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AN EXAMINATION OF TACTICS USED BY ZANLA TO PROMOTE THEIR
IDEOLOGY AND AGENDA FOR THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE. A CASE
STUDY OF MUZARABANI (1972-1979)

By

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APPROVAL FORM

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DECLARATION

I, Thelma B Bomani, hereby declare that this dissertation is my original work which has never been submitted to any university. All sources used in this dissertation which is not mine have been acknowledged to show that it is the work from other scholars in accordance to copy right law. This is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree in History and International Studies offered by the Midlands State University.

Thelma B Bomani

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June 2018

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family.

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There are a number of individuals who are worthy to be acknowledged in the completion of my degree. I would like to expose my sincere gratitude to **God**, the **Most High** for the gift of life, equipping me with knowledge and aptitude for pursuing this degree, without Him, I would have died an ordinary person.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
DC	District Commissioner
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
INTAF	Ministry of International Affairs
JMC	Joint Military Command
LC	Liberation Committee
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDP	National Democratic Party
OAU	Organisation for African Union
PCC	Peoples Caretaker Council
PF	Patriotic Front
PVs	Protected Villages
STIs	Sexual Transmitted Diseases
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN	United Nations
VOZ	Voice of Zimbabwe
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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GLOSSARY

Chitinyani –	A walking pass given to young men from 18 years and above in Centenary during the colonial period.
Chimbwido -	Errand girl.
Chimurenga –	A Shona name which mean to fight or “revolutionary struggle”.
Dare reChimurenga –	A ZANU war council that led in the confrontation with the Rhodesian colonial regime as part of the Second Chimurenga.
Gandanga –	A wild savage person. This was a name used by the Rhodesian regime, mostly in their printed and broadcast material in order to denigrate freedom fighters.
Keep –	“Protected Villages”, where people were moved into a fenced area protected by the guards during the liberation struggle.
Mujibha –	Young men who acted as spies and messengers for the freedom fighters.
Pungwe –	Night rallies that lasts through the night.
Selous Scouts-	Horrible special unit of the Rhodesian army that was formed in 1973.
Vana mukoma –	Brothers, freedom fighters.

ABSTRACT

ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU, one of the two liberation movements that led the Zimbabwean liberation war. The ZANLA forces adopted the Maoist “fish and water” doctrine along with the Mao’s principles of People’s War in their contest against the Rhodesian army. The reason why the ZANLA cadres choose this warfare strategy was obviously to come out triumphant against the Rhodesian super forces. Guerrilla warfare was adopted for the need of the continued survival of the guerrillas, a prerequisite for realization of a preferred goal. This study examines tactics used by ZANLA forces that guaranteed their survival and victory against the Rhodesian forces in Muzarabani. These include an alliance between the ZANLA forces and the rural civilians as well as the unconditional revolutionary support from outside the country. The study also looked at the counter insurgency operations which the Rhodesian government deployed as a way of avenging and retaliating to the ZANLA warfare strategies and tactics as well as its effects on Muzarabani. The researcher used published books such as those projects written by Hushim Mbita and Fay Chung. They talked about how ZANLA cadres survived during the war of liberation and also the books written by Mao Tse Tung which analyse the main characteristics and strategies of a people’s war. These books gave the researcher a clear understanding of the reasons why the ZANLA forces adopted the guerrilla warfare. The dissertation used qualitative technique as a methodology of the study.

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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

This research study is based on an examination to understand the tactics which were used by the ZANLA cadres to promote their ideology and agenda for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The reason for thinking about the topic under investigation arises from the writer's experience of growing up in Zimbabwe, encountering many people who were actors as well as victims of Zimbabwe's war of liberation and being involved in the literature that brings about Zimbabwe. Even though the country is called Zimbabwe at the present moment, this research study will use the term Rhodesia which was the official title during the period that is mostly talked about in this research.

Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was a multifaceted combination of Communist Ideology, Black Nationalism and racial liberation that sought to do away with colonialism. The white minority government had exploited power through a tribal system of discrimination in all realms. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were formed in 1961 and 1963, respectively, advocating for an end to white rule. These two ideas moulded the pillars of the liberation agenda, that is, the black majority rule and the reallocation of land to the black people.

The ideological perceptions which the guerrillas adopted during the Liberation Struggle were drawn from the Maoist "fish and water" doctrine, which stresses that there should be a cordial alliance between the masses and the guerrillas. Therefore, during the liberation movement the ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres were responsible for various orientation sessions. In this case, ZANU and its military wing, ZANLA will be used. The masses were introduced to the nationalist ideologies through Political Commissars which would politicize and indoctrinate the masses through music and dances, slogans, drama, pungwes (all night), media through Radio Mozambique, coercion and some demonstrations to mention a few. The general black

populace were agitated to support the revolutionary movement popularly known as the Second Chimurenga, despite of some harsh and brutal orientation sessions which were used by the guerrillas upon their fellow black people.

In addition, the guerrilla forces also worked through the support of other countries outside Africa, the Organisation for African Union (OAU) Liberation Committee and the Frontline States. They also worked through the support of the rural civilians. Their bases and camps which were stationed close to the villagers for easy supply of food, clothing and clean water. The liberation fighters also relied deeply on individuals such as chiefs and spirit mediums, as well as young men and women known as the mujibas and chimbwidos respectively who acted as spies and informants, thus war collaborators.

This study, therefore seeks to review various methods used by guerrillas to promote their agenda and ideology which was rooted from Maoism, Communism and Socialism. Their merits and demerits will be critically analysed.

The Rhodesian security forces and the ministry of internal affairs (INTAF) will also be examined taking into account the roles they played to disrupt guerrilla tactics and activities. The study will also address feelings of other scholars who looked in this area of study, who are referred to as conservative socialists.

Statement of the problem:

The Zimbabwean war of liberation was a long struggle characterised by extensive bloodshed and suffering. However, the guerrilla victory is argued to have emanated from the implementation of ideologies adopted from Maoism, Socialism and Communism. Therefore the researcher aims to:

Examine the tactics that were used by ZANLA to promote their ideology and agenda for the liberation of Zimbabwe and their overall contribution to their victory.

Objectives of the study

1. Identify and trace the origins of ZANU and ZANU ideologies
2. Examine the tactics which were used by ZANLA guerrillas to promote their ideology and agenda in Muzarabani during the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe.
3. To explore the different strategies used by the Rhodesian security forces and the ministry of internal affairs (INTAF) to counter guerrilla activities in the country.

Research Questions

The stated problem will be resolved by finding the answers to the following specific contributory questions:

- 1) What were the guerrilla ideologies
- 2) What methods were used to promote ZANLA ideology and agenda in Muzarabani during the liberation struggle?
- 3) Which roles which were played by other countries to help ZANLA cadres to promote their ideology and agenda.
- 4) What role did the Rhodesian security forces and the ministry of internal affairs (INTAF) play to disrupt guerrilla activities in the country?

Historical Background

On 11 November 1965, the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith declared Rhodesia, Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain. This political act of insubordination convinced the Africans that the only way to accomplish majority rule was through “the barrel of the gun”.

This view is collaborated by Young who suggested that, the Solicitor General of Britain, Sir Dingle Foot, gave an approval to Africans to resort to armed struggle when his response to UDI was that the African population had been denied all human rights and all means of political expression.¹ Thus, the situation was now set for an advanced level.

The nationalists were not sure about the nature of war that was to be waged in fulfilment of the political agenda that was the attainment of black majority rule, multiracial Zimbabwe as well as leading to fair redistribution of resources amongst its inhabitants. The nationalists expected that acts of sabotage and isolated attacks on remote white farms would pressurize Ian Smith government to opt for a peaceful settlement that would address the concerns of everyone.

These acts of sabotage worsened the situation and failed to produce the decisive action from Smith regime. The nationalists later believe that all that was necessary was to train and arm a few guerrillas and dispatch them back to Rhodesia to scare the whites and subsequently ignite a wave of civil disorder by the blacks.² On the other side, the Rhodesian forces, anticipated the outbreak of war and responded by sending military observers to Vietnam and Kenya to study counter guerrilla warfare strategies. Chingono therefore suggested that at the outbreak of war in 1966, the Rhodesian forces were far more ready and equipped for armed struggle than the freedom fighters that had little or no prior knowledge about this game.³

From 1968 to 1972 ZANLA adopted a strategy of a protracted war, beginning with the political education and mass mobilization, in order to build a sound logistical base to sustain future guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia. By 1972, the political and tactical situation had radically changed in favour of the Maoist guerrillas. It has to be pointed out that the insurgent activities of the early 1970s was indeed a bitter experience of what had happened earlier which led to the revision of nationalist tactics and approach, which enabled the local black people to adopt guerrilla 'hit-and-run' attacks.

As will be revealed in the research below, it is not the strength and superiority of ZANLA forces that regulated the outcome of war. The qualitative change that was recognised by the adoption of Maoist principles and strategies by the liberation fighters and its successful implementation coupled by the failure of the Rhodesian forces to comprehend the true nature of the war they were engaged in, should be credited for the final outcome of the war. After the

Altena battle, the nationalists made a balanced calculation of their military situation. According to Gann, they made an equally pragmatic assessment of the regional and International environment and embarked on a realistic strategy aimed at bringing the Rhodesian economy to a standstill and shattering the whites' will to resist.⁴

Literature Review

In this section the researcher discovered the related literature of what was printed out by various intellectuals and academics on the tactics used by ZANLA to promote their ideology and agenda during the Liberation Struggle. A literature review therefore gives the researcher some guidance. It inspires, informs and helps one to generate his or her own ideas. This means that in research one needs to depend on existing knowledge in order to come up with new knowledge.

There has been an increase of literature that has been written on the liberation war in Zimbabwe by scholars such as Young, Lyons, Lan, Kriger, Bhebe and Ranger among others. This study has revealed some gaps concerning the methods used by the ZANLA cadres to promote their ideology and agenda during the Zimbabwean war of liberation in Muzarabani area. The discourse has attracted a lot of research interest and attention by many writers. However, what is disturbing is the absence of scholarly work on the tactics used by the ZANLA corps during the liberation war. The published scholarly literature on this research study focuses on different areas neglecting the guerrilla tactics in Muzarabani. For instance, Mbita did very well on the roles which was played by the OAU liberation committee and Frontline states to support ZANLA cadres.⁵ Ranger mainly focused on rural peasants.⁶ Martin and Johnson researched on the attacks of defenceless women and children at Chimoio and Tembwe.⁷ Nevertheless they ignored the part of the "guerrilla orientation sessions," specifically in Muzarabani.

Lyons holds that the history of the war had been told from a male perspective because women's participation in the war is not appreciated.⁸ Chung brought in a different perception suggesting

that freedom fighters relied on young men and women known as the mujibas and chimbwidios respectively who acted as spies and informants.⁹ The political mobilization of the rural population by the liberation fighters emphasized the cruelty and brutality of the colonial forces and colonial injustice that severely troubled the African population.¹⁰ It was largely at pungwes (night gatherings) that the liberation guerrilla fighters conducted political mobilization of the rural peasants. This amplified the military successes of the liberation fighters especially the ZANLA forces. The propaganda of the nationalist liberation forces was therefore effective because it was crafted in such a way that it fitted in with the expectations of the rural people who were yearning for the removal of the unjust colonial system.¹¹ Nevertheless, many scholarly work pertaining the Second Chimurenga, deserted the discourse of the ideological orientation methods which were used by freedom fighters in Muzarabani.

During the war of liberation, the use and range of violence to intimidate Shona-speaking ethnic groups inside Rhodesia was deliberately systematic and extreme, to the extent that it constituted 'a political language'. Thus, the masses were introduced to the nationalist ideologies rooted from Maoism, Communism and Socialism through music, drama, pungwes (night vigils), slogans, Radio Mozambique and some demonstrations mostly through force and intimidation. As has been said, the experience of ZANLA cadres in the liberation war was brutalisation to enforce solidarity and 'discipline' amongst the masses.¹² Kriger coincides that a significant part of the mobilization by guerrillas involved force because of the contradictory plans of peasants.¹³

Staunton notes that while independence and sovereignty created a conducive political environment in which writers could document about politics, the liberation war narrative writers did not quite have the freedom to write about the negative aspect of it.¹⁴ She argues that though writers now had the freedom to write about the guerrilla war they understood that their freedom went to a certain point.¹⁵ This is a clear indication that the writers did not have the

freedom to explore and write about the negative side of the liberation war. They have written what was positive in the ears of those in authority, fawning the war and nationalistic cadres as most of them wrote at a time when the nation was celebrating the new Zimbabwe. They therefore feared to be viewed as anti-revolutionary where Chiwome clearly states that “the fear was real”.¹⁶ This simply shows that the writings were therefore to romanticize the war and not to expose the negative aspects of the war, therefore it is one sided. From the above evidence, it is defensible that most literature was one-sided which compels this study to close the gap by enlightening other areas of the liberation war.

Tagwirei pops in with another revelation to this study as he talks of the “Significant Silences” whereby literary texts are prevented from speaking pertinent issues by the discursive contexts in which they emerge.¹⁷ This clearly shows that most fiction circumvents certain features leaving the actual implication of the matter. One silence which obviously needs to be examined pertains to the ideological orientation sessions used by ZANLA cadres to orient the masses during Zimbabwe’s liberation war in Muzarabani. Therefore this research is going to address this gap by highlighting the ideological orientation methods used by guerrillas to orient the masses during the liberation war which are not given in the existing literature.

Bhebe and Ranger notes that there is much literature about soldiers and what transpired during the war but very little is known about the experiences of those people who did not go to the war front which freedom fighters relied upon for support in bases and camps, for the easy supply of food, clothing and water as well as the mujibhas and chimbwidos who acted as spies and informants.¹⁸ This research argues therefore that the history of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe cannot be complete without an examination of the tactics used by ZANLA cadres to promote their ideology and agenda during the liberation war in Muzarabani.

The researcher noticed that there appears to be a huge gap in Zimbabwean literature in terms of research that focuses on the tactics used by ZANLA cadres to orient the masses during the liberation war in Muzarabani area. Therefore the researcher was compelled to have a deeper and extensive research on this study so as to come up with a detailed research on the matter.

Sources and Methodology

Diverse methods were used to obtain information in order to come up with a balanced and factual product as it will be precarious for the researcher to use one method to assemble data because all different techniques have their strengths and weaknesses. The researcher used oral and primary sources of information such as interviews and questionnaires to collect data. Secondary sources of information such as textbooks, journals, newspapers were also of great importance in this research.

Meyer and Eccles postulates that an interview is a conversation in which the interviewer questions the interviewee in order to get information.¹⁹ Interviews can be formal or informal, and can be conducted one on one, in groups or face to face. Thus, an interview is a dialogue where questions are asked and responses are given. Interviews usually involve a transfer of information from interviewee to interviewer, which is usually the primary purpose of the interview, although information transfers can happen in both directions simultaneously. The researcher had interviews with the villagers of Centenary, Dande and Chadereka communal areas. Interviews were very useful to obtain comprehensive information about personal feelings, perceptions and opinions pertaining the tactics which were used by the guerrillas to orient the masses during the Liberation Struggle. Through oral interviews the researcher was able to collect first-hand information which was grounded on real experiences and interpretation on the events of the war.

Questionnaires were also used as a data collecting tool. Questionnaires were designed and administered in both close and open ended format and were administered to villagers and

farmers who witnessed and participated during the Second Chimurenga. Francisco asserts that, a questionnaire is a way of eliciting the feelings, experiences, beliefs, perceptions or attitudes of a sample of individuals.²⁰ Thus, questionnaires were used to gather responses from Muzarabani residents who were involved in the Liberation Struggle. Respondents were made aware of the purpose of the research by explaining to them the topic and objectives of the study before they answered the questions. This was done to make respondents comfortable to answer questions knowing that it was for academic purposes only. The researcher self-administered both open-ended and close-ended questionnaires. The open-ended questions allowed the respondents to use their own words and therefore had the freedom of expression to say what they felt. However, because of the low literacy level in the community, the questionnaire was interpreted into vernacular so that project members would not have difficulties in responding. Close-ended questions on the other hand were faster to answer and results were easier for the researcher to analyse.

The use of secondary sources of information added to the in-depth analysis. Hox and Boeije define secondary data as data collected originally for a different purpose and is reused for another research question.²¹ The author used research papers, scholarly journals, books, official statistics and other archival material for the research. Secondary data was used to gain an in-depth understanding of the research question and to extend views on the study topic through interpretations and conclusions developed by others. The researcher also used other documents from ZANU PF Headquarters. Using secondary data was a cheaper and more accessible way of collecting data.

The research was therefore purely grounded on qualitative technique as a research methodology to capture the views and experiences of Muzarabani residents during the liberation struggle. This allowed for impressive data cases. The researcher used interviews which are formal and informal. Group interviews with both men and women were also crucial

especially at beer halls, parties and other social gatherings. The targeted people were the elderly and those people who witnessed the Second Chimurenga. These researches were of great importance in compilation of this study.

Significant of the study

The study is significant to researchers, students who shall use it in their review of related literature. The study will be important to the community who suffered long from victimization by bogus war heroes. It will be significant to policy makers as they shall remember the efforts of the struggle and therefore it is a need to let children learn about the struggle.

Dissertation Layout

This study will consists of four chapters which allow the research to explore the relevant issues in a logical, coherent and appropriate manner. Each of these chapters/sections should serve specific purposes as indicated below:

Chapter one addresses the historical review of ZANU and ZANU ideology.

Chapter two focuses on other revolutionary support for Zimbabwean armed struggle to promote ZANLA ideology and agenda.

Chapter three focus on Muzarabani and the tactics used by ZANLA to promote their ideology and agenda.

Chapter four will address the roles played by the Rhodesian security forces and the ministry of internal affairs (INTAF) play to disrupt guerrilla activities in Muzarabani

The last part will address the conclusion.

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CHAPTER 1: A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE ORIGINS OF ZANU IDEOLOGIES.

1.0 Introduction

This Chapter seeks to provide a historical review of the causes of the liberation struggle as all ZANLA’s ideologies and agenda, recruitment efforts and warfare must be understood in the

context of the prevailing social injustices, economic hardships and political turmoil suffered by the black majority in Rhodesia. The formation of ZANU, its military wing ZANLA and their political ideologies will also be looked at. The Chapter also search for the ZANLA's warfare and strategies as well as training and recruitment. ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces operations will also be highlighted in order to have a clear understanding of what transpired during the war of liberation in Zimbabwe.

1.1 Factors that led to the Zimbabwean war of liberation.

The Second Chimurenga came as a result of many factors, centred on the discriminatory policies of the White Settlers. The struggle was a result of joint grievances among the black Zimbabweans. The hatred of colonialism was witnessed through the formations trade unions, peasant and nationalist groupings, although there were suppressed by the Rhodesian government.

The land issue: The land issue dates back to 1890 when Cecil John Rhodes and the Pioneer Column came and quickly embarked on the expropriation of land from the Africans. This became the main vessel through which the Zimbabwean populace had to go to war against the Ian Smith government. In the pre-colonial Zimbabwe, land was an integral part of the social fabric as it is in today's world. Repressive laws were introduced to advance the needs of the settlers at the expense of the local black people. Alexander suggested that the creation of colonial was characterized by "repression and dispossession".¹ After making a land survey of mineral content and soil texture, it became obvious that Africans were to be relocated into dry, rocky and tsetse fly infested reserves. Thus the issue of land became the backbone of colonial resentment among the peasants and nationalist activists who wished to recover their land. Chung elaborates that in swap for support, nationalist fighters guaranteed the reinstatement of land to the civilians.² This indeed shows that the black people became enthusiastic participants

in expectation that they would regain their land. So putting real-world senses in play, land is the major player for all activities not only a dwelling place.

The 1930 Land Apportionment Act made it illicit for Africans to own land outside of the delegated “Native Reserves.” The government also passed legislation that ensured the prices of African-produced agricultural products could not compete with those produced on white farms. According to Chung, those fortunate enough to harvest a good crop were not allowed to sell it to the government-controlled marketing board.³ To worsen matters, all Africans were relocated into Gwaai and Shangani reserves which were not good for agriculture. Not even animals could endure this type of environment. To the African people this was unfair and they saw it as a wicked act and they couldn’t tolerate this for long.

Through the land husbandry act of 1953, Africans also lost their cattle. This act determined how many cattle the Africans should own yet cattle was regarded as the form of wealth and it was the language which the local indigenous people could understand very well. This act although on the other side was correct in the sense that they tried to conserve the land as well as protecting the land against overgrazing. The problem was that they did not involve the Africans on this issue and this created tension.

Racial Segregation in Social Amenities: Besides the land issue, Zimbabwe’s liberation war was a result of high unemployment. Throughout the colonial period, Africans had limited access to skilled jobs. Gann and Henriksen notes that a fairly number of Africans became educated but still faced widespread unemployment.⁴ Through this situation, some Zimbabwean residents voluntarily joined the liberation movement. Many people continued to walk in all corners of the cities in search of jobs but to no avail. The most nationalist fighters were therefore recruited amongst these frustrated unemployed and hungry people.⁵ Having this

scenario, the masses quickly embraced the guerrilla political ideologies and the mass mobilization policy from the freedom fighters, which they had to adopt during the war for the betterment of their living standards.

Housing problems in towns and cities contributed to the eruption of the Second Chimurenga. People lived in squatters and living conditions were very horrible. During colonial times, men were only allowed to live in towns because of the cheap labour they provided in industries, farms and mines. Tungamirai asserts that at work houses were racially distributed, no native was allowed to obtain town property in any white selected area. The police contacted night patrols in the workers houses to check on unemployed persons who might have been housed by their employed relatives.⁶ Tungamirai goes on to say that if the jobless returned to the country with his family, land was not to be easily owed to them since it was limited, even if it was obtainable clearly it was a very little piece and too deprived even for subsistence farming.⁷ With these ruthless colonial racist policies the Africans were left with no choice but to join guerrilla combatants in struggle against the colonial regime.

Educational system was also based on racial segregation that became a point of resentment that enabled the Africans to fight the colonial regime. African children were concentrated on very few and poor schools while whites were enrolled in group “A” schools such as Chaplin in Gweru. The then University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, now University of Zimbabwe only admitted whites. Succeeding governments had pursued a strategy of harshly limiting educational opportunities for blacks. Therefore, this system of racial segregation in education energised the Africans to join the liberation Struggle.

The oppressive legislation: Basically when the white settlers colonised Zimbabwe they drafted their constitution. These statutory instruments were segregating the blacks and mostly the laws were put in place to protect the interests of the whites. If an African broke any law the punishment was too severe. The use of sjambok became a norm. The blacks had no

representation in the parliament and their voices and concerns were not heard regardless of constant disasters that continued in their areas of dwelling. Force and intimidation were used against those who refused to comply with the whites or they could find themselves in trouble.

Political repression: this was another cause of the Zimbabwean war of liberation. It is understood that the Rhodesian colonial government restricted nationalist movements and political associations that were organised by the Africans. In Rhodesia, nationalism did not mysteriously appear on the horizon, it was a gradual phase of grievances that led to the dawn of African nationalism on the plateau. Africans had a lot of complaints they wanted equal opportunities to whites however, the pleas for transformation of black standards of living did not yield any result. The UDI of 1965 had made the connection or any association with the political movements illegal. The African trade unions of the 1950s were fervently suppressed by the Southern Rhodesian government. African Nationalist parties were strictly forbidden, for instance, the African National Congress (ANC), the National Democratic Party (NDP), ZAPU, the Peoples Caretaker Council (PCC) and ZANU.

All these African Nationalist parties and groupings were therefore dedicated to restore the indigenous African welfare. The Rhodesian government went on to arrest and detain the nationalist leaders for instance Joshua Nkomo was detained at Gonakudzingwa Restriction Camp in 1964 by Ian Smith's government. All the ZANU leaders within the country were detained at Sikombela near Que Que in 1965, where they issued the 'Sikombela Declaration', thereby giving the exiled ZANU leadership in Zambia and elsewhere the power to organise and direct the armed struggle. Hence, these all forms of political oppression and suppression generated much resentment from the Africans and eventually culminated into the liberation struggle.

1.2 The formation of ZANU

ZANU was formed as a breakaway party from ZAPU. Ndabaningi Sithole and others decided to form a new political party, ZANU, on 8 August 1963 in Highfield Township when Joshua Nkomo was in Zambia at the time others were incarcerated. Mazarire suggests that, its first People's Congress was held at Munhumutapa Hall in Gweru, Southern Rhodesia, from 21 to 23 May 1964.⁸ The Congress specifies how the masses should arrange and organize themselves for armed struggle. Mazarire further posits that, it was conveyed by what was thought to be ZANU's implementation strategy, a "5-point plan" that remains a top-secret up to this day.⁹ ZANU was banned again, however it has to be noted that, the Congress had already paved a way, for the liberation struggle to begin.

During that period of detention, the ZANU leadership issued a declaration of war against the Ian Smith government as non-violent and diplomatic negotiations by the colonial regime had failed to bring a favourable settlement to the Africans. The Central Committee now confined to Sikombela Detention center near Que Que, issued the "Sikombela Declaration" in 1965 thereby giving the exiled ZANU leadership in Zambia and elsewhere the power to organize and direct the armed struggle. Therefore, ZANU formed ZANLA whilst ZAPU would form ZIPRA.

Having well equipped with the Sikombela Declaration, the exiled leadership constituted itself into a 'Revolutionary Council' with Herbert Chitepo as the chairman and Josiah Magama Tongogara as the chief of defence. According to Tekere, the Council was initially composed of seventeen people, five of whom had direct military responsibilities.¹⁰ Revolutionary Council was later replaced by the Supreme Council or Dare ReChimurenga which was composed of eight members.

ZANU in Exile (Dare reChimurenga)

The nationalists who were not arrested by Ian Smith government crossed borders to wage the armed struggle from Exile. According to Sithole¹¹, members that constituted the Supreme Council in 1973 were:

- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Herbert Chitepo | Chairperson |
| 2. Mukudzei Mudzi | Secretary for Admin |
| 3. Henry Hamadziripi | Secretary for Finance |
| 4. Noel Mukono | Secretary for External Affairs |
| 5. John Mataure | Political Commissar |
| 6. Rugare Gumbo | Information and Publicity |
| 7. Kumbirai Kangai | Welfare |
| 8. Josiah Tongogara | Chief of Defence |

1.3 ZANLA Force

ZANLA was the military wing of ZANU which fought fiercely against Ian Smith government. This military organ was formed in 1965 in Tanzania soon after the Sikombela Declaration, although it was based in Zambia until the early 1970s. Hebert Chitepo led ZANLA until, 1972, he was later followed by Josiah Tongogara from 1973 up to his death in 1979. The command later fell to Robert Mugabe.

1.4 Political Ideologies

ZANLA drew its inspiration from the Maoist “fish and water doctrine”. The dogma stresses that there was the need to create a cordial alliance between the peasants and the military in order to realise military support. The idea of adopting the Maoist ideologies of war was to expose the ZANLA cadres to the Chinese experience of operating inside the enemy territory.

In line of this context, from 1972 onwards, the tide of the liberation struggle changed. Upon revising the Chinhoyi battle, the ZANU leadership saw that they had to change their routine. The first thing they did was to initiate a mass mobilisation policy using the principles of Mao


Tse Tung of “the masses are the water, and the guerrillas are the fish, without water the fish cannot survive.” According to Munyoro, political orientation was where the masses were taught the heartlessness of the Rhodesian regime and the ill-treatment of blacks.¹² Political Commissars were therefore responsible for politically orienting and directing the masses on the intentions of the war efforts. People were inspired to support the revolutionary force through Radio Mozambique, slogans, oratory speeches, influence from spirit mediums and Pungwe’s were they used songs and dances where masses were introduced to the nationalist ideologies as shall be explained in detail in the following Chapter. Through these orientation sessions, freedom fighters would win the hearts and minds of the people. The fighters also used the eight key points of attention to discipline the military leadership and troops in the field as well as to maintain good relations between the freedom fighters and the masses. This was commonly known as Nzira Dzemasoja.

1.5 Training and Recruitment

From the period 1964-69, ZANU relied on recruitment outside the country and this greatly affected the war. Martin and Johnson propounded that, both ZANU and ZAPU had difficulties in getting sufficient recruits, they therefore decided to employ a method once widely used by the British Navy, that of press-ganging.¹³ Bhebhe and Ranger argues that, the vast numbers of refugees who soon flooded ZANU camps in South Eastern Zambia and Mozambique made such methods unnecessary.¹⁴ However, some people voluntarily sneaked out of the country to join the freedom fighters. Sometimes these recruits were given orientation before being conscripted. Both men, women and children were recruited and given the same opportunities to handles rifles just like men.

During training, the guerrillas were strictly taught not to waste resources. Each infiltrating group would normally carry enough for its own needs. Accuracy was the most ZANLA’s important rules of economics. The order was, “One settler, one bullet”

Fig1. Showing ZANLA forces training in Mozambique.



Source: Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, Munhumutapa, Harare, 2017.

Training camps were located in neighbouring countries of Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania as well as China. In Mozambique the recruits were trained in major bases such as Chimoio, Nyadzonia and Tembwe. While in Tanzania, major bases were Mgagao, Nachingweya and Mboroma. The recruits were introduced into intensive training for a period between three and eight months. After completing military training the guerrillas were deployed to various provinces of the country where they fought against the Rhodesian Forces of Ian Smith. Nationalist leaders such as Edger Tekere, Ndabaningi Sithole, Solomon Mujuru and Rugare Gumbo were very influential in mobilising guerrillas, training and deployment.

1.6 ZANLA's Warfare and Strategies

As a military organ ZANLA arranged warfare strategies. Guerrilla Warfare was a major characteristic which Mao advocated for in People's war. They opted for guerrilla warfare because it is difficult to contain and economical to the communist fighter and expensive to the counter-insurgent. Amongst its tactics were the following,


“...divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy. The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue. To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around. Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible methods. These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy.”¹⁵

Guerrilla warfare was therefore a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants would use surprise attacks such as ambushes, raids, hit and run tactics to fight a larger force. Militants would attack their victims when they are least expecting. ZANLA combatants avoided direct military confrontation against the Rhodesian forces due to their numerical superiority.

Once inside Rhodesia, the guerrillas began operations from remote base camps close to villages. The freedom fighters relied on the mujibhas and chimbwido who would gather intelligence on security forces movements. The intention was to overturn discriminatory Rhodesian government and to secure a better life for Africans. Therefore, many people sensed guerrilla victory in future and came to comply and support the local guerrilla groups.

1.7 ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces operations

Fig 2. Showing the ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces operations



Source: H, Ellert. *Rhodesian Front war: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia 1962-1980*

ZANLA started its operations from Mozambique, with three provinces namely Tete, Manica and Gaza. In each province there were three battalions which had a provincial commander, a sectorial commander and then a section commander. Rex Nhongo commanded the Nehanda sector where Muzarabani is located which is the area under study. Mass mobilization go before military operations. By 1973 the guerrillas were now enjoying the full co-operation of the locals in Zimbabwe and the war began to spread like a veld fire. April 1974 Mozambique got independence thus opening the whole eastern border to ZANU infiltrations. ZIPRA operated from Zambia with three provinces namely Southern Region, Northern region I and II.

The Rhodesian forces on the other hand had their operating areas which were centred on the same zones as those of the freedom fighters as a way of countering the guerrilla activities. Operation areas like Hurricane, Thresher, and Repulse countered the ZANLA incursion from the Tete, Manica and Gaza provinces respectively. Tangent which was established in 1976 was meant to counter ZIPRA infiltrations from the Northern front 1 and Southern Front Region. Splinter countered ZIPRA forces from Northern front II. Grapple which was centred on the Midlands was responsible for any guerrilla incursions from both ZANLA and ZIPRA forces.

1.8 Conclusion.

Zimbabwe's war of liberation was a result of colonial resentment which haunted the Africans. It is through this turmoil that ZANU and its military wing ZANLA was born. Their recruitment, training, warfare and strategies were all channelled towards white settlers in Rhodesia. Through the "Maoist fish and water doctrine", guerrillas quickly recognised the need to politicized and indoctrinate the masses to realise military support. This chapter has been successful in bringing about the causes of Zimbabwean Liberation as all ZANU's ideologies and recruitment efforts, methods and achievements must be understood in the context of the prevailing social injustices, economic hardships and political turmoil suffered by the black majority in Rhodesia.

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CHAPTER 2: OTHER REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT FOR ZIMBABWEAN ARMED STRUGGLE TO PROMOTE ZANLA AGENDA AND IDEOLOGY

2.0 Introduction

As mentioned before ZANU emerged as a separate party from ZAPU in 1963 and it was banned by the colonial government on 26 August 1964 and its leaders were arrested and detained at Sikombela. The nationalists who were not arrested by Ian Smith government crossed borders and went to wage the armed struggle from exile. However they were not easily recognised by OAU who continued to view them as synthetic. This chapter therefore seeks to examine strategies that ZANU manipulated through these challenges to become recognised as an independent liberation movement around 1970s. The work of individuals and organisations that supported ZANU through diplomatic, humanitarian, military as well as financial roles will be closely looked at. Thus the roles of countries outside Africa, OAU liberation committee as well as the role of Frontline states will be discussed. ZANLA successes therefore lies in the unwavering support of the outside world.

2.1 Formation of OAU

The two opposing camps, the Casablanca (radicals) and the Monrovia (moderates) finally came to terms and agreed to draft a single charter towards African unity. On 25 May 1963, independent African states met in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa for launching the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Telli notes that, besides coordinating the affairs of African member states, the OAU was charged with a mandate of spearheading the liberation struggle in the territories which were still under foreign domination and eliminating colonialism altogether.¹ OAU wanted to dismantle colonialism over diplomatic- nonviolent means and armed struggle. Temu and Tembe concurs by suggesting that, for the liquidation of all forms of colonial oppression, Africa was pragmatically supposed to pursue the route of dialogue to negotiate the independence of African countries which were under foreign domination.² However, there

were sure that due to the nature of the colonial and racist situations, it was not possible to rectify them purely through negotiations alone. It is therefore obvious that the OAU preferred dialogue, but due to the nature of the colonial racist policies, supporting the armed struggle became an alternative.

The desire for the OAU to avoid bloodshed wherever and whenever possible is clearly specified in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1965 which states that,

“We have always preferred and we still prefer to achieve African liberation without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence, we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If, in peaceful progress to emancipate were possible, in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.”³

The use of force was therefore mainly applied when dialogue had failed, as it was the only weapon that could force the adversaries to the negotiating table.

2.2 The role played by the OAU Liberation Committee

The OAU Liberation Committee (LC) was set up as a political organ responsible for policy issues. Its specific task was to assess and evaluate the work of the liberation movements as well as budgetary matters. At international level, the LC were required to present the OAU position on the issues of the liberation armed struggle to the international agents like the Commonwealth, the non-aligned movements as well as the United Nations.⁴ It was also the source of funds to the liberation movements as it was responsible for sourcing financial assistance from all corners of the world. Mobilisation of local and international support for the liberation movements was also carried out by the LC. It was out of these LC efforts that many countries provided camps and trainings of freedom fighters as well as other forms of assistance. Therefore the LC greatly assisted the liberation movements against colonialism.

At first the LC agreed to cut off diplomatic and consular relations with South Africa and Portugal as well as to impose economic sanctions against them. A delegation was sent to the United Nations (UN) to speak on behalf of all African countries. According to El-Khawas, the new organization gave an impetus to move away from moderation and accommodation to confrontation and militancy.⁵ African representatives in New York were instructed to press UN for the adoption of the grievous possible measures against South Africa, Portugal and later Rhodesia as a protest of their solidarity. The time for appeasement was now over, forcible measures to induce changes became an alternative. Although the LC expressed their concern over colonised Africans, it has to be noted that, their efforts have not always succeeded.

The LC also get donations from individuals, organisations and friendly countries. The flow of resources was hinged on the way and extent to which the LC managed to propagate and popularize the liberation agenda. Countries that contributed most in assisting the armed struggle included the African countries, Communist countries and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). However, the uneven contribution towards the Liberation Fund limit the effectiveness of the LC in helping the liberation movements as the majority of African countries insisted that payments should be made voluntarily. Liberation Fund therefore depended on the willingness of governments to make contributions. The majority even refused to commit themselves to regular annual payments to the Liberation Fund.⁶ Hence, financial difficulties weakened the LC's ability to influence the course of the liberation movements.

Some individuals like Sam Nujoma, the former Namibian president testifies that the Executive Secretariat of the LC became the lifeblood of the liberation movements.⁷ Militarily, bases and training centres were established in independent countries that became the frontline states. All logistical negotiations were carried out by the LC. Relevant travelling documents for the nationalists' leaders and freedom fighters⁸ were also made available by the LC.⁸ This section

therefore seeks to look critically at the active involvement of the LC in the armed struggle for Zimbabwe.

There were two major liberation movements in Zimbabwe, (the then Rhodesia). These were ZANU which was headed by Ndabaningi Sithole and ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo. ZANU was formed as a breakaway party from ZAPU on 8 August 1963 in Highfield. ZANU and ZAPU had a bitter relationship which eventually affected the struggle through out. From its onset, ZANU was not considered to be an authentic liberation movement. Bukarambe suggested that one of the LC task was to support liberation movements which were detected to be the genuine.⁹ Nevertheless, the OAU Liberation Committee extended recognition to ZANU in 1966.¹⁰ The contradictions in the international solidarity movement, shaped by Sino Soviet rivalry, shaping ZANU in important ways throughout the liberation struggle. China even volunteered to support ZANU recruits in Tanzania.

The major challenge of the LC was to reconcile ZANU and ZAPU so that these two movements could form a united front. In 1963, a meeting was held in Lusaka. OAU appointed Malawi and Tanzania to mediate between the two movements. ZANU leaders showed up and agreed to discuss the matter while ZAPU rejected the discussion. In 1964 at Accra and in 1965 in Nairobi, ZANU expressed its enthusiasm to discuss the matter of a united front and ZAPU continued to be adamant. In 1966 ZANU even proposed for a Joint National Emergency Council at Addis Ababa. The prime reason for calling this meeting was the desire for ZANU to settle their differences with ZAPU and maintained their political parties as two separate entities, however, ZAPU precluded the proposal. From the above evidence, it is therefore justified to suggest that the LC played the most significant role in the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe. Their aim was to promote ZANU and ZAPU's ideology and agenda through a united front.

In 1969, the OAU heads of states appointed Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia to create a common front among the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. On 20 June the same year, three countries and the delegates of ZANU and ZAPU met at Tanga in Tanzania to examine a possibility of cooperation between the two movements, ZAPU refused once again. Hence, the efforts of the OAU unfortunately proved abortive.

ZAPU's arrogance towards unity need to be properly examined. Being the first vibrant liberation movement in Zimbabwe, it thought that it was the only legitimate movement. Therefore to ZAPU, ZANU had no rights or legitimacy to pledge negotiations or unity talks with it. ZAPU's attitude was therefore obviously a major obstacle for unity between the two movements.

In 1972, the LC make extra efforts to unite the two liberation movements. On 12 January 1972, ZANU and ZAPU leaders drafted a declaration intent aimed at creating a united front with an assurance to submit a joint agenda to the council. Temu and Tembu advances that a meeting of military and political leadership of both liberation movements was held under the auspices of the LC in Mbeya, Tanzania. At the end, both movements signed, in supporting of the formation of a "Joint Military Command" (JMC) in the presence of the Executive Secretariat. LC felt that the formation of the JMC, could be a positive road towards unity.¹¹ However, the LC noted that the leaders of both movements were still not willing to merge politically. All these efforts justifies the role which was played by OAU in support of ZANLA.

In 1973, the LC advised both ZANU and ZAPU to honour the Mbeya Agreement. In January the same year, the LC formed an AdHoc committee which consisted of Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Cameroon. This committee succeeded in bringing the two liberation movements to the negotiating table in Lusaka, Zambia. Finally, the two movements signed the Lusaka Agreement that maps out tactics for the liberation of Zimbabwe. According to Banana,

the formation of an umbrella organisation, to which all assistance from the OAU and well-wishers would be channelled, was the brainchild of the Frontline states.¹² The creation of the JMC was also advocated by the LC. Yousuf concurs that, the Secretariat was now ready to offer a collective training centre for joint trainings.¹³

From the day it was signed, the Lusaka Agreement was not implemented by both parties. In November 1974, Ian Smith and John Vorster tried to initiate a peaceful settlement in the country. African nationalist leaders were released from jail so that the Rhodesian government could discuss together with some heads of state the future of Zimbabwe. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the then ANC leader had held meetings with Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere and Seretse Khama at the same period. The result was the union of all liberation movements of Zimbabwe under ANC. Temu and Tembu argues that the union of parties therefore redirected the recognition of ZANU and ZAPU by OAU to the ANC, which was then regarded as the reliable representative of the Zimbabwean people.¹⁴ Despite of ANC recognition, it has to be pointed out that the LC only wanted to achieve a united front against the Rhodesian forces. These were some of the avenues which ZANU manipulated for overall victory.

Furthermore, the incarceration of ZANU leaders in Zambia did not led to the disintegration of ZANLA. Instead, ZANLA forces in Frontline zones were able to remain united. It was in this situation that a group of university freedom fighters were able to play a significant role in keeping ZANU and ZANLA united against the colonialist regime. Thus the university students, lecturers together with ZANLA cadres in Tanzania, issued the Mgagao Declaration in 1975.¹⁵ The LC addressed the Mgagao Declaration which solemnly stated that the guerrillas had the “right to die” for their country. Chung posits that the freedom fighters believed that armed struggle was the only way to win independence in the face of the Smith regime’s intransigence, and it ended with an appeal to the OAU and the Tanzanian and Mozambican governments to allow them to return to their own country to fight.¹⁶ Their petition did not go unnoticed. OAU,

together with the Frontline presidents, were to come round again to full support of the armed struggle, after a break of over a year.

2.3 The role played by Frontline States

The diplomatic task of the OAU in the then Southern Rhodesia has been carried out by the five frontline states namely Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. The liberation tactic of the frontline states shoots straight from the Lusaka Manifesto of 1965 as been stated earlier.

Most notably, the Frontline States offered asylum to the freedom fighters of Rhodesia that were operating in exile for security reasons as well as sanctuary for refugees. The nationalists who were not arrested by Ian Smith government crossed borders to wage the armed struggle from Exile. The ZANU Supreme Council (Dare reChimurenga) was formed in Zambia as well as the ZANLA High Command. Thus Zimbabwe`s freedom fighters aligned to ZANLA infiltrated the country from the welcoming zones of either Mozambique, Zambia or Tanzania, Botswana and Angola. Around 1976 when the war reached at the climax, many civilians crossed borders in fear of being killed. The Rhodesian counter insurgency methods killed, tortured and traumatised many civilians. As a result, many people ran and went to neighbouring countries (frontline states). Frontline states became a sanctuary for the refugees. El-Ayouty asserts that, the UN General Assembly requested the UN specialized agencies to increase their assistance to African refugees.¹⁷

The frontline states played major significant roles in promoting ZANLA ideology, agenda and majority rule in Zimbabwe. The military forces depended on guerrilla bases and training camps of the Frontline states. Training camps were located inside the frontline states. In Mozambique ZANLA recruits were trained in major bases such as Chimoio, Nyadzonia and Tembwe. While in Tanzania, major bases were Mgagao, Nachingweya and Mboroma. The alliance provided logistical support and training for guerrillas, medicines, weapons, food and clothes.

International aid from outside the region was also played an important part, but the Frontline states clearly carried the main burden in terms of capital and casualties.

Equally important, the alliance provided a diplomatic base for the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. In 1976, when tensions within the ANC escalated, the frontline states worked so hard so that they could be a credible leadership that would intensify the struggle against the Anglo-American initiative.¹⁸ On September 1976, they were able to impress ZANU now under Robert Mugabe to form Patriotic Front (PF) a political wing of Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). It was also the Frontline states who initiated the negotiating conferences that eventually led to the Lancaster House. According to Thompson, the Frontline states were able to mobilise African support through the OAU, and then wide international support for the nationalists, the frontline states was decisive in exposing the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Rhodesian Regime and its allies to establish a neo-colonial government of black leaders dependent on the white minority, rather than the African majority, for their power.¹⁹ She further says that, diplomatic support was given to the Zimbabwean nationalists throughout the various negotiations they entered during and after the war.²⁰

The formation of PF was a great achievement on the side of the Frontline states while Abel Muzorewa and other ANC members objected the formation of PF. Bishop Abel Muzorewa purported that PF was formed by the Frontline states, therefore, it did not represent the Zimbabwean masses. Temu and Tembu posit that, Bishop Muzorewa says that there was no real unity between ZANU and ZAPU, and that the formation of PF was a fictitious marriage of convenience between Nkomo and Mugabe.²¹ They further criticized the Frontline states for granting leadership upon the Zimbabwean people.²²

Moreover, Frontline states also kept the nationalists united in their demands. A well-known tactic in war is to divide and confuse the enemy. Ian Smith regime therefore often tried to take

advantage of historical differences amongst the nationalists, their differences ideology, tactics and tribal differences. However, the Frontline states helped the nationalists to find a common ground and find ways to present a united front to Smith which finally won the negotiated settlement. However, Smith's inability to divide the political leaders of the guerrilla forces Robert Mugabe (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) was an important factor in his defeat.

However, Sithole comes in with another dimension as he defines the idea of "frontlinestatism" as the "tendency for nations nearest a theatre of socio-political upheaval to want to get involved with the outcome".²³ Therefore, each Frontline state supported a particular liberation movement in the Second Chimurenga, most reliable and compatible with its interests.

It has to be noted that, Frontline states were not directly challenging international capitalism, as Western critics contended, the nature of the Zimbabwean economy was to be determined by the Zimbabwean people during and after the armed struggle. Rather, the Frontline states supported the national liberation, majority rule, sufficient state power to control national resources and supporting for parties not beholden to South Africa for achieving power.

2.4 Conclusion

ZANU survived and fought its armed struggle from external bases with a wide range of international support. Many countries gave sanctuary and training bases and camps to ZANU cadres despite the disunity and confusion among ZANU. Diplomatic talks and negotiations were all facilitated by the OAU and the Frontline states. Some African and outside governments failed and others grew impatient with ZANU. In the end, when all seemed conceivable as ZANU escalated the war in pursuit of final military victory, the freedom fighters still depended on a strong diplomatic initiative supported by its exiles. Therefore, with the support of other countries, inside and outside Africa, ZANU's ideology and agenda would have died a natural death.

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CHAPTER 3: MUZARABANI DISTRICT AND THE TACTICS USED BY ZANLA TO PROMOTE THEIR AGENDA AND IDEOLOGY.

3.0 Introduction

The chapter continues to explore how the liberation war infringed into Muzarabani area. The reasons why the Muzarabani residents joined the liberation war and the tactics used by ZANLA cadres to disseminate their ideology is also conferred in this chapter. Guerrilla operations in Muzarabani will also be revealed. The role played by influential personalities during the war of liberation will also be looked at as evidenced by multiple interviews that were conducted in the area.

3.1 Muzarabani district and the grievances of people

Muzarabani in some cases referred to as Centenary is a district which is comparatively flat and it is found along the Mozambique-Zimbabwean border in Mashonaland Central province in Zimbabwe. The area is divided into Muzarabani flat lands which encompasses Centenary and Chawarara and lower Muzarabani which comprises of Dande, Hoya and Chadereka. The original dwellers of the area were mainly people the Korekore ethnic group of the Shona. Before colonialism, people were sparse and scattered, and population density was very low.

However, the white settlers were attracted by the flat-fertile lands of the area, specifically the today Centenary. They quickly embarked on the expropriation of large pieces of land (Prazos) from the Africans. African reserve names were replaced by English names of white farmers. For example, Chami, Magirazi and Garapazuva reserves were replaced by Dannbutton, Prize and Butter farms respectively. People were relocated into mountainous areas like Mhene in Chiweshe, situated along Mavhuradonha Mountain which was a game reserve. People could not sustain themselves in those areas. They could migrate back to the farms in search of employment. Working conditions were very horrible and people could work for six months without salaries. In an interview with Muchina, he firmly said that,

Kwaiva nechikoro chimwe chete munzvimbo. One teacher ndiye aidzidzisa grade one to five. Zvekuti kana mwana akasvika kunana grade 5 aisafanira kuenderera mberi kusvika kunana grade 7. Aibva atoendeswa kubasa kuminda otanga kunhongeswa makonye mufodya nemucotton. Kungotanga kutoshanda chete, munhu aibva ave kutozvimirira. Izvi zvaireva kut munhu aive otopiwawo ration yehamper. But hamper yacho yaive isiri hamper inotoshamisira, taiyiwa Bakayawe rinovava, fish dziya dzekuMozambique dzinenge dzakachenuruka salt.¹

Translation

There was only one school in an area. One teacher could teach grade one up to five. When a child reached grade five, he was not supposed to proceed up to grade seven. He was then forced to go to work in white farms where they could pick bollworms in tobacco and cotton fields. When someone start working, he could be seen as an independent somebody. This means that a person could now receive a ration in the form of a hamper. But the hamper wasn't that too special, we were given briny *Bakayawe*, those whitish salted fish from Mozambique.

He further says that, when boys reached at the age of 18 years, there were expected to take a *Chitinyani* (walking pass) which was taxed at a stipulated period of time.² This greatly angered the Muzarabani residents. There were therefore ready to turn the clock back to precolonial era. However, it has to be noted that grievances differed from one area to another. In lower Muzarabani, although Muzungumwe was replaced by Adar Estates for whites projects, the people of Dande, Hoya and Chadereka, were not highly opposed to the colonial system. According to, Andrew Bomani, Dande was better than Chawarara and Centenary as the residents remain the owners of their own motherland despite of repressive laws that were extended to their territory.³ He further says that, he had a large portion of land deep in the Mavuradonha Mountain. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1953 was not thoroughly imposed as compared to Centenary. Their main problem was the absence of schools and clinics which were at a long distance. Many children remained backward and illiterate

According to Kamudyarewa, despite of the repressive laws and discriminatory policies that was extended to their territory Dande remained a home to Africans even during the colonial era.⁴ People had their own land, cattle and their way of life was not affected much by colonialism. However, it has to be noted that, it is the migrant civilians that influenced other people in the Dande region to rise against the Rhodesian government. Dande residents would migrate to areas such as Centenary, St Alberts, Chawarara and other areas in and around Mashonaland Central in search of greener pastures. White settlers became congested in Centenary around 1952 when the area was opened up for the production of tobacco. The quality of this tobacco made it a prominent growing area. Tobacco contributed to the development of roads, schools, clinics and township in the area. It therefore becomes an area of influence in the region that attracted many people.

These migrant civilians from Dande were subjected to abuse and torture in those white farms. There were also treated the same way as highlighted above. Such difficulties which emanated from the colonial administration greatly help to explain why the Dande civilians devotedly rallied behind the guerrilla fighters during the liberation struggle. In an interview with Rosemary Mudoka, after asking her why she supported the guerrillas against the whites, she said

Vanhu vaitosevenza kumapurazi uko, kunana Sendinari nekunana Sendi Arubheti waitobva kuno kuDande. Vaibatwa chibharo muminda mirefu yamabhunu yavaishandamo. Saka vakomana ava vakazouya vachionesa vanhu hupenyu, ndokubva vanhu vaona kuti zvauya nevakomana ava ndozviri *right*.⁵

This translate to say,

The people who worked in the white farms in Centenary and St Alberts, came from here, in Dande. They were being abused in those white farms where they worked. So these boys (guerrillas) came and made them realize that there were being ill-treated. Then the masses

saw that the boys had come with the right thing. (To fight and liberate the Africans from the colonial bondage)

Although Muzarabani had various grievances, the most important were ecological in nature. Through the imposition of the Native Land Husbandry Act, grazing lands for cattle were reduced. The extension of white farms reduced wetlands for gardening and dispossession of the right to hunt among others. Chakawa notes that, such grievances meant that the war came to a people who, for various reasons, were indifferent to the colonial system.⁶ On top of those grievances, what haunted most of the blacks was unemployment which was mostly centred on white farms. Most Africans were confined to unskilled jobs, therefore it became so hard for them to get better jobs in urban centres.

3.2 War and Muzarabani district

The liberation struggle war in Muzarabani area started in 1972 when freedom fighters penetrated into the Dande area. A group of *vana mukoma* led by Rex Nhongo and Mayor Urimbo crossed Mavhuradonha Mountain where they went and attacked the Altena Farm of Marc Borchgrave in Centenary on 21 December 1972. *Vana mukoma* proceeded by attacking Whistlefield farm and most importantly, they set a landmine on the road which was on the middle of the two farms. When responding to the attack, the Rhodesian Security forces detonated a landmine which killed and wounded many soldiers. This incident became a watershed of the war as it marked the decisive phase of the Liberation War.

Soon after the incident, all villagers in and around Centenary fall victims of the circumstances. Villages like Chapitura, Mhene and Chiweshe were taken to St Alberts Mission where they were to live inside the fence. There were tortured, harassed and reduced to mere animals. There were blamed of failing to report the existence of terrorists to the Rhodesian officials. Villages were later moved to the Zambezi valley where they were forced to live in concentration camps. This was indeed a slave yard.

The war later spread into the Dande area in 1974. Mudoka alluded that, it was in 1972 when the ZANLA guerrillas approached various villages in Dande region usually at night in which they introduced themselves as (Mangandanga) freedom fighters.⁷ The guerrilla insisted that migrant civilians who would go to Centenary, Chawarara and other areas in Mashonaland Central to search for job opportunities were not supposed to tell the soldiers (Rhodesian Security Forces) about their presence in the area.

Nevertheless, it was around 1974 when the Rhodesian soldiers heard the rumours about the guerrilla presents in the Dande region. They went on to the Dande residents, captured and tortured some of the civilians in the area so that they could expose where guerrillas were hidden. One day, as they came through the today, Muzarabani Growth Point, guerrillas had inserted landmines (chimbambaira) under the ground. As the soldiers drove off, the landmine explode and all soldiers died instantly. This incident brought the whole of Muzarabani into the war in 1974.

3.3 Tactics used by ZANLA cadres to disseminate their ideology agenda in Muzarabani

Muzarabani became visible to the liberation struggle simply because of its vicinity to the North-east border with Mozambique where ZANLA cadres had their major bases and camps. The Mavhuradonha Mountain and the dense forest provided a complimentary environment for the freedom fighters to wage and perform their guerrilla tactics and operations. In Dande, the freedom fighters used to camp in the bush where they had established their bases. There were several guerrilla bases in the Dande community. Munyoro notes that guerrilla bases were located in Muzarabani, Hoya, Chadereka and Chimoio (not to be confused with Chimoio in Mozambique).⁸ So in order to promote their ideology and agenda of the war, ZANLA had to politicize and indoctrinate the masses. Through Mao's principles of the "People's war", the guerrillas realised that there was the need to create a cordial alliance between the peasants and

the military in order to realise military support. They therefore initiated mass mobilization and political orientation. People were inspired to support the revolutionary force through a numbers of ways as shall be explained below.

Political Commissars

Political Commissar was a regulatory officer who was responsible for political education and organization of the party. In general, the military commander was assigned to further the political aims of the ZANU Dare reChimurenga, whereas the political commissar was charged to further ZANU's goals in the ZANLA. While the commander was assigned with military combat issues of commanding and directing troops in the war, the body of political commissars was in control of propagating the ZANU perspective in the ZANLA and endeavoured to retain absolute power of the party over the army.

Political commissars were therefore able to direct the ZANLA through the web of domestic political and military situations successfully, which often involved the shaping of military campaign amongst others. The role of political commissars became vital and at times decisive. According to Bhebe, nationalist fighters were taught to hate their opponents by the commissariat departments.⁹ Each political party had its own commissariat department, whose main task was to impart and to teach the new recruits the history of the party, who the leaders were, how the party was unique from the other rival party.

Political Commissars even crossed borders and went to the war fronts where they were responsible for politically orienting and directing the masses on the intentions of the war efforts. Chakamwe alluded that group of guerrillas including Urimbo, were sent secretly to the Zambezi Valley with the task of carrying out reconnaissance along the river from Feira on the border with Mozambique to Kariba.¹⁰

He further argues that Mayor Urimbo whose real name was Samuel Mamutse, who was a ZANLA Commissar and three others ultimately went into Zimbabwe to begin the war in Muzarabani district.¹¹ In Muzarabani, especially in Dande region political orientation was conducted. According to Munyoro, political orientation was where the masses were taught the heartlessness of the Rhodesian regime, Whiteman's discrimination against the black majority, how the whites had taken land from the indigenous people, the ill-treatment of blacks and for them to get out of this situation, they had no option but to fight on their own.¹² Therefore, it was through these political commissars that ZANLA was able to impart their ideology and agenda to the masses.

Pungwe's (Night Rallies)

Pungwes were revolutionary community gatherings that were used by liberation movements during the liberation war of Zimbabwe. They conducted ceremonies, music, dance, dialogue and feasting to bring people together so that they could discuss their thoughts of what their new country would be once they had attained the liberation war.

Traditionally, pungwes were all night rituals where people were linked with their ancestors through celebration and supplication. During the Second Chimurenga, when the freedom fighters needed a way to reach out to people, there were given permission by the Shona Chiefs and spiritual leaders to conduct pungwes. Thus, mass meetings were conducted usually at night by the guerrillas in Muzarabani where people were introduced to nationalist ideologies and directed to the intentions of the war efforts. Muchina notes that, during pungwes, people educated and enlighten each other about the war strategies.¹³ He further propounded that, in Rugare village in Dande region, pungwe meetings were compulsory.¹⁴ In this case night rallies were important in politicizing the masses to join the war. The night rallies therefore facilitated the establishment of the relationship between the freedom fighters and the masses.

Music

Music was a main genre that boosted and oiled the armed struggle through the messages that defined the liberation war. Every training camp in exile had a cultural guerrilla unit. Pongweni argues that, this cultural unit underwent military training and conscientisation as part of their preparation for war.¹⁵ Dick Chingaira Makoni who led the ZANLA choir is known for having composed many liberation songs.

ZANLA cadres promoted their political education and agenda through songs and dances. Chenjerai Hove concurs that, “the fighters always had something to say. When they had nothing to say, they had something to sing. When they had nothing to sing, they had something to dance.”¹⁶ Some scholars believe that Bob Marley’s music was an important source of influence with the lyrics that says “Emancipate yourself from mental slavery, none but ourselves can free our minds!”

During the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe, songs played a very significant role in unifying the guerrilla and the masses. Songs and dances were used to educate, inform and entertain as well as to preserve the morale of guerrillas and the masses. Guerrillas used songs and dances at pungwe gatherings to educate the masses about the intentions of the war. The songs of the struggle openly define the aims of the war. Mudoka says that, most of the popular songs that touched the hearts of Muzarabani residents were titled “*Nyika ye Zimbabwe*”, “*Sendekera mukoma Chakanyuka*” and “*Ruzhinji rwatsidza*”.¹⁷ According to Chung, songs that were popularized at night rallies were *Nzira yeMaSoja*, or the “Soldiers’ Guide”, which was a mixture of Maoist, Christian, and traditional values.¹⁸

Slogans

As speeches were given, no one was allowed to start a speech or even to start a song without chanting the standard slogan. Ravengai suggested that slogans were recited as:

“Viva ZANU
Viva
Pamberi nehondo
Pamberi!
Pamberi neZANLA
Pamberi!
Pamberi nekunzwisisa
Pamberi!
Pamberi nekubatana
Pamberi!
Pasi nevatengesu
Charira!
Kupiko?
KuZimbabwe
Pasi
ZANU
Iwe neni tine basa!
Icho!

This translate to say,

Long live ZANU
Long live!
Forward with the war
Forward!
Forward with ZANLA
Forward!
Forward with understanding
Forward!
Forward with Unity
Forward!
Down with sell-outs

The rocket has exploded!
Where?
In Zimbabwe!
Down!
ZANU!
You and I have together
Hear! Hear!"¹⁹

Such slogans were therefore used to capture the attention of the masses. Mudoka argues that slogans became a unifying force between the guerrillas and the masses as such slogans appealed so much to the heart.²⁰ In other words, slogans also became a tool which was used by the ZANLA cadres to promote their ideology and agenda as well as to fish out enemies who were at times not familiar with the jingle.

Coercion

ZANLA cadres could use force and intimidation to mobilise support. This is cemented by Martin and Johnson who suggests that both ZANU and ZAPU had difficulties in getting sufficient recruits, they therefore decided to employ a method once widely used by the British Navy, that of press-ganging.²¹ This therefore proves that ZANLA used coercion as a strategy to promote their ideology and agenda.

However, many Rhodesian agents like Flower and Parker has exaggerated the use of force and coercion by ZANLA. They ascribed force and coercion as the key instruments which were used by ZANLA to promote their agenda and ideology during the liberation struggle. Kriger concluded that the freedom fighters used violence as the instrument to bring the rural masses on their side.²² Oral testimonies which the researcher acquired from Muzarabani testifies that, peasants were reluctant to occupy positions in guerrilla structures because those positions made

the civilians more vulnerable to Rhodesian punishments. However, they still supported the liberation war.

Rhodesian government popularised the propaganda which asserts that the liberation fighters were terrorists. Nevertheless, there has not been any robust evidence to support this claim. The Rhodesian Selous Scouts committed horrible atrocities in rural homes in the guise of freedom fighters. The support was therefore willingly given to the freedom fighters with the full knowledge that the guerrillas were children who required such support and benevolence from the masses.

Media

For effective means of military communication, ZANU employed a radio station called The Voice of Zimbabwe (V.O.Z). At early stages of the war, ZANU relied on extensive help from Tanzania and Egypt. It was used as a tool for political education and consciencisation of the masses by enabling the party to publicize its agenda and political goals as well as to communicate possible changes of the struggle with their every so often illiterate followers.

It has to be pointed out that the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe came at a time when the latent propaganda by the radio in Africa was on the increase as radio ownership mounted. Mosia, Riddle and Zaffiro suggested that, during the Cold war period, Radio Moscow began regular transmissions to Africa by attacking colonialism.²³ This made many Independent African states to join radio war. Many independent countries made their radio services available to those political movements recognised by OAU to liberate themselves. ZANU therefore became one of the major beneficiaries amongst others.

Hopkins and Mansbach propounded that, Tanzania stated to aid nationalist movements in Southern Africa as one of its aims in foreign policy, together with Ghana and the Nasser

Regime in Egypt.²⁴ By 1967, the ZANU's were broadcasting from Zambia in both the Ndebele and Shona languages. However, President Kaunda stopped the Zimbabwe broadcasts, following a bloody battle in Lusaka over ZANU leadership.

However, Mozambican independence of 1975 rescued ZANU operations. From March 1976, with the help of FRELIMO government, Maputo became the heart of ZANU broadcasts. According to Mosia et al, Radio Mozambique gave VOZ 30 minutes per day, between 8:00 and 8:30 pm.²⁵ Kangai and Ndhlovu notes that VOZ was propelled "for the purposes of explaining the plight and suffering of the Zimbabwean masses under the yoke of colonialism and racialism, to mobilize public opinion and support for our cause from friendly countries, organizations and individuals."²⁶ VOZ therefore conveyed news bulletins on the struggle, revolutionary songs, speeches and reports, so as to mobilise the masses to support the guerrillas in order to defeat the Rhodesian government. Richard Hove and Eddison Zvobgo were amongst the VOZ staff.

It was a prerequisite for each guerrilla unit to have a radio. ZANLA forces in Muzarabani therefore was provided with continuous information which they would provide to the masses. Kamudyarewa even testifies that, in Dande area, during the pungwe gatherings, people could be given some few minutes to listen to the VOZ.²⁷ However, Mosia et al suggested that, Zvobgo believes that VOZ targeted the fighters mostly, that the general audience broadcasting.²⁸ Mudoka concurs that there were few radios in Muzarabani area.²⁹ There was also limited information on programming available to rural listeners even if they had radios. Discovering the frequency was also a difficult, along with the weak signal versus the much robust RBC signal. Whatever way, VOZ played a significant role in promoting the ZANLA agenda and ideology.

The creation of Wampoa College. (Chitepo School of Ideology)

The Chitepo Ideological School, which was formerly the Whampoa Ideological College, was the brainchild of Chrispen Mataire, who was the first director of the school set up in 1975 to run wartime leadership and Marxist-Leninist studies. The ideological college was named after the death of Cde Hebert Wiltshire Pfumandini Chitepo who was the Chairman of ZANU and the Dare reChimurenga. It is believed that he was murdered in a callous act by the Ian Smith government. It was therefore under the Hebert Chitepo's wardenship that ZANU sought to disseminate its ideological foundations and bring clarity in the party about the logical bedrocks upon which an independent Zimbabwe would be built.

New ZANU recruits were enrolled and indoctrinated with the Communist ideologies. Political Commissars were taught tactics and techniques of disseminating the ZANU ideologies. Therefore, the Chitepo School of ideology played the most significant role in promoting ZANLA ideology and agenda.

The significant of an ideological College in independent Zimbabwe was projected in the Section II of Mwenje 2. It also plays a full part in mobilizing and educating the masses in the new tasks of economic development and nation building this really shows that the Chitepo Ideological College was a critical opponent to the assurance of the success of the revolution.

3.4 Individuals and their provisions to the armed struggle

Both men and women, children and the elderly were all united in one cause. Spirit mediums, chiefs, mujibha and chimbwidos became the source of both power and support to the ZANLA cadres. There were indeed agitating for black majority rule.

Spirit Mediums.

African Traditional Religion held a special position during the liberation war. Quite a number of cadres who went to training and who eventually went to the war front attribute their participation in the war to the spirit of Mbuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi, Chpfeni, Chidyamauyu and others. Before she was hanged, Nehanda had made a prophecy that her bones would rise again. Her words and spirit motivated many people, particularly peasants to rise up and fight the Rhodesian government. In the early 1970s when the military struggle had reached the climax, ZANLA commanders had to persuade the traditional religious leaders to support their struggle. The main duties of spirit mediums evolved around the recruitment exercise, mobilization as well as giving the spiritual guidance.

During the 1970s, the spirits of spirit mediums were therefore revived. The spirit of Nehanda continued to play a significant role in mass mobilization in the Dande area of Mt Darwin. It has to be pointed out that the peasants had shifted their allegiance from their chiefs, who were seen as puppets of the Rhodesian governments. ZANLA guerrillas, who always sought for long-term co-operation with the peasants, persuaded the spirit mediums to support them. Once the children, the boys and the girls in the area knew that Nehanda had joined the war, they came in large numbers. Chakawa concurs that support was further increased when the spirit mediums of Chiwawa and Chiwodzamamera joined the war.³⁰ Thus, with the help of the spirit mediums, the guerrillas were able to carry out their ideology and agenda to politicize and to recruit the masses.

Some of these key religious leaders were persuaded to follow the guerrillas into Mozambican bases as well as Zambian training camps to provide spiritual and ideological leadership for the armed struggle. Gogo Tariwiwa Shawu's interview with Munyaradzi Huni, narrates how ZANLA comrades came to Tsokoto and took Mbuya Nehanda to Chifombo in Zambia.³¹ This was a decisive move in terms of gaining popular support, especially from the peasants which constitutes about half of the freedom fighters

The spirit mediums often gave warnings against imminent attacks the following day. Fish eagles (Zvapungu) symbolised an impending attack. Guerrillas were therefore advised to vacate their bases before they were attacked by the Rhodesian forces. Guerrillas were also advised to do traditional prayers using leaves from Munondo tree before going to the battle as well as upon returning from the battle. However, Chung says that at times spirit mediums could give false alarms to the people. This greatly made many people to lose their trust in the mediums.³²

However, it need to be noted that, during training in Tanzania and Mozambique, there were no teachings concerning ATR. What were importantly emphasized was the Maoist “fish and water doctrine” which stresses that, there was need to create a cordial alliance between the peasants and the military in order to realise military support. Guerrilla Warfare which was a major characteristic of Mao People’s war was also emphasized during training. Nevertheless, seeking guidance from the spirit mediums was not just a matter of political pragmatism but was induced by the strong feeling that it worked.

Mujibhas and Chimbwido.

At home, young men and women were employed as mujibha and chimbwido respectively during the armed struggle. There were both informers as they acted as intermediates between the masses and the guerrillas. Their major roles included informing the freedom fighters on the whereabouts of the Rhodesian forces as well as aiding the guerrillas to organise pungwes where the masses were introduced to guerrilla ideologies. Nilsson argues that, the youth acted as liaisons among the civilian population and the combatants as well as among groups of combatants in a particular area.³³ Thus the mujibha and chimbwidos served in the armed struggle as the eyes and ears of the ZANLA combatants.

Rosemary Mudoka and Alice Gunduza who experienced the armed struggle as chimbwidos who lives in Dande area stressed the relevance of chimbwidos when they said that the mobilisation process and organisation of the war became possible through the help of chimbwidos and mujibhas.³⁴ They further argues that it was impossible for the freedom fighters to win the war without spiritual, physical and moral support from the locals, taking into consideration the superiority of Whiteman's weapons. Urdang suggested that in revolutionary war situations there is often no defined front line and both men, women and children can come directly under attack.³⁵ Thus, the stereotyped image of men going off to war and women staying home away from the conflict has to be radically revised.

It can therefore be concluded that, the victory of the armed struggle in Muzarabani should be ascribed to the support of both men and women who contributed immensely to withstand the pressure of the liberation war from 1974 to 1979 when the country was at the climax in fighting the Rhodesian Security Force. The analysis of the roles carried by both young men and women revealed through oral testimonies in this chapter that these roles were significant for the success of the armed struggle in Muzarabani.

Conclusion

The survival of the ZANLA forces can be attributed to the support and active participation of civilian population in the war. The motivation to support the armed struggle by the people of Muzarabani was a product of mass mobilisation steered by the ZANLA cadres. This resulted in the voluntary donation of food and clothing and clean water to the cadres by the rural populace. The prime objective of ZANLA cadres in choosing this type of warfare was to come out victorious against the better armed Rhodesian forces. This study have examined tactics which were used by ZANLA to promote their ideology and agenda that in turn guaranteed their survival and victory.

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CHAPTER 4: RHODESIAN COUNTER INSURGENCY AND ITS EFFECTS IN MUZARABANI

4.0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to unveil the forms of counter insurgency operations which the Rhodesian government deployed as a way of avenging and retaliating to the ZANLA warfare strategies and tactics. The Chapter further highlights the effects of Rhodesian counter insurgency strategies and how the consequences have shaped the lives of Muzarabani residents.

4.1 The nature of the Rhodesian counter insurgency in Muzarabani

The independence of Mozambique in 1975 became an added advantage to the ZANLA cadres. The freedom fighters were heated up and the war was intensified. The Rhodesian security forces responded by employing their counter attacks which they have learned in Kenya and Malaya. Hoffman et al argues that, although they mastered the art of counter insurgency operations- because of their racist policies, they were never able to win the campaign for the hearts and minds of the black Africans, a prerequisite in any guerrilla campaign.¹

In order to separate the fish and the water in Muzarabani area during the liberation war, the Rhodesian government embarked on a number of horrible and repressive strategies. The civilians became vulnerable as both sides depended on them for military support and overall victory. According to Muchina, the Selous Scouts resorted to coldblooded beating up of *mujibhas* and *chimbwidos* in Dande, Hoya and Chadereka areas for collaborating with the freedom fighters.² All people who were suspected and accused of being spies and informants of guerrillas were punished as they exposed the whereabouts of the Rhodesian Security Forces in the area. The main aim was to instill fear amongst the civilians so that they would withdraw their support from the guerrillas as the fish could not survive out of the water.

The Rhodesian security forces could release the dogs at the civilians if they happened to hide the information pertaining to the movement of the freedom fighters. According to Kamudyarewa, on one occasion the security forces tracked the guerrilla shoe steps to Tapera homestead in Sowe village and began to beat up the family members who were denying having seen the freedom fighters in their homestead. The parents were tortured and whipped in front of children.³ Such a shameful treatment shows the aggressive and undignified features of the Rhodesian counter insurgency strategies. However, it has to be pointed out that these punitive measures which were employed by the Rhodesian government, only served to intensify the war.

Even more irksome, the Rhodesian bureaucrats resorted to burning of villages in Centenery, Chawarara, Bwazi, Dande and Hoya communities during the armed struggle. Rosemary Mudoka recapped that the deaths of seven Rhodesian security forces in 1976 when their car exploded after they drove over a landmine near Sowe village brought disaster to the people who lived in the locality.⁴ A number of soldiers invaded the village and committed horrible atrocities among the villagers. Several homesteads in the village were set on fire and the family members were taken to Protected Villages PVs in Chadereka for torture. The occasion also brought the people to severe anguish through electrical shocks. Thus the brutalization of the civilian population became prevalent during the Second Chimurenga. This was the case in Muzarabani where the civilians were tormented by the Rhodesian strategies.

In addition, the Rhodesian officers resorted to destroying public services as a way of punishing and starving both the civilians and the liberation fighters. Mudoka propounded that the Rhodesian security forces embarked on dismantling boreholes within the Dande community to deny the freedom fighters who lived in the bush access to water.⁵ The security forces had to monitor the boreholes and outlawed the people to use the boreholes after 6 pm. Destruction of

wells in Dambature and Nyakadukutu was the order of the day. This was indeed a tough time for the civilians as they fall victims of the circumstances.

Some villagers could have their livestock's confiscated by District Commissioners (DCs) upon failure to raise cash to pay fines. In an interview with an elderly woman in Sowe area under Sabhuku (headman) Dzomupepa, after asking her why she supported the guerrillas against the whites, she said,

Taisungwa maoko nemakumbo muzukuru, tokandiwa mumatarakita amasoja. Taibva taendeswa kumakipu ku Chadereka uko aive akakomberedzwa newaya iya yeminzwa, aive akachengetedzwa namagadhi. Pakutanga taigariswa pamwechete takasangana nevanhurume. Haauiwa, zvakapisa tsitsi mwanawe nazvino ndikazviranagarira, moyo wangu unotambudzika kwazvo.⁶ (*She started crying*)

This translate to say',

Our hands and feets were tied together my grandchild, we were then thrown into trucks. We were moved into the keep (PVs) in Chadereka, it was a fenced area sheltered by the guards. At first, we would stay together with our male counterparts. It was such a disgrace my child, even if I remember that, my heart bleeds. (*She started crying*).

The Rhodesian forces later realized that the most imperative factor that sustained the guerrillas was the support from the rural population. An attempt to separate the guerrillas from the masses was undertaken. The Rhodesia government embarked on forceful relocation of the people into the PVs or 'keep'. It was implemented in a desperate attempt to separate "the fish from the water". Bhebe noted that Protected Villages started in 1973, uprooting peasants.⁷ The primary purpose for creating the PVs was to cut off the guerrilla-civilian interaction. According to Mazambani, PVs were established to eradicate African nationalism.⁸ They really wanted to starve the fish as it was so hard for it to survive outside the water. Mazambani and Mashingaidze postulates that protected villages were constructed to cut off the guerrillas and deny them of civilian support.⁹

The PVs were also established under the Rhodesian propaganda that is, it was to defend the rural populace from the raiding ‘terrorists’ (guerrilla fighters). In Muzarabani, PVs were at Chimoio, Hoya and Chadereka. The PVs were guarded by a force called the Guard Force. The Guard Force earned a reputation for brutality in the PVs. DCs were authorized to impose ruthless punishments on villages suspected of assisting guerrillas. This was indeed a hard time for the civilians.

In Chadereka, PVs were made up of metal which were not even suitable for human beings to live in, considering the high temperatures of Muzarabani. The picture below shows the nature of the PVs that were established in Chadereka, Muzarabani.

Fig 3. Showing metal PVs in Chadereka, Muzarabani.



*The remaining structures of metal PV in Chadereka, Muzarabani.
Source: (Picture taken by Thelma Bomani)*

In addition, Mazambani notes that, PVs were designed to stem the tide of nationalism by cutting off the guerrillas from food and shelter and isolating them from the people.¹⁰ This resulted in a prolonged and vicious contestation between the freedom fighters and the Rhodesian forces as

they tried to control and influence the Africans. Mazambani further posits that, this led to an intensification of militarism and violence which adversely affected children who were caught up in the middle and the crossfire.¹¹

However, it has to be noted that, peasants continued to support the guerrillas by providing food, clothes, intelligence and moral support, even after being forced into PVs as noted by Manungo.¹² Even though various attempts were undertaken to develop PVs, the lack of finances, manpower, political constraints, as well as the underestimation of the guerrilla strategies led to the Rhodesian early death. People could sometimes sneaked out of the PVs to give the guerrillas food. Mudoka says that, in spite of the difficulties which people faced in PVs, the masses did everything they could to assist the guerrillas.¹³ She further testifies that, she usually put some small bags of mealie-meal inside a bucket and then pour manure on top so that the Guards would think that there were going to the garden, while she was going to give guerrillas food.¹⁴ Colonial Historians like Brand would like to ignore the fact that many PVs were always attacked by freedom fighters and that guerrillas moved in and out of PVs, further averting and reversing efforts made by the Rhodesian government. This was witnessed mostly in Hoya and Chadereka. Hence, by introducing the PVs, it can be concluded that the Rhodesian forces dug their own grave leading to their demise. Therefore, colonial historians like Brand wrote the history of PVs from a colonial perspective to justify their establishment and also portray them as humanitarian centers to assist the vulnerable people.

According to Mazambani, Colonial historians were themselves often colonial sympathizers and therefore they mainly viewed PVs as humanitarian centers established to assist Africans who were abused and harassed by terrorists during the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe.¹⁵ In actual fact, colonial historians wanted to justify the creation of PVs and advance the notion that the African people and children were safe inside PVs.

Furthermore, as the liberation movement was at the climax, civilians started to move in large numbers into neighbouring countries. To curtail this, the Rhodesian officials implemented the strategy of cordon sanitaire along the border with Mozambique and Zambia like the one along the Israeli border with Lebanon and Syria. Unfortunately, the Rhodesians did not have adequate financial resources to maintain it. Having limited resources, the idea failed again, as movement of people across the borders remained unhindered.

Rhodesian forces also embarked on bombing and attacking of external operations were bases were suspected to be. This was designed to disrupt control of the guerrilla forces, and to disturb logistic supplies and training courses in the camps. In Mozambique, the Rhodesian Forces attacked ZANLA camps with refugees in Nyadzonia and Chimoio in 1976 and 1977 respectively. Many people died and some were brutally murdered. This incident even hardened the guerrilla hearts who continued to fight for their independence.

From 1976-78, when the war was at its highest peak, it is alleged that biological and chemical weapons were used. According to Martinez, the Rhodesian security forces, farmers and officials urged the government to impose firmer and swifter methods of justice on the “terrorists”.¹⁶ Mangold and Goldberg argues that in the late 1970s, the techniques that were used were, spreading cholera, poisoning wells, infecting clothes used by the “terrorists” and using anthrax to kill cattle, thus denying food supplies to the guerrillas.¹⁷ They further suggested that, chemists and doctors from the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were recruited by the CIO and asked to identify deadly chemicals that could be used against the freedom fighters.¹⁸ The Rhodesian government used fatal toxins for example Ricin, Thallium, warfarin, Parathion and anthrax bacterium. Around 1975, it is believed that clinical trials were performed on humans, which was indeed a great crime against humanity. The aims of the Rhodesian officials was to reduce rural support as well as lowering the morale of the guerrillas.

On the issue of media, the Rhodesian government also introduced counter measures to attack the VOZ. They employed divide and rule tactics in their broadcasting operations. Tribal differences and leadership vendettas between the Shona and the Ndebele were worsened by the RBC reports. This greatly affected the masses. To make matters worse, the Rhodesia government also set up a Radio Mthwakazi which was a Ndebele radio station. Their main aim was to tighten the Shona-Ndebele ethnic violence, and to redirect them from the struggle for liberation. However, the RBC reports fell on deaf ears as the liberation war became increasingly intensified. Mosia et al notes that, Instead of helping the Rhodesian Front to deflect opposing points of view and upsetting the political information, RBC policies may actually have increased doubts in listeners' minds about regime policies and claims of success in "the war against terrorists".¹⁹

One mistake which was made by Ian Smith government was the failure to introduce equal political reforms that would accommodate the views of nationalist black leaders. Racial prejudices barred the Smith regime from sightseeing realistic alternatives to the decision of the Rhodesian conflict. As a result, the Rhodesian whites missed a chance to bring the hostilities timely on their terms. The Rhodesian forces won almost every battle. However, their failure to recognize the nature of the warfare they were fighting, as well as the failure to identify the centre of the tension, led to a settlement sympathetic to the freedom fighters.

4.2 Effects of Rhodesian counter insurgency methods in Muzarabani

The Rhodesian counter insurgency methods had a multiplicity effects on the civilian population. Operational Hurricane was introduced by the Rhodesian forces to counter ZANLA incursions from Tete Province. Muzarabani area was so much affected as it became the playground of both the soldiers and the guerrillas. As a result, environmental, psychological and physical effects were encountered.

In 1973, the Hoya Bridge which connects Chadereka Ward 1 and Kairezi Ward 23 of Muzarabani District was bombed by the guerrillas during the armed struggle. It provided a path for Rhodesian forces as they went to attack guerrillas undergoing training in Mozambique. Freedom fighters and FRELIMO forces bombed the Hoya Bridge because it enabled the Mozambican bases vulnerable to attack. Freedom fighters had employed other alternative routes to cross to the other side. This greatly angered the Rhodesian forces who were now ready for war. As a way of revenging, the Rhodesian forces came and attack the Dande region. Many civilians lost their lives. This incident affected the local people psychologically and physically.

Fig 4 showing the remnants of the Hoya Bridge in Muzarabani.



The scrap of what used to be Hoya Bridge before it was bombed by freedom fighters.

Source: – Innocent Makawa, The Herald. 10 February 2018.

Although the destruction of the Hoya Bridge was a strategic move during the war, it greatly affected people's way of life up to this day. The cutting off of the Hoya Bridge that links Chadereka and Kairezi is a major problem for the two communities as they have to cross Hoya River in search of a number of several services. School children from Kairezi used to go to Chadereka for school. If the Hoya Bridge is flooded, the Kairezi people cannot go to the clinics in Chadereka, instead, they have to go to Mt Darwin which is too far. Brighton Tauro argues

that, “I was born hearing stories of how the Hoya Bridge used to work. I do not really understand how a structure of such importance to the armed struggle can still not be working up to now”.²⁰ From the above evidence, it is has been justified how the destruction of the Hoya Bridge affected the inhabitants of the area up to this day.

To worsen matters, Rhodesian soldiers went on to throw bombs at Kahungwe in Dande in 1976. This move had detrimental effects amongst the civilian population as well as the environment. Many people were killed and injured. Some were even crippled and this affected their lives up to this day. Mudoka testifies of a man whom she refused to expose his name for ethical reasons, who survived out of this menace. Sadly, he was affected to the extent of becoming infertile up to this day. She further estimated that about 21 families of the area were destroyed and forgotten.²¹ From the above evidence, it can therefore be said that the Rhodesian counter insurgency methods greatly affected Muzarabani.

Women inside the PVs were forced into sexual relationships with the DCs. Those who refused were accused of being the wives of the terrorists. This made women more vulnerable as they had no choice except to do what pleases their masters. Nhongo-Simbanegavi maintains this when she said that Zimbabwean women have been subjects of military disputes in the past but never before in the history of the country had their bodies used as a terrain for military and political contestation.²² This greatly shows that the PVs were not “Protected” zones as portrayed by the Rhodesian government. Instead they remained slave yards which mistreated women in Muzarabani.

It needs to be pointed that women were forced into sexual activities by situations that were beyond their control. Women were voiceless in expressing themselves. This leaves one justifiable for noting that sexual violence troubled women who could not rescue themselves. It

has to be noted that, sexual violence violates women and human rights. The Programme of the Research and Advocacy says:

“Forced concubine is a situation in which women are coerced into a sexual partnership with a man and or compelled to perform the wifely duties expected by the partnered male...it occurs predominantly, but not exclusively, in areas of conflict, whether violent or non-violent...it is a gross violation of human rights which must be prevented, and, if it occurs, must be investigated and punished.”²³

What was occurring inside the Keeps was human rights violation at its highest level. Sexual abuse inside PVs played a key role in the destruction of marriages. The end results of these sexual abuses were evidently STIs and unwanted pregnancies. Women fall preys of the circumstances. Various married women were divorced by their spouses and there were labelled prostitutes. According to an elderly woman in Chadereka who refused to be exposed her name for moral reasons, she supported the above claim when she said that she do not even know the father of her second born child, as she had many sexual encounters with different men during that time.²⁴ This greatly affected the inhabitants of Muzarabani area. Those effects are even haunting the residents for the rest of their lives.

In addition, violence has many destructive psychological and physical effects on the residents. Victims of violence also experienced effects such as headaches stress and abnormal pains. As human beings, they were affected brain injury, paralysis, fractures, traumatic stress disorders and many other psychological and physical effects. What makes this research pertinent is the fact that there was no —Truth and Reconciliation Commission, like the one established in South Africa, which gave victims a platform to share their war time experiences. Although the Herald through the Second Chimurenga files is trying to uncover some of the aspects by interviewing, both active and passive participants of the war, it has to be noted that, the interviewee tend to narrate only the bad side, leaving the other side. Also, they might end up leaving some important information when trying to safe guard their own interests.

Children were also robbed of their childhood needs. Muzarabani area also suffered church neglect throughout the late 60s to the 80s, since it was a hotbed of the liberation war for Zimbabwe due to its close proximity to the freedom fighter's bases in Mozambique. This gave rise to a large number of sects and venerations, which dominate the area. Many people who are mostly Korekore practice traditional ancestral worship and are said to be possessed by the baboon spirit. During summer, some of the people of the Muzarabani area brew alcohol from the masawu fruit, which they offer to appease the baboon spirit. They also beer brewing to sell or simply for entertainment during social gatherings. Nevertheless, from 2010 there was a tremendous change as different churches started to open up in the area, for example, Operation Mobilization (OM) International in Chimbuwe and Matemakungu villages in Hoya area. However, it has to be highlighted that, where there is war, there is no development.

Conclusion

As a way of responding to ZANLA tactics, the Ian Smith government adopted a radical counter insurgency strategies. The Rhodesian government portrayed African nationalism not as a local political phenomenon, but as an outer instrument of Communism. When Rhodesia faced a protracted insurgency, they therefore employed counter insurgency warfare which had disastrous effects amongst the civilian population of Muzarabani. The Ian Smith government viewed ZANLA guerrilla warfare as separate to domestic politics. Smith's counter insurgency did not have a realistic political dimension. The Rhodesian officials were blinded to the vital need to win the souls by applying timely policies of political pacification and modification to its counter insurgency effort, instead a campaign of maximum force was pursued. Such a campaign accelerated the deterioration and leading finally to the political victory of guerrillas in 1980.

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CONCLUSION

The research has explored the tactics used by the ZANLA cadres to promote their ideology and agenda for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The ideological perceptions which the guerrillas implemented during the Liberation Struggle were rooted from Maoism, Communism and Socialism. ZANU adopted Mao's principles of Peoples War along with the Maoist "fish and water" doctrine, which stresses that there should be a cordial alliance between the masses and the guerrillas. The masses were introduced to the nationalist ideologies through Political Commissars which would politicize and indoctrinate the masses through music and dances, slogans, drama, pungwes (night rallies), media through Radio Mozambique, coercion and some demonstrations to mention a few.

The study had revealed that the general black populace were agitated to support the revolutionary movement popularly known as the Second Chimurenga despite of some harsh and brutal orientation sessions which were used by the guerrillas upon their fellow black people. They also worked under the cover of the rural populace, bases and camps which were established in the close proximity to the villagers. Freedom fighters also relied heavily on young man and women known as the mujibas and chimbwidos respectively who acted as spies and informants, as well as individuals such as chiefs and spirit mediums. The motivation to support the armed struggle by the people of Muzarabani was a product of mass mobilisation steered by the ZANLA cadres. The survival of the ZANLA forces can therefore be attributed to the support and active participation of civilian population in the war.

In addition, the guerrilla forces also tactfully endured through the support of other countries outside Africa, the OAU Liberation Committee and the Frontline States. ZANLA survived and fought its armed struggle from external bases with a wide range of international support. Many countries gave sanctuary and training bases and camps to ZANLA cadres despite the disunity and confusion between the ZANU Dare reChimurenga and the ZANLA High Command.

Diplomatic talks and negotiations were all facilitated by the OAU and the Frontline states. Some African and outside governments failed and others grew impatient with ZANU. In the end, when all seemed conceivable as ZANU escalated the war in pursuit of final military victory, the freedom fighters still depended on a strong diplomatic initiative supported by its exiles. Therefore, with the support of other countries, inside and outside Africa, ZANU's ideology and agenda would have died a natural death.

The Rhodesian security forces and the ministry of internal affairs (INTAF) embarked on radical counter insurgency strategies as a way of retaliating to the ZANLA mobilisation tactics. The Rhodesian government portrayed African nationalism as terrorism as well as an outer instrument of Communism. The counter insurgency warfare which was employed by the Rhodesian forces had disastrous effects amongst the civilian population of Muzarabani as highlighted in the research.

Nevertheless, Smith's counter insurgency did not have a realistic political dimension. The Rhodesian officials were blinded to the vital need to win the souls by applying timely policies of political pacification and modification to its counter insurgency effort, instead a campaign of maximum force was pursued. Such a campaign accelerated the deterioration and leading finally to the political victory of guerrillas in 1980.

Although ZANLA forces came out victorious against the Rhodesian forces, there are some certain aspects which are being revealed and criticized up to this day which are drawn from the tactics which were used by ZANLA cadres during the liberation struggle. The use of pungwes have been criticized left, right and centre by the Muzarabani communities, who contends that, apart from being used as a political platform to spread the ideology and agenda of ZANLA, pungwes were also centres of punishments and cruelty. The culture of violence was instilled in the minds of the people. Sometimes the ideology was enforced on to the masses. People were

bitten thoroughly and many civilians lost their lives, which greatly affected the Muzarabani community up to this present day.

In postcolonial Zimbabwe, during election times in Muzarabani, those who rally behind ZANU, became perpetrators of violence in the name of “discipline”. Bases are formed where night rallies are conducted. People are forced to attend those *pungwes* as well as to conform to ZANU ideologies. A lot of people died and some people conducted Sexual Transmitted Diseases (STI’s). Horrible atrocities are committed in the communities against opponents. Brutality is now manifesting in many ways in the area. Violence is not therefore a new phenomenon in Muzarabani community. This was evidently inherited from ZANLA principles which were used during the liberation struggle, although it was “violence for freedom”.

Some young overzealous men who are send by the ZANU authorities to instil order and discipline in Muzarabani, sometimes they overdo what they have been instructed to do. During election time, adversaries are bitten thoroughly and some are even killed. This will later affect the families of the assassin through *ngozi* not the ZANU authorities. Thus, even though the ideas which were adopted and spread to the community were positive, one can pinpoint or delineate certain negative aspects, which are still haunting communities up to this today.

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