, not the powerful nationalists.

The great and inspirational stories by these former fighting forces have since 1980 been deemed as not worthy of inclusion in defining Zimbabwe's national identity and this study argues that Zimbabwean national identity is not complete without their narrative. As Raftopoulous and Mlambo (2009) assert, the making of the national identity known as Zimbabwe is still in a state of construction.

2.2.2 A history given prematurely in service of nationalism

Zimbabwe has experienced three historiographies that are explicitly linked to the post-colonial nation-state project (Ranger, 2004; Ranger, 2006). First is nationalist historiography which dates from the 1960s to the 1980s; then second is the history of the nation which dates from 1980 to around 2000, and third and final is patriotic historiography which dates from 2000 to the present.

These historiographies were produced by local and international academics, (Warner 1981; Martin and Johnson, 1981; Lan 1985; Ranger 1985; Ranger 1989; Mombeshora 1990; Manungo 1991; Kriger 1992; Ranger 1994; Robins 1996; Bhebhe and Ranger 1996; Vail 1997; Alexander 1998; Bhebhe 1999; Raftopoulos 1999; Lindgren 2002; White 2003; Bhebhe 2004; Msindo 2004; Mandaza 2005; Msindo 2006; Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2007; Msindo 2007; Holland 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008a; Ndlovu-Gatshen 2008b; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009 and Ncube 2014).

These studies were produced following liberation war accounts given by nationalists and to a large extent ignore the perspectives of the fighting forces, except in rare cases where commanders such as Elias Hondo were interviewed by Warner (1981). However, the interviews by Warner are problematic and he even acknowledges that there are numerous problems associated with writing about a guerilla war “which is still in progress, or which has only recently ended” due to extreme emotions (Warner, 1981:17).

There are high chances that the narratives by commanders such as Hondo could have been influenced by emotions as they were conducted immediately after the

liberation war. However, emotions aside and the numbers aside, Warner (1981) observes the ethnic contestations after examining ethnic compositions of the political and military hierarchies of ZAPU and ZANU before, during and after major rifts in these two political formations.

Warner (1981) notes that besides ethnic rivalries, personal ambition, differences over tactics and strategies, disputes between guerilla cadres and their military leaders, influence of interested African, Communist and Western governments and ideological differences caused rifts in the two political parties. Leaders of the two political parties used ethnic bonds to elicit support during times of crisis but during times of organizational stability, ethnicity was not politically relevant.

Interestingly, Msindo (2007) argues that in the period 1950-1963 “ethnicity and nationalism positively fed each other. Ethnic associations were the springboard for the emergence of nationalist leaders while ethnicity provided the needed pre-colonial heroes, monuments and local expressions of anti-colonial discontent” (Msindo, 2007:267)

Just like, Warner (1981) and Msindo (2007) most of the research by the local and international scholars makes reference to the military wings of ZAPU and ZANU, but there hasn't been any coordinated approach and methodology to give the fighting forces prominence in the prevailing discourses.

Studies that were produced during the early years after the attainment of independence in 1980 (Warner 1981; Martin and Johnson, 1981; Lan 1985; Ranger 1985; Ranger 1989; Mombeshora 1990; Manungo 1991; Kriger 1992; Ranger

1994; Robins 1996; Bhebhe and Ranger 1996; Vail 1997; Alexander 1998; Bhebhe 1999; Roftopoulos 1999) have been branded as historical texts produced too early.

As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) notes studies by Martin and Johnson (1981), Ranger (1985), Lan (1985) and Bhebhe (1999) were written in the service of nationalism and were abused by ZANU-PF. Those historians who wrote seminal works on nationalism were ‘too close’ to the cause of nationalism to the extent that they produced what Robins (2006) refers to as ‘praise-texts’ in service of official nationalism. These academics provided heroic narratives of nationalism and the armed liberation struggle, making themselves ‘willing scribes of a celebratory African nationalist history that profoundly shaped official accounts of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle’. The victors’ version of the history of nationalism was easily acceptable (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

It was the crisis of governance together with economic meltdown that gripped the country at the beginning of the 2000s, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) that prompted historians like Terrance Ranger to mount one of his most robust and brutal deconstructions of nationalism, directly engaging with the darker aspects of the national liberation struggle. Earlier on, Kriger (1992) was the lonely voice in challenging celebratory texts of the liberation war as she broke the celebratory tradition by focusing on guerrilla violence and coercion that characterised the engagement between peasants and guerrillas.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) observes that soon after the attainment of independence, there was a rush by many scholars to record the country’s history at a time when emotions were still running high.

It is high time that Zimbabwean nationalism be exposed to Fanonian-style analysis with a view towards deconstruction of celebratory narratives and its discursive essence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The first historians who wrote on nationalism were according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) willing scribes and their writings celebrated African nationalist history rather than critiquing it. These early historians were themselves products of nationalism and in the process they profoundly influenced and shaped official accounts of Zimbabwe's definition of nationalism as the liberation struggle. This intellectual tendency resulted in interpretations of nationalism as a tale of totally heroic African struggles for emancipation from colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

On the other hand, as Moyo (2014) argues, the propagation of nationalist historiography was “work that had to be done” as a concerted reaction to Eurocentric perceptions that Africans had no history prior to the arrival of Europeans on the continent (Ranger, 2009:66). To this end, nationalist historiography was primarily concerned with demonstrating that “Africa had produced organised polities, monarchies, and cities, just like Europe,” (Zezeza, 1997:1).

In doing so however, nationalist historians, according to Moyo (2014) eulogized Africa's past without subjecting it to critique. In Zimbabwe, for instance, nationalist historiography took the form of tracing the roots of African nationalism, its connections with the uprisings of 1896-97 and the 1960-70s anti-colonial struggles inspired by mass consciousness now called the First and Second Chimurenga, respectively (Ranger, 2009).

Nationalist historiography coincided with what Msindo (2007:276) calls the “golden age” of nationalism because at that historical juncture, nationalism easily

transcended the divisive tendencies of ethnicity and united all Africans in a politically imagined reality called Zimbabwe. Looking back, Ranger (2009:67) has noted that the dangers of such a historiography have been to canonise the wars of liberation as “the total significant history of Zimbabwe” to the exclusion of other socio-political dynamics that have been central to the nation-state.

Outlining the shortcomings due to the euphoric period soon after the attainment of independence, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) argue that the majority of works produced within this period, accepted the victor’s version of history and ignored the activities of such nationalists as Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole, James Chikerema, George Nyandoro and others who were active in the nationalist struggle throughout the 1970s but failed to come into power in 1980. Due to these challenges, it is clear that the liberation war account has been suffering a lot of deficiencies, necessitating this study which seeks to democratize liberation war discourses by giving the forsaken fighting forces a voice.

This deconstruction of nationalism from the perspective of the early scholars started with scholars such as Norma Kriger leading to historians like Terrance Ranger acknowledging the shortcoming of their earlier works. Academics like Robins (1996), White (2003), Raftoupolous and Mlambo (2009) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) embarked on this project of revisiting Zimbabwe’s historiography. Their idea is to democratise historical knowledge, liberating it from dominant and hegemonic nationalist historiographies of the 1960s and 1970s that provided raw material that enabled monopolisation of national histories by a single political party and few political elites who claim to have ‘died’ for all Zimbabweans (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

However, in their bid to liberate historical knowledge these scholars (Robins 1996; White 2003; Raftouplous and Mlambo 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009) still ignored the liberation war narratives of the fighting forces during the Second Chimurenga. These academics perpetuated the narratives of the former nationalists, further delineating the fighting forces who played a crucial role during the war.

So in the service of nationalism, Zimbabwean history was given prematurely, but this is not unusual as Byrnes (2012:1) argues that the “totality of history is never fixed and stable, but is constantly subject to change, contingent upon the ways in which we re-read the past events in light of the present.” These early academics gave their perspective to the liberation war narrative as was determined by their closeness to the cause and this study is a breakaway from that nationalist perspective. Samuel (1990) notes that history is never dead, buried or certain but rather is a living and mutable force in the present. This study is not about giving the totality of history, but is about giving a perspective to the narratives by the former fighting forces which the early academics found not worthy of focusing on.

Furthermore, this study is carrying on the revisionist project started by (Robins 1996; White 2003; Raftouplous and Mlambo 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009) but goes a step further to examine the generational and ethnic contestations emanating from the liberation struggle from the perspective of the former fighting forces. History is always a partial and one-sided view of events (Byrnes, 2012).

Cognizant of this reality, this study presents the liberation war account from the discourses of the forgotten fighting forces, but does not claim to be presenting the

best view. As Byrnes (2012:1) argues, when “we think of history we ought not to visualize a place or a distant past, but an approach and a perspective.” This study presents an approach and a perspective from the forgotten former fighting forces whose narrative had been put aside and in some instances subsumed by the early academics in preference for “Big History”.

2.2.3 “Willing commissar intellectuals” who failed the people

After 1980 Zimbabwe’s historiography was supplanted by the history of the nation whose primary concern was to both celebrate and legitimate the new nation-state that came into being with the advent of independence in 1980 (Ranger, 2009). This task was carried out by what Robins (1996:76) refers to as “willing commissar intellectuals” who produced liberation war accounts to celebrate and legitimize the former nationalists.

As Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) observe Martin and Johnson (1981) became the earliest willing ‘commissar’ intellectuals who helped to produce official nationalism as they served nationalist power instead of critiquing it (Robins, 1996). These ‘commissar’ intellectuals became ‘willing scribes of a celebratory African nationalist history that profoundly shaped official accounts of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle’ (Robins 1996: 76).

This historiography served the purpose of legitimating the new state and its rulers to the people ruled but remained fairly open to challenges by alternative views especially as the euphoria of independence waned (Moyo, 2014). The collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and other east European countries negatively

affected the socialist rhetoric that had been the hallmark of the history of the nation (Moyo, 2014).

Liberation war-oriented historiography was consolidated following the International Conference on Zimbabwe's War of Liberation that was hosted by the University of Zimbabwe in July 1991 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). One of the early academics who pioneered studies that critiqued celebratory historiography was Kriger (1999) who questioned the notions of the liberation struggle as a popular revolution in which peasants voluntarily rendered their support. Kriger (1999) opens up debate on guerrilla violence and coercion, and in the process earned a bad name as an unpatriotic, reactionary, and expatriate scholar bent on betrayal of the Zimbabwe national democratic revolution (Moyo, 2014).

While Kriger (1999) chartered new ground in terms of challenging celebratory historiography by the commissar intellectuals, her study falls short in really democratizing liberation war discourses in the sense that she still relied on narratives by peasants, downplaying the views of the former fighting forces. So a literature gap exists as the story of the former fighting forces is yet to be told.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) posits that when Kriger's 1999 book was published, the willing commissar intellectuals were not happy because of the slant that seemed to be against the creation of heroes from the liberation struggle. While one expected such a response from the defensive post-independent government, it was surprising that progressive scholars were so intolerant of a study that demythologised the liberation struggle. In focusing on coercive peasant mobilisation by the guerrilla armies, Kriger ended up being accused by the willing commissar intellectuals as having betrayed the revolution (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). This is how the commissar intellectuals had gripped liberation war discourses. Anyone who went

against celebrating and creating heroes from the liberation struggle was seen as a sellout, leaving people wondering why historians were failing the people.

As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) notes, Ranger's early academic work provided the historical raw materials for the nationalist reconstruction of the ideology of Chimurenga. However Ranger (2002) laments how his history books were being used to construct what he termed 'patriotic history.' He defines patriotic history as a populist proclamation of the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition spearheaded by ZANU-PF cadres as patriots.

Patriotic history, according to Ranger (2009) was invoked in Zimbabwe partly as a response to Western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe following the country's controversial land invasions of post-2000. An emerging opposition in the form of the labour-backed Movement for Democratic Change party (MDC) that drew its support from a growing national discontent also needed to be combatted ideologically if ZANU-PF was to remain in power (Ranger, 2009).

As Moyo (2014) posits, patriotic history is perhaps the most controversial form of historiography to emerge in post-independence Zimbabwe as it represents an extreme version of nationalist history that is averse to critical academic history and general contestation. Thus patriotic history is deployed in the public arena as a weapon to reimagine national problems as being externally induced by the West, a West that is supposedly the enemy of the Zimbabwean people since the days of colonialism (Moyo, 2014).

In the midst of patriotic history, this study examines how the former fighting forces interpret the generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation struggle. About 38 years after the attainment of independence, how are the former freedom fighters challenging the dominant liberation war discourses and re-presenting themselves? This research was indeed long overdue as some of the former fighting forces are dying with their liberation war narratives.

Critical engagement with the nationalist past, as Moyo (2014) argues is urgently required, because postcolonial problems of authoritarianism, militarism, violence, identity crises, and the lack of democracy and anti-human rights culture that continues to puzzle many people have their roots in the way nationalism was produced and the way the liberation war was fought.

The issue of national unity that haunted the nationalist movements spilled over to the postcolonial epoch with devastating consequences on nation-building (Moyo, 2014). There is too much continuity from the nationalist struggle than change in Zimbabwe, to the extent that re-reading nationalism as a phenomenon reflects and directly informs most of the issues haunting contemporary politics in the country (Moyo, 2014).

This study is in line with Moyo (2014) assertion that there is need for a critical engagement with the past, but it differs with the prevailing dominant liberation war discourses because it engages with the narratives of former freedom fighters. On the other hand, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) observe that the current discourses on the liberation struggle from academics such as Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009) and Ndlovu- Gatsheni (2009) seek to democratize historical knowledge, liberating it from dominant and hegemonic nationalist historiographies. However, still there is a glaring literature gap as these scholars continue to ignore the voice of the former fighting forces by focusing on nationalists like Joshua Nkomo, without giving the former ZIPRA fighting forces a voice to speak about their leader. As a result, their supposed democratization of historical knowledge falls short in achieving their intention.

While the literature from the nationalists and the academics is welcome, it's confined to one-view of the liberation struggle and is dominated by the voices of nationalists who were stationed in Lusaka and Maputo. A literature gap therefore exists as Zimbabwe's liberation struggle cannot be defined only by leaders who were stationed in air-conditioned houses in faraway Maputo and Lusaka. It is important to examine how the liberation war account has been constructed in the

midst of generational and ethnic contestations by the fighting forces who operated in Rhodesia.

As Moyo (2014) argues, history is written with political, intellectual and ethical considerations of the present in mind. This points to the need for a more reflexive historical engagement that acknowledges and makes explicit these considerations and contexts. About 38 years since the attainment of independence, the emotional tempers from the liberation struggle have cooled down and the fighting forces have overcome the trauma caused by the protracted war. Now is their time to give their side of the story.

Therefore this study is about recovering history that has been frequently manipulated and misrepresentations that have been constructed over time. These misrepresentations have served in the production of distorted and often disfigured discourses (White, 2008). This study brings to the fore the story of their former fighting forces, their history, influences and contributions, not only during the liberation struggle but in identifying Zimbabwe as a nation.

2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study examines the contesting generational and ethnic discourses in historical accounts of the liberation struggle in selected interviews. In this examination, the study deploys an eclectic approach borrowing theoretical strands from Terence Ranger's concept of patriotic history fusing them with Maurice Halbwachs' collective memory approach and the post-colonial theory. According to Corbin and Strauss, (2008:39) a theoretical framework "provides a conceptual guide for

choosing the concepts to be investigated, for suggesting research questions, and for framing the research findings.”

On the other hand, Eisenhart (1991: 205) define a theoretical framework as “a structure that guides research by relying on a formal theory...constructed by using an established, coherent explanation of certain phenomena and relationships”. Highlighting the importance of identifying a suitable theoretical framework, Lysaght (2011:572) asserts that a “researcher’s choice of framework is not arbitrary but reflects important personal beliefs and understandings about the nature of knowledge, how it exists (in the metaphysical sense) in relation to the observer, and the possible roles to be adopted, and tools to be employed consequently, by the researcher in his/her work.” The collective memory approach fused with patriotic history and post-colonial theory will provide a theoretical understanding of the contestations emanating from the selected interviews under the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*.

2.3.1 Collective memory approach and the concept of patriotic history

Present day values and attributes inform how we look back and review what has gone before. “History is therefore a constant conversation with the past...we can never re-create the totality of the past – this is an actual impossibility. We can only work with those pieces that remain (Byrnes, 2012:1). This study deploys the collective memory approach and examines how “the pieces that remain” from the liberation struggle contributed to the formation of patriotic history in Zimbabwe.

Collective memory as propounded by Maurice Halbwachs (1980) refers to a practice in which social conceptions about a common past are used to build and maintain togetherness and group identity in the present and for the future. This is a

type of social knowledge that can be passed from generation to generation and reflects the present needs and future desires of the group that shares it (Halbwachs, 1980).

The generational and ethnic contestations emanating from the narratives of the selected interviews from the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga* should also be viewed from the collective memory approach since the former fighting forces re-present social conceptions about a common past which is the liberation struggle. The narratives by the former freedom fighters give them a certain identity and togetherness that speaks to their hopes and aspirations.

This confirms the views of Neiger et al. (2011) that collective memory rests upon the assumption that every social group develops a memory of its past which allows it to preserve and pass along its self-image. This collective memory is a sociopolitical construct, a version of the past, defined and negotiated through changing socio-political power circumstances and agendas (Halbwachs, 1980). This study examines the kind of collective memory that the former fighting forces build in a bid to preserve and pass along their identities.

The theory of collective memory provides solidarity and continuity, while groups modify the memory of the past according to the necessities of the present (Halbwachs, 1980). This is a dynamic process of constructing the past, and of generating a collectively shared present which is based on an agreed common past. In this theory, neither past nor present is prior to each other; rather the past is active in present constructions, notions and values of present social frameworks (Halbwachs, 1980). In addition, Halbwachs (1992) notes that the past and present are always in interaction in the collective memory of groups since the continuity and solidarity of groups are essential for their survival.

In light of this, this study examines the notions, values and ideas that the former fighting forces are transferring from one generation to the next as a group. Also, the collective memory approach allows the researcher to examine how the present predicament of the former fighting forces is shaping their narration and interpretation of the generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation struggle. This is because as Halbwachs (1980) observes, the past is always active in the present.

As noted by Halbwachs (1980) under collective memory, the memory of the past is modified according to the necessities of the present. This augurs well with Terrance Ranger's concept of patriotic history which was invoked in Zimbabwe partly as a response to Western sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe following the land reform programme that started in year 2000. In a sense, one can justifiably assert that patriotic history became the necessity as noted by Halbwachs (1980). Patriotic history became the response to a past that was under threat and was deployed to safeguard the legacy of the liberation struggle.

Patriotic history, as Ranger (2009) asserts is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition and confronts Western bogus universalism which it depicts as a denial of the concrete history of global oppression. This claim to the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition makes patriotic history more pertinent to this study because of the need to establish how these former fighting forces use their narratives in the column to perpetuate the relevance of the revolution on the country's historiography and maintain ZANU-PF hegemony.

Patriotic history is propagated at many levels – on television and in the state-controlled press; in youth militia camps; in new school history courses and textbooks; in books written by cabinet ministers; in speeches by Robert Mugabe and in philosophical eulogies (Ranger, 2009).

In this sense, patriotic history which Ranger (2009) posits as a proclamation about the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition, fits perfectly well into the intentions of collective memory which are to seek continuity and preserve a shared past. As observed by Páez et al. (2015) for history to be collectively commemorated, it should meet certain criteria that is, the issue should be relevant for social identity and connected to social change.

In addition, Páez et al. (2015) assert that collective memory is also used to legitimize the group's behavior and mobilize the group. Historical social identity includes the idea that if the group has survived into the present, then its existence will likely continue in the future. It also includes the idea that group members should work together to ensure that their traditions continue (Blatz and Ross, 2009; Jodelet, 2008).

This study examines the true social identity of these former fighting forces so that once their discourses dominate the public domain, their contribution to the liberation struggle is not downplayed. If collective memory is about solidarity and continuity (Halbwachs, 1980), then to an extent one can assert that patriotic history is one of the practical products of collective memory. As Ranger (2009) notes patriotic history is about a resurgent nationalism following threats from western countries led by Britain.

Zimbabwe has experienced three historiographies that are explicitly linked to the post-colonial nation-state project (Ranger, 2009). First is nationalist historiography which dates from the 1960s to the 1980s; then second is the history of the nation which dates from 1980 to around 2000, and third which is patriotic historiography which dates from 2000 to the present. The propagation of nationalist historiography was ‘work that had to be done’ as a concerted reaction to Eurocentric perceptions that Africans had no history prior to the arrival of Europeans on the continent (Ranger, 2009:66). To this end, nationalist historiography was primarily concerned with demonstrating that ‘Africa had produced organised polities, monarchies, and cities, just like Europe,’ (Zezeza, 1997:1).

In doing so, as Zezeza (1997) posits the nationalist historians eulogized Africa’s past without subjecting it to critique. In Zimbabwe, for instance, nationalist historiography took the form of tracing the roots of African nationalism, its connections with the uprisings of 1896-97 and the 1960-70s anti-colonial struggles inspired by mass consciousness now called the First and Second Chimurenga, respectively (Ranger, 2009). According to Msindo (2007:276) nationalist historiography coincided with the ‘golden age’ of nationalism because at that historical juncture, nationalism easily transcended the divisive tendencies of ethnicity and united all Africans in a politically imagined reality called Zimbabwe.

From nationalist historiography, Moyo (2014) notes that the first two decades of independence were characterised by the history of the nation as a form of historiography that celebrated the birth of the new nation-state and sought to legitimate its chosen ideology of socialism. This historiography is not markedly different from the nationalist historiography of the nation. This historiography

represented the fulfilment of those aspirations that the nationalists envisaged in the 1960s. For them, the attainment of independence was the apogee of the nationalist struggles (Moyo, 2014). As such, this historiography was largely celebratory of the nation state and was characterized by what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:14) refers to as ‘praise-texts.’

This historiography, as Moyo (2014) and Tendi (2010) observe served the purpose of legitimating the new state and its rulers to the people being ruled but remained fairly open to challenges by alternative views especially as the euphoria of independence waned. In addition, Moyo (2014) argues that the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and other east European countries negatively affected the socialist rhetoric that had been the hallmark of the history of the nation. Furthermore, the state had to appeal to a new historiography to legitimate its incumbency in the wake of growing unpopularity following the economic decline that was concomitant to adoption of Western inspired economic adjustment programmes in the 1990s and the post-2000 crisis (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011).

This historiography pleaded for a sense of patriotism and at the same time blamed the West for the country’s worsening economic crisis (Moyo, 2014). To justify the post-2000 occupations of formerly white owned farms by the landless blacks, this historiography re-narrated how the settlers had violently dispossessed the African indigenes of their land during colonial conquest. Thus, patriotic history was inspired by a resurgent nationalism and an emerging opposition in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change that drew support from the displaced white commercial farmers (Moyo, 2014).

Patriotic history, according to Moyo (2014), is perhaps the most controversial form of historiography to emerge in post-independence Zimbabwe as it represents an

extreme version of nationalist history that is averse to critical academic history and general contestation. Thus patriotic history is deployed in the public arena as a weapon to reimagine national problems as being externally induced by the West, a West that is supposedly the enemy of the Zimbabwean people since the days of colonialism. In these circumstances, history was seized upon by ZANU-PF and re-interpreted as a means to re-justify a legitimacy that was under threat (Moyo, 2014; Tendi, 2010).

In light of the three historiographic phases that Zimbabwe has gone through before and after the attainment of independence, this study examines how the former fighting forces interpret the generational and ethnic contestations that took place during the liberation struggle. It examines whether the former fighting forces speak as aggrieved participants from the liberation struggle or they have since given up being considered as worthy participants as according to Tendi (2008:380) patriotic history divides Zimbabweans as “patriots” and “sellouts.” Knowing fully well the need to keep the legacy of the liberation struggle and knowing that ZANU-PF hegemony is under threat in the post colony, how do the former fighters deploy collective memory to safeguard that which they fought for?

Patriotic history presents ZANU-PF as the sole champion, past and present of the independence and sovereignty of Zimbabwe (Tendi, 2010). These former fighting forces have visible scars from the liberation struggle, they lost fellow comrades during the liberation struggle and on returning home after the attainment of independence, some of them found out that all their family members had been killed by the Rhodesian army.

In terms of nursing wounds from the liberation struggle, the fighting forces were the worst affected. This study examines whether this suffering, these wounds and the losses affect their collective memory and how they interpret the generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation struggle in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

As Tendi (2010) observes, patriotic history presents ZANU-PF as the sole champion of the liberation struggle. This is in line with the concept of collective memory which alludes to the fact that these different players from the past come together and show solidarity in the face of any threat. By re-presenting ZANU-PF as the champion of the liberation struggle, this is an attempt to bring together all those who participated during the liberation struggle so that they defend not only themselves but the legacies of the war.

But of course in using the past to defend the present, the former fighting forces don't always remember everything that happened in the past. As Jodelet (2008) observes, collective memory is characterized by selective remembering and selective forgetting. This is applicable in this study as there is need to examine whether in their liberation war discourses, the former fighting forces selectively remember and selectively forget events from this era.

Halbwachs (1980) asserts that collective memory suggests that the past is inaccessible and can be reconstructed in the present only through the lens of current social frameworks. This study examines the social frameworks that the fighting forces used to narrate and interpret the generational and ethnic contestations emanating from the liberation struggle. Furthermore, the study examines the thinking behind the narratives and what the former fighting forces seek to achieve going into the future. This is because, according to Jodelet (2008),

collective memory reinforces identity and ethos, therefore aiding a nation into being and in re-orienting itself towards the action to be taken.

Burke (1989) further alludes to collective memory's role in identity construction by analyzing salient archetypes in national historical narratives in which good prevails and evil is either vanquished or conveniently omitted. Memory preserves the collective values that people should aspire to follow, shaping history as a teaching tool for how to live rather than as an archive of facts (Burke, 1989). From this perspective, this study examines how in their liberation war narratives, the freedom fighters try to galvanize their collective values for nation re-building, which can be interpreted as patriotic history.

So Maurice Halbwachs' collective memory approach and Terrance Ranger's concept of patriotic history will be used as theoretical lenses to establish how in their liberation war narratives, the former fighting forces make use of collective memory to preserve their identity and pass it on to future generations. Furthermore, patriotic history will be deployed in this study because it is one of the products of collective memory from the former fighting forces as they try to defend the liberation struggle. This is because as Binney (2004) argues narratives that are born of social and political crises are preserved in memory not so much as records of those times but tools by which to act in the present.

2.3.2 Post-colonial theory

This study also deploys the post-colonial theory as Zimbabwe is a post colony while the former fighting forces were active participants in executing a protracted

war that saw Zimbabwe becoming a post colony. However, it is important to first get a deeper appreciation of what it means being a post-colonial state.

The term post-colonial, as Ashcroft et al. (1998) argue can be misleading since it refers to the period when the colonies of ex-European empires became independent sovereign states, but this gives the false impression that all means of colonial rule have ceased. Given that the political independence is even an illusion for these ex-colonies, colonialism continues in a neo-colonial mode after taking different forms. For these countries, the achievement of political independence did not solve the problems which were expected to be overcome by expelling colonial masters but instead, new forms of domination appeared (Ashcroft, 1998).

As Ranger (2009) notes, Zimbabwean historiography has gone through three phases and throughout these phases, the liberation war discourse that has dominated is that of former nationalists. The voices of the former fighting forces have been silenced confirming views by Memmi (2003) that new elites in the independent states emerged as the new oppressors. So for the former fighting forces, its change without change (Moyo, 2004) as they have not enjoyed the freedom to contribute to the liberation war discourse.

In addition, Young (2004) posits that post-colonial theory focuses particularly on the way in which literature by the colonizing culture distorts the experience and realities, and inscribes the inferiority, of the colonized people on literature by colonized peoples.

On the other hand, Said (1978) brings up the concept of Orientalism where he attacks the West for “othering” and stigmatizing the “Orient.” The Orient in post-

colonial studies does not only refer to the geographical Orient, but to the Third World and colonized communities in general (Said, 1978).

In this vein post-colonial theory is relevant to this study as the silencing of the former fighting forces since the attainment of independence has “Othered” them against the former nationalists. In a way, one can deduce that the narratives by the former fighting forces in the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga* are a form of resistance against relegating them to the periphery of nationalist historiography. The new black oppressors have deployed discourse to make it appear as if they owned the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

In the process, they have made the fighting forces feel inferior as if their role during the liberation struggle was and is not worth celebrating. This study takes a leaf from Young (2004:200-201) who observes that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s aim is to “work against such imperialist representations and narrativizations of history and to introduce a true history instead.” As McLeod (2000) asserts, postcolonial theory is concerned with defending the marginalized other living within repressive structures of domination.

In a bid to explain the situation obtaining in the post colony, one of the classical post-colonial theorists Homi Bhabha formulated concepts like mimicry and hybridity. These concepts according to Huddart (2006) seek to explain why there is change without change (Moyo, 2004) in the post colony.

According to Ashcroft et al., (1998:118) Bhabha stresses the “existence of hybridity of cultures, or mixedness within every form of identity”. In the case of cultural identities, “hybridity refers to the fact that cultures are always in contact

with one another, and this contact leads to cultural mixedness” (Huddart, 2006:4). Hybridity, according to Ashcroft et al. (1998:118) refers to the creation of “new trans-cultural forms within the contact-zone produced by colonialism” and “implies the mingling of separate and discrete ways of living.”

As Ashcroft et al. (1998) argue postcolonial writers attempt to show hybridity as an anti-colonial tool regarding identity, culture and language, because in hybridity, the sense of mixing, breaks down the strict polarization of imperialism. They regard hybridity as the mutual trans-culturation of the colonizers and colonized culture, but the celebration of hybridity generally refers to the establishing of colonized culture (Ashcroft et al. 1998). Gandhi (1998:136) bemoans the celebration of hybridity saying, “The West remains the privileged meeting ground for all ostensibly cross-cultural conversations”.

While the concepts of mimicry and hybridity are used by post-colonial theorists as anti-colonial tools, they can, as observed by Gandhi (1998), be viewed also as concepts that are perpetuating the dominance of Western discourses in the South. This is so because under mimicry, the colonized hopes to become “almost the same but not white” while under hybridity according to Gandhi (1998) the West remains the “privileged meeting ground” for the different cultures.

With this background, this study examines how despite the continuing neo-colonial agenda in Zimbabwe after the attainment of independence, the former fighting forces continue to identify themselves with the liberation struggle. This, despite the fact that their former leaders during the liberation struggle – the nationalists –soon after independence claimed to be the real owners of the struggle.

This study is about examining the forgotten subalterns as they speak for the first time since the attainment of independence in 1980, taking a critical look at their interpretation of generational and ethnic contestations during the Second Chimurenga. Through post-colonial lenses, this study examines how the forgotten former fighting forces add or subtract to the master narrative that Chakrabarty (1992:1) refers to as “the history of Europe.”

2.4 Conclusion

Chapter 2 highlighted and reviewed literature relevant in examining the generational and ethnic contestations from selected interviews in column. Major theories – collective memory approach fused with patriotic history and post-colonial theory- that inform the research were unpacked to provide theoretical lenses to the study. Chapter 3 will highlight the research methods and methodology.

CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

3:0 Introduction

This Chapter explores the research methods and methodology that this study deploys in examining the generational and ethnic contestations emanating from *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga. Issues such as research approach, unit of analysis, sampling methods, methods of data gathering, data analysis, data presentation and ethical considerations will be explored to put the research into a proper frame and context.

3:1 Research methodology

Research methodology is a way to systematically solve the research problem (Kothari, 2004). In light of this, the methods and methodology to be deployed will interrogate the generational and ethnic contestations emanating from the column. This will be done to systematically examine the generational and ethnic contestations from selected interviews by the former freedom fighters who played a key role during the liberation struggle. Due to the fact that this study examines selected accounts of opinions and descriptions of events that took place during the liberation struggle, this study will be qualitative in nature.

Methodology examines the logic behind the methods to be used in the context of the research and explains why a particular method has been chosen over the other (Kothari, 2004). A case study design will be utilized while purposive sampling will be deployed as the researcher used his own judgement to select the interviews for interrogation (Yin, 1984). Since the interviews were conducted a while ago, archival research will be utilized while critical discourse analysis will be used to

examine the narratives by the former fighting forces as the main idea is to establish how they position themselves in history. Data will be presented thematically, capturing the key ideas from the selected interviews.

3:2 Research approach

This study utilizes a qualitative research approach. A qualitative research approach is a scientific research that systematically uses a predefined set of procedures to answer a question by collecting already existing evidence (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Furthermore, qualitative research is effective in obtaining culturally specific information about the values, opinions, behaviors, and social contexts of particular populations (Bryman, 1984).

In the context of this research, qualitative research was utilized because it provides information about the human side of an issue – that is, the often contradictory behaviors, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals (Shank, 2002). Contesting generational and ethnic narratives from veteran freedom fighters who were at the war front in Rhodesia will be examined, making a qualitative research approach more appropriate.

A qualitative research approach, as Silverman (2010) observes, seeks to describe an observed situation, historical enumeration of events and accounts of different opinions people have over an issue. Silverman (2005:170) adds that qualitative methods are “especially interested in how people observe and describe their lives”. This study examines how the former fighting forces recount their participation during the Second Chimurenga and where they place themselves in the liberation war account.

However, Silverman (2010) argues that qualitative research approaches sometimes leave out contextual sensitivities. This is true because in their narratives, the former fighting forces cannot recall historical events in their totality (Byrnes, 2012). Due to these concerns, the research will capture different perspectives, opinions and interpretations from the interviews that are representative enough to produce credible results.

Despite its weaknesses, qualitative research is most appropriate in this study as Kothari (2004) argues that this is the most suitable approach to describe a situation, phenomenon, problem or event. The primary concern of this research is to study the generational and ethnic contestations emanating from Question and Answer interviews conducted under the Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga column. As a result, a qualitative research approach was utilized because in the interviews, the former fighting forces give their opinions and describe how events unfolded during the liberation struggle, from their own perspective.

3:3 Research design

This study utilizes a case study design, specifically an exploratory design. A case study design is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1984). On the other hand, exploratory case studies seek to explore any phenomenon in the data which serves as a point of interest to the researcher.

In this study, the “case” are the selected interviews that are being treated as representing the views of the former fighting forces, who are grouped as one entity. The interviews are subjected to a thorough, holistic and in-depth examination by the researcher. As Silverman (2010:47) notes a case study is an approach “in which a particular instance or a few carefully selected cases are studied intensively.”

On the other hand, Yin (1994) asserts that a case study design is preferred when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed and when the researcher has little control over events. A case study is therefore appropriate for this study as it examines how the liberation war accounts of the former fighting forces were subsumed and why their narratives have largely been ignored in preference to the discourses of the former nationalists. In addition, as Kumar (2011) observes a case study is a very useful design when exploring an area where little is known or where you want to have a holistic understanding of the situation, phenomenon, episode, site, group or community.

However, the researcher is cognizant of concerns that a case study design has been criticized for its lack of rigour, the issue concerning biased views influencing direction of findings and the argument that a case study provides little basis for scientific generalizations (Yin, 1984). The researcher acknowledges these limits of a case study design but maintains that it remains the most appropriate research design for the study as the researcher undertakes to examine the generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation war accounts of this forgotten group.

3:4 Unit of analysis

The first step in deciding how one will analyze the data is to define a unit of analysis, which basically is the ‘who’ or the ‘what’ that the researcher is analyzing for the study (Trochim, 2006). Zimbabwe’s Second Chimurenga was fought in different phases starting with the sporadic deployment of forces before the 1966 Battle of Chinhoyi, the preparation for the sustained liberation war from 1966 to 1972 when the war broke out in earnest leading to the eventual attainment of independence in 1980. The selected interviews are from former fighters who participated in the liberation struggle at different phases, ex-combatants who held influential positions during the execution of the liberation struggle and former fighters from different ethnic backgrounds. These ex-combatants participated directly in battles and rebellions that have been written about extensively from the perspectives of nationalists and academics.

Under the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga about 140 interviews have been published in *The Sunday Mail* and from this total, 18 interviews have been chosen as the unit of analysis. Interviews selected include those of former fighters John Makwasha, Fox Adolphus, Chabudaishudhu Kufahakuurayi and Shadreck Gatula who were among the first ZANLA fighters to be deployed into Rhodesia before the 1966 Battle of Chinhoyi. Obert Mazhandu was in the first Dare reChimurenga while Tobias Chizengeni was among Zimbabweans living in Lusaka, Zambia who provided resources to the former freedom fighters during the early years of the liberation struggle.

Joseph Khumalo, Norman Bethune, Jimmy Mangwende, Kenneth Gwindingwi, Kenny Ridzai and John Pedzisa were among the first freedom fighters from

ZANLA to be deployed into Rhodesia as the Second Chimurenga began in earnest in 1972. Shadreck Chipanga was the overall commander of the Group of 45 Zanja freedom fighters who went for military training in Ghana in 1964.

Chemist Ncube is one of the survivors from the famous 1974 Nhari-Badza Rebellion while Philip Gabella was among the comrades who were sent from Tanzania to capture the leaders of this rebellion. Elias Hondo and David Todhlana were active participants during the famous Vashandi Rebellion in 1978. From the ZIPRA side, interviews selected included those of senior commanders at the war front Peter Scotch, John Mbedzi, Conary Mabuto and Soft Magarasadza. There were only four selected interviews from ZIPRA due to the fact that most ZIPRA commanders refused to grant *The Sunday Mail* interviews. These selected interviews give a broader and representative account of the liberation struggle from the perspective of the former fighting forces.

3:5- Sampling approach

Sampling is very important in qualitative research because we cannot study everyone and everything (Kothari, 2004). In light of this, this study utilizes a non-probability sampling approach which is often associated with case study research design and qualitative research (Yin, 1994). This is because case studies tend to focus on small samples and are intended to examine a real life phenomenon (Kothari, 2004).

This study utilizes the non-probability sampling approach due to the fact that the total number of former fighting forces has never been verifiably quantified and because of that a smaller sample has been used as the unit of analysis.

3:5:1 – Sampling Methods

This study deploys a purposive sampling method. The researcher utilizes a purposive sampling method in the sense that the selected interviews to be used in the study were chosen using the researcher's judgement. The researcher settled for the selected interviews mainly for four reasons – firstly the interviews are from former ZANLA fighting forces from different phases of the liberation struggle; secondly, others are from former fighting forces who held influential positions at the war front; thirdly, some interviews are from former fighting forces who participated in some of the famous rebellions during the liberation struggle and fourth, the other interviews are from former fighting forces from ZIPRA. Due to these reasons, the 18 selected interviews warrant to be the sample of this study.

Purposive sampling is one of the most cost-effective, time-effective sampling methods available and is considered as the only appropriate method available if there are only a limited number of primary data sources who can contribute to the study (Sanders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). While the researcher is cognizant of the advantages of purposive sampling, the researcher acknowledges the limitations of purposive sampling which include vulnerability to errors in judgment, low level of reliability and high levels of bias (Sanders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).

Despite the limitations, purposive sampling remains the sampling method of choice because Kumar (2011: 189) argues that this this type of sampling is “extremely useful when you want to construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon or develop something about which only a little is known.” This study is about constructing a historical reality from the generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation struggle.

3:6 Methods of data gathering

This study utilizes archival research, as a method of data gathering because it is mainly concerned with the generational and ethnic contestations coming out of interviews that were published by *The Sunday Mail* over a period of time. Archival research, as Punch (2005) notes is research involving primary sources held in an archives, a special collections library, or other repository. Archival sources can be manuscripts, documents, records, objects, sound and audiovisual materials, or other materials (Punch, 2005).

This study makes use of selected interviews that were published in *The Sunday Mail* over a period of four years. The selected interviews, archived in *The Sunday Mail* database, will be used to answer the research questions in a way that does not compromise the integrity, accuracy and reliability of the study. In addition, the selected interviews are from different former fighting forces, giving different narratives. This allows the researcher to compare the different perspectives in a bid to identify the generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation struggle.

The researcher in this study is the author of the Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga column and is therefore well-positioned to select the suitable, adequate and reliable interviews that attend to the objectives of the research.

3:7 Methods of data analysis

This study deploys critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a method of data analysis. CDA stems from a critical theory of language which sees the use of language as a form of social practice (Fairclough, 1995). All social practices are tied to specific historical contexts and are the means by which existing social relations are

reproduced or contested and different interests are served. As Kumar (2011:145) notes, CDA is concerned with “how text is positioned, whose interests are served by this positioning, whose interests are negated and what are the consequences of this positioning?”

An even more elaborate definition is proffered by van Dijk (2001) who asserts that CDA focuses on the discursive conditions, components and consequences of power abuse by dominant groups and institutions. CDA examines patterns of access and control over texts, contexts genres and talk as well as the discursive strategies of mind control (van Dijk, 2001).

Critical discourse analysis is appropriate in this study as the researcher examines interviews by the different former freedom fighters in a bid to understand how they position themselves in history. The study explores how the former fighting forces use their narratives to gain control of the liberation war account and examines whose interests the narratives are meant to serve.

The former fighting forces had since the attainment of independence been denied discursive spaces in the main stream media by former nationalists who up to this day occupy positions of authority and academics. Due to this, critical discourse analysis will be utilized to examine how the dominant discourses over the years affect the liberation war accounts of these former fighting forces. As van Dijk (2001) asserts, CDA examines how discursive sources are maintained and reproduced within specific social, political and historical contexts.

3:8 Methods of data presentation

This study utilizes the thematic presentation of data, which according to Braun and Clarke (2006:79) is a method used for “identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within the data”. In addition, “rigorous thematic approach can produce an insightful analysis that answers particular research questions” (Braun and Clarke, 2006:97).

A theme as Braun and Clarke (2006) posit is something which captures the key idea about the data in relation to the research question and which represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set. On the other hand, Bazeley (2009:6) claims that themes only attain full significance when they are linked to form a coordinated picture or an explanatory model – “describe, compare, relate” is a simple three-step formula when presenting the results.

Thematic data presentation is appropriate for the study because the researcher identifies, analyzes and reports patterns within the selected interviews from the former fighting forces. The themes address the research objectives and attend to the research questions. According to Bazeley (2009:9) there should be a “link between the research objectives and the summary findings from the raw data.”

The researcher makes use of thematic data presentation as Dancin and Lincoln (2000) note that this method allows the use of quotations in the presentation of data. In this case, the researcher uses quotations from the different interviews to support the themes and bring out the generational and ethnic contestations from the liberation struggle. Thematic data presentation in addition allows the researcher to quote extensively in verbatim format (Kothari, 2004).

3:9 Ethical issues

Ethical concerns remain central in any kind of social research as they are the “principles of conduct” or that which is “considered correct” (Kumar, 2011). In the context of research, ethics mean the “appropriateness of one’s behaviour in relation to the rights of those who become the subject of your work or affected by your work” (Sanders, 2007:178). On the other hand, Seiber (1993:14) refers to ethics as “the application of moral principles to prevent harming or wronging others, to promote the good, to be respectful and to be fair”.

The researcher is cognizant of ethical implications, relating to archival research. Issues such as collecting data and presenting it accurately from the different interviews will be of paramount importance. In collecting data and presenting it, the researcher will avoid bias which according to Kumar (2011:222) constitutes the deliberate attempt to either “hide what you have found in your study or to highlight something disproportionately to its true existence.” The researcher as the author of the column and will avoid this sort of bias as it will compromise the research findings and credibility of the study.

In addition, Kumar (2011) calls on the researcher to avoid selected a highly biased sample or drawing wrong conclusions. Awareness to these concerns will be of paramount importance since the researcher is the author of the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*. The authorship of the column will enable the researcher to choose the most appropriate sample. Also, the fact that this study aims at challenging the nationalist and academic discourses that have dominated discursive spaces since 1980, will see the researcher thriving to draw the most appropriate conclusions from the findings.

The researcher will also avoid the incorrect reporting of findings which Kumar (2011:223) refers to as “reporting findings in a way that changes or slants them to serve your own or someone else’s interest.” The researcher will ensure that the findings speak to the research objectives and address the research questions in an ethically accepted manner.

3:10 Conclusion

Chapter 3 highlighted the research methods and methodology to be utilized in examining the generational and ethnic contestations from the selected interviews under the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga. Aspects such as the research approach, methods and design were highlighted together with the unit of analysis and the sampling approaches and methods. In addition, methods of data gathering, analysis and presentation were highlighted while ethical considerations were also brought up. Chapter 4 highlights the organizational structure of *The Sunday Mail* and outlines the background of the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga.

CHAPTER 4: Political Economy of *The Sunday Mail*

4.0 Introduction

This Chapter utilizes a critical political economy approach to discuss the organizational structure of *The Sunday Mail* newspaper. Mosco (1996) defines political economy as the study of power relations between the state, the market and the construction of good society. On the other hand, Golding and Murdock (1991) assert that critical political economy is holistic, historical and is centrally concerned with the balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention. Through the critical political economy approach, the research explores the latent issues such as institutional dynamics and how these influence the operations of the newspaper. The Chapter also elaborates on the genesis and trajectory of the column under study, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*

4.1 History of the press in Zimbabwe

The history of the press in Zimbabwe is entrenched in the country's colonial politics and experiences. A discussion of the history of Zimbabwe Newspapers (Zimpapers) stable, the publishers of *The Sunday Mail*, is incomplete without discussing the birth of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC) in 1927 in the then Rhodesia (Saunders 1991). At the attainment of independence this company became Zimpapers.

In terms of funding all the newspapers under RPPC relied on advertising revenue mainly from the colonial administration (Saunders, 1999). From this perspective, one can trace the roots of the close links between the state and the publicly-owned

mainstream media to the days of the RPPC as the media house became the conduit through which the colonial government maintained its dominance (Mukasa, 2006). Due to this close relationship, the RPPC was under constant surveillance from the Rhodesian Front and laws to censor the media such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act were promulgated to enable the colonial government to maintain, gain and negotiate its hegemony (Saunders, 1999). The introduction of such laws led to constant clashes between one of the founding editors of *The Sunday Mail*, John Parker and the colonial administration (Saunders, 1999).

The colonial history of Zimpapers is important in this study as the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga comprises narratives by former freedom fighters who were fighting against the colonial regime. During the days of the RPPC, the views and interests of these freedom fighters were ignored or downplayed as the media house pushed the agenda of the white colonialists. Unfortunately, when Zimbabwe attained independence from Britain in 1980, coloniality persisted (Grosfoguel, 2011) as the independent state continued to marginalize the narratives of the former fighting forces. So the colonial history of Zimpapers assists in tracing the genealogy of this marginalization.

4.2 Zimpapers in the post-colony

Following the attainment of independence in 1980, Rhodesia became Zimbabwe and this had a bearing on the RPPC as the new government sort to transfer the ownership of the media house into the hands of the majority of Zimbabweans.

Zimpapers has been accused of sympathizing and supporting the ZANU-PF government that has been in power since the attainment of independence in 1980

(Chuma, 2005 and Tendi, 2010). The media house has been accused of pushing the ZANU-PF ideology, which in a way is a reflection of change without change in terms of media operations before and after independence (Moyo, 2004). Before the attainment of independence, the RPPC was accused of maintaining the hegemony of the colonial administration which was in power and now Zimpapers is being accused of pushing the agenda of the ruling ZANU-PF government.

The background of Zimpapers operating in the post-colony is relevant in this research as it gives the context in which the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga is being published. The former fighting forces are giving their narratives in the post-colony and it is important to contextualize their narratives as Zimpapers seeks to maintain its national development agenda.

4.3 Zimpapers Goals and Objectives and Core Values

Zimpapers is guided by goals and objectives that seek to make media company produce high quality newspapers professionally and profitably. In addition, the media house has values that give parameters on how all publications and stations operate.

These goals and objectives and the core values are of paramount importance because they set up the parameters within which content such as in the column has to fit in. As the newspaper publishes the narratives of former fighting forces, the paper has to be cognizant of the requirements set up by the goals and objectives and the core values.

4.4 Ownership, Funding and Control of Zimpapers

As a publicly-owned media house, Zimpapers, besides serving as an agent of culture and as a source of information, operates as a business with the goal of making profits (Albarran, 1996). Zimpapers is listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) is given policy guidance by a Board of Directors chaired by Delma Lupepe. Other members of the board which is appointed by the Information Ministry include, Pikirayi Deketeke (chief executive officer), Trevor Manhanga, George Manyere, Nyasha Mudzingira, Terrence Hussein, Felix Moyo, Doreen Sibanda, Rejoice Nharaunda and Karen Dube. Government with 51, 09 percent is the majority shareholder in Zimpapers. Other private companies share the remainder of the shares.

4.5 The Sunday Mail

The Sunday Mail was established in 1935 under the RPPC and has grown to become Zimbabwe's biggest circulating newspaper.

4.5.1 Historical Background and Content Structure

Established in 1935 under the RPPC, *The Sunday Mail* is the Zimbabwe's biggest circulating weekly newspaper with an average print run of 50 000 copies per week (Zimpapers, 2018). Just like all newspapers under RPPC, *The Sunday Mail* from its formation was accused of re-presenting the views of the white minority during the colonial era (Rusike, 1990).

Following the attainment of independence in 1980, *The Sunday Mail* fell under the ownership of the ZMMT, as one of the weekly newspapers under the stable. *The Sunday Mail*, just like all publications under the Zimpapers stable has been accused

of being a ZANU-PF mouthpiece through its support of the party's ideological stance (Chuma, 2005; Willems, 2004). According to Ranger (2005), *The Sunday Mail* practices patriotic journalism which was invoked partly as a response to Western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe following the country's fast-track land reform programme which started in 2000 (Moyo, 2004).

The Sunday Mail comprises the Main Section whose content includes hard news, feature articles, foreign news, analysis, opinions pages and local and international sports. The paper has the Society Section which gives an in-depth analysis of mainly human interest stories. In this Society Section, there are subsections such as religion and entertainment. Then there is the Business Section - which covers business issues through feature articles and hard news. The column under study, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga* is published in the Main Section of *The Sunday Mail*.

4.5.2 Zimpapers Editorial Policy

An editorial policy is a “systematic attempt to foster certain types of media structure and behaviour and to suppress alternative modes of structure and behaviour. It is a deeply political phenomenon (Freedman, 2008: 1).” From this perspective it is clear that an editorial policy is a political endeavor used for power and control. It determines what a radio station, television channel or newspaper can and cannot publish.

All publications under Zimpapers are guided by an editorial policy which states that: “Newspapers must be credible, giving readers information that is as accurate as possible; Newspapers must be as complete as possible; publishing reports of the major local, national, regional and international events, whether news, business,

sport or cultural; Newspapers must be fit reading for all, requiring sensitivity in the handling of sensational and lurid stories; Newspapers will be supportive of Zimbabwe and its goals and generally supportive of the elected government of the day.”

The editorial policy explicitly calls on Zimpapers publications to support the “elected government of the day.” When Moyo (2004) argues that newspapers under this stable have become mouthpieces of the ZANU-PF government, there is nothing amiss. *The Sunday Mail*, just like all Zimpapers publications adheres to this editorial policy which calls on it to support the “elected government of the day.” The column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga* is published within the parameters set by this editorial policy and this in some instances has created friction between *The Sunday Mail* editorship and government. The friction emanates from the editorship’s bid to remain professional and government’s push for favourable hegemonic content.

4.5.3 Zimpapers Charter for Editorial Independence

The Zimpapers charter states that: “The board of directors acknowledges the responsibility of journalists, artists and photographers to report and comment on the affairs of the country fairly and accurately regardless of any commercial, personal or political interests including those of any shareholder, director manager, editor or staff member. The right to appoint or dismiss the editors resides with the board of directors and its appointed management. Subject to this, full editorial control of the newspapers within agreed budgets shall be vested in the editors. They alone shall determine editorial content.

All editorial content (text, video, pictures, graphics) belongs to the Zimpapers group and not individual titles, and or platforms and shall be shared following the Breaking News policy and in keeping with the Group's convergence strategy. In exercising editorial control editors shall take into consideration the need to carry advertorials or native advertising in the publications/platforms but this should be clearly marked as such.

The editors shall be directly responsible to the appointed management and shall at all times carry out their duties in a way that will preserve and ensure the independence and integrity of all the platforms, be it print, digital, or broadcasting, under the Zimbabwe Newspapers stable in accordance with this charter.

In exercising their judgement, editors shall take into account: (a) National Interest; (b) Public Benefit; (c) That Zimpapers publications are family newspapers, and; (d) That Zimbabwean societies have their own mores and values which have to be recognized.”

4.5.4 The Sunday Mail Organogram

Management in various media institutions is at various stages of production (Albarran, 1996). In light of this, it is important to know the organizational structure of *The Sunday Mail* as it reveals who does what with regards to content production. *The Sunday Mail* organogram is also of paramount importance in this research as the researcher is part of management at the newspaper.

The operating structure of *The Sunday Mail* comprises the following editorship - Editor (Mabasa Sasa), Deputy Editor (former Deputy Editor, Munyaradzi Huni, author of this study) and Assistant Editor (Wendy Nyakurerwa-Matinde).

Below the editorship are the desk editors for the various sections – News Editor (Darlington Musarurwa), Sports Editor (Makomborero Mtimukulu), Investigations Editor (Brian Chitemba), Religion Editor (Fatima Bulla), Features Editor (Garikai Mazara) and Entertainment Editor (Mtandazo Dube). The News Editor is considered as the nerve centre of the newsroom and as a result this is the only post under the desk editors that has a deputy (Levy Mukarati). Under the desk editors is the Chief Reporter (Kuda Bwititi). Each desk editor is assigned reporters that report to him/her directly and covers issues related to the desk. Besides the content produced in the newsroom, *The Sunday Mail* relies on analysis and opinion pieces from outsiders, especially experts. With regards to the cartoon, the newspaper relies on a correspondent.

Editor

The Editor at *The Sunday Mail* is appointed by the board of directors through the chief executive officer. The Editor is mainly responsible for ensuring that the newspaper adheres to the Zimpapers editorial policy. In addition, the Editor ensures that in terms of content production, the newspaper caters for the interests of the different stakeholders that include the majority shareholder (government), the advertisers and readers. The Editor edits stories for publication and has the final say in the content that the newspaper publishes. Through the editorial comment, the Editor tackles issues that the newspaper considers to be topical at a given time. The Editor can write opinion pieces and is responsible for the appointment of desk editors and the reporters.

Given the politics of appointment of the editors, scholars (Willems, 2004; Chuma, 2005; Rusike, 1990; Moyo, 2004) have questioned the autonomy of the editors

under the Zimpapers stable. They point out the interference in the appointment of editors by government through the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services.

In an interview on 25 October 2016, the then permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, George Charamba openly said: “The relationship between the ministry and editors is a very, very complex one. More so if you have a sophisticated minister and secretary who really know how to go about bringing editorial influence as opposed to editorial cohesion.”

Deputy Editor

The Deputy Editor is appointed by the board of directors through the chief executive officer and works in close liaison with the Editor in ensuring that the newspaper adheres to the company’s editorial policy. The Deputy Editor is mainly responsible for content production, ensuring that the content is diverse enough to cover different sectors of society. The Deputy Editor also ensures that the content has enough depth by working closely with the desk editors.

Just like the Editor, the Deputy Editor edits stories and assists in ensuring that content attends to the interests of government, advertisers and readers. The Deputy Editor, in the absence of the Editor writes the newspaper’s editorial comment and other opinion pieces. Working together with the Editor, the Deputy Editor assists in the appointment of desk editors and reporters. The former Deputy Editor Munyaradzi Huni was the author of the column under study.

The column was authored by the former Deputy Editor due to the fact that this was his concept which he developed over a period of about five years as he interacted with war veterans. *The Sunday Mail* housed the column due to the former Deputy

Editor's interest in the country's historiography and due to the newspapers' nationalist outlook as it covers news from across the country.

Assistant Editor

The Assistant Editor is appointed by the board of directors through the chief executive officer and works closely with both the Editor and the Deputy Editor in content production. However, at *The Sunday Mail*, the Assistant Editor is mainly responsible for the administrative aspect of the newspaper, like ensuring that the newsroom has the required machinery and the desk editors and their reporters have tools of their trade. The Assistant Editor writes opinion pieces and in the absence of the Editor and the Deputy, can write the newspaper's editorial comment. The Assistant Editor has an input in the appointment of desk editors and reporters.

News Editor

The News Editor is the engine room of the newspaper. The news editor edits and writes stories for the Main Section of the newspaper. After editing the stories, the News Editor forwards the stories to the editorship. The News Editor is responsible for putting up a diary of stories to be covered in the Main Section of the paper and he guides the chief reporter and other reporters on how to tackle stories. The News Editor is the one responsible for the day-to-day allocation of resources, like vehicles for assignments to the different desks. The News Editor recommends to the editorship if he wants to employ any reporter or to engage someone on contractual basis. The News Editor runs the newsroom with assistance from his deputy and the chief reporter. The news editor is appointed by the Editor in consultation with the Deputy News Editor and the Assistant Editor.

Other Desk Editors

The other desk editors – religion, sports, investigations, features and entertainment – cover stories that fall under their purview. They are responsible for assigning and guiding reporters as they tackle stories. The desk editors edit stories and forward them to the editorship.

4.5.5 Funding Mechanism

The funding mechanism of all Zimpapers entities is quite unique and goes against the dictates of the political economy of the media as propounded by Western theorists. Western political economy theorists (Albarran, 1996; Picard, 1987; Doyle, 2002) glorify the power of advertising revenue over newspaper content as they describe advertising as the latter day licensing authority, but Zimpapers presents a totally different picture. As a former senior manager at *The Sunday Mail*, I discovered that at all Zimpapers entities, political interests take precedence over commercial interests.

The editors at Zimpapers are more powerful than the managers in the advertising department as they can decide not to use a certain advert or they can change positions of adverts in their newspapers. Although government is the majority shareholder in Zimpapers, the government does not give the company funds for recapitalization and in turn the government does not expect monetary dividends from the company. As the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, George Charamba always puts it “as the majority shareholder, we are content with the messaging dividend.”

4.5.6 Association with Other Organisations

Despite the peculiar arrangement between the majority shareholder and Zimpapers, the media house remains a big business as it falls under the economic dictum (Picard, 1987). This is because for the media house to conduct its day-to-day operations of gathering news and disseminating information, Zimpapers needs resources.

Considering that the government does not give Zimpapers funds, the media house has had to enter into associations with different companies as a way of raising revenue and to market its products. Zimpapers share content with ZBC. *The Sunday Mail* also make use of stories from several regional and international news agencies like Reuters.

4.6 Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga – A Personal Experience

The column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga was the first column in *The Sunday Mail* that gave former fighters the opportunity to chronicle their journey during the liberation struggle.

4.6.1 Background to the birth of the column

The column was born in a sustainable and consistent format in November 2015 after years of randomly interviewing comrades without following any sequence. The researcher, as *The Sunday Mail* Assistant Editor, in 2012, was inspired by Terrance Ranger's concept of patriotic history and having observed how the narrative of Zimbabwe's war veterans from the liberation struggle had been largely ignored. The researcher sought to understand why there was this glaring historical anomaly.

With *The Sunday Mail* photographer Kuda Hunda, the researcher went around the country interviewing the war veterans whose gripping narratives quickly caught the attention of many readers of *The Sunday Mail*. The researcher was assisted by senior war veterans like Norman Bethune and Joseph Khumalo in identifying these comrades. These were some of the commanders who joined the liberation struggle at its formative stage. The immediate response to the interviews was overwhelming as readers from both inside Zimbabwe and across the world wrote emails, sent WhatsApp messages and even called urging the researcher to “please bring out this forgotten story.” Clearly, Zimbabweans were showing how thirsty they were to read the narratives of these comrades.

However, despite the gripping and fascinating narratives, as the interviewer the researcher felt there was something amiss with the way the interviews were flowing. At one time, the researcher would interview a comrade who joined the liberation struggle in 1978, then next he would interview a comrade who joined the struggle in 1962. The narrative sounded a bit jumbled as it was not flowing smoothly according to how the liberation struggle unfolded.

Despite the lack of coherence in the narrative, Zimbabweans just loved reading whatever was available. Charamba was the first official in government to notice the popularity of the interviews. He told the researcher that this was a “gold mine of content” that could change Zimbabwe’s historiography. In 2013, he roped in a team from the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation led by producer, Forget Tsododo to ensure that the interviews were recorded on video.

Led by Charamba and with the researcher as the main interviewer, the team went to Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central for two weeks hunting for the war veterans. The team managed to interview Cdes Vhuu, Herbert Shungu, Cde Saddat (one of the survivors during assassination of Herbert Chitepo), Cde Steria, Tendie, George Rutanhire, Claris Moses and Philip Gabella among others. Slowly, the narrative was taking some shape, but not without challenges. Some of the comrades were too angry to open up, some of the comrades wept uncontrollably during the interviews while others abandoned their narratives midway through the interviews as emotions took over. All the comrades felt they had been ignored for too long and they thought Zimbabweans no longer cared about them and their narratives. It was heartrending, emotional and energy sapping. For example, it took Charamba more than an hour to convince Cde Saddat to open up, but the team persevered.

After this first trip, despite the challenges, the appetite to interview more comrades grew and Charamba organized another trip to the same areas. During this second trip the team managed to interview Cdes Munodawafa, Angeline Tongogara (wife to Josiah Tongogara), Gabarinocheka and Joseph Khumalo. Still the comrades expressed their anger, but it was when the team tried to interview Cde Gurupira that they came face-to-face with a war veteran who was way too angry to open up. The team got to Gurupira's homestead in Centenary and found his wife doing some chores outside the kitchen hut. The moment the team disembarked from our vehicles, she starred at the team with those eyes that showed that there was something terribly wrong. Before the team could introduce itself, the wife said; "baba havapo, endai munovatora kumashops (my husband is not around, go and fetch him at the shops.)"

After saying this, she hurriedly walked into the house and slammed the door shut. The team was baffled by what had just happened, but when the husband arrived, the team soon discovered why the wife had acted so strangely. The husband was seething with anger and right in front of the team, he told Charamba that “get away from my house. I don’t want to see all of you here.” Charamba introduced himself but this didn’t help matters.

After about 20 tense minutes of harsh exchanges outside, Charamba managed to convince Gurupira to go and talk inside the house. They went inside the house but the team outside could still hear Gurupira insisting that they were supposed to leave. Gurupira’s anger stemmed from the fact that he felt used and unappreciated by the government. He said he was even more angry because he had tried to reach out to the then President Mugabe but found no joy. After almost two hours inside the house, the two came out with Gurupira still insisting that the team should leave his homestead. Indeed, the team left without interviewing him.

After this trip, the researcher continued hunting down the former war veterans but soon discovered that his narrative was just too one-sided. It comprised narratives from war veterans from ZANU and ZANLA, sidelining the ZAPU and ZIPRA narrative. Some readers were also calling on the researcher to track down the ZAPU and ZIPRA comrades. The researcher went to Bulawayo and interviewed Dumiso Dabengwa (ZAPU intelligence supremo), then interviewed Ambrose Mutinhiri (senior commander in ZAPU), Tshinga Dube and Arthur Chadzingwa. Tracking down ZAPU and ZIPRA comrades wasn’t an easy exercise as most of the comrades refused to speak out. The researcher asked Dabengwa and Mutinhiri why ZAPU and ZIPRA comrades were not willing to speak out and they informed him that first it was because most of them were not happy with disturbances that took

place in the early 1980s leading to Gukurahundi, which saw about 20 000 people killed in state-sponsored violence. Secondly most ZIPRA comrades felt ZANLA was given preference after the attainment of independence.

As the quest for more narratives continued, the researcher together with Hunda went to Tanzania to interview former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa to get his views on how the country took the decision to host liberation movements like ZAPU and ZANU by providing training bases. While in Tanzania the researcher took the opportunity to interview Hashim Mbita who was the secretary of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee which coordinated war efforts by liberation movements in Africa as they fought against the colonial regimes.

From Tanzania, the researcher went to Zambia Lusaka where they interviewed Vernon Mwangwa who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in that country during the time of the liberation struggle. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, his duties involved working closely with liberation movements like ZAPU and ZANU that his country was hosting by providing training bases. In Lusaka the researcher also managed to interview Retired Brigadier General Timothy Kazembe who was part of the Zambian commanders who fought the Rhodesian forces as they crossed into Zambia to attack ZIPRA bases.

The Zimbabwe National Army's Civil Military Relations noticed how popular the interviews were and on November 1, 2012 they launched a project to record the country's history. On March 14, 2013, the department wrote a letter to the researcher requesting that he give a brief about his experiences in conducting the interviews to one of their research teams that was set to go to Mashonaland

Central. On March 18, 2013, the researcher went to Defense House Civil Military Relations Department to give the brief to the team.

The interviews continued, but still the flow of the narratives was not satisfactory. Meanwhile, the readers were piling on pressure that they wanted to read more about the comrades who were at the war front in Rhodesia.

4.6.2 The Birth of the Column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga

In August 2015, the Zimbabwe National Army with assistance from two senior war veterans – Norman Bethune and Joseph Khumalo managed to track down over 70 male and female war veterans, most of whom were at the war front in Rhodesia. These war veterans were brought to Harare at once and Charamba called the researcher to Defence House to meet them. Officials from the Zimbabwe National Army and Charamba explained to the war veterans that the researcher, together with Tsododo and Tendai Manzvanzvike from *The Herald* were to interview them.

Charamba emphasized to the war veterans that they were supposed to speak their minds because there was need to record their history extensively. Some of the war veterans expressed disappointment that it had taken too long for government to see the importance of their narratives, but Bethune and Khumalo assured them that this was good for them, their fellow comrades who had died during the war and the future generations.

Before the interviews started, there was a challenge that the researcher had to clear. Officials from the Zimbabwe National Army thought these war veterans could be interviewed within a short period of time, but the researcher told them that this was

not possible as in some instances it was likely to take us more than 10 hours to interview just one comrade. And so it was decided that the interviews would start with those comrades who had gone to the liberation struggle in the early 1960s, then move on to those from the early 1970s to those from the late 1970s.

Before the interviews started, one of the comrades suggested that this was an important exercise they were undertaking for the first time since the attainment of independence and so the war veterans were supposed to first seek permission from those they had left in the bushes whom they were going to speak about in their narratives. The veterans bowed their heads as Bethune “spoke to the departed comrades” asking for their permission.

After this, the comrades chanted “pamberi nehondo! Pamberi nemagamba ehondo!” With their clenched right hand fists raised and facing one direction, all the comrades started singing the famous liberation war song; “Moyo Wangu Watsidza Kufira Zimbabwe.” After this there was a moment of silence, then the war veterans started shaking hands and hugging each other showing clear excitement as if their “departed comrades” had given them the go-ahead to start the interviews.

The interviews then started and it took the team almost three months to finish the interviews that were being conducted at the Defence House. Defence House is the building that houses the Ministry of Defence and War Veterans in Zimbabwe. For the first time, the narratives of the former fighting forces came out in proper sequence starting with those comrades who were deployed to the war front before the Chinhoyi Battle in 1966. The Chinhoyi Battle signaled the beginning of the Second Chimurenga, although after this battle which saw seven comrades dying

the war was put on hold until 1971. After this the narrative moved on to 1972 when the war started in earnest up to the attainment of independence in 1980. After completing the interviews, at the beginning of November 2015, the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga* started in earnest.

Some of the highlights from the interviews included interviewing Elias Hondo, the ZANLA commander who was given the responsibility to lead the relocation of ZANU from Lusaka to Maputo, Mozambique following the assassination of Herbert Chitepo that led to the arrest of the majority of ZANU leaders in Zambia. The interview went on for about 15 hours as Hondo spoke frankly about contentious issues such as the Nhari-Badza Rebellion. This was recorded as the first open rebellion against the ZANU leadership. The rebellion was led by veteran commanders, Nhari and Badza. Hondo also spoke about the, Vashandi Group Rebellion, which was mainly led by comrades who first started operations in Mozambique in 1975 as most of the ZANU leaders were in Zambian prisons following Chitepo's death. Hondo also gave a narrative about Josiah Tongogara that created discomfort in quite a number of people. He spoke frankly about some of the leadership shortcomings of Tongogara, especially the failure to handle the Nhari-Badza rebellion properly. The other highlight was interviewing Chemist Ncube, one of the ZANLA commanders who was accused of being part of the Nhari-Badza Rebellion. Before starting the interview, Ncube asked for permission to sprinkle some traditional snuff on the desk where the team was conducting the interview.

After sprinkling the snuff, he went into a trance for about five minutes appearing to be speaking to some invisible comrades. He then chanted the slogan that ZANLA comrades used before going into battle; "icho! Charira! Icho! Charira!" After this

the interview started and it took almost 21 hours to finish the interview with Ncube.

The most humbling experience during the interview was when the team was interviewing Jimmy Mangwende, one of the early ZANLA commanders. On hearing that Mangwende was around Constantino Chiwenga and Perence Shiri came to the boardroom where the interviews were being conducted to greet their former commander whom they addressed as “Shef” (boss) from the days of the liberation struggle. They hugged and laughed as they spoke about how tough Mangwende was as a commander during military training. On the other hand, interviewing the female comrades was the most taxing exercise as they gave touching and harrowing narratives that saw most of them weeping uncontrollably.

However, what struck the team most was the sharp memory of almost all the comrades that were interviewed. Despite the three to four decades that had gone by, the comrades vividly remembered battles that took place and when these battles took place. They remembered their fellow comrades, those who died and those alive, mentioning them by names leading the team to ask the comrades how this was possible after so many years. Their response was that “our lives depended on each other during times of life and death, the bonds became too strong. Up to now our love for each other, both dead and alive, has never died.” Indeed, this was evident in the way these comrades greeted each other when they met at Defence House – they hugged, laughed, sang and chanted revolutionary slogans as if the war was still on.

From these interviews there were names of some comrades that kept being mentioned and so after these interviews, the researcher once again embarked on the exercise to track down these comrades. As he continued with the exercise, the

researcher came across Bulukani Masola a war veteran from ZIPRA whose interview opened floodgates for other ZIPRA comrades to open up. Masola spoke frankly about quite a number of sensitive issues from the ZIPRA perspective and the fact that *The Sunday Mail* published the interview must have made the other ZIPRA comrades realise that this was their opportunity to speak out.

In total now, about 140 war veterans from ZIPRA and ZANLA have been interviewed under the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga. The column has become so popular that per week the researcher receives not less than ten calls, over 15 WhatsApp messages and emails from readers across the world asking different issues related to the liberation struggle. The majority of the messages come from families whose sons and daughters went to the liberation struggle and never came back after the attainment of independence. The other messages come from families being haunted by the spirits of their sons and daughters who were buried in mass graves and shallow graves in Zambia, Mozambique and inside Zimbabwe. It is in this broader context, the author examines generational and ethnic contestations captured in the column on Zimbabwe's historiography.

4.7 Conclusion

This Chapter highlighted the Organizational Analysis of Zimpapers, which is the parent company under which *The Sunday Mail* falls under. The chapter also highlighted the critical political economy of Zimpapers focusing on the history of the company, its goals and objectives, core values and the funding mechanisms. *The Sunday Mail* Editorial Policy, the Charter for Editorial Independence and the paper's organogram were analysed as they provide the framework within which the

column is published. The background to the establishment of the column was outlined with the researcher giving a personal account to the publication of the column. Chapter 5 focuses on the presentation of data gathered during the research.

CHAPTER 5 – DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter thematically presents and discusses data gathered during the research process. The thematic format is utilized following the identification of recurrent themes in the data gathered. The research examines the ethnic and generational contestations in the historical accounts of the liberation struggle emanating from column. In this vein, the themes are presented and analysed in a way that attends to the research objectives and research questions. The findings are analysed in the context of the research's theoretical framework and reviewed literature.

5.1 Fighters as pawns: The genealogy of contestations between fighters and politicians

The study demonstrates that the genealogy of ethnic and generational contestations during the Second Chimurenga can be traced back to the early days of the liberation struggle. In their historical accounts in the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga, the selected former freedom fighters narrate that during the early 1960s, leaders from both ZAPU and ZANU sent unprepared and ill-equipped fighters to the war front in Rhodesia. This gave birth to ethnic and generational contestations between the politicians stationed in air-conditioned offices in Lusaka, Zambia and the fighting forces deployed in Rhodesia.

The study shows that from the early 1960s, the fighting forces have always thought that political leaders of the two parties, ZAPU and ZANU treated them as pawns in a bid to attract the attention of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This

created mistrust and left the former fighting forces feeling betrayed and unappreciated. Throughout the liberation struggle, these contestations would erupt intermittently causing divisions and the derailment of the war efforts.

For example, in an article published on January 3 2016, Shadreck Musari Gatula (born 1940) narrates that:

ZANU did not just wake up with trained soldiers. ZANU did not wake up with guns and everything. Before all this, there are comrades who had to improvise to keep the party going. We had to find means of keeping the party alive and sending a message to the Rhodesians that ZANU meant business. Maybe because we didn't have guns, that's why we are not recognised. But we played our crucial role.

Gatula claims his group was deployed into Rhodesia in 1964 without receiving military training and due to this most fighters who were deployed during these years were either captured by the Rhodesian forces or were killed in ambushes.

In an article published on November 29, 2015, Joseph Musambasi (born 1942) whose Chimurenga name was David Tendai concurs with Gatula adding that ZANU made a number of mistakes in the early 1960s as it was under pressure to show the OAU that it was a formidable political entity after breaking away from ZAPU in August 1963.

I think there were quite a number of mistakes. There was pressure for ZANU to be seen to be doing something by the OAU and other countries. ZANU was under pressure to show that after leaving ZAPU, it was existing. This compromised the planning process. The other mistake that we saw was that the party was supposed to send people for reconnaissance and these people were supposed to spend lots of time studying the movements of the Rhodesians.

After this, we were supposed to be deployed mbichana mbichana (after careful consideration) and by this time, we were supposed to have done mass

mobilisation. Hondo yaida kudzidziswa (people were supposed to be taught about the war first). Reconnaissance and mass mobilisation had not yet been done so this created serious problems.

The strategy was very poor but I understand because kutangisa chinhu kwakaoma (starting something is always difficult) and there were bound to be mistakes. We also heard that some groups, especially the Chinhoyi Seven were sold out by fellow comrades. These were some of the problems because of the poor strategy. I however, don't think our group was sold out. I think takangosangana nema (we just met) Rhodesian forces by accident because they knew that surviving in the Zambezi escapement was not easy. The terrain was just bad. As you know, after our arrests, hondo yakatombo mira (the war stopped) as the party was now re-strategising.

One of the early instructors in ZANU, Joel Samuel Siyangapi Muzhamba whose Chimurenga name was Joseph Khumalo even acknowledges that indeed, during the early 1960s, they never thought about the safety of the fighting forces they were deploying into Rhodesia.

Says Khumalo:

Indeed, we were training people but during these years we never thought about the safety of the deployed comrades. That's why from 1966 up to 1968, most comrades who were deployed were either arrested or were killed. We didn't have expertise in security to protect our comrades...

Mao Tse Tung said 'where there is war there is sacrifice,' and he went further saying, 'fight, fail, fight, fail until you succeed.' That's why ZANU said chero zvikaoma sei (even if the going gets tough), we will keep pushing because our aim is to free Zimbabwe. We knew that after a while, the people of Zimbabwe would wake up and support the struggle.

Khumalo confesses that the mistakes they made during the early 1960s still haunt him as many lives were lost unnecessarily. He adds:

Of course I look back. Dai varungu vakabva nepfuti, (if the whites had lost power through the gun) as we wanted to march from bush to office, I don't think we would be having any whites in this country. Up to this day I see visions of my fellow comrades... That's why when people look down upon war veterans, my heart bleeds. People now say "makanga matumwa nani"? (Who had sent you?) Ok, takaenda hedu tisina kutumwa and we brought you the country, ko chaipa chii? Motitukirei? Zvinorwadza. (No one sent us to fight for our country, so what is wrong with that? Why do you insult us? It's painful.) (*The Sunday Mail*, May 8, 2016).

These sentiments by Gatula, Tendai and Khumalo expose the narratives by former nationalists (Sithole 1980; Nkomo 1984; Tekere 2005; Chung 2006) that glorified the roles played by these politicians. These former nationalists shied away from accepting the fact that they caused the deaths and arrests of many fighting forces during the early 1960s. The narratives by these former nationalists focused on positive self-representations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010) as if the liberation war started smoothly without any mistakes.

Another former fighter, Crispen Tapfuma Mataire (born 1945) whose Chimurenga name was David Todhlana was among the top ZAPU officials who later crossed the floor to ZANU. He acknowledges that the pressure to impress the OAU affected both ZAPU and ZANU.

We were getting support from the Liberation Committee of the OAU but this support was given in accordance to what we were doing. The committee would ask, 'you ZAPU since you came here to Zambia, what have you done at the war front in Rhodesia? Have you fought any battles so far? ZANU, how far have you gone?' So both ZAPU and ZANU ended up sending comrades who were ill-prepared to the war front. The idea being to prove a point to the OAU that mainzwa here (did you hear the sounds), iZAPU yakaridza? (It's ZAPU that is fighting). Takatumira vakomana vakanoridza, vakadai vakadai (we sent brave fighters) so as to increase budget from OAU...

The idea during these days was not to fight the war proper. The idea was to sabotage the Rhodesian economy. The struggle during these days was a peaceful form of struggle. We were taking lessons from countries such as

India. Remember the days of Mahatma Gandhi? They waged a peaceful struggle. So that was the same form of our struggle but of course with a little bit of some sabotage. Even when vana Ngwena (President Mnangangwa) were sent to Rhodesia, the idea at this time was kuvhundutsira-vhundutsira (the idea was just to scare the whites).

This was actually understandable because the comrades who were leading the struggle at this time had no military training. They were just political leaders. People like James Chikerema, Herbert Chitepo, Jason Moyo and so on. They were not soldiers. Zvekuti ngatirwei hondo (the idea to wage a war) came much later.

During these early days the struggle was more about demonstrations, vanhu vachinotema fodya yevarungu (blacks destroying tobacco belonging to white farmers) and so on. So kwaitotumirwa (we would send) comrades who were ill-equipped and ill-prepared. Some would be told kuti munonwana zvombo ikoko kumusha. Kumusha kupi? (Some were told that they would get weapons on arrival in Rhodesia but they soon discovered these were all lies) (*The Sunday Mail*, October 22, 2018).

According to John Makwasha (born 1940) whose Chimurenga name was Bayayi Mabhunu, the contradictions started because during these early years, some political leaders would send their relatives to further their education abroad instead of deploying them to the war front in Rhodesia.

There was no clear policy (on recruitment). There were comrades who had relatives outside the country, vakuru vakuru (political leaders). So these comrades vaiti vakasvika like kuTanzania, their relatives, vakuru vakuru vaivarambidza kuti aiwa usaende kuhondo enda kuchikoro (When these recruits got to Tanzania, some political leaders would advise them not to go for military training but go to further their studies).

“Others who went to school at that time include people like Salatiel Hamadziripi, Rugare Gumbo who told us point blank kuti imi musina kudzidza, ndimi muri kuenda kunodzidza zvepfuti. Kana matora nyika, isu tiri kuenda kuchikoro touya tokutongai (you the uneducated you go for military training. When you win the war, we the educated we will come and run the country.) (*The Sunday Mail*, March 27 2016)

The narratives by Todhlana and Makwasha confirm the views of Neiger et al. (2011) that collective memory rests upon the assumption that every social group develops a memory of its past which allows it to preserve and pass along its self-image. The two former fighting forces are developing a memory of the past that they think can preserve the image of the forgotten former fighters. The tone of their narratives show that they are blaming former nationalists for the problems they encountered in the early 1960s. They blame the nationalists for lying to the former fighters and causing divisions through favouritism. Their narrative is indeed a socio-political construct, a version of the past that they are defining through the changing socio-political power circumstances (Halbwachs, 1980).

The study also shows that the former fighting forces are convinced that their treatment as pawns by the politicians during the early 1960s led many people to look down upon their contribution to the liberation struggle. For example in an article published on March 19, 2017, Gilbert Musekiwa (born 1938) whose Chimurenga name was Chabudaishudhu Kufahakuwurayi says:

It looks like these days ukanzi uri muwar vet watoita muvengi wevanhu, why? Some ask, wakaenda kuhondo ukazouya nei? Chauinacho hapana (being a war vet means an enemy of the people. You went to war and what did you bring? You have nothing). Some people would tell us during the liberation struggle kuti imi musina kudzidza chiendai munoridza pfuti kana matora nyika yacho, isu takadzidza tichauya tokutorerai (You the uneducated go and fight the war. When you win the war, we the educated will come and take it away from you). This is what is happening now.

Takutonyara kutaura kuti tiri mawar veterans (we are ashamed to be called war veterans). Some people ask, wakanga watumwa here kuenda kuhondo kwacho? (Some even ask us whether we had been sent to fight the war). I told you I voluntarily joined the liberation struggle and even after serving 10 years in prison I went back to join the struggle. No one forced me because I wanted to free my country. Today, vanhu vaguta vava kutisvora (people are

living well now and they are looking down upon us). Aiwa pakanaka (It's all good).

It is clear from the narrative by Chabudaishudhu that he is using collective memory to create a positive image of the former fighting forces. He even tries to draw some sympathy by outlining that even though the fighting forces were betrayed by the politicians and even though they were not educated, they still managed to win the war against the colonial regime. This positive socio-political construct in a subtle way reads like a response to narratives by former nationalists who presented themselves as the flawless planners of the war.

Furthermore, the study shows that the mistrust between the fighting forces and the politicians was caused by alleged rituals which some political leaders conducted in a bid to hide their secret dealings with the Ian Smith regime. For example, James Dhehwa (born 1942) whose Chimurenga name was Jimmy Mangwende narrates that:

Takanzi nemhondoro muzive kuti nyika iyi ichanetsa kuuya nekuti kune vanhu vakuru vamwe vatungamiriri havasi muhondo nekuti vari kuside remangendengende (we were told by spirit mediums before we started the war that this was going to be a long protracted war because some of our leaders were working with the enemy). This meant some leaders were kuside revarungu... (Working with whites).

Some of you don't want this country to be free. Vari kutsvaga ngendengende, meaning vari kutsvaga mari (some of your leaders are after money). We asked kuti, so what do we do zvikanzi, don't worry tichavagadzirisa (we asked how we can solve the issue and the spirit mediums said they would attend to that issue). Pane mukuru anedumbu rakadai, rakadai, akatora mombe akasungirira (one of your leaders with a big stomach took some cattle and conducted some rituals). Mukuru iyeye ari kudyidzana nemungendengende. (that leader is working with whites).

While you are coming to fight and free this country, you won't go far. You will either be arrested or killed.' We were reminded of the arrests of several

comrades who were now languishing in jail and the Seven Comrades at Chinhoyi battle. Indeed several of our comrades had been arrested and we didn't really understand why" (*The Sunday Mail*, November 1, 2015).

Mangwende says indeed rituals were conducted and it was discovered that some of the political leaders were working with the Smith regime. "We know that there were some people who entered into deals with Smith. We saw that during the liberation struggle," concludes Mangwende.

Comrades Gatula, Davie and Makwasha were some of the comrades who were arrested by the Smith regime upon deployment into Rhodesia in the early 1960s. Mangwende was the commander of the group of seven commanders who were sent by the ZANU leadership to carry rituals before the Second Chimurenga started in earnest in 1972.

One of the commanders from this group of seven commanders, Joel Samuel Siyangapi Muzhamba whose Chimurenga name was Joseph Khumalo narrates how some ZANU leaders at the end of 1971 were told at a meeting held by Mbuya Nehanda's spirit medium that they would not see a free Zimbabwe. In an article published under the column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga in *The Sunday Mail* on May 15, 2016, Khumalo says:

We stayed a few days mudzimu waMbuya Nehanda uchibva wasvika uchiti ndava kuda kuparutsa vazukuru vangu. Ndisati ndaparutsa ndiri kuda kusangana nevatungamiri venyu (Mbuya Nehanda's spirit medium said I am about to die but before that I want to meet your leaders). Munhu umwe nemumwe akataurirwa zvakanga zviriri paari (The leaders were told their future with regards to the war).

I think you have heard so many comrades saying Tongogara aigara achitaura kuti ini pamwe handisviki kumusha kuZimbabwe (Tongogara would always say I may not see a free Zimbabwe). This was coming from what he had been told at this meeting with Mbuya Nehanda. All the leaders were there. Cde Chitepo was there, Cde Noel Mukono, Cde Tongo, Cde Chimurenga, Cde Dabulamanzi, Cde Chinamaropa, Cde Kadungure, Cde Chauke, Cde Mayor Urimbo and many others were there.

The first thing that Mbuya Nehanda said that I remember up to this day was to say, “vana vangu, dai zviru zvekuti musati marwa hondo, musati mambobatana nevasikana, dai makatanga mauya kwatiri makataura nesu, hondo yenyu yanga isingatori three months or three weeks. Zvino hondo yenyu ichamboenderera mberi nekuti makatanga matora vasikana mukapinza munyika. Vasikana vava vachibva vabata utate hwenyu (guns). Vasikana vakanga vasingafanirwi kubata pfuti dzenyu (Before you gave female comrades the responsibility to carry your guns, you were supposed to bring them here. If you had done this your war was not going to last three months or even three weeks. But then the female comrades have already carried your weapons and so this war will take a bit longer).”

By this time, the first group of women recruits was now in Zambia and was helping to carry materiel to Zambezi in preparation for war. Mbuya continued saying “vasikana ava were not supposed kubata pfuti dzenyu nekuti vanoenda kumakore (these women were not supposed to carry your guns because they go for their monthly periods).” That was around 1972-1973. So she said, anyway now that vasikana vatobata pfuti, tichazovagadzira kuti vagokwanisa kubata zvombo zvenyu vakachena vasisaende kumakore (but now that they have already carried your guns, I will conduct some ritual so that as they carry your guns they stop going for their monthly periods). Chechipiri, mungandivenge asi ndichataura chokwadi. Mutungamiri wamuinaye iyezvino, Ndabaningi Sithole, haasi iye achatungamirira nyika yeZimbabwe. Hongu mungarambe zvenyu, nekuti kunevamwe venyu ndiri kuita sendinopenga...(secondly, I know some of you will hate me for telling the truth but your current leader, Ndabaningi Sithole is not the one who will rule a free Zimbabwe. I know some of you think I have lost my senses).

Ambuya vakabvunza, “mandinzwisisa here, vanhu vese vakati zii (She asked whether everyone had understood her).” Joseph Chimurenga then rhetorically said, “ahh, imi makatitakurisawo chembere yapera basa. Chii chayava kutaura ichi? (Joseph Chimurenga stood up saying why did you make us carry this old lady? What is she talking about now?)” Mbuya vachibva vati, “aahhh, sewe zvako simuka. Tora utate hwako ndimire apo tione kuti unogona kundipfura here. Iwewe, hauna kwauri kuenda nokuti wanyanyisa mate ako avakubuda kuti ndatore nechigaro chikuru. Uri kuti wava mambo mukuru. Ndiwe wakazviisa here? Zvino hauna kwaunoenda. Uchanopinda zvako muZimbabwe, asi unenge usisina pauri (Mbuya Nehanda dared Chimurenga to stand up and shoot her. She told Chimurenga

that he was too ambitious and wanted to take over power and because of that he was going to enter into a free Zimbabwe as an ordinary person.

Indeed this happened. We came into a free Zimbabwe and Chimurenga was now just an ordinary person. Mbuya vakati haubvumi zvandiri kutaura. Mukati menyu vanangu mune rumwe, rumwe.

Iwewe, meaning Tongogara, ndiwe wanzi uhabata pfumo richasunungura nyika, asi hamuna kubatana nevamwe vako. Zvino chinzwa, nyika yavakuenda kumapeto, tavakupetera nyika, mumvuri wako unotsakatika. Hauzosviki munyika uri mupenyu. (Mbuya Nehanda said as leaders you are divided. She turned to Tongogara and said you are going to lead the war but there is no unity among the leaders. You won't get into a free Zimbabwe).

Cde Tongo stood up and said “Mbuya tsanangurai zvamunoreva.” Mbuya vakamboti ndozotaura kwasara vatungamiri vega, but Cde Tongo asked her to go ahead and explain. Cde Chitepo actually said, no, no let's talk about this tavatega vatungamiri but Cde Tongo insisted. (Tongogara asked what she meant exactly and Mbuya Nehanda said she would explain later in the presence of the leadership only. Chitepo actually agreed with Mbuya Nehanda but Tongogara insisted that she should explain everything at that meeting).

Mbuya vakati, ‘chiri pauri inyaya, yehu toboutobo. Nyaya yehu toboutobo.’ Nyaya yairehwa apa ndeye vasikana. Kwanzi, “ukapinda munyika nenyaya yako iyoyi, umwe achati ini ndini, umwe achati ini ndini chaiye waTongogara. Unenge uchiri nechimiro here? (Mbuya Nehanda told Tongogara that due to his weakness for women, this would create problems in a free Zimbabwe as many women would claim to be his wives. This would demean the commander).

Asi uchange waita basa guru kwazvo uye mhapo dzese dzenyika dzichange dzichikuombera. Asi zvatisingadi ndezvekuti uzove munhu anoiswa pasi nevana vauchange uchitungamirira. Saka tichasevenza tiinewe mumhapo asi hausviki uko. Ndasiidzira zvimwe. (Despite all this, you would have played an important role during the war. What we don't want is for your juniors to then start looking down upon you. As spirit mediums we will work with you but you won't see a free Zimbabwe. I have left some stuff.

People went silent. Mbuya Nehanda turned to Cde Chitepo and said handisi kuona zvakanaka, ndiri kuona pane mhapo ichapinda. (Mbuya Nehanda

turned to Chitepo and said, I am not seeing clearly, but I see evil spirits roving around you.

The roping in of the spirit of Mbuya Nehanda by Mangwende and Khumalo seeks to emphatically hammer home the point that the ethnic and generational contestations were born out of the moves by some of the former nationalists who worked with the colonial regime to undermine the liberation struggle. By apportioning the blame to the former nationalists the former fighting forces are deploying patriotic history (Ranger, 2009) to present themselves as a group that overcame the odds to win the war. There is also an attempt to use collective memory to create solidarity among the fighting forces. This according to Halbwachs (1980) is important for a group's survival into the future.

The study demonstrates that these statements attributed to Mbuya Nehanda's spirit medium planted seeds of mistrust that led to several clashes during the liberation struggle. From the onset, the fighting forces viewed these political leaders with suspicion.

One of the veteran commanders during the liberation struggle who trained many comrades who later became commanders of the war, Francis Komboni Gondo (born 1940) whose Chimurenga name was Elias Hondo exposes the former nationalists:

Some of them (nationalists) didn't understand at all. They had no training. For example, James Chikerema during the early days had this habit of going on Lusaka Radio announcing kuti "vakomana vedu, vanavo varungu. Vari kuvarova iyezvino vava pakati (Chikerema would go on Lusaka Radio announcing that our comrades are chasing the enemy at such and such a place)." This was wrong because he was exposing the freedom fighters. Even people like Noel Mukono they had not received any training.

Also during the early days around the 1960s, there was no proper reconnaissance. The comrades would get to Zambezi, look into Rhodesia using binoculars and then some comrades were deployed. That's why many comrades were killed and arrested during these days. But we learnt our lessons. During real war, there is no adventurism like you see on television. (*The Sunday Mail*, October 23, 2016).

Another veteran commander, Gomba Midson Mupasu (born 1942) whose Chimurenga name was Norman Bethune says some political leaders that are seen as heroes today are actually sellouts. Says Bethune:

Remember after the Chinhoyi Battle, the war stopped. The leaders had realised their mistakes and from 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 the leaders sat down to iron out the mistakes and weaknesses. They looked at why the 1964, 1965 and 1966 generation had failed to be successful in waging the war. It was a lesson learnt. Lots of mistakes.

You know most of the comrades who were sent to the front in the early 1960s were sent by ZANU just to get some publicity so that the party could get support? That is why most of them were captured. These comrades you now call heroes to me are sellouts. They sent comrades into Rhodesia during their early 1960s without any planning just to get publicity so that ZANU could be recognised. Vakatangesa vamwe vavo (Some of them are sellouts).

Our generation which opened the war front in Mashonaland Central is the one which later showed the world that ZANU was now serious in executing the war. The party's military wing, ZANLA, was now oiled and determined to fight the war. Kurovana naSmith and Smith accepted through the media kuti ndiri kurohwa (We hit the Smith regime until it accepted that indeed we were hitting them hard). (*The Sunday Mail*, March 11, 2018).

By presenting his group as the generation that "showed the world that ZANU was now serious in executing the war," Bethune was utilizing collective memory which Halbwachs (1980) posits it's about solidarity and continuity. Bethune seeks to show the usefulness and relevance of the fighting forces not only during the liberation struggle but even into the future.

On the other hand, the study shows that even the ordinary people (povho) doubted that the fighting forces could win the war against the Smith regime. This created some friction between the fighting forces and the povho, whose support the fighters could not do without. For example, in an article published on May 8, 2016, Khumalo says:

...black people in Rhodesia by this time could not believe that we could really fight a war with the Smith regime. They would compare the ammunition of the Rhodesian army and ours and to them it was unthinkable that we could win the war. I remember at one time, some povho in Mash Central saying ‘uummmm, muri kuda henyu kurwisa varungu, but tupfuti twenyu utwu munosvikepi? (You want to fight against whites but with your small little guns, how far do you think you will go?)

By this time we were using those very basic guns called tuma pepesha that Felix Rice Santana had brought from Congo. Some people in Mash Central only started believing that we could fight the whites after Cde Pedzisa’s group hit Altena Farm and when some school children were taken from St Alberts School in the province.

It is clear that the ethnic and generational contestations from the Second Chimurenga started way before the start of the liberation struggle in earnest in 1972. This study confirms that issues to do with sending ill-prepared fighters to the war front, issues to do with the lack of military training by the former nationalists and issues to do with some politicians entering into secret deals with the Smith regime gave birth to the contestations. The former fighting forces deploy collective memory and patriotic history as they seek to reclaim their rightful place in history.

5.2 “This revolution does not belong to the people of Shurugwi”: Tipping point of ethnic clashes

This study demonstrates that the tipping point of ethnic contestations during the liberation struggle pitted the late ZANU chief of defence, Josiah Tongogara and one of the veteran ZANLA commanders Elias Hondo. Tongogara’s home area was

Shurugwi and throughout the war, he was accused of giving favours in terms of recruitment and promotion, to comrades from his home area. According to Hondo, many comrades spoke in whispers about this anomaly but no one dared to confront Tongogara about it.

Hondo remembers that when ZANU leaders such as Tongogara were released from Zambian prisons in 1975, problems started.

Ndipo pakazoitika chimwe chimoto (this is when trouble started). When these comrades were released from prisons in Zambia, after being arrested on accusations of killing Chitepo, problems started. You see these comrades had been under arrest for something like 18 months. Now after being away for this long, these comrades wanted to come straight from prison to tell us what to do. So we sent a delegation headed by Rex Nhongo kuti muti Tongogara kana abuda mujeri atanga awuya kuno (when Tongogara comes out of prison he should come here first) so that we brief him about developments on the ground.

So Rex went and he says when he tried to talk to Tongogara about it, Tongogara said ‘munondiudza zvekuita imimi? Mapanduka sanaBadza imi’ (you can’t tell me what to do. You have rebelled like Badza and his team)... This was in 1976. I then said vakomana tikangoita mistake (boys if we make a mistake), we will be killed. There was now tension. That’s when Rex Nhongo also sold us out...

I then straight-away confronted Tongogara reminding him about how he had mishandled the Badza-Nhari issue. I said to him, ‘this revolution haisi yekuShurugwi’ (this revolution does not belong to people from Shurugwi). I knew kuti (that) if I don’t speak like that I would be killed. I said why is it that munhu wese ataura something unoti apanduka? (why is it that anyone who speaks his mind, you say he has rebelled?) I asked him why he had refused to come to see us in Mozambique before going to Geneva. Ndakati unofunga kuti ndiwe ani iwe? (I said who do you think you are?) I had to show bravery...

Later he responded and takatukana (we exchanged harsh words) for a long time. Takabva takonana (we completely disagreed). Tongogara was my commander and I respected him. No one can take away what he did for this country, but people have to know that it was not all smooth flowing during

the liberation struggle. We were human beings. We were young and clashes were inevitable. These clashes don't take away the role that Tongogara played for the liberation of this country (*The Sunday Mail*, November 13, 2016).

As if to hammer the point home that he had nothing personal against Tongogara, in an article published on November 27, 2016, Hondo adds:

I heard about the stories regarding regionalism. Chitepo was Manyika, vana Tongogara vaiva maKaranga. Despite his weaknesses, Tongogara didn't kill Chitepo. There is a white person who used to work in the Smith regime who actually confessed that he is the one who killed Chitepo. Of course there was talk that vaKaranga vauraya muManyika but from my knowledge, Tongogara didn't kill Chitepo.

This clash between Tongogara and Hondo just goes to show the depth of the ethnic contestations during the Second Chimurenga. These contestations played out between ZAPU and ZANU and within these two political parties and their armed wings, ZIPRA and ZANLA. In all instances, the contestations led to violence and even deaths of members of the different political parties.

Through the narratives, the former fighting forces show that the ethnic clashes can be traced mainly to the split of ZAPU and the formation of ZANU in 1963. By this time, ZAPU was the most popular political party and so ZANU was seen as a party of rebels. Unlike the politicians who faced these ethnic contestations in their offices in Lusaka and later Maputo, the former fighting forces faced the contestations at the war front. And according to the narratives of the fighting forces, the consequences were devastating.

The discourses by the former fighting forces show that ethnic contestations were fueled by the fight for power between ZAPU and ZANU, the Zambian government's support of ZAPU and the differences in the approach to the war. Also, there were intra-party ethnic clashes. In ZAPU, some Shona former fighters

say there was discrimination which favoured the Ndebeles. As a result, ZAPU was viewed as a party for Ndebeles, forcing some Shona fighters to cross the floor to join ZANU.

In ZANU, the intra-party ethnic contestations played out between the Zezurus, Karangas and Manyikas. There was even talk of “super Zezurus” and “super Manyika” as the clashes deepened. These contestations created invisible walls between these different tribes. In an interview published under the column Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga on December 27, 2015, Gatula says:

The honest truth is that the situation was bad between ZANU and ZAPU during this time (early 1960s). You see at this time, ZANU had just been formed so we were the minority party. ZAPU was the party that many people knew so it was popular. So as ZANU we had a very big task to explain to people what our party stood for and so on. It wasn't easy. On the other hand ZAPU didn't take our coming in lightly.

So people like Sam Manjengwa would lead us in the clashes with ZAPU supporters. Some of the comrades I worked with include Clakson Mutema, Makoni, Gatsi and Cephaz Matopodzi. Taitemana nematombo and some people actually died. We thought ZAPU was now all about talk with no action. I liked the ZANU stance that ‘we are going for direct confrontation with the colonial regime.

Joseph Musambasi whose Chimurenga name was David Tendai affirms the view by Gatula adding:

The breakaway of ZANU from ZAPU created animosity. The leadership yeZANU had problems with the way ZAPU was conducting itself. The leaders of ZANU were saying if we had continued in ZAPU hataimbotora nyika. ZAPU wanted to continue talking with the Rhodesians but ZANU was saying tozotaura tamborovana (we should fight first). What then led to the divisions between Shona and Ndebele was that ZAPU came up with propaganda that ZANU had broken away because it was a party for Shona people. And indeed, about three quarters in ZANU were Shona people, but that wasn't the reason for the breakaway. It was a matter of differences in

policies and approaches to the war. I never thought that one day Zanu and Zapu could sit on the same table. (*The Sunday Mail*, November 22, 2015).

Makwasha adds his voice in an article that was published on April 3, 2016 saying the fights between ZAPU and ZANU even took place in prisons:

We met (during time in prison) quite a number of comrades from ZAPU. The only problem was that we would clash very often with these comrades from ZAPU...The clashes were purely because ZAPU supporters accused ZANU of being a rebel party. There was ignorance of what politics was all about. There was a belief that if we let this party to survive, ichapinda mu power (it will get into power) leaving us out. That fear of being left out of power caused the clashes.

From the onset, it is clear that the former ZANU fighters are seeking to present themselves as patriots (Ranger, 2009) who fought to preserve the revolution through direct confrontation. It is interesting to note that even during these early stages of the liberation struggle, the power contestations between the two main political parties – ZAPU and ZANU – were already playing out.

As Makwasha confirms, even though the war was just starting, there were contestations as some ZANU fighters were already thinking about who would rule a free Zimbabwe. In addition, the former ZANU fighters present themselves as critical political economists (Mosco, 2009) who sought to bring change through direct confrontation with the Smith regime.

In an interview published on March 12, 2017, Chabudaishudhu gives a graphic description to support Gatula, Tendai and Makwasha. Bringing in the OAU perspective, he says:

When the OAU was formed in 1963, the organisation said all revolutionary organisations should be registered. By this time, ZAPU had been banned for about 11 months and it wasn't easy for ZAPU to be accepted by the OAU

because they were saying the party is banned. ZAPU had its executive comprising 12 members.

This executive sat down and some suggested to register a new party but the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo said doing so would be a betrayal of the agreement he had made with Parirenyatwa never to form another political party. Reverend Sithole then stood up and challenged Nkomo saying there was need to form a new party.

Nkomo then convened another meeting where he announced that he had expelled 11 members of ZAPU. I personally attended that meeting and I can tell you Nkomo at this time was very popular. He started the meeting by saying ‘I am going to name my 11 enemies. Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, Herbert Chitepo, Leopold Takawira...’ He named the 11 members... This new group led by the 11 leaders was labelled as New Party, New Movement, anti-Nkomo splinter group. This is what ZANU was called by its enemies before it came up with its proper name.

On August 8, 1963, that’s when ZANU was formed... The leaders used to say Zimbabwe African National Union is four-in-one, meaning it’s a political party, a nationalist party, a revolutionary party and a pan-Africanist party... The leaders called for freedom through direct confrontation through the five point liberation programme — that is mass mobilization, consolidation, recruitment, training and waging the war.

On the other hand, Hondo brings in the Zambian element to the contestations between ZAPU and ZANU saying:

President Kaunda favoured ZAPU. ZANU had no support from the Zambian government. After our clashes, the Zambian police would only arrest ZANU youths. The situation was tough. Russia (then called Soviet Union) which was supporting the liberation movements at this time only recognised what they called the Authentic Six liberation movements— in Rhodesia there was ZAPU, Frelimo in Mozambique, Swapo in Namibia, ANC in South Africa, MPLA in Angola and PAIGC for Cape Verde Island and Guinea Bissau, at that time these two were still united. ZANU was still some little party and we were not known (*The Sunday Mail*, October 23, 2016).

In the same interview, Hondo goes on to cite tribalism as one of the issues that fanned the contestations between ZAPU and ZANU.

The biggest issue at this time was tribalism. Most Shona people joined ZANU but people like James Chikerema and George Nyandoro remained in ZAPU with the late VP Nkomo. ZAPU remained looking like a party for Ndebele people. When Parirenyatwa (a Shona) died, there was a lot of talk that some top ZAPU officials from Matabeleland were involved. There was talk that Parirenyatwa was almost taking over ZAPU and following his death, Shona people were very bitter about it. That spirit continued for a long time.

These contestations continued playing out such that Hondo as one of the comrades with the responsibility to give recruits pseudo names, he had to strike a balance so that ZANU would not appear like a party for Shona people. Says Hondo: “Yes, after coming up with too many Shona names we would say, ummm, let’s come up with Ndebele names so that hainzi ZANU yemaShona. So we came up with names like Khumalo, Ndlovu, Ncube and so on” (*The Sunday Mail*, November 13, 2016).

These early ethnic contestations between ZAPU and ZANU are not given prominence in the revenge biographies by the former nationalists ((Mawema 1979; Sithole 1980; Nkomo 1984; Tekere 2005; Chung 2006). Even the “willing commissar intellectuals” (Robins, 1996:76) who wrote glowingly about the liberation struggle soon after the 1980 (Warner 1981; Martin and Johnson, 1981; Lan 1985; Ranger 1985; Ranger 1989; Mombeshora 1990; Manungo 1991; Kriger 1992; Ranger 1994; Robins 1996; Bhebhe and Ranger 1996; Vail 1997; Alexander 1998; Bhebhe 1999; Roftopoulos 1999; Lindgren 2002; White 2003; Bhebhe 2004; Msindo 2004; Mandaza 2005; Msindo 2006; Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2007; Msindo 2007; Holland 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008b; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009 and Ncube 2014) downplayed these ethnic contestations.

According to Khumalo, these early ethnic contestations were felt even during the recruitment of fighters. Says Khumalo:

It was an uphill task recruiting people from Zambia but we soldiered on. From 1965 up to 1969, per month we could get four or five recruits in Zambia. Because of these problems we opened a camp which we called Chimbi Chimbi which was in Kafue to give these recruits some training as we were waiting for the numbers to grow so that we could transport them to Intumbi.

Realising these challenges, we sat down with Felix Rice Santana, Noel Mukono, William Ndangana and Cde Kanoyera asking ourselves how we could get more recruits. The OAU was giving us pressure because ZAPU had more comrades.

We then decided kuti vakomana pano pava kutodiwa chimwe chimurenga muno muZambia (we decided that there was need to use whatever means to recruit the fighters). That's when we decided that anyone we came across talking Shona, we used to call them 'vana herehere', nana 'xa, xa, xa' (those speaking Ndebele) we would see where these people were staying. We were later joined by Cde Tongo and Cde Mupunzarima and some ZANU youths like Gwauya as we started abducting people and forcing them to go for military training. We would drive these recruits to Mbeya" (*The Sunday Mail*, May 8, 2016).

Kenny Constantine Mabuya (born 1952) a Ndebele fighter from Filabusi who joined ZANU agreed that indeed "*waiti ukataura Ndebele* you would be abducted and made to join ZAPU and *ukataura Shona* you would be abducted and made to join Zanu...This tribal element was always there but I brushed it aside and joined ZANU."

In an article published on April 1, 2018, Bethune says the ethics in ZAPU and ZANU were different. He adds that for example, ZAPU didn't believe in spirit mediums and that ZAPU comrades lacked political orientation. Todhlana in an article published on October 22, 2017, disagrees with Bethune saying: "The ZANLA training was far inferior to the ZIPRA training. The ZIPRA training was more rigorous and you could see you were being trained to be a soldier. YekuZANU haaa (the ZANU training) it was more like they were training girls."

One of the ZIPRA provincial commanders for the Northern Front, Joseph Sibuko Mbedzi, whose Chimurenga name was Joseph Sibuko concurs with Todhalana saying the ZIPRA training was more encompassing.

If you meet an ex-ZIPRA, they don't talk about guerilla. They talk about GWA. Meaning guerilla warfare and administration. Under ZIPRA you received training in everything. You should be in a position to administer yourself. We would receive training in combat tactics, engineering,

reconnaissance, first aid, logistics, and battle procedure. Everyone got this training then later one would then specialise. If you meet a well-trained ex-ZIPRA cadre, he or she can tell you how to operate up to 28 weapons (*The Sunday Mail*, May 22, 2018).

In the same article, Mbedzi goes on to explain that due to the superiority of the ZIPRA training, some ZANLA comrades at Mgagao Training Camp in Tanzania were always jealous. He says these contestations between ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres got out of hand at Mgagao in 1974, leading to the gunning down of 48 ZIPRA comrades.

“We didn’t have any guns. The Chinese were involved in this fight. They were supporting ZANLA.

Remember ZIPRA received training and support from the Russians. The ZANLA comrades and their Chinese trainers always complained about our Russian training. ZIPRA had uniforms while ZANLA didn’t have. We lost about 48 comrades during this shoot-out. Unarmed people” (*The Sunday Mail*, May 22, 2018).

Mbedzi dispels sentiments by Bethune that ZIPRA lacked political orientation adding that:

You can say everyone in ZIPRA was a political commissar. However, as ZIPRA we never had pungwes, those mass rallies. No. We avoided that for the safety of the civilians. When we got to a certain area, the political commissars went into houses talking to individuals.

Even our ideology was different from that of ZANLA. As ZIPRA we were saying land to the people. Not through willing buyer and willing seller. We were talking about mass production of goods and controlling that process. Our idea was that we were going to force these companies to comply and work with indigenous people or else they close... As ZAPU, we were socialists while ZANU was talking about humanism...

In terms of training, ZIPRA training due to the numbers, our training ended up being for six months. During the first years it was 18 months, then 12 months, then nine months. We even went for commando training where the fittest people were selected (*The Sunday Mail*, May 22, 2018).

It is however interesting to note that Todhlana who later crossed from ZAPU to ZANU reveals what he terms the discrimination of Shonas in ZAPU.

... there was some measure of discrimination (in ZAPU). While we were being sent for military training, I know many Ndebeles who were sent to go and further their education in preparation for a new government in Rhodesia. It was very rare for Shona comrades in ZAPU to be sent to further their education. Even during deployment, there were allegations that *vaisundira maShona kuenda kumusha* (they would send Shonas to the war front), leaving many Ndebeles in camps. But like I told you, I didn't face all that. All I witnessed was that *maShona* would be sent to join the army while many Ndebeles were sent to school (*The Sunday Mail*, October 29, 2017).

The narratives by former ZANLA commanders Norman Bethune, Joseph Khumalo and Kenny Ridza and those by former ZIPRA commanders David Todhlana and Joseph Mbedzi expose the contestations between these two armed wings of ZAPU and ZANU. Both the ZIPRA and ZANLA comrades utilize collective memory and patriotic history to create self-images that can perpetuate their place in history.

Through collective memory and patriotic history, the two armed wings seek to create a shared identity that binds them together. The discourses by the comrades from the two armed wings show some fear of being eclipsed in history. As a result, they both deploy patriotic history which according to Ranger (2009) is about resurgent nationalism following threats to a shared past.

However, despite the contestations between ZIPRA and ZANLA, whenever politicians got involved the fighting forces suddenly seem to gang up against the politicians. Former ZIPRA commander Mbedzi explains that during operations at the war front ZIPRA and ZANLA comrades would sometimes embark on joint operations without the blessings of the politicians in Lusaka.

For example in an article published on May 22, 2018, Mbedzi says:

We carried combined operations for about two to three days...but I spoke earlier about power. The politicians didn't want the forces to unite. When the ZANLA commanders went back for reinforcements (in Lusaka) and I also went to take my reinforcements (in Lusaka), I came back and was told that seven of my comrades had been killed by the ZANLA comrades. We never clashed. The fighters understood each other. The area we would meet frequently was in Guruve but we never clashed.

Another ZIPRA comrade, Elison Mupamawonde (born 1950) whose Chimurenga name was Soft Magarasadza in an article published on June 24, 2018 adds:

We indeed went into joint operations with ZANLA. You know as the fighting forces, we really didn't have problems with each other. We didn't care about one's area of origin. To us we were fighting the same war. The problem and divisions came nevakomana veku rear (comrades from the rear). Vakomana vezvigaro (comrades who were obsessed with positions).

Another ZIPRA provincial commander for the Southern Front, Agrippa Gava (born 1956) whose Chimurenga name was Conary Mabuto in an article published on July

22, 2018 confirms that ZIPRA and ZANLA operated smoothly around areas like Guruve, but gives a different view as to what went on to cause clashes between the fighting forces.

These divisions were the creation of the enemy to divide and rule. The idea was to divide the Zimbabwean people so that when they are divided, they become weak. As you know, all of the comrades had started in ZAPU. The division was actually an intrusion by the enemy.

ZIPRA operated from Feira, Guruve. Have you heard of Spolilo Battle by ZIPRA? You know that Spolilo is Guruve? So from Guruve we operated in Mutorashanga, Zvimba area, Msengezi, Nemaikonde, Hurungwe up to the Zambezi. We operated in Gweru, Mberengwa, Zvishavane and so on. And at the war front, sometimes the ZIPRA comrades would go for joint operations with their ZANLA comrades. Two commanders from ZIPRA and ZANLA would just go into an agreement to fight together but this was not on a larger scale. But we also got reports that sometimes the ZANLA and ZIPRA comrades would fight against each other.

Former ZIPRA commander in charge of the signals department, Bulukani Masola (born 1959) whose Chimurenga name was Peter Scotch brings in the Chinese and former Soviet Union factor into the contestations between ZIPRA and ZANLA.

By the time I finished training in the Soviet Union, I had three enemies. We went to Zambia in 1976 after incidents in Tanzania following the failure of ZIPA after fallouts in Morogoro and so on. The animosity between ZIPRA and ZANLA was very high. When some of the ZIPRA comrades told us about their experiences, it was very bad. They told us one of your enemies is Smith, but there is also “chim-chim” which was the code name for ZANLA.

Then from there you went to the Soviet Union. The relations between the Chinese and the Soviets were really bad. Now by the time you start fighting, you have to fight ZANLA, you have to fight the Chinese and then Smith. Everything filtered from the politicians and inevitably to the fighters. All the fights emanated from the politics... The direction that any country takes after a liberation war leans towards the dominant group. Before this happens, there is always some power play (*The Sunday Mail*, May 6, 2018).

If according to Tendi (2010) patriotic history presents ZANU-PF as the sole champion of the liberation struggle, one can justifiably argue that the former fighting forces are deploying patriotic history in a bid to present themselves as the true patriots from the liberation struggle.

The attempts by the former fighting forces to introduce a true history from their perspective are glaring. As McLeod (2000) asserts, postcolonial theory is concerned with defending the marginalized other living within repressive structures of domination. An interesting illustration of how the contestations between ZIPRA and ZANLA derailed the liberation struggle is given by former ZANU member of High Command, Elias Hondo as he narrates how the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) was formed in 1975.

In an article published on December 4, 2016 Hondo says the Front Lines States led by former Tanzania leader Julius Nyerere put pressure on ZANLA and ZIPRA to form ZIPA. This followed pressure from the OAU which wanted the liberation struggle to resume in Rhodesia as the war had stopped following the arrest of the ZANU leadership by the Zambian authorities in 1975. The ZANU leadership was arrested following suspicion that they were involved in the assassination of Herbert Chitepo.

Hondo, who at that time was the highest ranking ZANLA commander in Maputo, Mozambique says Nyerere called for a meeting in Maputo to discuss the resumption of the war. From ZANU the meeting was attended by Hondo, Rex Nhongo, Dzinashe Machingura, Parker Chipoyera, Soul Sadza and James Nyikadzinashe. From ZAPU the meeting was attended by Nikita Mangena, John Dube, Ambrose Mutinhiri, Report Mphoko and Mudzingwa among others.

After this meeting, Hondo says ZANLA and ZIPRA started putting in place structures to form ZIPA but ‘*taitambana tsoro chaiyo* (we played mind games against each other.’ Says Hondo:

By this time, ZANU had majority (in terms of numbers of comrades). The idea was to share the posts under ZIPA. The commander was Rex Nhongo and the deputy commander was John Dube, commissariat we gave it to Nikita Mangena, we deliberately took a decision that I should be demoted for the purposes of ZIPA because we wanted to be in charge of operations.

So the deputy political commissar was Wilfred Mhanda (Dzinashe Machingura). These were the top comrades in ZIPA. Then came the director of operations that was myself, deputized by Javin Maseko from ZAPU. Commissariat was given to Webster Gwauya. Intelligence was given to Gordon Munyani from ZAPU. Logistics we gave it to Report Mphoko deputised by Edmund Kaguri who later died at Nyadzonya and we replaced him with David Todhlana.

We gave Training to Ambrose Mutinhiri from ZAPU, deputised by Parker Chipoyera. Under Medicine there was Dr Mudzingwa from ZAPU deputised by Cde Pfeferere from ZANU. When we got to Finance, ndipo patakanetsana manje (we clashed). We then started looking at qualifications. We, as ZANU, put forward Soul Sadza (Arthur Magaya) and ZAPU couldn't challenge him because he was qualified mupfana iyeye (that boy).

Our slogan as ZANU at the war front was “Pamberi neZANU!” and all the comrades continued saying “Pamberi neZANU!” I instructed that this slogan

should not die and all comrades were supposed to continue chanting this slogan.

I am telling you kuti yaiva tsoro (we played mind games against each other). Like I told you ZANU was now in the majority and we had strong presence at the war front. ZIPA was formed in mid-1975 but we started our operations on 20 January 1976. This operation didn't take long. In no time yakanga yangova yezita (ZIPA only existed as a name). We were just doing it for the OAU. As ZANU we continued using ZIPA to get materiel from OAU.

Remember when ZANU was formed there was always suspicion between ZAPU and ZANU. That spirit persisted. We knew kuti ZAPU yaidawo kutitamba tsoro (that ZAPU wanted to play mind games) (*The Sunday Mail*, November 13, 2016).

Despite the mind games, Hondo says Nyerere told the politicians in both ZAPU and ZANU that "...you politicians you don't want to unite but the forces are uniting so we are handing over the war to ZIPA." After this, the Front Line States were now giving support to ZIPA.

Comrade Soft Magarasadza in an article published on June 10, 2018 concurs blaming politicians for the early death of ZIPA. He says as fighters, they were now chanting slogans like "*Pasi nemapoliticians* (down with politicians) because "...the politicians were causing a lot of problems."

You see the Frontline States wanted us to work together, I mean ZIPRA and ZANLA, but the problems were coming from the politicians. As the fighting forces we didn't have a problem working together. ZIPA was a very good idea. We were supposed to be united. The politicians were causing divisions and I think the Scotland Yard in Britain fueled the divisions. We operated under ZIPA with the leader being Cde Makasha in Gaza. His deputy was Cde Stopper. These were our commanders at the war front. The problems started at the war front because the ZIPRA and ZANLA tactics were different.

As noted before, the study also demonstrates the intra-party contestations within ZAPU and ZANU and their armed wings ZIPRA and ZANLA. In an article published on May 8, 2016, Khumalo says:

They say money is the root of all evils. Money is devil. Like I told you, these were the early years of ZANU and some of our leaders were in it for the money. They were being used by the Rhodesians. If you check, some of the leaders we started with fell by the wayside. Vamwe vakazopanduka kukasara (others sold out except) people like Cde Chitepo, Cde Noel Mukono, Felix Rice Santana, Percy Ntini who were dedicated to fight for their country.

What I can tell you is that there were sellouts within the party during these early stages. Some leaders in Dare ReChimurenga were selling information to the Smith regime. Our biggest problem was that during these formative stages we didn't have people who were trained in intelligence and counter-intelligence. As a result, it was easy for the Rhodesians to infiltrate us.

The formation of the High Command caused a lot of squabbles. The issue of regionalism and tribalism reared its ugly head in ZANU. Cde Chitepo fought a lot against regionalism and tribalism but he could only do so much. Even Noel Mukono tried his best but some people who were there vechiKaranga, vechiZezuru were saying since the president of the party, Reverend Sithole and chairman, Cde Chitepo were from Manicaland, so Manyika could not take this and that post.

Noel Mukono who was Chief of Defence ended up also being accused of regionalism and tribalism as he tried to sort things out. These things started from the early stages because people had no focus. That's why later Noel Mukono was dribbled and Cde Tongo took over as Chief of Defence. This move was orchestrated by people like Chigowe, Mutumbuka and so on. The idea was to later move Cde Tongo to become deputy president of the party since Cde Takawira had died. Joseph Chimurenga was supposed to then take over as Chief of Defence. This was the plot by the Super Karangas. So many wrong things happened at this time...

The people who really caused tribalism and regionalism in ZANU were Cde Hamadziripi, Chigowe and Cde Mandizvidza. They were coming from the UK and they came with this talk saying 'know your way?' They started

dividing people on regional and tribal lines. Cde Tongo was dragged into this unknowingly when he came back from training.

Cde Chitepo tried to address this issue warning us that this would destroy the party. On 28 February 1968, Cde Chitepo called most of the leadership of the party and spoke strongly against regionalism and tribalism. I will forever remember this day because that meeting was heated but Cde Chitepo maintained his cool as Cde Hamadziripi and his colleagues made all manner of accusations. Things got to a point where we were having what were called ‘Super Zezurus and Super Karangas.’ These were Zezurus and Karangas who were in leadership positions in the party.

On its part, ZAPU was also riddled with intra-party contestations as Todhlana reveals in an article published on October 22, 2017. He says the contestations got so heated that he together some Shonas like Rex Nhongo crossed the floor from ZAPU to ZANU.

Our training was until the end of 1969. We were brought to Tanzania and were supposed to go to Lusaka but by this time, there were divisions between James Chikerema and JZ (Jason Ziyapapa) Moyo. They had two camps. Chikerema would say ‘I am the overall in charge representing Nkomo because I am the vice-president of the Zapu.’ JZ would argue *kuti mudara zvimwe zvauri kuita hazvina ma- blessings aMdara Nkomo* (some of the decisions you are making have not been blessed). So there were lots of quarrels.

We were taken to Mbeya, still in Tanzania. From end of 1969 to June 1970, we were staying at Mbeya. I was still with Rex Nhongo, Thomas Nhari and others. Nhari was the vice-platoon commander. He was more senior to us. I was the political commissar and Rex was *seguranza* (security). One day we took a decision – it was myself, Rex and Nhari. We said *vakomana, ngatiende kune vamwe vedu kuZANU. Kuno kwatiri kuZapu tiri vaenzi* (we said comrades here in ZAPU we are just visitors, let’s go where we belong in ZANU). We agreed to cross the floor from ZAPU to ZANU in 1970” (*The Sunday Mail*, October 22, 2017).

The narratives by the former fighting forces from both ZAPU and ZANU and their armed wings ZIPRA and ZANLA show that the comrades were selectively

remembering and selectively forgetting some ethnic and regional contestations in their bid to create a historical social identity. Patriotic history (Ranger, 2009) was deployed by the former fighting forces as they sought to label political leaders who led their parties during the Second Chimurenga as sellouts who planted seeds of divisions in the struggle. The study therefore confirms, from the perspective of the former fighting forces, the existence of ethnic contestations at both the inter-party and intra-party levels during the liberation struggle.

These ethnic and regional contestations spilled into Zimbabwe after the attainment of independence. It is now almost acceptable that ZAPU is a party for Ndebele people while ZANU is for Shona people. This is despite the Unity Accord that was signed by the two political parties in 1987, leading to the formation of ZANU-PF. In ZANU-PF the contestations continue with divisions between the Zezurus, Karangas, Manyika always popping up whenever there are fights for power. Due to these contestations, provinces such as Midlands and Masvingo have always been seen as problematic in terms of balancing power dynamics.

5.3 Misunderstood and mishandled generational contradictions: Rebels that never rebelled

The study demonstrates that there were costly generational contradictions during the Second Chimurenga. These contradictions come out clearly in narratives that involve the famous Badza-Nhari Rebellion of 1974 and the Vashandi Rebellion of 1977 and 1978. The 1974 rebellion was led by senior ZANLA commanders Dakariyi Badza and Thomas Nhari whose real name was Raphael Chinyanganya. This was a rebellion between young commanders who had spent three consecutive years at the war front and the grey-haired politicians based in Lusaka. On the other hand, the Vashandi Rebellion was led by Elias Hondo who had the backing of

young and educated ZANLA commanders who sought to introduce a new ideology and approach to the liberation struggle.

According to the narratives of the former ZANLA fighters who participated in these rebellions, these rebellions never took place as these were mere generational contradictions that were misunderstood and mishandled by the politicians. This is despite the fact that following the Badza-Nhari rebellion the war actually stopped while following the Vashandi rebellion, several veteran ZANLA commanders were arrested in Beira, Mozambique.

One of the survivors from the Badza-Nhari rebellion, Noah Mbira (born 1948) whose Chimurenga name was Chemist Ncube gives graphic details of how he was sucked into participating in this rebellion. He says he became part of the rebellion by default as Badza and Nhari came to Lusaka just as he had gone there for treatment after being injured at the war front.

In an article published on August 28, 2016, Chemist Ncube says:

Whilst in Lusaka, at Number 93, I didn't know what was happening at the rear when Cdes Badza, Nhari and quite a number of commanders including Cde Cephas arrived at the house. They came on a truck and said to me 'Cde as you are aware, the armament situation at the war front is bad, so we need to meet the High Command and update them on the situation face to face.'

They said they had written reports about the situation but nothing had happened. I had been at the war front for three years with these comrades and I knew and understood what they were talking about...I spoke about the Magunje attack. The Rhodesians came with strong airpower and we lost quite a number of comrades. So all these were developments at the war front touched every fighter that we shouldn't be losing life like this. There was a clear need for us to improve our ammunition, strategy and tactics but still using guerrilla warfare as the backbone of the operation. So this was the theme and basis of this meeting that Badza and Nhari were calling for. When these comrades told me this, I had no qualms with the meeting.

Ncube continues saying he went around Lusaka with Badza and was present during a shootout that took place at Tongogara's house. He says despite the shootout, Badza had not informed him of the group's intention to abduct some of the ZANU leaders. Instead, Badza made it appear as if the group wanted dialogue with the ZANU High Command. Ncube says unknown to him, the group had already abducted some ZANU leaders and this created serious tension in Lusaka. In the meantime, Badza and Nhari had gotten in touch with some commanders from Frelimo from Mozambique asking for mediation between the ZANLA commanders and the ZANU High Command. Continues Ncube:

We went to one of the bases in Kaswende waiting for the meeting with the High Command. One day after our meals, we were actually dozing, we found ourselves surrounded. Anyway, so we were captured at Kaswende and takatambwa bhora kuita kunge usisiri munhu (we were treated badly as if we were not human beings).

We were captured by some comrades who were under Cde Robson Manyika. They were called the Gukurahundi team. There was also Cde Mupunzarima and I can tell you it was quite a scenario. Despite my visible injuries I was butchered. Some of the comrades in this Gukurahundi had come through me while I was at the front but they butchered me. As they were beating us up, I just asked myself, ndiyo hondo yacho here iyi? (is this the war we are now fighting?)

I don't want to begrudge these comrades who beat me up because like I said I have no apology to make. I was in it whether by default or whatever. We were beaten up despite our appeal to Frelimo for dialogue. When we were arrested, we didn't resist. There was no resistance at all. Yes, I know the leaders could have been offended but they should have handled the situation much better (*The Sunday Mail*, August 26, 2016).

Ncube goes on to question why the ZANU leaders had demoted Badza just before the rebellion saying these were provincial commanders who had to be treated with respect. Says Ncube:

Whatever problems Badza had, I think it was wrong for the High Command to demote him and let him mingle with the junior commanders and cadres. You see, a person who has tasted power and a person who many people saluted, I think it was a wrong decision to demote him... I don't and won't forgive the High Command for the action they took. If you are in position of leadership, you get problems, you don't answer them, you get problems you don't answer them. You are faced with numerous problems and in the end you protect yourself. What I am saying is, whatever problems were at the rear, this was compounded by the High Command's decision to demote Badza and let him stay at the grassroots (*The Sunday Mail*, August 26, 2016).

After their arrest at Kaswende, Ncube says the interrogation started led by Tongogara and Manyika.

The first to be taken for interrogation was Cde Badza, then after sometime it was me. A question was thrown to me – 'newewo Cde Chemist?' (and you too Cde Chemist?) That was Cde Tongo asking me. He said this because of my track record. Cde Tongo knew who I was and my contribution to the struggle. I didn't mince my words. By saying 'newewo Cde Chemist' Cde Tongo was trying to say I shouldn't have been part of this group. I didn't mince my words.

I responded to Cde Tongo saying 'comrade, aren't you aware of your Manyika and Karanga problems?' It wasn't a secret that the appointment of commanders was based on tribal grounds. Look at the composition of the

High Command, except for Ndangana and Chauke and maybe Chinamaropa, the rest were Karangas. It wasn't a secret. I said despite all the problems, we should have sat down to talk. The High Command had its share of the cake in terms of blame and we had our share of the cake also...

I want to call a spade, a spade – when you revolt against the leadership you get what is due to you, but to me this was never a revolt. They took us to the ZANU farm. Uummmmm. They were under the command of Cde Rex Nhongo. That night I just said to myself, is this the end of my life? And should my life end in this manner? I then said no. Ndakashevedzera kuti 'vanhu itai zvamuri kuita but remember takasiya vabereki vachitambura (I shouted that go ahead and ill-treat us but you should remember we also left our parents in poverty). I don't think mudzimu (the spirits) yeZimbabwe would allow this sort of thing to happen. Just carry on the way you want.' By this time the beatings were so thorough such that all the pain was gone.

One of the issues that was raised by the High Command was that takanga tavakuunza vakadzi (we were now bringing wives) from the front. Of course Cde Cephas and a few others had brought their wives from the front. The accusation was that vakanga vasisaiti zvehondo, vakanga vava kutsvaga vakadzi (we were no longer focusing on the war but on looking for women).

But let's pose a bit and look at life as it is supposed to be. For three years someone operating at the war front, what did you expect? These were people in love. Cephas' wife was already pregnant.

Now look at the High Command – they had homes and families at the rear in Zambia. Chifombo had its own stories about the treatment of women there. There were clashes for women at Chifombo, particularly among the High Command.

After this ordeal, I felt death creeping in. The following morning we were bundled into a car takaita kunge masaga (like sacks). After driving for quite a while, the car stopped and we saw Cde Chigohwe speeding towards us in his Peugeot. He stopped his car and said 'Chemist arikupi? Ngaaburuke (he should disembark). He is wanted by the Zambian government.' I was taken out of the vehicle as the other comrades proceeded. That was the last I saw these comrades. And that is how I survived. I was being driven to meet my death when Cde Chigohwe came.

The comrades I left in the car included Cde Chiridza, Cde Tedi, Cde Zindoga and many junior commanders. I think there were about 20 or so junior commanders. Like I said very promising junior commanders. These were the very base of the success story at the war front by this time. These were the comrades who were at the forefront executing the war leading to the release of the political prisoners in 1974. They had spent three years fighting the mighty Rhodesians. This is how these brave comrades were rewarded.

Remember by this time we were still very few comrades at the war front – Cde Mao in Chipuriro, Cde James Bond, Cde Bonzo in Madziva, Cde Vhuu in Rusambo and Cde Cephas at Nyombwe. I was in Chiweshe but based in Nyombwe between Mavhuradonha and Karuyana.

So basically we were seven leaders but in total we were around 45 to 50 comrades. These were the comrades who made the difference that forced the Rhodesian government to release the political prisoners and start maneuvers to engage in dialogue with the freedom fighters.

I am not saying what happened before is immaterial. No. I am saying whoever contributed to the liberation struggle contributed to the attainment of independence (*The Sunday Mail*, August 26, 2016).

He concludes in the same article:

Why didn't anyone pose to think of our age and what we had gone through? The rear composed of people we considered our elders...The High Command became a law unto themselves. The Nhari rebellion can be explained in many aspects, but people should know that these were very youthful people, adventurous who needed guidance. Takanga tiri vana, vanana (we were very young boys). Just look at what the youths of today are doing. Its characteristic of the youths and we all say they need guidance. This situation required proper handling of contradictions.

This story that the ZANLA commanders like Badza and Nhari who led the rebellion had genuine concerns that needed to be addressed has been downplayed. The story about the pioneering role that these commanders had played as the Second Chimurenga started has been conveniently forgotten. This story that these

were young commanders, some of them in their early 20s, who need guidance hasn't found currency in the dominant discourses.

Celebratory history from what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:4) refers to as “praise texts” downplays the role that former nationalists who were stationed in Lusaka played in fueling the rebellion. The former nationalists in their biographies and the willing commissar intellectuals in their service to the new nation, chose what to conveniently remember and what to conveniently forget (Jodelet, 2008).

Hondo, who ironically was part of the Gukurahundi team that was sent by Tongogara to arrest the leaders of the Badza-Nhari rebellion concurs with Ncube that the ZANU leaders mishandled the situation. In an article published on November 20, 2016, Hondo says:

The Badza-Nhari rebellion was mishandled by Tongogara and others. Nhari was the provincial commander of Tete province while Dakarai Badza was provincial political commissar. These were important positions...This rebellion was a fight between the war front and the rear...

You see, Tongogara wanted to imitate Fidel Castro. He could speak until he lost his voice. He came to me one day and said ‘yeah, Badza and Ndanga takavaendesa (we took them) kuLusaka.’ I thought on my own that this was not true. Ndakanyumwa (I became suspicious) but I couldn't ask. We were now left with Chimedza, Chemist and Chiridza. I whispered to Bombadiari, asking whether it was true that Badza and Nhari had been taken to Lusaka.

Bombadiari whispered back to me saying ‘takavauraya’ (we killed them)... Tongogara mishandled the situation and this is my personal view. He was a good commander, but I also saw his mistakes. He killed Mataure after accusing him of being on the side of the Badza-Nhari rebellion. Even Madekurozva who was a male nurse, he was killed. He also went to the publicity department where there was Washington Malianga. Kwakanga kune zvirema ikoko, but zvakapondwa zvose. Zvirema zvisingakwanisi kana kuita chii...

Tongogara was very ruthless with tendencies of a dictator. He used to admire leaders like Idi Amini and Samora Machel. Yes, he was very, very brave. Raive gamba (he was a hero) but he was kind of a Joseph Stalin from Soviet Union.

But of course, some commanders who worked with Nhari and Badza have a completely different story. As comrades who worked under Badza and Nhari, one cannot rule out an element of sour grapes and jealous. For example in an article published on April 1, 2018, Bethune has no kind words for Nhari and Badza:

Nhari and those who were implicated in that rebellion were militants. I was also a militant. The Nhari issue is another different story. This wasn't about tribalism. Nhari was a coward. Militarily he was trained by ZAPU. What I understand and know is that he was accusing the leadership that had deployed us to the war front that they had sent us with inferior weapons...When people like Nhari came from ZAPU, they started kusvora (looking down) our ammunition...They showed that they were cowards. It showed they lacked proper training. I operated with Nhari and Badza around Muzarabani area before we moved to Dotito. Their problems started in Muzarabani around Kakwidze area. These complaints against the ammunition started during deployment when we got to Zambezi. That is when Nhari and Badza started saying 'hee matipa pfuti diki and so muri kutituma kuti we go and get captured (you have given us small guns and so you are sending us to be captured).'

You know Nhari was very light and handsome. He would look at himself and say 'inini nehunaku hwangu ndingafe inini? (with the way I am handsome, should I die?)' Saka wawaida kuti afe ndiani? (who did he want to die?)... If they had received military training that we had got from the Chinese, they wouldn't have acted the way they acted. As field commanders, Nhari and Badza should have come up with survival plans but they failed because they were cowards. They went to war with a defeatist mentality.

The study shows that even within the ZANLA fighters, there were contestations between commanders from the same generation. There is a subtle bid by some of the commanders to present themselves as the brave fighters who improvised and sacrificed a lot to win the war. This confirms views by Burke (1989) who alludes

to collective memory's role in identity construction by analyzing salient archetypes in national historical narratives in which good prevails and evil is either vanquished or conveniently omitted.

Furthermore, the study shows the glaring generational contestations through the Washandi rebellion of 1977 as the old guard in ZANU clashed with the young and educated commanders who wanted to introduce Marxist and Leninist ideas to the war. The narratives by the former fighters demonstrate that the old guard in ZANU feared that the new generation of commanders, most of whom had degrees wanted to wrestle power.

The study demonstrates that in resisting the moves by the youthful commanders, the old guard in ZANU took measures that almost paralyzed the struggle. Todhlana was among the new generation of commanders and he confesses that he looked down upon the leaders as most of them were not educated.

After Geneva Conference flopped, everybody came back. We held meetings with Cde Tongo as commanders. During the meetings I suggested that the ZANLA High Command should change. I was making my contribution during discussions. We were discussing. I suggested that let's increase the number of the people in the High Command from the current 18 to 24 or more. I said this would increase the efficiency of the High Command.

As I was suggesting this, I had something in my mind. I was saying in my mind, 'I don't hold in high esteem members of High Command yaTongo.' Some of them were semi-illiterate. Like Joseph Chimurenga. Rex Nhongo was Standard Six? Elias Hondo, I think Grade Three? Chinamaropa, Chauke like the whole shoot of them. None of them could boast *kuti ndakaenda kuchikoro* (that they had gone to school). Even Tongo had gone up to Form 2.

I could see that these comrades could not embrace and understand the ideology that I wanted to push. My wish was to take the commander from Tete Province into the High Command, then commander from Gaza

province, commander from Chibavava, commander from Nyadzonya and others to make them six. I knew all these comrades had passed through Wampua College (ZANU college that taught Marxism and Lennism in Mozambique). I was the founder of this college together with Dzinashe Machingura.

At the college, we would tell the cadres that we look forward that our revolution would transform from being national democratic – just to free ourselves from the foreign yoke. We told them that this revolution would produce a capitalist state. We told them that we wanted a socialist revolution, as was in China, Soviet Union and son on. Our idea was that we take advantage of these socialist countries that were supporting us to skip the capitalist state and go straight into socialism. This is what we were teaching the cadres.

So I wanted the number of the High Command to be increased not that they were few but because I underrated them. My idea was to have an educated High Command. But then before we could do this, I was arrested in 1977. I was accused by people like Tongogara of being part of Vashandi rebellion.

I have no bad feeling against anybody. There was difference of approach and difference of opinion, full stop. But like I told you, the one who wins in a contest tells the story (*The Sunday Mail*, November 26, 2017).

In an article published on December 11, 2016, Hondo agrees with Todhlana saying:

I told you earlier on that our group yakanga isina kufunda maningi (our generation of commanders were not very educated). We were now taking vapfana vaibva kumusha (youngsters who had come from Rhodesia) who knew Marxism and Leninism. We were accused kuti tava kuda vanhu vakabva kuchikoro tichisiya vanhu vekuDarwin vakatanga hondo (we now wanted educated comrades forgetting those from Mt Darwin who had started the liberation struggle). This created lots of problems leading to our arrest in 1977. I was labelled as the leader of this group that people called Vashandi.

While we were under arrest, some comrades in Maputo started having problems with Tongogara. They slowly started supporting us led by Rugare Gumbo. I heard that in a bid to have us released, Stephen Chocha (Augustine

Chihuri) and some other comrade took Cde Tekere and Cde Ushewokunze hostage. They wanted to use these comrades to pressurise Tongo to release us, but Rex Nhongo came up with a counter plan and arrested Chocha and this other comrade.

After this that's when people like Rugare Gumbo were also arrested. This was now 1978 and these comrades who were arrested after us vakauyiswa (they were brought) where we were staying. All the comrades who were arrested were 72 in total.

Hondo insists that the move to incorporate the young and educated cadres into ZANU structures was meant to prepare the party for a free Zimbabwe.

We knew that the revolution in Zimbabwe comprised vanhu vakafunda nevasina (the educated and the uneducated). We wanted to have proper and educated political commissars because taingonzi magandanga haana kudzidza (people were saying freedom fighters are not educated). We wanted these educated boys to show the masses back home kuti kune vamwe vakadzidza (that there were some comrades who were educated).

We knew that an independent Zimbabwe ichada vanhu vakafunda (would require educated people). This was the reality and so we had to start preparing for it. Our revolution had gotten to that stage where we had to recruit educated people. Ini chaiye (myself) I became very popular during the struggle because ndaifamba nevanhu vakadzidza (I moved around with educated cadres). I had my Standard Five but still I led the struggle. I am not saying those who were uneducated were supposed to be sidelined. No. But we now had to strike a balance.

I know there were some comrades who used to say 'isu regai tiende kuchikoro. Imi kana mapedza kurwa hondo tichazowuya kuzokutongai (we are pursuing our education. When you win the war we will come and rule you). Now these educated comrades we were recruiting and training were supposed to show these ones who ran away from the struggle and went to further their education that the war could be fought by educated people. We wanted those who were rushing to London to further their education to know that kune vakadzidza (there are some educated comrades) who are fighting for the country.

We wanted cadres who understood socialism and Leninism. This angered people like Tongo. Kana takaita zviriro wrong, (if we did something wrong) well tough luck. Look now what happened after independence, those vasina kudzidza (uneducated cadres) were indeed sidelined or they had to quickly further their education.

From his own confession that he was moving around with educated comrades who used to “write things for me” it is clear that these youthful comrades had targeted Hondo as the most influential commander in Mozambique. They had managed to convince him that even though he was not well educated, his safety was guaranteed as they “wrong things for him.”

The study shows that it is very possible that these youthful comrades had good intentions but it seems like they clashed with leaders like Tongogara because they sort of ambushed those who had been leading the party since its formation in 1963. It was very suspicious that these youthful leaders chose to introduce a new ideology and new direction to the liberation at a time when most ZANU leaders were in Zambian prisons. The generational contestations were inevitable.

However, in an article published on October 8, 2017, Kenny Ridzai disagrees with Todhlana and Hondo saying:

You see, the idea of Chitepo College which was originally known as Wampua College was not a bad thing but they went on to poison themselves with wrong politics. They took politics dzisiri dzekuhondo dzavaiwudzwa nanaMakumbe

muno (they took academic politics that they had been taught by people like John Makumbe) and tried to apply that. Izvozvo hazvipindirane (that doesn't work).

The study through the Badza-Nhari rebellion narratives shows the generational contestations that led to the deaths of many fighters. The heavy handedness of leaders like Tongogara and Robson Manyika in handling the issue, reads like an attempt by the leaders of ZANU to not only stop the rebellion but to also silence the fighters. Not surprisingly, the narratives by the former nationalists have always blamed the former fighting forces for the Badza-Nhari rebellion.

On the other hand, the study shows the generational contestations through the Vashandi rebellion as the youthful commanders sought to take the liberation struggle in another direction. The arrests of the Vashandi group and their subsequent release in 1981 meant that when Zimbabwe got its independence in 1980, these fighting forces were not there to tell their story. The former nationalists seized discourse.

By saying the “one who wins the contest tells the story,” Todhlana is bemoaning the fact that the fighting forces lost in the generational contest against the former nationalists. Despite the historical silencing, the generational contestations have continued to haunt ZANU-PF. The factional fights that rocked the political party between Lacoste and G40 were purely generational. Lacoste consisted of the old guard in ZANU-PF backed by war veterans who claimed to be defending the gains of the country’s independence while G40 was made up of “mafikizolos,” the young generation politicians who wanted to take the country on a new political trajectory.

From a historical perspective, Lacoste resembled the Tongogara group which crushed the Nhari-Badza rebellion which was led by young commanders. Still in the same vein, the Lacoste group resembled the Tongogara group which crushed the Vashandi rebellion through arresting the young and educated commanders who

wanted to introduce new ideology to ZANU in 1977. On the other hand, there is a strong resemblance between the Nhari-Badza rebellion leaders, the Vashandi rebellion commanders to the G40 faction in ZANU-PF. This is a clear sign that the generational contestations will continue to haunt ZANU-PF into the foreseeable future.

5.4 “When the absence became the presence:” The great betrayal

The study shows that the ethnic and generational contestations spilled into post-colonial Zimbabwe. As a result of the contestations, heroes were turned into villains and villains turned into heroes. New patriots emerged as new sellouts were being brought to the forefront.

In addition, the study demonstrates that the politicians in both ZAPU and ZANU deliberately betrayed their fighting forces as the country headed towards independence in 1980. The former fighting forces openly declare that through the Lancaster House talks in London in 1979, the politicians conspired to push the fighters to the periphery of politics. As the contestations continue playing out, the former fighting forces seek to reclaim their political space by declaring that contrary to dominant discourses, the politicians didn't fight for this country.

In an article published on August 12 2018, Conary Mabuto, who was the ZIPRA commander in charge of the artillery department says there was some excitement soon after the attainment of independence but this excitement was short-lived:

There was some form of excitement in the beginning. We were excited that the war had come to an end. What had impressed us all was that the politicians had went to the Lancaster House talks as the Patriotic Front. We were very happy. But the disappointing thing was that at the end of the day when they were going for elections, they decided to go separate ways. As

ZIPRA we were disappointed by the politicians. I told you about the divide and rule tactics that the enemy was always using. The enemy wanted to divide the people of one country.

And the politicians were indeed divided. It was now ZANU on its own and ZAPU on its own during the elections. We were disappointed. How could people who had seen the need to unite going to Lancaster go for elections divided? This was one of the things that really disturbed some of us.

From the onset, one can read attempts by Mabuto to lay the ground for blaming the politicians for problems that later developed between ZAPU and ZANU. Unlike the nationalists who glorified their participation during the liberation struggle, Mabuto is exposing their shortcomings.

He adds that as the fighting forces, there had no much say in some of the decisions that the politicians were taking.

We were very far from the politics. We were in the army. We were very far from political decisions. We were in the armed forces. The people in the army who were maybe linked to the politics were people like Lookout Masuku, who was our commander then. By this time Nikita Mangena had died. There was Zwangami Dube as the political commissar of ZIPRA. These are the people who could have had a say in the political aspect of things. Some of us were strictly military people and there was nothing we could do.

The statement by Mabuto gives the impression that the liberation struggle was fought independently on two fronts – that is the political front and the military front. It's as if there was a disconnect between these two fronts. Yet the dominant discourses by nationalists that came out in the literature review glossed over these contradictions.

Turning to the ill-treatment of the former fighting forces, Mabuto says this was a plot by the politicians who used the Lancaster House talks to seek political relevance: Says Mabuto:

It is them (politicians) who instilled into the population the spirit of saying the armed forces did nothing. But if the truth is to be told, it's them who did nothing, those politicians.

They were staying as if they were in hotels. They didn't fight for this country at all. They were being given good food and acquiring degrees. They had white reporters coming to interview them, their wives coming to see them, their children coming to see them. Some of them being trained by the Smith regime to be infiltrators of the armed struggle. They infiltrated the armed struggle. They were not supposed to accept that Lancaster House document because we were going to take the country as the armed forces. We were now liberating zones, taking over the country.

We were now taking over territories. We were now victorious. And the politicians go to Lancaster and sign that bad document. You know why they did that? They were afraid that they might be irrelevant. Therefore they succumbed to nothing. There was no pressure at all, but they knew that if the armed forces take over the country, they were going to be irrelevant.

We were now winning the war and Smith realised that. That is why he was serious about Lancaster House. Our politicians, they go there and say yes. And they come from Lancaster with nothing for their guerillas, the fighters. Smith protected his soldiers and said the civil service of the country, whoever takes over, must respect that civil service.

Our politicians wrote nothing to protect us, their fighting forces. They didn't know our suffering because they were enjoying themselves. Now we come into a free Zimbabwe with half-baked things for the fighting forces. About 20 years after the attainment of independence, you haven't taken the land and given it to the people. Why when you were saying the land was the biggest grievance of going to war? You are given degrees and knighted by the Queen of England and you feel good? You are a good black man because you are protecting the interests of the whites. In the meantime, the fighting forces have become nothing in the country that they liberated.

The statements by Mabuto about one being "given degrees and being knighted by the Queen of England" and one becoming "a good black man because you are protecting the interests of the whites draws one to the concepts of mimicry and hybridity. As Gandhi (1998) notes, these two can be viewed as concepts that are

perpetuating the dominance of Western discourses in the South. This is so because under mimicry, the colonized hopes to become “almost the same but not white” while under hybridity the West remains the “privileged meeting ground” for the different cultures.

It is clear that the person who Mabuto is referring to as have been knighted by the Queen is the former President Robert Mugabe. Mugabe was appointed as an honorary Knight Grand Cross in the Order of the Bath by Queen Elizabeth II in 1994. Mugabe was also awarded four degrees from the University of London through its distance learning programme and in 1984 was awarded an honorary degree by Edinburgh University.

By awarding Mugabe the knighthood and the honorary degrees, one can see attempts by the former colonizer to perpetuate its dominance by producing Mugabe in their own image. The Queen was trying to produce a hybrid black leader who could protect British interests in Zimbabwe. And for the first two decades, Mugabe responded well through mimicry as he tried to become “almost the same but not white.”

Mbedzi, a ZIPRA provincial commander who claims that he was the last comrade to leave Guruve on October 29, 1979 says as a veteran fighter, he was disappointed that as independence beckoned, the “absence became the presence.”

Says Mbedzi:

You know as in any revolution, when things are ripe, people start thinking of other people. Later it was compulsory for us to leave the army. When we were fighting the war, there were others who were training. From nowhere these people were suddenly put in front of us. Suddenly we were being told that we were not educated but we had fought and won the war.

The ZIPRA High Command betrayed us. They took people from nowhere. The field commanders were thrown away. Can you imagine a person like Tshinga Dube, who was our head of signals, he was made a Colonel? Philip Valerio Sibanda who was the head of our reconnaissance unit had to fight his way up the ladder. We blame the ZIPRA High Command for all this. Some people want to talk about ZANLA, but no, it's the ZIPRA High Command which sidelined us.

You know up to now some of my comrades are still asking why the absence are now the presence, the presence are now the absence. We commandeered the war, but we are now the absentees. If we were not educated, that's fine but we had all the tricks and strategies to fight the enemy. Otherwise the brave soldier is not one who is educated. It's about how brave and how you fight in a war situation" (*The Sunday Mail*, June 3, 2018).

The study also shows that despite the attainment of independence in 1980, ethnic contestations continued between ZIPRA and ZANLA. In an article published on August 12, 2018, Mabuto says during the integration exercise to merge the three armed forces – ZIPRA, ZANLA and the Rhodesian forces, some ZANLA fighters disrespected him due to his ZIPRA background.

The only challenge was that at some point I had to be told by juniors that I was a dissident. I was told that 'you are a dissident. There is nothing you can tell us.' This despite the fact that I was a member of the Joint High Command. Some junior with a small rank openly challenged me. It's because of what I was. My background. The ZIPRA background. There were dissidents during this time around areas like Gokwe and so on.

That was the anti-climax of the revolution. That's why I always say, it was supposed to be victory time, but it was not victory time for some. It was lamenting time. The times of the war seemed to have been better than the time of peace.

A few days after the attainment of independence in 1980, yes, that time we were heroes. We were happy. Very happy to be heroes who had liberated the country. Little did we know that in a few months we would not be heroes? We would be victims. In the beginning we were heroes for sure. We felt it in

ourselves that we had done well for our country. A few weeks after that, we had to shrink.

The situation changed from heroism to being victims. I didn't know that going to fight for your country you come back and be treated the way we were treated. We go there, sacrificed our lives and we come back, only to be killed again. Only to be taken as rubbish. Even today I am still a rubbish.

Mabuto says he is looked down upon despite the fact that after the attainment of independence in 1980, he attained a Diploma in War and Strategic Studies, got a BA Honours in History then went to the University of London where he came back with a Masters in War and Strategic Studies from Kings College. He later became a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe.

Despite being looked down upon, Mabuto says:

I don't regret having fought the liberation struggle as ZIPRA. It's unfortunate some people see us from that perspective. I have very good ZANLA friends. I respect ZANLA comrades. I had a ZANLA wife for your own information. Like I told you, I was never a politician who saw things in terms of ZIPRA and ZANLA. I was never a politician. I was in the armed force (*The Sunday Mail*, August 12, 2018).

On his part, Peter Scotch reveals that after 1980, he refused to join the army because he knew that the ethnic tensions between ZAPU and ZANU were likely to flare up following questionable decisions by the ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo. Despite the fact that he was a top commander in ZIPRA, Peter Scotch acknowledges that the ZAPU leadership failed to read the situation towards the attainment of independence and he wasn't surprised when ZAPU and ZANU turned against each other in the early 1980.

In an article published on May 13, 2018, Peter Scotch says two things reinforced his decision not to join the army in 1980:

The first one was that towards the Lancaster House there were some omissions and additions in terms of the people who then came into the country from the ZIPRA side as commanders. We saw people who were nowhere near the command coming in as the Brigadier Generals and so on. The people who were really at the forefront being sidelined. I felt that was not on.

The second one, when the idea to go for elections as Patriotic Front failed and ZAPU and ZANU were going for elections separately, it was inevitable that there were going to be some friction. I knew that these problems would eventually permeate to us the soldiers. The last thing I was prepared to face was a situation whereby I would find myself in combat against my colleagues from ZANLA. I knew this was going to happen I did not want to be part of that.

He turns to the mistakes that were made by the ZAPU leadership towards 1980 saying:

I felt that when Josh (the late Vice-President Joshua Nkomo) came to Zambia, I think there was now a bit of a disconnect between the political leaders and the military leaders which I think had a negative impact on the war effort...I had some of these reservations. I just felt the political leadership was not giving the military the necessary support.

Coming back into the country, on Independence Day, 18 April 1980, I was at Zimbabwe House in Lusaka. Present there were the late VP John Nkomo and Arkim Ndlovu. I had gone to Lusaka to get replenishments for our supplies. I found these two comrades crying. Literally crying. They were crying that ZAPU had lost. My question to them was; 'did you think ZAPU would win? ZAPU was never going to win those elections.'

You see, you could not divorce or underestimate first and foremost ethnicity in our politics. It was inevitable. I think people's expectations there were misguided because they didn't analyse our situation with sufficient depth in order to position themselves correctly. Even the way we campaigned as ZAPU, we positioned ourselves as the disciplined forces. There was hardly

anybody out there campaigning when the other parties were out there campaigning.

When you look at some of the finer details of the strategies and tactics, which should have come from the political leadership, you could see there was something lacking. I think people were more historical in their assumptions that we were ZAPU therefore. Not realising that there was a very big change in the political dynamics prior and after independence.

People were caught napping. To a point where even after the elections, I think there was a possibility of Josh literally being the first President. He was offered and he rejected it. He then went for the Home Affairs portfolio.

There was no doubt that Josh was the Father figure and probably a non-executive Father figure then would have had a positive effect. You see, when Josh became Minister of Home Affairs, they created room for conflict. Josh should have played a supervisory role where he was not directly involved in the running of any ministry. You see, this was inevitable because when people decided to go separate ways, not as Patriotic Front for the elections, the stage was set for some kind of power play games.

I feel that from the ZAPU side not enough attention was paid to all these issues. I strongly feel that if Josh had accepted to be President, the rest of the people would not have felt threatened. You couldn't have two bulls in one kraal and so one had to withdraw tactically for the sake of the bigger picture.

So all in all, I think Josh had his positives and negatives. For me it's not where you start. It's where you end that matters most. You can be brilliant at the beginning, but if you sleep on the job in the middle, your ending leaves a lot to be desired. For political leaders that becomes very crucial because many people have trust in you (*The Sunday Mail*, May 13, 2018).

Chemist Ncube, the survivor from the Nhari-Badza rebellion, in an article published on September 4, 2016 says the "boys in the bush" have always been treated as third-class citizens:

War is not a joke guys. The Rhodesians were ruthless but we soldiered on. They called us the boys in the bush. The ill-treatment of these boys in the bush started then and continues up to this day.

Up to this day, I don't mince my words, we are treated like third class citizens. The Rhodesians are better treated than us. They got higher pensions. Mistakes were made but those mistakes were part of the war. We learnt our lessons as the war progressed and the leaders were supposed to address the challenges we brought to them.

Remember I am talking about a time when I was around 21-24 years. I could have gone to school. I left my family in a deplorable situation. I come back and find them still in that same situation. I am a prisoner. The High Command let us down. The unfortunate thing is that most of the comrades who were involved in this are no longer with us.

Hondo chips in saying:

Now ndiri chiseko chenyika (I am a subject of riddle). Some people actually say "uyu haasi comrade (this one is not a comrade)." I am happy that most of my comrades still respect me. If I meet vaChiwenga today (Vice-President Chiwenga), he greets me saying shef and in return I respect him. Dai takapinda in Zimbabwe tirisu tiri pamberi (if we had gotten independent with the fighters at the front) some of the things happening now wouldn't be happening.

The struggle was hijacked. It was hijacked by people like Tongogara, Robson Manyika, Rex Nhongo, Kangai and others. I remember some of the comrades from Wampua College singing songs saying "tinoona vakuru vedu vachipedza nguva vachirwisana (we see our leaders wasting time fighting against each other)." It was bad. I am not bragging here, but I was more popular kumauto kudarika Rex Nhongo (among the fighters than Rex Nhongo). Ask any comrade. They will tell you. All this that was happening was meant to eliminate us.

I did nothing wrong. I freed these comrades from prisons in Zambia, only for them to turn against me. I had power when Tongo was in prison and if I was power hungry I could have imposed myself. I can safely say 85 percent of what I did was correct. If I was not in Mozambique when these comrades were under arrest in Zambia, ingadai struggle yakafa and inga dai ZANU yakafa (the struggle would have died, ZANU would have died). I was the most senior commander in Mozambique at that time. I have nothing to regret.

I am the one who opened several bases in Mozambique. I am the one who appointed most of the commanders to these bases. Without me the ZANU operations in Mozambique would have failed to kick off. I have no reasons to be bitter and no reasons to regret anything. History will judge me (*The Sunday Mail*, 11 December, 2016).

In an article published on August 12, 2018, Mabuto says Zimbabweans may as well forget about the fighting forces.

Zimbabweans are enjoying themselves and have shown us that we don't matter. They may as well not even remember us. We don't need to be remembered, but we are proud of what we did for this country. There is a generation that has been brought up to hate war veterans and to think we are just nothing, it's all good and fine.

We are very proud of the little we did. Hope when the time comes, this generation will do even bigger things for its country. Whether they remember us or not, it's up to them. We will die as a proud people. Like I told you, maybe it's some future generation that will enjoy the benefits of what we did and will remember us.

They will remember that there was a war to liberate this country and thousands of people died. They will remember that we fought for nothing — no pay, no salary — but just the need to liberate this country.

Dominant discourses by former nationalists that glorified the roles they played during the liberation struggle complemented by praise texts by the willing commissar intellectuals have downplayed and in some instances completely ignored the narratives of the former fighting forces. The dominant discourses have

presented the former nationalists as faultless revolutionaries, yet this study has established that this wasn't the case. These nationalists were human and they made several mistakes that derailed the liberation struggle. In addition, they made deliberate moves and took deliberate decisions to "Other" the former fighting forces.

As the author of the column, *Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga*, the researcher made interesting observations during the interviews. First, some comrades who went to the liberation struggle around the early 1960s and early 1970s, like Shadreck Gatula, Fox Adolphus, John Makwasha, Chabudaishudhu Kufahakuurayi, Kenny Ridzai and John Pedzisa were clearly not very comfortable that the interviews were held at Defence House, which houses the Ministry of Defence and War Veterans. For example, Kufahakuurayi and Gatula occasionally asked whether they should speak openly on all issues. Sometimes, some of the comrades would openly say "we can't talk about that issue now, let's leave it for another day." This was despite assurances by presidential spokesperson, Charamba and senior war veterans like Norman Bethune and Joseph Khumalo that the intention of conducting the interviews was to record the country's history correctly and so all comrades were free to speak the truth.

Judging from the uneasiness that some comrades showed during the interviews, one can justifiably conclude that these comrades chose what to remember and what to forget as memory and memorialization is a power game (Halbwachs, 1980). The researcher in a bid to ensure the interviews continued and cognizant of the political economy at *The Sunday Mail*, would not push the former fighters to speak on these "sensitive issues." Most of the interviews were loaded with emotions as the former fighters wept uncontrollably narrating horrific events from the liberation struggle.

The researcher had to make sure that after these emotional breakdowns, the interviews continued and this required treating the former fighters firmly but cautiously.

On the other hand, the comrades who participated in the Nhari-Badza rebellion like Chemist Ncube and those who were part of the Vashandi rebellion like Elias Hondo and David Todhlana spoke frankly on all issues. For example, Hondo would remind the researcher that “I respect vaChiwenga because of the office he now holds and he respects me as one of his senior commanders from the war”. (At the time Constantino Guvheya Chiwenga was still the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces).

What was even more interesting was the fact that when Jimmy Mangwende came for the interviews at Defence House, Chiwenga and Perence Shiri (who was still commander of the Air Force of Zimbabwe) came from their offices to greet him as their “shaf” (boss) from the war. In turn, Mangwende greeted Chiwenga and Shiri as “vakomana vangu” showing the mutual respect.

What was even more interesting is the observation that some of the ZIPRA comrades who were interviewed at different locations away from Defence House, showed much freedom to express themselves. Comrades like Peter Scotch, John Mbedzi, Soft Magarasadza and Conary Mabuto were interviewed in their own environments and one could see they spoke without restrictions. However, all the former ZIPRA comrades clearly showed that they were not comfortable talking about the shooting of the Viscount 1 and Viscount 2 towards the end of the liberation struggle. The shooting of these two Viscounts led to the death of many white civilians and this seemed to gag the former ZIPRA commanders from

speaking openly about what exactly transpired. Again in such instances, due to the sensitivity of the issue and the political economy of *The Sunday Mail*, the researcher could not force the comrades to speak much on the issue.

Through their discourses, the former fighting forces have constructed a past, generated a collectively shared present in a bid to pass on their historical social identities into the future. Unfortunately, as Byrnes (2012:1) asserts: “We can never re-create the totality of the past – this is an actual impossibility. We can only work with those pieces that remain.”

5.5 Conclusion

This Chapter thematically presented and analysed the findings of the study. Four recurring themes were identified which show that ethnic and generational contestations during the Second Chimurenga started in the early 1960s and violently erupted in subsequent years, leading to the derailment of the liberation struggle. It was also thematically established that the ethnic and generational contestations spilled into post-colonial Zimbabwe. Chapter 6 serves as the conclusion to the research.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

This chapter serves as the conclusion to the study. The intention of this research was to examine ethnic and generational contestations coming out of the liberation war narrative in *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga. The research also sought to examine the forces behind the contestations and to establish who, in the midst of the contestations, are emerging as patriots of the liberation struggle. Although the research was extensive and representative in covering former fighters from the different generations during the liberation struggle, in examining the selected interviews not everything that was narrated was taken as it is.

The study utilized a qualitative research which according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000) is a scientific research that systematically uses a predefined set of procedures to answer a question by collecting already existing evidence. A Qualitative research approach was more appropriate for the study as Bryman (1984) notes that this approach is effective in obtaining culturally specific information about the values, opinions, behaviors, and social contexts of particular populations.

The study deployed archival research. Archival research involves primary data held in archives, special collections library and other repository (Punch, 2005). This study gathered data from selected interviews that were published in the weekly newspaper.

The study examined interviews from 18 former ZIPRA and ZANLA forces who participated in the liberation struggle from the early 1960s up to the attainment of

independence in 1980. The interviews were published in *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga from October 2015 up to August 2018.

The study in terms of theoretical casting was grounded in collective memory fused with patriotic history. In addition, post-colonial theory was also used as a theoretical framework. Collective memory as propounded by Halbwachs (1980) was utilized as this is a practice in which social conceptions about a common past are used to build and maintain togetherness and group identity in the present and for the future. On the other hand, patriotic history was used as Ranger (2009) asserts that it is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition. Post-colonial theory was deployed as the silencing of the former fighters by former nationalists has “Othered” them from nationalist historiography.

However, this study was not without its limitations. For example, in terms of data gathering the use of archival research was appropriate but could have been buttressed with fresh interviews of some of the former fighters. This would have allowed the researcher to get deeper and targeted responses to explain some of the contestations.

In addition, the other limitation is that in Zimbabwe there are many newspapers competing to re-write the history of the liberation struggle, but this study only focused on *The Sunday Mail*. While this is understandable considering that *The Sunday Mail* is the only local newspaper that has consistently published interviews by these former fighting forces, the study would have been enriched more by spreading the research wings to other publications.

Also, while the researcher is reflexive, the fact that he is the one who interviewed the comrades under study poses some challenges. Issues to do with the neutrality of the researcher can come into question. Despite the limitations, the study came up with findings that are set to challenge what Byrnes (2012:3) observes as “Big History.” This is the history which according to Ndlovu-Gatseni (2009) has been deployed by the new black oppressors to make it appear as if they own the liberation struggle.

Below I summarise the findings thematically.

Fighters as pawns: The genealogy of contestations between fighters and politicians

The study established that the contestations between the fighters and politicians started way back in the early 1960s. What gave birth to the contestations was the fact that the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU in the early 1960s, treated the fighting forces as pawns in a bid to get the attention of the OAU. As a result, these politicians sent ill-prepared and ill-equipped fighters into Rhodesia.

The consequences were devastating as most of these fighters were either captured or killed by the Rhodesian forces. From the onset of the liberation struggle, this created mistrust and suspicion between the fighters and the politicians. Throughout the liberation struggle, the contestations would intermittently erupt further delaying the attainment of independence.

“This revolution does not belong to the people of Shurugwi”: Tipping point of ethnic clashes

The study demonstrated that there were ethnic contestations between ZAPU and ZANU and within these two parties and their armed wings ZIPRA and ZANLA. Between ZAPU and ZANU, the clashes were between Shonas and Ndebeles and these clashes played out even among the fighters at the war front.

Within ZAPU, the study established that there was discrimination against Shona comrades forcing some Shona fighters to cross the floor to ZANU which was seen as a party for Shona people. Within ZANU, there were ethnic contestations between Zezurus, Karangas and Manyikas. These contestations caused serious divisions within the fighting forces during the liberation struggle.

Misunderstood and mishandled generational contradictions: Rebels that never rebelled

The study established that the Nhari-Badza rebellion and the Vashandi rebellion were generational contradictions that were not handled properly by the ZANU leadership. The Nhari-Badza rebellion pitted young but senior commanders who had operated at the war front for a consecutive three years against the politicians who were stationed in Lusaka. As for Vashandi rebellion, the study established that this was a generation clash between the old guard in ZANU and the new and educated recruits who wanted to change the party’s ideology and approach to the war.

These two rebellions exposed the fears of the politicians in ZANU and the ambitions of the young cadres in the party. The politicians feared that the young and educated commanders wanted to “steal their war” while the young

commanders became too ambitious and lacked patience as the attainment of independence became imminent. The study established that the generational clashes led to the deaths of many comrades in ZANU and the arrest of 72 comrades.

“When the absence became the presence”: The great betrayal

The study demonstrated that as independence beckoned, the politicians in both ZAPU and ZANU conspired to push the fighting forces to the periphery. The first plot was at the Lancaster House talks in 1979, which the fighting forces say were used by the politicians to seek relevance. The other plots were that towards the attainment of independence in 1980, in ZAPU, the politicians started bringing in new faces that had not fought the war while in ZANU, senior commanders were sidelined through arrests.

As a result, soon after the attainment of independence it appeared as if the politicians are the ones that owned the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatseni, 2009). However, this study has demonstrated that the politicians deliberately “Othered” the former fighters, leading to the negative attitudes against war veterans.

6.1 Recommendations for future research

My study observed the ethnic and generational contestations coming out of the liberation war narrative in *The Sunday Mail* column, Chronicles from the Second Chimurenga but there remains scope to interrogate more of the contestations from the ZIPRA perspective. This is because the majority of the selected interviews were from former ZANLA comrades.

Also a gap remains with regards to examining the ethnic and generational contestations from the narratives of the female fighters. So far, the dominant

discourses, regarding the women who participated in the liberation struggle portray women as unworthy victims whose story revolves around issues to do with rape and abuse.

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