

MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY



FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

**The influence of Security Sector in governance, case study of the Zimbabwe National Army
from 1980 to 2015**

By

HOPEWELL MUPANGANYAMA

R132551E

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Dedication

Dedicated to the memory of my late parents

Acknowledgements

My profound gratitude accrues to my lecturer for being my supervisor, her unwavering support throughout the writing of this dissertation. Her guidance and comments were instrumental in producing this piece of work. Worth mentioning is the invaluable support that I constantly got throughout my research from Colonel S. Mhere, Colonel P. Maranjisi and Colonel S.Vezha from the Zimbabwe National Army. My love goes to my family who supported me all through the time that I was doing my studies. I appreciate the role played by Joseph Musengi and JamesonMupanganyamathroughout my success and failures that I have experienced. Not forgetting Precious Musapatika and my close friend Moses Musanhu for assisting me in various ways. I must also pay tribute to the Department of Politics and Public Management for providing an academic environment that was both challenging and hospitable. Above all I give praise to the Almighty for he is the alpha and omega of my life. I am a true reflection of his power and Glory! Lastly I would also want to express my sincere gratitude to my sponsor (Higherlife Foundation which is Econet Wireless' arm of social responsibility) for paying all my tuition fees and accommodation allowances from primary level, I am really proud of who I am, where I am right now and the vision I have for the security sector in Zimbabwe. I think I can do something different there.

Abstract

The paper examines the influence of the security sector in governance, a case study of Zimbabwe National Army from 1980 till 2015. Such a topic has been necessitated culminating from Zimbabwe experiencing the deployment of military personnel to strategic positions in various state institutions responsible for governance hence affecting economic and political governance positively and negatively. The research aims to find out why the ZNA fail to divorce itself from the ruling party ZANU PF in issues of governance. It aims to assess the internal and external operations as well as economic and political operations which have been carried out by the Zimbabwe National Army which has both positive and negative effects to governance. It also examines the achievements and challenges within the Zimbabwe National Army in promoting good governance. The researcher also covers the gaps which various scholars failed to cover in the literature view concerning this topic. Many theories were also included to support the research topic. This research also takes into consideration stakeholders' perspectives on factors behind the influence of the ZNA in governance and among the stakeholders include ZANU PF, ZNA, MDC T officials to mention but a few. The research is qualitative in nature. Also the research put into consideration both the primary and secondary sources. Questionnaires and interviews were used to collect data. Tables only were used to represent the results. The results obtained from this research shows that the influence of the security sector in governance issues is inextricably linked hence it affects governance issues positively and negatively. Recommendations and future suggestions presented in this research is of paramount importance.

Abbreviations

AFZ	Air Force of Zimbabwe
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
ESC	Electoral Supervisory Commission
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
JOC	Joint Operation Command
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NGO	None Governmental Organization
NOCZIM	National Oil Company of Zimbabwe
NRZ	National Railways of Zimbabwe
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

ZAPU	Zimbabwe People’s Union
ZDERA	Zimbabwe Democracy Economic Recovery Act
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People’s Revolution Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLA	Zimbabwe National Revolution Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZPS	Zimbabwe Prison Services
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic of Police

Key words: Security sector, military, influence, governance.

Table of Contents

Dedication.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Abbreviations.....	iv
CHAPTER ONE	1
1.0 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Back ground of the study	1
1.2 Statement of the problem	3
1.3 Research objectives.....	4
1.4 Research questions.....	4
1.5 Justification of the study	4
1.6 Limitations of the study	5
1.7 Delimitations.....	5
1.8 Definition of terms	6
1.9 Summary	6
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAME WORK	7
2.0 Literature review	7
2.1 The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in the early years of independence.....	7
2.2 Zimbabwe National Army's external Operation with effects to governance.....	10
2.3 The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in Zimbabwe's Political Governance.....	12
2.4 Zimbabwe National Army's Internal Operations which affects Political Governance.....	22
2.5 Zimbabwe National Army in economic governance	25
2.6 Theoretical frame work.....	31
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	35
3.0 Introduction.....	35
3.1 Research methodology.....	35
3.2 Research design	35
3.2.1 A case study	36
3.2.2 Advantages of using a case study.	37
3.2.3 Disadvantages of using a case study.....	37
3.3 Sampling methods used in the research	38
3.3.1 Purposive sampling.....	38

3.4 Sources of data.....	39
3.5 Research instruments	39
3.5.1 Questionnaires.....	39
3.5.2 Interviews.....	40
3.6 Data collection procedures.....	40
3.7 Summary	41
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION	42
4.0 Response rate	42
4.1 Questionnaires.....	42
4.2 Interviews.....	43
4.3 Zimbabwe National Army, State Security and Governance	44
4.4 Zimbabwe National Army in civil ministries responsible for governance	45
4.5 The link between the ZNA and public policy execution.....	47
4.6 Achievements of the ZNA in governance.....	49
4.7 Challenges faced by the ZNA in promoting good governance	51
4.8 An overview of the research findings	54
4.9 Summary	55
CHAPTER FIVE	56
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	56
5.0 Introduction.....	56
5.1 Summary	56
5.2 Conclusions.....	57
5.3 Recommendations.....	58
5.4 Suggestion for future research	60
REFERENCE LIST.....	62
Appendix I: Respondent Questionnaire	68
Appendix II: Respondent Interview Guide.....	73

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

Governance can be defined as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good and this includes the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension) and as well as the government's capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension). Within the security sector, the influence of the defence forces in political and economic governance can be noticed in all forms of governments. The scope and nature of the defence services makes it an important institution in governance for example in the defence of the republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity against internal and external threats. In Zimbabwe the influence of the military in key state institutions responsible for governance makes the ruling government ceremonial to the extent that the military is now regarded as the centre, the god father and the locus of decision making in Zimbabwe's political and economic governance despite the prohibition of the security agents from being part and parcel of political issues of the country by both the ZDF Act and the constitution of Zimbabwe. The ideology of the armed struggle brought with it a sense of entitlement with regard to the daily governance of the state as a result the ruling party (ZANU PF) argues that the marriage between the gun and the economy in Zimbabwe is based on the fact that the former is the guarantee of the latter. The researcher is going to examine the influence of the Zimbabwe National Army on issues of governance in Zimbabwe from 1980 till 2015 and to provide recommendations on what needs to be done by the Zimbabwe National Army in order to improve governance issues in Zimbabwe.

1.1 Back ground of the study

In 1979, the majority of the Lancaster House Conference organizers preferred the creation of the new army for the new Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to be under the jurisdiction of the government that would emerge from the elections thus they failed to create a framework which can lead to the creation of the new army. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006), President Mugabe made his intentions to create a combined army before the end of December 1980 consisting of 35,000 troops. Soon after independence the ZNA was created and recruitments were taken from the Zimbabwe People's Revolution Army (ZIPRA), Zimbabwe National Revolution Army (ZANLA) and Rhodesian forces into a unified Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). There is no

doubt that the formation of the Zimbabwe National Army masked the military binning of Rhodesian forces and the swallowing of Zimbabwe People's Union (ZAPU) by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) since only ZANU cadres were given strategic and key positions in the military. This resulted into the dissident of ZAPU soldiers from the national army.

However after the successful operation Gukurahundi (a Shona name which means the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains) which was carried out by the 5th Brigade to crush the dissidents in Matebeleland, ZANU and ZAPU joined together to form ZANU PF through the unity accord of 1987 and this helped the army to regain its power in an orderly and professional manner. People may blame ZIPRA for joining hands with ZANU PF and its ZANLA forces but if they did not do so, they would have lost their hands during the massacre thus the operation Gukurahundi clearly shows the influence of the military in governance. The nature in which ZANU PF government got into power (the liberation struggle), external threats of civil wars from neighbouring countries namely South Africa and Mozambique, threats from former colonizers who advocated for regime change through Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) and the fear of another military rebellion created a tense environment for the ruling party (ZANU PF) to the extent that without the military's influence in governance, the government was like a sheep without a shepherd.

The influence of the ZNA in governance increased when President (Robert Gabriel Mugabe) was given powers to appoint key posts in the military from the position of Colonel. The relationship between the ruling party (ZANU PF) and the Zimbabwe National Army started to be like that of a parent and a child in which the former became the sole protector of the later. The referendum defeat in February 2000 forced President Robert Mugabe to turn to the military to shield himself from attacks and to mobilize support around himself. It was the army, alongside demobilized war veterans which organized the land invasions thus working hand in glove with the government. This was followed by sanctions namely the Zimbabwe Democracy Economic Recovery Act of 2002 from United States of America and this was being supported by western countries who continued to be major threats to Zimbabwe's political and economic emancipation. The government responded by strengthening its relations with the security sector especially the military hence fuelling the influence of the ZNA in governance.

The ZNA was influential in the 2002 presidential elections, the President again heavily relied on military personnel who were appointed to a number of key positions responsible for governance. Due to drought which affected the country heavily the same year, the government deployed forces to supervise the import and distribution of the staple maize after a widely reported corruption and mismanagement at the Grain Marketing Board that normally handles the matter. The ZNA was more influential in many operations namely the Operation Seed, in response to HIV and AIDS, Operation Taguta/Sisuthi (Operation Eat Well), Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) in 2005, Operation Garikai/ HlalaniKuhle/Live Well, Operation Sun rise in 2006, Operation Chikorokoza Chapera /Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile (No More illegal Mining) of January 2007, Operation Reduce Price to mention but a few.

In regard to such a background, the involvement of the Zimbabwe National Army in governance has caused a lot of concern among several stakeholders namely civil societies, non-governmental organizations, opposition political parties and above all from countries such as Britain and United States of America which the researcher regards as international predatory states. There is real need for an investigation on the scope and nature of the security sector's influence on governance. The background of the ZNA as a powerful institution within the security sector helps to provide the base and direction in which the research is going to be conducted.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The ruling government is currently relying on the security sector especially the military to run the economy. The systematic deployment of retired Brigadier Generals and Colonels to run civil ministries which are in charge of both political and economic governance is not only resulting in poor governance but has also caused the militarization of the state in the process of decision making and implementation in Zimbabwe (operation governance). The involvement of the military in governance can either weaken or strengthen governance thus the influence of the military on governance should be scrutinized with the aim of resurrecting the economy of Zimbabwe.

1.3 Research objectives

1. To examine the contribution or achievements of the Zimbabwe National Army in governance.
2. To assess why the ruling party(ZANU PF) is failing to divorce itself from the Zimbabwe National Army when it comes to governance.
3. To examine the government's capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies with the help of the Zimbabwe National Army.
4. To offer recommendations that will lead to the independence, transparency and professionalism in the Zimbabwe National Army as far as governance is concerned.

1.4 Research questions

1. Has the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) managed to promote good governance in Zimbabwe?
2. What causes the Zimbabwe National Army to operate in line with ZANU PF on the process governance?
3. What are the challenges faced by the Zimbabwe National Army in creating a favourable environment for good governance?
4. What needs to be done to promote the independence and professionalism within the Zimbabwe National Army so as to promote good governance?

1.5 Justification of the study

The research arose in a time when the state of the country in terms of governance is about to be confined due to a number of challenges being faced by the governing body of the state which is heavily influenced by the military institution. Therefore the influence of the security sector especially Zimbabwe National Army which exist as the highest office in the land by both de jure and de facto ways needs to be scrutinized so as to come upwith all-inclusive measures and strategies which can promote military professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness of the ZNA in promoting good governance .

1.6 Limitations of the study

- The research covers a wide area for a detailed examination within the limitations of an Honours dissertation hence some of the issues may not be scrutinized as they deserve.
- The research is too sensitive in regard to the current factionalism which dominated the ruling party and government. Scrutinizing the military is tantamount to scrutinizing the one who appoints them (The President) as a result compliance of participants on security issues will be limited. The researcher is going to respect the supreme law of the land especially in respect of the office of the President.
- Most of the participants came under the same thinking cape namely ZANU PF officials, war veterans, military agents and the ruling government which may lead to bias as they all share the same ideology dominated by the experiences of the liberation struggle hence increasing the probability of having similar views regarding the influence of military in governance. To counter this, the researcher will also involve the major opposition political party MDC T. The researcher will explain the purpose of the study and kindly ask the participants to be as truthful, honest and realistic so that the research can be beneficial to executors of governance in Zimbabwe.
- Respondents especially from the ZNA have a lot of state responsibility and they are always occupied thus there is limited time to interact with them for the purpose of research progress. The researcher is going to be punctual whenever they set a date to meet the researcher.

1.7 Delimitations

The research will be restricted on the influence of Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in governance. The researcher will not focus too much on anything linked to the so called Security Sector Reform (SSR) and regime issues of regime change in Zimbabwe.

1.8 Definition of terms

Security Sector refers to organizations and entities that have authority, capacity and orders to use force or threat of force to protect the state and civilians. Such institutions include the armed forces, intelligence, customs guards, the judiciary and penal services.

State security refers to the concept that a government on behalf of the state, along with its parliaments, should protect the state and its citizens against all kinds of national problems through the use of various power projections namely political power, diplomacy economic power, military power among others.

Military refers to the armed forces.

Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) refers to the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF)

Military Operation refers to the coordinated military based actions in response to a developing situation and these actions are carried in the interest of the state.

Influence refers to the power to affect, control and manipulate something or someone.

Governance places an emphasis on the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented.

Sovereignty refers to the assumption that government of a state is both supreme and independent.

Territorial integrity is the principle that nation state should not attempt to promote secessionist movements or to promote border changes in other nation state and the principle is governed by international law.

Independence means direction of one's own affairs without interference.

Public Policy it as a purposive course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems (Anderson 1975).

1.9 Summary

The research concentrated on the direction, methods, and instruments among other important information to be applied during the research which is concentrated on the influence of the security sector in governance hence targeting the ZNA as specific area of study. Strength and weakness regarding the research has been outlined thus in this chapter the researcher has provided the foundation or the base in which the research is going to be focused on.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAME WORK

2.0 Literature review

In this chapter the researcher is focused on various related literature showing questions that emanate from previous scholarly researches on the influence of the armed security forces of Zimbabwe National Army in governance. The chapter will concentrate on what has been said and done on the similar topic by other writers. A lot of staff on the nexus between the security sector and governance has been written and commented by many authors and the main attention was given specifically on the influence of the military. It can be highlighted that although the majority of these scholars were in the same direction, the researcher saw a big gap between what they wrote and the reality on the ground which can never be undermined. Some writers went too far to the extent of advocating for Security Sector Reform (SSR). Rupiya (2005) labels it as governance through military style. According to Mayer and Burnett (1977) the military is a crucial sector which requires attention. Such a view is applicable to both well developed nations and third world countries. Governance associated with the hand of the defence forces is a sensitive issue and many scholars have commented on the nexus between the military and governance in Zimbabwe. Various views, comments and suggestions have been advocated on this topic. However the researcher is going to scrutinize the writings of these scholars and comment his personal opinion with respect to realistic point of view.

2.1 The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in the early years of independence.

In order to develop a more informed perspective about the influence of the Zimbabwe National Army in the current and future governance in Zimbabwe as well as on how the ZNA qualified to be the source, the backbone or the centre of power with powers, authority and influence to formulate basic principles by which government is guided, "one needs to understand its place and role in both the immediate and contemporary history of the country" (Zimbabwe Institute Report 2008). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) propounded that since the 1970s war of liberation, the relationship between the military and the party has always been strong in both ZANU and ZAPU to the extent that the guerrillas were important actors in party politics. One can argue that the Lancaster House Agreement which was a political compromise reached by ZANU, ZAPU and

Rhodesian Front is a perfect scenario which shows how crucial is the influence of the military institution as far as Zimbabwe's governance is concerned.

The importance of the military in reaching an accepted political settlement between the conflicting parties in Rhodesia namely ZANU under Robert Mugabe, ZAPU under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and the Rhodesian Front party of Ian Smith was proved by the fact that all parties brought their chief military and security personnel to the Lancaster peace talks. The presence of ZANU's military supremo, the Commander In Chief of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZNLA) Josiah Tongogara who took over the command from Herbert Chitepo in 1973, ZAPU had both the head of its intelligence, Dumiso Dabengwa and the commander of Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) Lookout Masuku, while General Peter Walls and the head of the Central Intelligence Organization, Ken Flower represented the Rhodesian Forces. The involvement of the military leadership in such important talks was not simply essential for the discussion of security related issues, but was also a crucial politburo meeting for shaping issues of governance in Zimbabwe thus showing the involvement of the ZNA in governance.

There was real need for President Mugabe to keep his eyes on the military so as to make sure that the return of Joshua Nkomo as the father of dissidents will not repeat again hence there was a sensitive vacancy on governance which needed to be monitored directly in his personal capacity especially after the death of Josiah Tongogara on 26 December 1979. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) also condense that ZANU PF tried to establish the Chinese military system of making sure that soldiers are part and parcel of food production than making soldiers purely professional military. This paved away for the penetration of the military in governance.

The Zimbabwe National Army influenced a lot on Zimbabwe's political and economic governance during the early decades of independence due to the loyalty of ZNA generals. General Solomon Mujuru, a.k.a Rex Nhongo Mujuru who was appointed to be the chief of the army played a key role on political governance. During the integration of ZNLA forces into the Zimbabwe Defence Forces after the resignation of Peter Walls, Mujuru was an important figure. He was also influential in the cleaning of dissidents in the Matabeleland and Midlands

region during the operation Gukurahundi. The effort and uncompromised hard work of the loyal Fifth Brigade under General Air Marshal Perence Shiri was also important.

The Operation Gukurahundi was indeed a turning point which shows the dependence of ZANU PF on military and as the researcher writes, the Operation Gukurahundi is still a controversial issue. According to Ndodana (2008), a member of the ZANU PF politburo conceded that ZANU-PF did not trust Tsvangirai, not least because they feared he would take away the farms awarded to many regime insiders by Mugabe's 2000 land reform (but because) Tsvangirai might also sanction the prosecution of Mugabe and others named as culpable in the Gukurahundi killings of the 1980s, in which Mugabe's military stand accused of murdering large numbers of civilians in a bid to eliminate political opposition in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions, 'no matter what Tsvangirai says about guaranteeing President Mugabe's safety, we just cannot trust the man'. In this scenario in which ZANU PF executive and the military share the same threatening and unpardonable spoils, one cannot underestimate the nexus between the ZNA and governance.

The influence of the ZNA army in the 1987 Unity Accord cannot be undermined during the early decades of independence. The military leadership from both the ZNLA and ZIPRA wing were key players in the signing of the Unity Accord which marked the genesis of the swallowing of ZAPU by ZANU in 1987 even though these parties were united in the new baptism name under the banner of Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). Rafopoulos (2009) noted that the 1987 agreement between ZNLA (ZANU PF) and ZIPRA (PF ZAPU) ended the Matabeleland civil war but did not guarantee continuous security for Zimbabwe. According to Brattor and Masunungure (2008), ZANU-PF is unabashedly committed to maintaining control of the state, and the 1987 Unity Accord even explicitly declares that "We (the ZANU-PF) shall seek to establish a one-party state." One can note that without the stamp of the military to approve any negotiations or a policy formulated by the government, such an attempt can be regarded as a mere utopian action. Currey and Kondowe (2000) concur that in Zimbabwe the ruling government managed to link the military in governance in the name of its mainly reference points namely territorial integrity, sovereignty, and state security. It can be pointed out that the ZNA should obtain trust from citizens by being neutral in politics if the institution needs to get good reputation on issues of governance.

2.2 Zimbabwe National Army's external Operation with effects to governance

The mission statement of the Zimbabwe National Army is to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests of Zimbabwe and to contribute to international peace and security. As an institution the ZNA has remained committed to its mission statement as evidenced by a number of operations which were carried out by the Zimbabwe National Army especially soon after independence both within and externally. However some of these operations were based on personal interest of top officials than national interest hence negatively affecting governance in Zimbabwe.

According to Chitiyo (2009) the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) was part and parcel of the Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo war after independence. As a strategy for protecting trade interest namely the protection of the vital transport artery within the port Beira, the ZNA was sent to assist FRELIMO in the war against RENAMO rebels in 1982 and the ZNA's mandate expanded in 1984 as the army engaged in an open alliance with the FRELIMO. The influence of the ZNA in Mozambique war was a good political and military strategy to boost the governance system of Zimbabwe. Politically the intervention was an ideal for the ZANU PF regime to protect its relations with FRELIMO government hence strengthening political governance. Economic governance was strengthened through trade as evidenced by the passing of Zimbabwe goods from overseas through port Beira. It can be noted that the intervention was a payback time for President Mugabe's military which owes its military success to FRELIMO cadres during the liberation struggle. Despite the negative effect of the FRELIMO war on governance such a move was positive for governance since there was a need for a landlocked Zimbabwe to be in good relations with its neighbours for free movement of goods and services and for state security reasons hence strengthening both political and economic governance.

In 1997, the role of the ZNA in the Democratic Republic of Congo in which President Mugabe supported Laurent Kabila against the M23 rebels deserves to be highlighted since it affected both political governance and economic governance within and abroad. Politically the major benefit of the DRC war for Zimbabwe's political governance was that the country showed commitment to regional cooperation specifically on the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). It

can be noted that the SADC Protocol on Peace and Security calls for member states to assist each other on matters which threaten peace and security and indeed the resource based DRC war was a threat to peace and security not only within the geographical borders of DRC but within the whole of Southern Africa as other countries such as evidenced by the intervention of Uganda and Rwanda intervened in support of the M23 rebels against Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and DRC. Zimbabwe's commitment to regional cooperation helps Zimbabwe to survive the threats within the international system as the country managed to mobilize alliance namely Angola, Namibia and DRC against its enemies in the international system specifically Britain, France, United States of America among other countries who condemned the involvement of Zimbabwe in the DRC war thus maintaining the country's independence on political governance. Economically the involvement of the ZNA in DRC war paved a way for trade agreements between Zimbabwe and DRC hence the ZNA participated in boosting economic governance through military entrepreneurship based on DRC diamonds in Mbuji Mayi (Chitiyo 2009).

The ZNA's influence in governance increase in the later 1990s due to the President's patronage system in which President Mugabe managed to keep the army leadership close to him by making them beneficiaries of the lucrative mining contracts on offer in the DRC (United Nation Report (2002)). The intervention of ZDF in DRC was a clear strategy for ZANU PF government to get funds for economic development from DRC as well as for its political mileage in the region in the name of national interest. However despite the success of the ZDF in the war against the M23 rebellion, the intervention was condemned by Zimbabweans since the war was too costly for the economy of Zimbabwe which was about to give its last breath on governance.

The United Nations Report (2002) indicated that military commanders and leading politicians enriched themselves on proceeds from Congo's diamond and cobalt mining industries, and from trade in timber and transport. The United Nations report (2002) pointed out that members of the Zimbabwe National Army aligned to ZANU-PF were also implicated in the looting and plundering of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)'s natural resources following Zimbabwe's intervention in the DRC war between August 1998 and July 2003. A United Nations expert panel investigating the plunder of DRC resources found that joint venture companies to exploit resources were formed between 'generals and other top officers in the Ugandan and

Zimbabwean army and other top officials and unsavoury politicians in the government of the DRC (Rupiya2011).The Zimbabwe Defence Force took a business-like approach, creating joint-venture and front companies to cream off some of Congo's richest mines. Among the top brass, the army chief, General VitalisZvinavashe, was a major stakeholder in a company called Operation Sovereign Legitimacy which had lucrative mining contracts in Congo through a partnership with a firm owned by Congo's late president, Laurent Kabila. The report singled out Mnangagwa and Zvinavashe, as having allegedly played a leading role in exploiting Congo's mineral wealth for personal benefit.It can be noted that the external military intervention based on personal interest than national interest threatens good governance.

Indirectly external military influence of the ZNA brought negative consequences on the economy of Zimbabwe due to the fact that the intervention was done during the period of hyper-inflation as evidenced in Zimbabwe during the DRC war. External military intervention organized in a state of emergency affect governance as funds budgeted for service delivery may be channelled to support unbudgeted external military intervention. The DRC war forced the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to print money resulting in inflation thus affecting governance. External intervention by the military also affected governance specifically on human security. Many ZNA agents were killed during the DRC and very little compensation was given. However it cannot be undermined that the success of military interventions abroad promotes trade and good political relations with the assisted state hence positively affecting governance in Zimbabwe. It can be emphasized that military interventions abroad is the most efficient tool to boost the state's economy if used for national interest than personal interest as evidenced by the case of Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO)in which military members of NATO are responsible for looting resources on behalf of their mother countries through external operations.

2.3The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)in Zimbabwe's Political Governance

The military is now deeply engrained in political affairs of the country to the extent that whatever transitional deal has to be undertaken has to take into consideration the political and economic interests of this important constituency. The increased influence of the army in politics since the late 1990s strongly suggests that the military leadership would be an important power broker whose opinion will have to be sought on any political deal to be concluded. This can be

evidenced by the influence of the military during the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, the Unity Accord of 1987, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 2008, and currently on the controversial ZANU PF factionalism. One can argue that if the military engaged in political governance without the respect of military professionalism in which the military is supposed to be free from political affiliation, such an attempt can deteriorate political governance

Equally important, all other parties would need to get the almighty hand of army to underwrite any agreement if it were to be effective and lasting. The most important challenge for Zimbabwe's transition is thus how it deals with the military in the whole quest for political reforms and stabilization (Zimbabwe Institute Report 2008). The ZNA was channelled to fill in the political vacuum with the same structure of the government since the time of Joshua Nkomo as the father of dissidents. It was through the influence of the military again that Joshua Nkomo was baptized from being the father of dissidents to be called the father Zimbabwe hence showing that the military has influence, power and authority not only over politicians but over political governance as well.

Although various scholars concluded that the ZNA should be blamed for involving in political governance the researcher noticed that it is the weakness of political parties, lack of respect to democratic ethics by ZANU PF, western countries' thirst for weakening Zimbabwe's security sector so as to foster regime change agenda, pressure from western sponsored civil organization and non-governmental organizations who are advocating for security sector reform forced the military to penetrate in political and economic governance with the overall aim of deterring external threats. However the participation of the military in maintaining ZANU PF political integrity against MDC and National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) which campaigned against the 2000 referendum clearly shows the influence of the ZNA in political governance since ZANU PF felt 'shaken' (Zimbabwe Institute Report 2008). It can be argued that the ZNA intervened as a super power institution with the power to zip the mouth which utters political violence or threatened the ruling government in and outside hence threatening political governance.

The involvement of the military in Zimbabwe's political governance is just symptomatic not the cause of Zimbabwe's malaise. It can be noted that the negative impact of the so called Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), the radical fast track land reform, drought, corruption, debts, payment of unbudgeted salaries to former freedom fighters (war veterans) mismanagement of resources, pressure from the opposition political parties namely the Movement for Democratic Change and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) especially in September 1999, external campaigns for regime change agenda by Zimbabwe's former colonizers namely Britain and its western allies among other causes threatened ZANU PF and President Mugabe's survival as if they were about to be dumped into the political coffin. The only narrow escape for incumbent regime was to use history to predict its future survival, before, during and after elections. Turning to the military was and is still the means which justified the ends of the ruling government on both political and economic governance. Harassment and torture was used by ZANU PF against its internal political enemies so as to keep its grip on power at all cost especially after 2000 (Raftopoulos 2009). Such an abuse of the military sector can be vehemently condemned as it threatens military professionalism and political governance.

Nyakudya (2010) noted that by 2008, the security sector had become systematically entrenched in the country's political life. He goes further to note that there was no constitutional boundary which limits, control or oversees the transparency and accountability values within the ZNA. Only the President claims to be accountable to the military thus showing that the ZNA was and is still prone to abuse. ZANU PF has steadfastly refused to divorce itself from what Nyakudya (2010) described as 'nationally undesirable marriage', during the 2008 power sharing agreement between ZANU PF and opposition parties namely MDC T of Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC M of Author Mutambara. During the ZANU PF Congress of 2009, President Mugabe vowed that his party which is the party of the revolution and the defender of the benefits of the liberation struggle will never allow any reform within the security sector mainly because it is ZANU PF's liberation ideology which gave birth to the defence force institution. Ranger (2004) as well as Nyakudya (2007) noted that through its propaganda, ZANU PF tried to make sure that the world understands it very well that the liberation struggle owes much to ZANU PF and hence it is its own product. Today, therefore the influence of liberation struggle history on state security and governance in Zimbabwe continues. This is actually the answer to the equation in which the

security sector reform issue has no formula as President Mugabe once declared that “May I state this clearly and categorically, as ZANU (PF) the defence of our sovereignty rests with us and with no other. Any manoeuvre to tamper with the forces will never be entertained by us. Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of the gun. According to the internet source “the gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer its guarantor.” (http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/dec13a_2009.html)

Meredith (2007) noted that the people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable. Saunders (2000) agreed that in Zimbabwe a set of belief that political power was the result of the gun and that the “AK 47” is under the authority or control of the same ideology is concept that has since moved from one place to another within the present government structure without fundamental change of direction. The ZNA executives have openly stated that they will not show respect, recognise or subscribe to any political leader who does not have liberation certificates (SW Radio Africa 2007). Vitalis Zvinavashe Gava who became the commander of the Zimbabwe National Army in July 1994 also played a key role in threatening opposition parties from being part and parcel of decision making in Zimbabwe before his death on 11 March 2009. According to SW Radio Africa (2008) in March 2008 Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander, General Constantine Chiwenga signalled his readiness to set aside the constitution should Robert Mugabe be defeated at the polls, describing Mugabe’s opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai as an agent of the West and vowing to instruct the military not to take orders from him. On 09 January 2002 Commander General Vitalis Zvinavash declared that he will not take orders from anyone who did not participate in the liberation struggle. In this scenario one can argue that the ZNA is actually the almighty visa with powers to endorse politicians’ political passport so that they can enter, leave or stay in political office especially the presidential office hence the influence of the ZNA in political governance does not need an optical instrument to be seen.

Commander General Zvinavash was succeeded by Constantine Chiwenga in 2003 who is currently the commander of the ZNA. Chwenga and other top military personnel are actually the pillars of strength for President Mugabe and his party when it comes to governance. According to the SW Radio Africa of 10 March 2008, Chwenga once said President Mugabe as his companion,

Defence Forces chief, and as a fellow soldier will come out as a winner after the June 2008 presidential elections. Currently as the researcher writes Chiwenga responded to the current factionalism within the ruling party ZANU PF when he attacked the Higher Education Minister Jonathan Moyo and Manicaland Provincial Affairs minister Mandi Chimene. Writing in the Daily News of 08 August 2016, Chidza comments that Chiwenga once warned that ‘We were reading mapepapaakatangakuti ‘when you want to destroy Zanu PF you need to do it from within’. They told us they will have youths who will take over. Was it not written? You think we were blind to it? Is it not happening now? People must just eat quietly...’ The involvement of military chiefs in political factionalism is one of the important factors responsible for the deterioration of political governance. The behaviour, character, manners and attitude of military generals is a true reflection of the unprofessional influence of ZNA in political governance in which generals defend and preach President Mugabe and ZANU PF the same way the Apostles defend and preach Christ and Christianity, there is no way in which one can separate the Apostles against Christ and Christianity gospel which they preach. The failure to separate the military from ZANU PF government is the centre of the problems associated with political governance.

It was once reported that former senior brigadier Paradzai Zimhondi who is currently the head of Prison Service once said if the Movement for Democratic Change defeat ZANU PF in the June 2008 election, without wasting time, before all other generals leave their jobs, he will quit permanently, resigning from his job so that he can take the gun and protect his farm. On the issue of his land, former senior brigadier Zimondi said he was not going to be separated from his land hence he ordered his subordinates to vote for the President (Mugabe). Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) concluded that the party–military nexus helped to stabilize the state and shield the government from any possible military takeover. The survival of ZANU PF as a political giant in Zimbabwe since 2002 owes much to the security forces especially on Border Gezi’s National Youth Project in which the military and war veterans were tasked to train the youth patriotism as a means to pave a way for ZANU PF’s victory. The Zimbabwe Institute Report (2008) noted that from 2002, the ZNA voiced that it will reject, refuse to accept or allow the process of voting that contradict Robert Mugabe’s post as the President of Zimbabwe. One can argue that the military was and is still doing so without any logical contradictions within Zimbabwe and abroad. In regard to the mentioned facts the researcher can argue that the fear of losing personal property

namely the land distributed to generals under unfair circumstances is actually a rope tied on the necks of ZNA hence forcing the institution to support ZANU PF in political governance or risk to lose their own life. There is no doubt that the influence of the military in political governance is a virus on its own on political governance.

The Joint Operation Command (JOC) becomes gradually visible not just as a significant institution in charge of Zimbabwean politics but as watchdogs with powers to bless or curse political leaders and their parties. The military elite became the central nervous system of the ruling class of Zimbabwe responsible for integrating political sensory information and responding accordingly. In 2002, the Joint Operation Command was made up of the late Brigadier General Vitalis Zvinavashe who was previously the commander of the ZDF, General Philip Chiwenga who was by then a Lieutenant commander of the ZNA, Air Marshal Perrence Shiri who exercise authority over the Air Force of Zimbabwe, and Augustine Chihuri who was and is still in charge of the Zimbabwe Republic Police as the Police Commissioner. The director or person in charge of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) as well as the person in charge of the Youth Chairman were also involved in a formal gathering which was held once a week with the aim of formulating various strategies and tools to be used to make sure that ZANU PF survive in the political governance both in rural areas and urban areas. The Joint Operation Command can never be separated from the security sector as it proves to be centre of decision making not only within the security sector but in governance issues as well. It cannot be disputed that key members of the JOC are military agents thus showing that the influence of the ZNA in governance issues is above that of the ruling party's politburo. Fig 2.1 below was extracted from Dzimiri (2011) and it shows the state security structure in Zimbabwe.

THE JOC STRUCTURE




Fig 2.1: JOC Structure: Adapted from Dzimiri (2011)

In regard to fig. 2.1 above, such structure shows that outside the government and parliament of Zimbabwe, there is a strong politburo emanating from the security sector with the powers to influence who gets what, when and how in political governance. Chitiyo (2009) argued that the JOC functioned without a clear mandate or responsibility within the state as it was under the authority of ZANU PF than of the state and the fact that JOC was not part of government machinery was free from mist and became clear by 2005. It had become an alternative to the state, and was, in effect, a parallel government. It is at the mercy of the security forces especially the ZNA that ZANU PF can still claim its legitimacy in political governance. One can note that there is no way in which the ZNA backside against the general will of the ruling government due to the fact that President Mugabe appointed them on the basis of patronage and

nepotism than ability thus the military is politically breastfeeding President Mugabe's government as a token of appreciation.

The ZNA is actually acting as a ZANU PF's body of electoral observers created to oversight electoral process despite the existence of Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) hence manipulating political governance in favour ZANU PF. It cannot be disputed that in elections what is important is not about who votes but it is about who monitored and counts the votes. Military personnel also dominated the electoral commission which is one of the key institutions in political governance. According to Nyakudya (2010), President Robert Mugabe appointed Justice George Chiweshe who was also familiarized with the ZNA as he once worked there in the military courts. Chiweshe was appointed to chair the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission from 2005 until 2010 and during his tenure ZEC was in charge of the March and June 2008 presidential elections which were associated with gerrymandering and violence respectively. Nyakudya (2010) goes further to argue that in May 2010, Mugabe promoted Justice Chiweshe to Judge President, a move widely regarded as a reward for his partisan role at the helm of ZEC. The Attorney General's office was headed by Gula Ndebele until his axing in May 2008 by Mugabe for supporting the Mujuru faction in the cut-throat ZANU PF succession politics (SW Radio 16 May 2008). Job Wabira, Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba, Major Utuile Silaigwana and many other military agents dominated the ZEC in 2008. The militarization of the ZEC is a living testimony which shows that ZEC is just a ceremonial body which work under the supervision of the ZNA in favour of ZANU PF as far as political governance is concerned.

Former ZNA commander Vitalis Zvinavavshe Gava once threatened that the most powerful institution in Zimbabwe (ZNA) is a 'straightjacket' holding the office which is responsible for monitoring and guaranteeing the aims of the liberation struggle hence ZNA agents will not pay attention to anyone who thinks outside the box of the liberation struggle. Such a direct utterance of the senior military commanders shows the erosion of military code of conduct in political governance hence such influence of general threatens not only opposition political parties but all civilians interested in participating in political governance hence poor participation of the masses in the political field weakens the political governance.

At the same time the ZNA also serve as the office of political consultancy responsible for image management of ZANU PF presidential candidate Robert Mugabe. It is reported that on 23 October 2010, General Nyikayaramba once briefed chiefs in the rural areas, the military and ZRP agents in Mutare at 3-3 infantry battalion that only those with revolutionary qualifications on their curriculum vitae eligible to rule Zimbabwe. According to Rupiya (2009), Nyikayaramba wanted the elections to be done on the 5th month of 2011 for President Mugabe to win. Major General Martin Chedondo once said he will stand together with other military agents behind their Commander-in-Chief. He also warned soldiers that they will be fired if they failed to vote for President Mugabe during the June 2008 elections. The fact that low ranked military agents are forced to protect ZANU PF weakens military code of conduct in political governance.

When it comes to political governance, the ZNA is actually the most trusted and loyal campaigning team of ZANU PF responsible for marketing President Mugabe and ZANU PF's ideology to the citizens with the aim of maintaining ZANU PF presidential candidate in power. Addressing people at Retired General Chimombe's funeral service in Jerera, Major-General Engelbert Rugeje addressing a rally in Masvingo in May 2008 once stated that "the country came through the bullet, not the pencil hence it will not go by an 'x' of the pencil". Major-General Engelbert Rugeje warned that he will not watch the vigorous contribution of war veterans such as the late Chimombe wasted due to the fact that these war veterans sacrificed their lives to liberate this country. He even threatened that when he visits Jerera again he will come with a full package of bullets in the helicopter because the people of Jerera "knows what they did" during the presidential elections. Major-General Rugeje was referring to the 2008 presidential elections in which president Mugabe was defeated. It was reported that soldiers were distributing bullets in the rural area of Mudzi in April 2008 threatening villagers that if they failed to cast their ballots for President Mugabe during the run-off election scheduled on 27 June 2008, everyone will get his or her own bullet (Human Rights Watch 2008). One can argue that the influence of the ZNA in political governance is not far fetched since military agents are always at the fore front during ZANU PF campaigns.

The Human Rights Watch Report (2008) reported that President Mugabe once declared his approval regarding the view of military and war veterans who refused to tolerate leadership renewal based on democratic election. President Mugabe himself publicly stated that the pen

cannot fight the AK hence he warned the citizens not to argue with the gun. In other words the President was saying the ballpoint pen which is used to put an 'x' during the casting of votes under a democratic election cannot remove him from power thus he relied on the ZNA who are holders of the gun to shield him in power. This clearly shows that it is only through the influence of the Zimbabwe National Army rather than elections that President Mugabe can be removed from power. It can be noted that leadership renewal through democratic means is an important prerequisite for good political governance hence the monopolization of the gun is a threat to political governance. Fig. 2.2 below shows the involvement of the security agents in electoral violence in 2008.




Fig. 2.2: The ZNA share of political violence: Adapted from the Solidarity Peace Trust Report 21 May 2008 p.53

Fig. 2 above shows that the Zimbabwe National Army has much influence on political violence than any other institution in the security sector. It can be noted that in some circumstances the military backed both the ZANU PF youth and ZANU PF supporters in electoral violence as long it is done at the benefit of their Commander In Chief.

One can argue that the influence of the ZNA on Zimbabwe's political governance is dynamic since the institution act as a security wing not only of the state but of ZANU PF, it serves as an office of political consultancy responsible for image management of ZANU PF presidential

candidate (Robert Mugabe), it is a ZANU PF's body of electoral observers above (ZEC) as well as ZANU PF's most trusted loyal campaigning team. The influence of the ZNA in political governance is based on a twisted doctrine of state sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national interest. It is clear that ZNA is not involving in ZANU PF political governance affairs but it is actually part of ZANU PF's military wing inherited from ZNLA during the liberation struggle. Despite the abuse of the ZNA by politicians, political violence, lack of free and fair elections, poor electoral policies, poor political institutions, limited media and civil society participation and above all lack of political will and courage among citizens to participate in political governance without fear are some of the viruses which are affecting the political governance.

2.4 Zimbabwe National Army's Internal Operations which affects Political Governance

Since the formation of the Zimbabwe National Army, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces carried a number of internal operations which influenced political governance in Zimbabwe namely the Operation Merger, Operation Gukurahundi, Operation Tsuru (Rabbit), Operation Makavhotera Papi? (Who Did You Vote For?), Operation Dzikisai Madhishi (Remove Satellite Dishes), Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) among others. Some of these operations were crucial in promoting a favourable environment for good political governance in the name of peace and order and the majority actually threatened political governance.

According to Chitiyo (2009) the Operation Merger was important during the unification of ZNLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian Forces (RF). One can note that Operation Merger ended the existing military divisions among the mentioned three military groups which pose threats to military and political security soon after the victory of ZANU PF in 1980. However, it should be highlighted that only ZNLA senior generals constituted the ZNA executive structures at the expense of RF let alone ZIPRA forces. This threatens political governance as it promoted ZANU and its ZNLA's interest of creating a one party state in Zimbabwe even though the operation was a success. This can be evidenced by the *gamartox* (a coined phrase in Zimbabwe which refers to the Joice Mujuru's attempt to remove Mugabe from power by force in 2015) of ZAPU through the 1987 Unity Accord which ended the Operation Gukurahundi which has been already discussed as one of the worst political operation carried by the ZNA in the 1980s. Operation

Merger actually was more of a ZANU PF's projects of survival and dominants through manipulation of the army hence affecting the independence of the military when carrying out political operations which are linked to governance.

The ZNA implemented the Operation Tsuru (Rabbit) from March to July 2000 with the aim of taking over the land owned by 1600 white farmers operating at commercial level and to make sure that opposition political parties voted for ZANU PF through force (Chitiyo 2009). War veterans, ZANU PF youth militia, the 5th Brigade, members of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), ZRP agents, also participated in the Operation Tsuru. It was estimated that 700 white land owners have been forced to vacate their land, 135 MDC supporters lost their lives and the majority suffers from intimidation (Colvin 2000). According to Chitiyo (2009), altogether the Operation Tsuru (Rabbit) claimed 1500 agents from the security sector that is 1000 military agents, 300 secret agents and 200 ZRP agents. Operation Tsuru (Rabbit) threatened political governance since the whole operation was implemented violently and at partisan bases. In addition to that opposition supporters were forced to vote for President Mugabe. It can be noticed from the numbers of the military agents who participated in this operation that the ZNA's influence on governance through operations is at its highest level in Zimbabwe.

The Operation Makavhotera Papi? which can be translated as the Operation Where Did You Put Your Vote?, was influenced by the ZNA as the military was on the fore front of a radical campaign which meant to punish opposition supporters who voted against President Mugabe and ZANU PF in the March 2008 elections (Rupiya 2011). The campaign was carried in areas such as Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland provinces where opposition parties recruits the majority of its members. The operation was a form of threat to political governance in the eyes of many Zimbabweans. It can be noted that under democratic political governance, the casting of votes during elections is supposed to be done through a secret ballot box hence asking the people about who they gave their vote was a violation of political governance ethics, norms and values especially in a country which claimed to be democratic like Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum (2008) also noted that members of the Zimbabwe National Army launched another operation in mid-2008 which meant to force urban based citizens

especially in Harare to remove their TV satellite dishes. The operation was known as Operation DzikisaiMadhishi (Remove Your Satellite Dishes). The ruling party ZANU PF blamed the western countries for sponsoring regime change agenda within Zimbabwe and abroad through the use of satellite dishes. One can argue that the influence of the ZNA on this operation was a violation of people's rights to access information hence it cannot be disputed that the operation was a threat to political governance. The ZNA agents should undertake workshops and training which are based on the rise of unavoidable effects of globalization on security due to the fact that the rise of technology is inescapable in the modern world thus such operations against the use of modern technology suffers defeat.

Chitiyo (2009) noted that the ZNA was also part and parcel of Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order), which followed the parliamentary elections of 2005. He goes further to lament that ZRP agents and military agents spent the whole month of May 2005 destroying houses which were built without the approval of the government in major cities especially the capital city Harare. Many people were left homeless and they were forced to move to rural areas. In a critical analysis one can argue that this was a political operation carried out by the security sector on behalf of ZANU PF. The majority of those who were left homeless were members of the opposition political parties as a result the migration of opposition supporters from urban areas to rural areas enabled ZANU PF to engage in gerrymandering of constituencies. Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) threatens the social security of citizens as the government failed to provide adequate housing delivery service.

However it should be highlighted that the Operation Murambatsvina (restore Order) can be justified since the level of urban crime, competition for essential service delivery such as water and shelter was no longer acceptable. Before the operation, the mob was difficult to control thus raising threats to peace in towns. Apart from that urban cities were prone to diseases such as cholera due to overpopulation. Without the involvement of the army as law enforcers the police alone were not going to carry out the Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) effectively thus the influence of the ZNA was necessary for the success of the operation. In short the Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) was a necessary evil, although it meant to improve service

delivery, it was also a political weapon influenced by the ZNA to send opposition supporters to rural areas thus providing a free winning ticket for the ruling party in the urban areas.

The ZNA's overall mandate is based on the need to offer security of the country hence such a mandate allows it to influence political governance both within and abroad. Lasswell (1971) defines state security as freedom from foreign detection while Lippmann (1944) noted that state has security when and if it does not sacrifice its legitimacy interest to avoid war and when the state is able to maintain its interest by war. National Defence of India defined state security as an appropriate and aggressive gland of political resilient and maturity. Factors such as availability of human resources, economic capability, technological competent, Industrial base, availability of natural resources and military might constitute state security. It goes without many contradictions that such factors are the backbone of governance in any country. In the case of Zimbabwe National Army, the institution has enough human resources since it always engage in mass recruitment. However when it comes to governance, the problem is on political maturity within the ZNA as the institution is always prone to political abuse.

2.5 Zimbabwe National Army in economic governance

In Zimbabwe, economic governance is under the leadership of the military and an attempt to divorce the military from key economic sectors in Zimbabwe suffers defeat. Good economic governance was and is still a major challenge in Zimbabwe due to the fact that those with military skills are being appointed if not anointed to carry out tasks which require economic skills. The impracticality of this scenario is tantamount to appointing a Chinese based chemistry teacher from China to teach Ndebele or Shona in Zimbabwe. Good economic governance places an emphasis on the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (www.unescap.org). Due to high unethical militarization of civil ministries, the defence forces are now a major key player in decision (Alexander and Tendi 2008). It goes without doubt that in Zimbabwe's economic governance, the military sector is the economic decision maker and the economic decision maker is the military sector any attempt to distinguish the two is regarded as null and void.

The influence of the military in economic governance has been debated by various scholars in which the majority tries to rubbish the role of military in governance while some regarded it as a catalyst for a fast track economic recovery. According to Chuter (2011) the military can be involved in technical aspects of policy-making and implementation, but not in fundamental decisions about how a country is run in terms of its role in civilian law enforcement. Born et al (2011) argue that the involvement of the military in governance is a controversial and problematic role which entails risks. Military involvement in governance can lead to politicization and can threaten civilian oversight of the military (Born 2009). Despite such facts the ZNA senior officials are part and parcel of public policy making process. Among all actors in the public policy formulation, the security sector has powers to sabotage or support public policy hence showing the influence of the ZNA in economic governance.

Ranger (2004) wrote that, the ruling party itself, having been a militarized liberation movement, failed to de-militarize itself, not only in practice, but also in attitude and style of management of civil institutions and the state at large. Dr Sydney Sekeramayi who was and is still the current Defence Minister once put it clear in 2000 that the national defence policy is based on the economic development of Zimbabwe. According to the minister the defence policy is intertwined with the economic and political nature of the society in which it operates. This was a clear statement from the minister which shows that the economic military nexus was inseparable. The voice and actions of the military during the fast track land reform cannot be ignored when it comes to the role of the military in economic governance. The military was at the fore front during the fast track land reform programme in 2000 as they take a lead in claiming their hard earned natural resource (land). Without the backup of the security sector specifically from the ZNA, the Fast Track Land Reform Policy was going to be a mere utopian dream.

Due to the militant nature of the Fast Track Land Reform Policy the country which used to feed Africa, as “breadbasket for southern Africa” (Sachikonye 2005) was actually struggling to feed its own citizens. The greediness of senior military officers who owned large pieces of land and which they actually do not know how to use for example the Chakoma Estates belongs to the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander, Constantine Chiwenga, Air Marshall Perence Shiri owns at least two farms in Marondera and Shamva. Reports also noted retired army general, Solomon

Mujuru and his wife, former Vice President, Joyce Mujuru together with their close family members allegedly own at least 25 farms totaling 105,000 hectares. The ZNA have an upper hand in decision making as far as the land question is concerned thus showing their influence in economic governance. However other factors beyond the influence of the ZNA are responsible for the failure of the land policy in Zimbabwe and this including lack of agricultural inputs, drought, lack of farming skills, unfair distribution of land and the violent nature of the policy implementation which threatened donor fund on agriculture among other causes are responsible for the failure of the land policy.

In economic governance the ZNA serves as both the brewer and shield of corruption for the benefit of corrupt ZANU PF ruling class. According to Zimbabwe Institute Report (2008) land audits picked many cases of unfair distribution of the land, embezzlement of funds donated by Britain and America which was supposed to be used for buying farms. There was looting of farming machineries by senior security officers in the ZNA and the ZANU PF elites. General Mike Nyambuya was accused of illegal acquisition of farming machineries in Manicaland at Kondozi Estate in 2006. The ZNA was given the mandate to take over from the GMB the delivering of national agricultural equipment and maize since 2002. (Solidarity Peace Trust April 2006). However due to corruption in the ZNA, food distribution benefited the card caring members of ZANU PF and relatives of the security agents hence affecting economic governance.

The ZNA exist as the ruling government's department of human resource which supply loyal military generals who can carry out any task given to them by the President regarding economic governance without any excuses. According to Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) a corollary sub-text to the militarization of political and economic governance can be noticed from the transfer of the ZNA High Command to civilian ministries responsible for both political and economic governance. Senior military officials are being kept closer to President Mugabe and ZANU PF through the use of nepotism and patronage system. The use of nepotism and patronage system was and is still a political fishing machine to attract the military agents by deploying them to take charge of means of production (Zimbabwe Institute Report 2008). According to Rupiya (2011) since independence, patronage system allows the President to channel military agents to control influential positions in economic governance. This was a well-planned strategy to protect the interest of the ruling party in economic governance. The deployment of military agents in state

owned entities is a living testimony that ZANU PF use nepotism and patronage approach when deploying former security agents in economic governance.

According to the Solidarity Peace Trust (2006) in November 2005, the Zimbabwe government began to implementing, Operation Taguta/Sisuthior ‘Operation Eat Well’ and the operation was under Colonel Ronnie Mutizhe. This Command Agriculture programme, conceived by the Joint Operations Command (JOC), consisting of the army, police, prisons, and the intelligence service, is aimed at placing the vital process of food production under the partial control of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. Through this operation, the army has deployed soldiers to enforce the delivery of grain by newly resettled farmers to the Grain Marketing Board, reputed for paying below market prices for grain products and long delays in paying for grain delivered. The programme has been widely criticized for its commandist approach to agriculture which tries to enforce peasants to grow the staple maize crop at the expense of other crops. The operation benefited mainly the members of the security sectors and ZANU PF activists. Direct influence of the ZNA in agriculture forcing peasants to grow maize only at the expense of other crops was a threat to food security hence affecting economic governance as far as the delivery of food is concerned. However the attempt by the ZNA to boost agriculture through Operation Maguta (Operation Live Well) should never be undermined.

The government launched the Operation Garikai/ HlalaniKulhe (Live Well) under the supervision of Lt Colonel Arnold Hakata which meant to christianize the satanic nature of the Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order). Although the Operation was an ideal for economic governance, the army was the overseer during the operation Garikai (Live Well) and soldiers were among the beneficiaries of the few houses built nationwide under the operation Garikai which has become part of the patronage system of the ruling government. Some reports noted that senior army commanders have been in charge of the building of houses across all provinces, and the overwhelming beneficiaries of ‘Operation Garikai/HlalaniKuhle’ have been the uniformed forces, senior government officials and their extended families. The Solidarity Peace Trust noted that about the 700 houses constructed in Cowdray Park in Bulawayo as part of Operation Garikai/HlalaniKuhle were occupied by the members of the security sector hence undermining the principle of equality and equity which are major core values of economic governance.

Despite such weakness the ZNA deserve recognition for trying to boost good governance through housing projects.

In August 2006, the government launched Operation Sunrise as a move to cure viruses which were already affecting the immune system of the economy. However the military was involved in the Operation Sunrise as a result, force was used instead of legal frame works. It is also reported that Operation Sunrise, was launched in a bid to curb Zimbabwe's hyperinflation and money laundering. The police, the army and members of the ZANU-PF's youth were at the forefront during the operation. According to Zimbabwe Institute Report (2008) in an attempt to control sky-rocketing food and other commodity prices as a result of Zimbabwe's hyperinflation, the JOC ordered an ill-advised clampdown in July 2007 compelling businesses and manufacturers to slash the prices of goods by more than 50 percent. The Operation Reduce Prices, was under the supervision of inspectors including the police, the army and the CIO, led to the arrest and imprisonment of directors of manufacturing companies, shop managers and widespread shortages of food and goods as shops failed to restock. The involvement of the military in such an economic operation was influenced by the imposition of ESAP by the Western countries. ESAP demanded the privatization of state owned entities and the resulted in job losses, unemployment, rise of civil discontent nationwide thus causing food riot, looting and destruction of shops. The involvement of the ZNA was a response to such a threat to governance but one can argue that the method used to solve such a problem was a threat to economic governance as it created an environment which was prone to violence.

The ZNA launched the Operation Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile (No More illegal Mining) of January 2007 which meant to stop the informal mining and illegal export of minerals. Members of the security sector including the army mounted on roadblocks on major highways to intercept suspected gold and diamond dealers and arrest them. In reality the need to end illegal mining was justified. Miners are supposed to get mining licenses from the ministry of mines so that through those licenses the government raise revenue. Chitiyo (2009) agreed that those companies which were given permission to extract diamonds in the Marange diamond field managed to get mining license through the back door. ZNA senior officials were at the fore front during the scramble for diamonds in Chiyadzwa namely the Vice Air Marshal, Robert Mhlanga,

who was President Mugabe's helicopter pilot for over 20 years, chaired the Mbada Holdings. Retired Captain Kurotwi was in charge of the Canadile Miners as a director. Rupiya (2011) noted that the military offered tight control of the Marange diamond. The ZNA launched another operation against illegal diamond miners in Chiadzwa after the police failed to offer security there. Chitiyo (2009) laments that Operation Hakudzokwi ('No return') chased away over 30,000 illegal diamond miners in Marange diamond fields. It cannot be disputed that instead of ending diamond dealing, the military agents were actually involved in the scramble for extracting these diamonds thus threatening economic governance as the government failed to raise revenue from diamonds resource.

The involvement of the military in public policy formulation makes the military a powerful institution in economic governance. According to Dye (1972) a public policy can be defined as whatever the government chooses to do and not to do while Anderson (1975) defined it as a purposive course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems. It can be noted that in Zimbabwe the military plays a key role in all the stages of public policy formulation especially on problem identification and implementation. ZANU PF depends on the military approval and support on the implementation of its policies since 1980. The upper hand of the ZNA in public policy formulation makes it is for the military to influence economic policies.

The researcher also comes with the tripartite centralization of power factor as a personal concept outside the views of the above mentioned scholars on military intervention in governance. The constitution of Zimbabwe allows the President to be the Commander In Chief of the ZNA, Head of state and government. Such a tripartite post allows the ruling government to control the military and even channel the security sector in the field of governance without much opposition. Apart from the abuse of the military by politicians in economic governance, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, parochialism, graft, fraud, bribery, abuse of privileged in information, abuse of power and embezzlement by public officials, poor economic policies, the impact of the economic sanctions, poor secondary industries, Zimbabwe's poor behaviour in the international system against the well developed countries among other factors are the main threats to poor governance in Zimbabwe.

The researcher noticed that the heads of the ZNA and civilian institutions in this country came through the same background of the liberation war and some are former veterans who answer to a specific ideological persuasion hence the nexus between the two is intertwined. This is a reality that cannot be dumped into a political and economic governance dustbin. It can be noted that soldiers are political animals, they have the mandate to support civil institutions in both economic and political governance hence the ZNA should not be in a position to allow political and economic developments which are not in line with a specific national agenda to go unchecked. Even in the Western countries the military does not only check and determine political and economic policies but they also influence them with the aim of promoting national interest on governance so the question is why not the Zimbabwe Nation Army?

2.6 Theoretical frame work

The influence of the military in economic and political governance is not new in all forms of governments. Military interventions in governance are results of many factors such as past or historical experiences, issues of political differences, economic based conflicts, personal or individual greediness, military strength or weakness, social, ethnic and cultural differences. This research will incorporate theories designed to explain the causes of military interventions in governance from the individual level to structural level. There are various theories which

explain military interventions in governance and this include socio-economic development, political development, the centrality of military and the internal conflict theory.

This research is going to examine these theories which explain the influence of the military in governance starting with the theory of social and economic development which is common in different forms of government administrations. Finer (1988) argues that the probability of military influence in government responsibility is more likely to be reduced with rise of social and economic development position. Countries associated with well-organized social and economic position have more advanced level of literacy rate, urbanization and well developed industries hence there are high chances for citizen participation in social and economic activities (Putnam, 1967). Social and economic development provides knowledge, perception or awareness of political events. In simpler terms, it promotes and provides opportunities of those who want to participate in politics and spread political materials or tools to actors who are ready and willing to run civil institutions. Industrialization diminishes the tendency of military involvement in governance due to the fact that high social and economic development will be always above the ability of the military to involve in governance.

In regard to the tenets of this theory, the facts mentioned here means countries with well-developed socio-economic status have limited influence of military in governance due to increased citizen participation and poor socio-economic development create limited participation of the masses in politics hence allowing the military to easily influence governance affairs. In the context of Zimbabwe, the country is suffering from poor socio-economic development. This caused poor participation of the mass in governance thus allowing the ZNA to intervene easily in governance since the socio-economic development of Zimbabwe is far from being beyond the skills of the ZNA. The intervention of ZNA in the 2002 Fast Track Land Reform Program in which top military commanders were more influential in distribution of land is a practical example.

The Political development theory is another area to be considered. The theory is mainly focused on explaining the concept of poor political institutions as well as overload in participation (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992). According to Huntington (1977) the importance of institutionalizing political organizations and procedures is determined by the concept of political development as well as political decay. The influence of the military in government affairs can be accelerated by political decay which is caused by lack of proportion between political institutionalization and social mobilization. If a poor political organization regulates participation, the government will definitely fail to meet demands of social conflicts in social mobilization. This will pave way for military intervention. The ZNA always takes advantage of the weaknesses of the political institutions to influence political governance especially during presidential elections and economically through occupying key civil institutions.

Last but not least, internal serious disagreements or differences dominated by the nature of the society also explains the influence of the military in governance. Ethnic hostility may include the number of different groups who constitute the society's culture (cultural diversity), the dominance of a group of people with a common national or cultural tradition (ethnic dominance) and competition based on cultural differences are the factors responsible for the military involvement in governance (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992). A military natured by ethnic and cultural differences is difficult to control as another tribe will try to control another thus forcing the dominant tribe to link with politicians in governance. Conflict within the society is normally fuelled by language differences and ethnic diverse. Kurian (1991) noted that several governments are making great efforts on creating countries or nations from societies natured by cultural diversity, the task is being a big challenge because the problem is based on a collective action. Morrison and Stevenson (1992) lament that the higher the number and diverse of cultural groups, the higher the elite conflicts hence paving a way for the military to influence governance. In the case of Zimbabwe, the ethnic conflicts between the Shona and the Ndebele are a sensitive issue which actually paved way for military intervention during the civil war in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. As the researcher writes, ethnic antagonism is still a problem in the ZNA since only Shona Generals dominated the ZNA executive board.

The centrality of the military approach theory explains the influence of the military in governance on the bases of centralization of power. The more the resources and the chances for military unification, the higher the chances of military influence in governance (Mayer and Burnett 1977). The concentration of power by the military sector and its legitimate use of violence helps the military to dominate political and economic institutions especially countries with poor civilian institutions (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992). If the military take control of many resources than civil authorities, there will be high probability of military influence in governance. One can argue that military institutions with high chances of getting a lot of revenue from the government are prone to coups. In Zimbabwe the military sector has more resources than civilian sectors thus allowing the ZNA to intervene in any sector of governance without much resistance from these civilian institutions.

The second view of this theory argues that a centralization of power, within the military sector enabled the military to exist as a strong united group with the ability to influence seizure. The ZNA is also a living testimony of this second view of the centrality theory due to the fact that the ZNA is under a centralized chain of command in which the President who is the first secretary and chairperson of ZANU PF and commander In Chief of the ZNA and Head of State and Government. President Robert Mugabe is the one who appoints all top military agents from the position of Colonel. Therefore it is from the above mentioned theories that explains why the Zimbabwe National Army intervenes in governance.

The researcher is going to use the centrality of the military approach due to the fact that its concept of centralization of power clearly reflects the ZNA's scope and nature on governance issues. It is the centrality military approach which explains well the influence of the ZNA in governance due to the fact that the authority in both political and economic governance is in the hands of no one else except President Mugabe.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter is going to give attention on the system of methods used by the researcher during the investigation concerning the influence of the security sector in governance specifically the ZNA hence emphasizing the mannerism in which the research shall be directed. Focus will be given also on the research design, tools to be used during the gathering of facts or data, the advantages and disadvantages of using a case study, sampling methods to mention but a few. The aim of this chapter is to find a methodical way to address the problem faced by the ruling government in governance issues to the extent that it depends on the influence of the security sector especially the military for its relevance in the state.

3.1 Research methodology

Sampling entails the steps or the process of selecting typical class, group or a small population containing the typical similarities of the whole population of the group or a class being researched. It explains the process of choosing a small or a part of the large population to act as a representative of the entire population. Qualitative method has been used as the research design and quantitative is applied in matters that are appropriate. Purposive sampling will be applied when it comes to sampling hence targeting people who have relevant information about the subject matter. The researcher is going to use qualitative approach to give more detail on the influence of the ZNA.

3.2 Research design

According to Bell (2005), the process of research design entails the collection of data with the main objective of bringing the data together so as to come out with a good research. This can be recognized through full knowledge about the research. Trochim (2006) has pointed out that research design is used to structure a research and acts as a “glue” that holds all of the elements in a research project together, it is a plan of action indicating the specific steps that are necessary to provide answers to research questions and thereby achieve the research purpose.

The research design used by the researcher is mainly descriptive and this is supported by a case study so as to allow the examination of factors relating to the gathering of relevant information. Research design explains in deep the plan designed to achieve a particular long-term aim (strategy) and this involves problem statement, the explanation on the meaning of the observation which tries to provide solutions to solve the challenge (Singleton and Straits 1999).

3.2.1 A case study

A case study refers to deep study of a particular research problem. Yin (1984:23) defines the case study research method “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” Yin (1994) laments that one should use a case study strategy because he or she deliberately wants to study contextual conditions. The research design is useful for the examination whether a specific theory and model actually applicable to phenomena in the real world. In this instance, a case study refers to the Zimbabwe National Army hence this is an institution which represents the whole security sector for Zimbabwe in this research. Kumar (2011:7) noted that a case study means a sub group of a population, it may be an individual, a town or a community.

It is necessary to use a case study especially when there is limited data on the area being studied. The researcher had little knowledge on how the security sector may influence governance process in Zimbabwe. The researcher managed to explore the genre through the application of the case study as the research design. In addition from that, the case study allows the researcher to have a deep knowledge about the causes of military influence in governance at all levels. Interviews help in the observing of first-hand information through personal conduct with the subjects.

3.2.2 Advantages of using a case study.

The researcher sought to benefit from various advantages of using a case study when one needs to get a well-articulated representative data and answers for the research questions and this include:

- Through detailed contextual analysis of an inadequate number of procedures and their relationships it helps in understanding of a complex issue.
- It is flexible; as such it enables the application of a variety of methodologies and relies on a variety of sources to investigate a research problem.
- It adds strength to what is already known through previous research.
- Enables the application of contemporary real-life situations and provides the basis for the application of concepts and theories and the extension of methodologies.
- The design can provide detailed descriptions of specific and rare situations.

3.2.3 Disadvantages of using a case study.

- It may bias the researcher's interpretation of the conclusion on the topic being researched by treating the case study as more specially or as the least among the whole area being studied.
- It cannot easily provide a room for valuation of cause and effect relationships.
- It cannot represent the whole scope and nature of the whole topic being researched hence the problems associated with the case study may not reflect the problems of the whole population being researched for example here it is not fair enough to argue that the challenges associated with the ZNA reflect the whole security sector since each department namely the CIO, ZRP and the Prison Service have different problems which are different from that of the ZNA.

The research used more than one method of collecting information (triangulation method).Denzin (2000) articulated that the use of more than one method to examine research questions for one to improve the validity of the findings is known as triangulation method. The best way to provide a sound reasoning validity of any research can be recognized through the use of triangulation method (Webb et al 2002). The researcher used methodological triangulation of data collection. It involves the use of more than one method of gathering data.

The shortcomings of observation namely the natural tendency urge to analyse information in a particular way which is far away from the reality on the ground (bias) was compensated by the use of questionnaires. Interviews were used by the research to make it easier to get direct answers from respondents on the influence of the military in governance. Randomly selected military bases to be studied represent almost the whole scope and nature of the Zimbabwe National Army.

3.3 Sampling methods used in the research

In this research, the researcher is going to use stratified random sampling and purposive sampling method.

3.3.1 Purposive sampling

Purposive sampling is applied when gathering information from the sample of population. Purposive sampling is when the researcher selects a sample on the basis of the information they have on the population including its elements and the nature of researcher aims (Babbie 1990). It is a sampling technique under non probability sampling that deals with case selection and that are representative of the population that is usually combined with techniques under probability sampling to reduce the weakness of each technique (Singleton and Straits 1999). The researcher used a sampling method which represents a single institution which shows a true reflection of the whole sector. Kumar (2011) lament that in circumstances where one has an aim of reaching a target faster, and where sampling for corresponding in size is not a major requirements, purposive sampling can be the best. With purposive sample, one is likely to get the

opinions of his or her target population. Therefore this sample is going to be used in this research in the selection of stakeholders which are military agents, government officials, war veterans, senior ZANU PF and opposition parties' members among others so as to get valid data to explain the problem.

3.4 Sources of data

Primary and secondary data will be used as key source by the researcher hence making it easy to extract valid information on the influence of the security sector in governance, specifically the ZNA. Singleton and Straits (1999) Primary data entails a first-hand interpretation of information or events as they happen.

The use of data collection techniques namely questionnaires, interviews and field observation that is free from bias is important. Secondary source are second hand sources which involve indirect evidence taken from primary sources through earlier researches namely textbooks and others.

3.5 Research instruments

Research instruments refer to the means, tools or instruments used to gather data during the research. The validity of tools or instruments used during the research determines how valid and reliable the research project is. Questionnaires and interviews will be used by the researcher in collecting data. The researcher will allow respondents to answer the questions in their own words without being influenced by the researcher.

3.5.1 Questionnaires

Questionnaires can answer many questions on what, when and how but it cannot answer well on the why question. Kumar (2011:145) defines a questionnaire as “a written list of questions, the answers to which is recorded by the respondents. In a questionnaire, respondents read the questions, interpret what is expected and then write down answers.” Both open ended and closed ended questions are going to be used by the researcher. Kumar (2011:146) ‘Open ended

questions are questions which are constructed to give choices to the respondent in saying anything within the context of the question, whereas closed ended questions have possible answers given which limit the respondent choices in providing his or her response'. The researcher is going to use questionnaires to get information on the influence of the Zimbabwe National Army on governance. The short comingsof the questionnaires is that they provide written evidence hence respondents can doubt the degree of confidentiality.

3.5.2 Interviews

Interview enables a face to face scenario between the interviewer and the respondent. In this research the researcher used direct interviews to collect data. Although interviews are an independent entity they can be familiarized with questionnaires. Direct interviews are important as the researcher can even take note of the gestures used by the respondent which can even explain a lot of issues concerning the topic being researched. Structured and semi structured interviews will be used by the researcher to counter the problem of fear among respondents on issues which are too sensitive or emotional. Although interviews enable the researcher to get valid information, it is also prone to bias as respondents can easily run away from the question being asked by the researcher.

3.6 Data collection procedures

As a precondition, seeking permission from relevant and responsible authorities, punctuality when given a time table scheduled for the interviews and preparations for conducting interviews and questionnaires are crucial prerequisite to be done. Data collection will start from the senior ZANU PF and senior officials from MDC T, senior war veterans' members, former Border Gezi students, government officials and finally the researcher will get information from senior officials from the Zimbabwe National Army. The researcher will avoid long time interviews as he will focus on key questions.

3.7 Summary

This Chapter has outlined the research methods and design used in carrying out the research on the influence of the security sector in governance in which the ZNA was used as the specific area of study. Research instruments such as the use of questionnaires and interviews, sources of data namely the primary and secondary sources, sampling methods such as purposive sampling and data collection procedures have been clearly outlined. The chapter examined the strength and weakness of using each instrument and it emphasized that the investigation is based on qualitative approach.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Response rate

4.1 Questionnaires

All in all 37 out of 42 respondents participated in answering the questionnaires. 80% of the ZNA and MDC senior officials responded to the questionnaires, 60% of the government officials also participated while participants from the war veterans and ZANU PF senior officials constituted 100% hence making a total rate of 88%.

Table 4.1: questionnaires raw data.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Total Contributors</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Not Contributed</u>	<u>% Contributors</u>
ZNA senior officials	4	5	1	80%
MDC T senior officials	8	10	2	80%
ZANUPF senior officials	7	7	0	100%
Senior War veterans	15	15	0	100%
Senior government officials	3	5	2	60%
Total	37	42	5	88%

Table 4.1 explains the results obtained from the questionnaires from numerous sectors namely from the ZNA, ZANU PF, MDC T, War veterans and government senior representatives. 88% total response proportion was obtained. 12% failed to participate due to a number of different reasons and some of the reasons include the fear of political victimization. Due to the current problem of political factionalism within the ruling party many senior members from the ZNA and ZANU PF officials regarded the research topic as a threat to their jobs.

4.2 Interviews

Stratum	Total interviewees	Interviewees participated	Interviewees not participated	%Participant
ZNA low ranked agents	1	1	0	100%
ZANU PF general supporters	4	4	0	100%
MDC T general supporters	2	2	0	100%
Low ranked War veterans	2	2	0	100%
Low ranked government officials	1	1	0	100%
Former Border Gezi graduates trainees in rural areas	1	1	0	100%
Former Border Gezi graduates trainees in urban areas	3	3	0	100%
Total	14	14	0	100%

Table 4.2: Interview raw data

Table 4.2 displayed above represents the proportion for interviews mainly from the low ranked ZANU PF, MDC T, war veterans, government representatives, former Boarder Gezi students from rural and urban areas. All the 14 respondents participated in the interviews hence making the overall response rate of 100%.

4.3 Zimbabwe National Army, State Security and Governance

There are various definitions of state security but state security entails the concept that government should protect the state and its citizens against all kinds of national crisis through a variety of power projection such as political power, diplomacy, economic power and military might.

In respect of the 80% respondents who viewed the influence of the security sector in governance as the other different side of the same coin, one can argue that the security sector cannot be substituted in governance as it provides state security which is a prerequisite for good governance. Respondents generally argued that there is a symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance citing the fact that always security motives overshadow issues of governance in Zimbabwe. Considering the consequences that have arisen due to the marriage between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance, the following was suggested by respondent from various facets.

Senior officials from the Zimbabwe National Army noted that the aim of the ZNA is to ensure state security, to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest of Zimbabwe so as to improve governance in Zimbabwe. They also noted that the provision of providing essential services to the public is also a mandate of the Zimbabwe National Army thus they denied allegations that their institution threatens good governance but rather the ZNA exist for the maintenance of state security. One of the senior officers (Chief Instructor) in the Zimbabwe National Army argued that ZNA has promoted good governance in Zimbabwe by upholding the constitution of the country which then facilitates other arms of government to function properly. They argued that without security, life will be brutal, nasty and short. The researcher noticed that such a concept cannot be treated like a mere utopian idea since it proved to be more realistic. Officials from the ZNA concluded that there is need for a constant military preparedness for the preservation of the state against all forms of threats on national security. The need for a strong army is for Zimbabwe's own defence. Senior officials from ZANU PF responded that the influence of military in governance is a necessity since it is the only way to safeguard security against forces of external aggression and internal chaos thus according to them with the absence of security sector, good governance will remain a dream. According to both senior War Veterans and

ZNA officials, the Zimbabwe National Army was created to safeguard any form of governance which upholds the principles of the liberation struggle and which does not affect state security. They also argued that any policy which threatens the principles of the liberation struggle is regarded as a threat to the state security and governance. They go further to elaborate that opposition political parties like MDC T represent a form of threat to ZNA, State security and governance.

On the nexus between the ZNA and state security on governance, it can be noted that many respondents namely officials from the ZNA, war veterans and ZANU PF officials agreed that any form of political institution, policy or law which is against the aims of the liberation struggle is a threat to ZNA, state security and governance. Only officials from opposition political parties such MDC T concluded that the abuse of the liberation struggle to justify military influence in governance in the name of state security is barbaric.

4.4 Zimbabwe National Army in civil ministries responsible for governance

According to the Movement for Democratic Change Tsvangirai (MDC T) department of Information many state officials from ZANU PF with security background were deployed to be head of civil institution in Zimbabwe in 2008. In an interview with one of the MDC T senior officials, civil ministries were controlled by the security sector especially the military and this includes the Ministry of Energy and Power Development (under Lieutenant-General Mike Nyambuya), Youth Development and Empowerment Creation (under CIO Saviour Kasukuwere and Brigadier Ambrose Mutinhiri), Transport and Communication (under Lt Colonel Hurbert Nyanhongo), Industry and International Trade (Colonel Christian Katsande), Energy and Power Development (under Ex CIO Justin Mupamhanga), Construction (with Colonel Joseph Mhakayakora as director), (Foreign Affairs with Major General Elisha Muzonzini, General Edzai Chimoyo and Brigadier Borniface Chidyausiku as ambassadors), Grain Marketing Board (under Samuel Muvuti), Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (under Major General Engelbert Rugeje), National Railways of Zimbabwe (under Air Commodore Mike Karakadzai), Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (under Major General Engelbert Rugeje), Prison Service (under Major General Paradzai Zimondi), the Central Intelligence (under Brigadier General

HappytonBonyongwe and many other ministries were and some are still run by former military generals at the basis of loyalty, nepotism and politics of patronage.

One of the senior officials in the government noted that President Mugabe appointed Brigadier General Asher Walter Tapfumaneyi as permanent secretary in the ministry of war veterans that was established after the ZANU (PF) Congress in December 2015 and others include Brigadier General ThandoMadzamus (economic planning), Air Commodore Ivan Gibson Dumba (higher and tertiary education) and Brigadier General Godfrey Chanakira (finance). President Mugabe made Brigadier General Evaristo Dzihwema the new youth ministry principal director while Major General Richard Ruwodo, Brigadier General James Muronzvi and Brigadier General were moved to the war vets ministry to help Brigadier General Tapfumaneyi. The current permanent secretaries and directors of various ministries have a military background for example Misheck Sibanda, the chief secretary to the president and cabinet is a former general.

Respondents from ZANU PF senior members agreed that Zimbabwe has well skilled military human resources who need to be freed from the political bondage of both ZANU PF and MDC T so as to improve governance systems. As it was not enough, they advocated that there is need for strong commitment by ZNA members to acquire management and technological skills as well as commitment on good governance ethics such as probity, transparent, accountability and recognition of rule of law when it comes to the governance of civil ministries. In addition from that they were frank enough to argue that the involvement of the military or former military agents in governance should not be at the interest of ZANU PF but of the public. Be as it may, opposition party supporters from the MDC T heavily condemned any attempt to recruit military personnel in civil institutions. Respondents from MDC T members recommended the need to demilitarize the civil institutions. However the military should only involve when necessary but the fact that there is no clear facts on who should determine when and how the ZNA should engage in governance makes the institution vulnerable to politicians.

4.5 The link between the ZNA and public policy execution

Respondents from the government officials noted that the top officials from the ZNA are always involved in all different typologies of public policies. Respondents from the government and ZNA officials argued that the ZNA as an institution cannot be separated from policy formulation due to the fact that ZNA has duty to make sure that the government complies with the country's policies for the benefit of the people.

ZNA officials noted that they cannot have too much influence on public policy formulation process since this duty is normally carried by the parliament, cabinet and the executives but they have the duty of oversight during the execution of public policies. "The ZNA can also participate in public policy execution under its constitutional mandate of military aid to civil authorities" said one of the colonels. Respondents from the ZNA argued that the Zimbabwe National Army has contributed in the execution of many policies especially on the Land Reform Policy. Respondents from the War Veterans noted that they gained maximum support from the ZNA especially during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme which benefited the majority of the landless citizens. Former Border Gezi graduates trainees also noted that without the hand of the ZNA the Land Reform Programme was going to be unsuccessful. The Zimbabwe National Army facilitated the Land policy through the deployment of its agents to those areas in which the white's settlers were resisting to vacate their self-claimed farms peacefully. In an interview with one of the MDC T senior members, the respondent vowed that the involvement of the ZNA in the execution of Land Policy was mainly for plunder thus they condemned the militarisation of the Land Policy. The researcher noticed that many top military officials benefited large pieces of land during the Land Reform Program at the expense of the poor citizens. As that is not enough, many of these senior military agents lacked the skills of agriculture hence this is negatively affecting agriculture in Zimbabwe to the extent that the country which used to be the back born of Southern Africa on food production is now struggling to feed its own citizens.

Despite the contribution of the mentioned respondents, the researcher noticed that the involvement of the ZNA during the execution of the Land policy in Zimbabwe was a necessary

evil. There is no doubt that the land issue in Zimbabwe started in the barracks since both the War Veterans and the military argued that the land question was the major reason among the causes of the liberation struggle so any attempt to engage the military on this matter was null and void. The presence of the security sector agencies namely Josiah Tongogora, Lockout Masuku, DubisoDabengwa among others during the Land agreement at Lancaster House justifies the involvement of the military again during the execution of the land policy in Zimbabwe. The military was supposed to play an oversight role as well as to preserve order during the execution of this policy. Public policy execution can only be successful when the policy is being implemented in a peaceful environment. At the other side the military was not supposed to play a key role on determining who is going to take which farm when and how since it resulted in the militarisation of the Land Policy.

Respondents from MDCT senior officials condemned the ZNA for being involved in the execution of legal policies such as AIPPA and POSA. They blamed the security agents for being used as a tool to safeguard ZANU PF's survival through the use of AIPPA which limited the freedom media. Through AIPPA the media was heavily monitored by the security agents so that it will not tarnish the image of the ruling government. Journalists were intimidated and mass media was not a free ticket. Respondents from the Border Gezi in both rural and urban areas noted that they used to help the military to maintain order in the country by banning opposition party rallies in the name of POSA. Low ranked officials from ZANU PF and the government also share the same view that the security sector is being abused by the ruling government to promote ZANU PF's survival. The researcher noticed that this low ranked official does not share the same belief with their senior officials on the influence of the security sector in governance. In an interview with one of the low ranked government agents, he opposed the oversight role of the military in governance arguing that the involvement of the military only benefits the top officials.

After an effective analysis of the views of the respondents on the involvement of the ZNA in public policy execution, the researcher can argue that the involvement of the military agents in

public policy execution cannot be undermined since it is the duty of the military sector to approve or disapprove national policies which threatens its mission statement thus all public policies cannot just be implemented without being checked by this important institution. Apart from that, the military is part and parcel of the execution stage when it comes to public policy formulation since it is the military which has the power to enforce compliance of the public to any public policy through the preservation of peace and order.

4.6 Achievements of the ZNA ingovernance

There are various achievements done by the Zimbabwe National Army since its formation. The Zimbabwe National Army senior officials noted that the military has the ability to offer all the services which are being provided by the government to the members of the public. They argued that the ZNA has the capacity to engage in civil authority institutions due to the fact that its agents are not only being trained for war but they are also equipped with the different skills which suit every civil institution responsible for governance.

As part of its internal achievements, the Zimbabwe National Army played an important role on State Security. The ZNA continued to safeguard the national interest of Zimbabwe especially on the doctrine of state sovereignty and its stand on the gay and lesbian rights which Zimbabwe condemned despite the imposition of the so called targeted sanctions on its top commanders. Zimbabwe is actually free from foreign detection thus this is one of the most achievements of the Zimbabwe National Army as far as governance is concerned. On peace, the ZNA has managed to help the Zimbabwe Republic Police on the preservation of peace which is the most important necessity for good governance to prevail, noted one of the top officials in the Zimbabwe National Army. One of the Border Gezi graduate trainees from Masvingo rural area noted that Zimbabwe is known abroad because of its ability to maintain peace. Senior officials from the ZNA boasted that it was through military that the hungry mob was contained in 2008 both in rural and urban areas.

They go further to argue that the ZNA also engaged in various community based projects for example the 1 Infantry Brigade Engineering Squadron involved in the construction of Usher Institute High School in Matebeleland, Landa John Nkomo High School , Esiphikeni Secondary School and the Sengezai River bridge in Matabeleland North, Goba Primary School, painting at Thekwani High School. The forces also undertake medical outreaches where they offer free medical aid to the members of the community for example the one which was carried out by medical staff from 1 Field Ambulance Company at Filabusi District Hospital conducted by 1 Infantry Brigade during the United Nation Peace Support Operation Exercise in 2014. There are also records of the ZNA participating in the fight against HIV and AIDs. In disaster management such as floods, the Zimbabwe National Army played a key role in rescuing citizens in time of floods for example in Muzarabani, TokweMukosi in Masvingo and party of Tsholotsho in 2013. The ZNA also participated in charity activities for example it carried clothes donation in Binga thus providing the basic necessity of citizens, noted one of the Colonels in an interview. The ZNA Chief Instructor argued that the ZNA is participating in land reclamation process in areas affected by landmines such as Crooks Corner to Sango Border Post in Chiredzilowveld area, Victoria Falls, Burma Valley in Mutare, Mukumbura Border Post in Mashonaland Central and Lusulu in Matabeleland North. This is positive contribution to governance as it allows free movement of people to access essential services. The same respondents noted that the ZNA played crucial role during the 1992 and 2002 drought when it involved in the distribution of food.

In an interview with the Chief Inspector in the ZNA respondent, he noted that a number of missions based on peacekeeping were carried out by the ZNA thus protecting the national interest of Zimbabwe and exposing the military agents to regional and international skills of safeguarding peace which is a prerequisite for governance. He noted that on 2 July 1991 the ZNA was deployed to Angola for peace keeping for the first time under Colonel Nyambuya. The Chief Instructor also noted that there after the ZNA was deployed to United Nations Peace Keeping in Somalia, Eritrea and Rwanda. The respondent argued that in 1998 President Mugabe deployed military in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to save Laurent Kabila from the M23 rebels. The fact that Angola and Namibia also sent their troops shows that the mission was

indeed a Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) initiative despite the fact that other countries in the region such as South Africa condemned it. In 2014 when President Mugabe was the Chair of SADC, the ZNA played a key role in Lesotho when Zimbabwe National Army top commanders and the minister of defence helped to restore order in Lesotho together with South Africa after an attempted coup. The Zimbabwe National Army got the world's attention when they arrested a planeload with well-armed 64 mercenaries who had planned a coup known as the Wonga coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea in 2004. Such contribution to the preservation of peace abroad is of paramount importance for good governance to prevail as evidenced by the improvement of both economic and political ties between Zimbabwe and those countries which Zimbabwe National Army helped.

On such achievements, the researcher noticed that the ZNA has full capacity to provide all the services offered by the civil institutions. There is need for this important sector to send its military agents abroad so as to improve not only military skills but development and technological skills so that they can meet modern standards of improving good governance.

4.7 Challenges faced by the ZNA in promoting good governance

Many respondents agreed that there are many factors which are responsible for the inefficiency of the Zimbabwe National Army and this includes economic incapability, technological incompetence, lack of a functioning industrial base, lack of functioning natural resources to support the military, politicisation of the military, the call for security sector reform being raised by opposition political parties, Zimbabwe's behaviour in the international system, the call for regime change agenda by the western countries, factionalism and lack of succession plan within ZANU PF, climate change, radical economic policies, sanctions, poverty, unemployment, political instability especially during presidential elections, corruption, mismanagement, politics of patronage and nepotism among other causes.

Officials from the Zimbabwe National Army noted that the institution is technologically backward as they are still using old model guns such as the AK 47. Some of their machines in many departments of the ZNA, vehicles and helicopters need to be replaced since they no longer

suit the modern military technology which can improve efficiency on both security and governance in Zimbabwe. Respondents from MDC T blasted the ZNA for being inefficiency because of mismanagement, politics of patronage and nepotism. The ZNA top officials denied such allegations as they complain about lack of enough resources to fund the institution. MDC T argued that the ZNA once depended on Namibian helicopters to help the citizens during the TokweMukosi natural disaster in 2013. They also noted that few months ago one of the ZNA helicopter was forced to land somewhere in Masvingo due to lack of fuel. However one of the Senior War Veterans in Masvingo denied such a statement arguing that it was a foreign plane. As that was not enough, in an interview with one of the MDC supporters, he undermined the effectiveness of the ZNA due to the fact that the institution is not yet in a position to demonstrate its military might at Defence Forces day like in other countries such as Russia. This is caused by lack of an industrial base and economic incapability. Be as it former graduates trainees from BorderGeziespecially those in the rural areas still believe that the ZNA is one of the most efficient and effective military institutions in the continent of Africa. Majority of these students shows that they have zeal to join the ZNA. Senior military agents heavily denied that they are linked to ZANU PF as they vowed that they are apolitical. Respondents from opposition political parties vehemently condemned the ZNA for being politicised and they argued that this is the most weakness of the ZNA.

The call for security sector reform threatens the efficiency of the ZNA. In an interview with one of MDC T senior members, he emphasised the need to reform the security sector especially the military basing on allegations that the ZNA top commanders politicize the military institution. The researcher noticed that such a view suffers from political maturity as far as the notion of state security is concerned. Reforming the security sector in Zimbabwe or even elsewhere in Africa can make the national security of Zimbabwe (if not of Africa) prone to predatory states or war mongers of this modern world such as Britain and United States of America. The reality on the ground shows that the security sector especially the military cannot be easily reformed just like a mere club due to the inseparable mandate between ZNA and civil institutions on governance. The imposition of radical policies threatens foreign investors, said one of MDC T respondent. Zimbabwe's behaviour in the international system poses demons of threats to state

security and governance in Zimbabwe due to the fact that Zimbabwe is not yet in a position to political insult the super powers of the international system as it results in the isolation of the country. It cannot be disputed that the Commander In Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, His Excellency Cde Robert Mugabe is always at loggerheads with super powers such as Britain and United States of America. President Mugabe always lambasted western countries, “...what is the problem? We now have aeroplanes which can take them back quicker than the ships used by their ancestors” he once shouted against the western countries in one of his speeches. However despite these western countries being super powers, there is no guarantee for them to win a war in the international system but it should be highlighted that the mentioned challenges truly affect the ZNA in governance.

ZANU PF senior members pointed their fingers to the western countries for imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe and for their western agenda on regime change in Zimbabwe hence causing economic challenges which hindered the efficiency of the ZNA in governance. It cannot be disputed that sanctions fuelled the economic hardships faced by Zimbabweans thus affecting the economic security and the call for regime change agenda threatens the political security. Factionalism and lack of succession plan within the ruling party is causing division if not confusion within the ZNA on who is going to be the Commander In Chief. The researcher is of the opinion that political factionalism and lack of succession plan also caused military factionalism with the ZNA hence affecting governance. Such threats to economic and political security are some of the major challenges faced by the ZNA in promoting good governance. The same can be said on climate change, poverty, unemployment, hidden tribal conflicts between the Shona and the Ndebele which was inherited from the 1980s’ civil war which threatens social security within the ZNA as a result affecting its efficacy in governance. Only Shona military generals dominated the ZNA executive hence causing divisions based on ethnic dominance. Climate change (which caused drought) and radical economic policies threatens food security and lastly the challenge of political instability which threatens human security is one of the challenges being faced by the ZNA in promoting good governance. There is need for the ZNA as an overseer of both policy makers and national policies to do its home on policy formulation and implementation free from political manipulation.

The researcher noticed that although the challenges raised by respondents proved to be true, there is need for a deep scanning of these challenges. It cannot be disputed that in Zimbabwe there are natural resources and the industrial base but the country is struggling to have the secondary industry to process those natural resources and boost the economy so as to fund the military institution with the purpose of improving governance in Zimbabwe. Technological incompetence, lack of political will, corruption, mismanagement of resources, nepotism and politics of patronage are some of the major challenges faced within the military institution thus there is real need for transparency and accountability as well as the need for professionalism. Government officials should walk the talk in dealing with all the mentioned problems thus the researcher advocates for political and economic will of the government in promoting efficiency in the ZNA with the aim of improving good governance.

4.8 An overview of the research findings

The results shows that the ZNA, government representatives, War Veterans, former Border Gezi graduates trainees, ZANU PF and the opposition party MDC T acknowledges the influence of security sector in governance specifically the Zimbabwe National Army. It can be revealed that there is no consensus among respondents on the neutrality of the ZNA in political and economic governance. The research revealed that the ZNA and governance in Zimbabwe are two sides of the same coin and the politicization of the ZNA as an institution is a harmful or destructive tool that can be monopolized to maintain governance power by political parties. It has been pointed out in this research that governance problems have been caused by the unprofessional militarization of civil authorities, corruption and mismanagement. The impact of sanctions can never be undermined. The major causes of poor governance have been due to lack of practical separation of powers in which the local authorities can be freed from ceremonial bondage. Various operations have been inaugurated by the ZNA in order to improve governance in Zimbabwe.

The research demonstrates that ZNA and governance issues are inextricably linked and the influence of the security sector in governance is of paramount importance. Various success

stories are in account for the achievements of the ZNA and this includes its influence on land reform programme which benefited many homeless indigenous Zimbabweans, the ZNA also involved in charity activities assisting disadvantaged communities, it played a key role in national disaster management for example in time of floods, removal of landmines, distribution of food during drought and in national, regional and international peace keeping. Never the less corruption, mismanagement, lack of transparency, politics of patronage, absence of separation of powers, sanctions and lack of military will to carry out military duties based on offering military assistance to civil institution so as to improve good governance are some of the challenges affecting the ZNA

4.9 Summary

The chapter was focused on the research outcome obtained through the application of qualitative method based on the use of tables only. The information gathered shows that the security sector specifically the ZNA is capable to guarantee good governance but a number of factors are responsible for its failure. The unprofessional militarization of key state institutions responsible for governance is an extension of ZANU PF's power in Zimbabwe. ZNA and governance issues are inextricably linked. The relation between the ZNA and governance in Zimbabwe is like a bullet and a gun, the two cannot work separately due to the fact that the military has the duty to offer assistance to civil authority. The adverse, harmful or unfavourable governance situation affecting the country owes much to the militarization of civil ministries responsible for governance. Commitments to demilitarize civil ministries was attempted so many times by opposition political parties namely the MDCT and as the researcher writes opposition parties now including the People First of Joice Mujuru are calling for demilitarization of key state institutions. Coming next is a short well-crafted chapter focusing on the summary, conclusion and recommendations of this whole study.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

In this chapter, a brief statement of the overall research will be outlined. It is the aim of the chapter to sum up the results obtained during the research. Recommendations on what needs to be done, why and how, so as to achieve good governance through the use of the security sector specifically the ZNA will be outlined in this chapter..

5.1 Summary

The investigation was carried out through an approach that assesses the extent or effect of the Zimbabwe National Army as part of the security sector in influencing both political and economic governance. Main attention was on the efficiency and effectiveness of the ZNA in improving good governance in Zimbabwe.

In the first part of the research, the introduction including the background, statement of the problem, objectives of the research, research questions, justification of the research, limitations and delimitations of the research have been outlined. The investigation of this topic arose from serious concern about the deployment of former military agents in key civil institutions causing the problem of unprofessional militarization of the state which fuelled poor governance. The nexus between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance is also clarified in this chapter. Attention to the writings of previous scholars on the same topic being researched was given on chapter two and the researcher also managed to fill the gap which was not discussed by these writers. There is not a single factor which explains the involvement of the military institution in both economic and political governance in Zimbabwe. However, good governance will remain a dream without the almighty influence of the ZNA.

Chapter three was focused on research methodology which the researcher used to carry out the research. The researcher used first hand source (primary sources) and second hand sources (secondary sources) during data collection. Questionnaires and interviews were used as research designs. Due to a number of reasons beyond the control of the researcher some of the questionnaires were not answered and some interviews were not successful.

The fourth chapter was based on describing or indicating precisely the results. The research shows that the Zimbabwe National Army cannot be divorced from both governance and ZANU PF. National policies such as the Land Reform Programme, Indigenization Policy, Zim-Asset and Operations such as the Operation Maguta/Sisuthi (Feed Well), Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle (Live Well) owes much to the influence of the ZNA. More-so there is increased rate of political interference in the security sector causing the ZNA to be vulnerable in the hands of ZANU PF. It was revealed in this chapter also that a number of achievements were done by the ZNA in improving good governance and a number of challenges affecting the ZNA in governance were noted. It has been made clear that limited political influence in the military institution can save a long way to guarantee the influence of the ZNA in governance. This chapter gives an overview of the whole research, recommendations and the conclusion of the research.

5.2 Conclusions

The research was a success hence the investigation was able to examine the influence of the security sector on governance using the case study of the ZNA and the results obtained from the research shows that the influence of the security sector in governance issues is inextricably linked. The ZNA has contributed or achieved a lot towards political and economic governance in Zimbabwe however the influence of the ZNA in governance was associated with negative effects more than positive effects. The government's capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies with the help of the Zimbabwe National Army is very poor and this has been caused by the politicization of the military through the use of politics of patronage and nepotism. This has affected the independence of the ZNA in political and economic governance causing the institution to be prone to political abuse. It can be suggested that freedom from

political bondage among other factors can lead to the independence, transparency and professionalism within the ZNA as far as governance is concerned. The ruling party ZANU PF is failing to divorce its self from the security sector especially the ZNA due to the fact that ZANU PF regards the ZNA as a ZANU PF product inherited from ZNLA and ZIPRA military wings during the liberation struggle hence ZANU PF claims ultimate jurisdiction over the ZNA on governance. The ZNA despite having the influence, authority and power in political and economic governance, the institution is facing a numbers of factors such as the politicization of the military, corruption, mismanagement, lack of transparency and accountability, lack technological competence, lack of an efficient and effective industrial base, economic incapability, sanctions, politics of patronage, nepotism and lack of military will and passion to respect military ethics or principles in governance.

5.3 Recommendations

The research analyses the practical situation which currently exists between the security sector and governance process in Zimbabwe. Recommendations on the influence of the ZNA in governance are of paramount importance in this research.

First and foremost are the efforts to make sure that the ZNA is not being abused by politicians hence military generals should stop and refused to be used by politicians just like political tissues or political condoms which these politicians used when it suit their interest in governance. History shows that after being used by politicians, military generals are dumped into political dustbins. There is real need for the security sector especially the ZNA and government executives to pass through political circumcision in which the foreskins of their corrupt political minds can be removed so that they can be protected against political and economic viruses such as politics of patronage, nepotism, corruption among others for the recognition of good political and economic governance.

The ZNA should get freedom from political bondage of the liberation struggle which is being used by ZANU PF to justify its marriage with the military. In political governance this can be done through advocating for New Electoral Reform Agenda (NERA) which allows the demilitarisation of the ZEC. Advocating for NERA is the best way to improve political governance than the call for the so called security sector. Reforming the security sector in Zimbabwe or even elsewhere in Africa is not a one day task and such a concept can make the national security of Zimbabwe (if not of Africa) prone to predatory states or war mongers of this modern world such as Britain and United States of America. The ZNA should refuse to support national policies which threaten military security, economic security, political security, human security, food security, environmental security and social security if the security sector wants to curb all threats on governance. The military should remain apolitical not just in theory but in practice, military agents should be professional and walk the talk on the neutrality of the military in governance.

Zimbabwe should spend more time on military build-up so that the ZNA can play a key role not only in national security but in governance also hence attempts to force top commanders to be replaced can be regarded as a suicide bomb to political and the economic governance. Top commanders should attend military workshops together with other military institutions from other countries which have the ability to run the military institution with respect to military professionalism so that they can understand the practicality of such a doctrine. There is need for transparency and accountability in the military sector so that the ZNA can effectively carry out its duties on governance with zero tolerance to corruption. Soldiers should be promoted on the basis of ability than politics of patronage and nepotism. There is also need for ZNA to engage in military diplomacy with countries such as Russia and China so as to get modern military, technological and governance skills. Education requirement should be a must when it comes to recruitment this can improve the management skills of ZNA top officials on governance. The military should be prepared to support any government elected by the Zimbabweans and any government elected by the Zimbabweans should be flexible enough to cooperate with this important sector for the recognition of good governance in Zimbabwe rather than engaging in a barbaric and nonsensical call for security sector reform.

The ZNA agents should always be alert to poverty, climate change and natural disasters so as to safeguard social and food security in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe should swallow its pride in the international system and allow diplomatic means to be used by the military to negotiate on the removal of sanctions on behalf of state so as to stabilize economic security of the country. Peace should be safeguarded at all costs by the ZNA with the aim of guaranteeing political security and human security. Good relations with other countries in the international system is of paramount importance for military security and recognition of good governance hence President Mugabe should revise his behaviour in the international system despite his realistic nature. ZNA agents should maintain integrity so as to improve its public relations with the society. The ZNA should be able to maintain political security, economic security, social security, human security, food security, military security and state security among other dimensions of security for good governance to prevail.

In short there is real need for the military agents to be in barracks than in the village (demilitarization of civil institutions) and the villagers should know what is happening in the barracks (transparency in the military sector). However, the reality is that civil institutions will never succeed in promoting good governance without the almighty hand from the barracks because the existence of barracks is for the protection of the village (civil institutions). If good governance is to be recognized in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe governance builders should start not from the roofing where they target to remove President Mugabe from power but they should start from the foundation by promoting the independence, efficiency, effectiveness, integrity and above all professionalism in the security sector specifically the ZNA.

5.4 Suggestion for future research

Drawing lessons from this investigation, the researcher learned that ZNA and governance issues are inextricably linked thus all key players in governance issues should not use emotions when it comes to the relationship between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance but should face the reality that as long as ZANU PF exist, attempts to undermine the influence of the ZNA in

governance is a waste of time. However the ZNA should be prepared to work with any government elected by the people through a democratic election due to the fact that although ZANU PF government has been elected into power by both hook and crook means, the government will one day come out of power by both hook and crook means but the state of Zimbabwe will remain forever hence the duty of military should not be shaken by change of government. All key players in governance should consider the duty of the Zimbabwe National Army in governance. A lot of issues need not only to be discussed or written but to be put in to practice within the military so as to improve good governance in Zimbabwe.

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Appendix I: Respondent Questionnaire

Dear respondent,

My name is **Hopewell Mupanganyama**, a fourth year student studying Bachelor of Science in Politics and Public Management at Midlands State University. This questionnaire is designed to examine the **influence of the security sector in governance. Case study Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) (1980-2015)**. The information you provide will help us understand better the relationship between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance. Due to the fact that you are the one who has valid information on this topic, I am kindly requesting you to respond to the questionnaire frankly and honestly.

Confidentiality is the major ethic to be respected on the information which you are going to provide. In order to ensure privacy you are provided with the participant's telephone number +263778 470 116 which you can use for the follow up procedures.

The summary of the results will be mailed to you after the data has been analyzed in case you are interested.

I thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

We greatly appreciate your help in furthering endeavours this research.

Yours sincerely

.....

Researcher

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

Name of the respondent (optional).....

Email address of the respondent if any

I kindly request you to tick in the box provided

1. Gender of the respondent

a) Male

b). Female

2. Age of the respondent

a) 25-30

b). 31-35

c). 36-45

d). 46 and above

f) Below 25

3. Marital status

a) Single

b). Married

c) Others specify

4. The highest level of education of the respondent

a) Primary

b). Secondary

c). Tertiary

d).University

e). others specify.....

5. Designation

SECTION B: The relationship between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance in Zimbabwe.

6. Do you think there is any relationship between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance in Zimbabwe?

a). Yes

b). No

b). Give reason/s for your answer?

.....
.....

7. State any contributions from the Zimbabwe National Army which promoted governance in Zimbabwe.

.....

.....

8. State any activities or actions carried by the Zimbabwe National Army which threatens governance in Zimbabwe.

.....

.....

SECTION C: The scope and nature of the Zimbabwe National Army.

9. The Zimbabwe National Army is aimed at :(please rank the following on the scope and nature of the Zimbabwe National Army that is 1 to least or 3 to most)

Statement	1	2	3
Aimed to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests of Zimbabwe than governance interest of the ruling elites			
Aimed at providing essential governance services to the members of the public			
Created to safeguard governance which upholds the principles of the liberation struggle.			
Established to protect and support ZANU PF's interest on governance.			

If any other specify

a).....

b).....

c).....

10. The following are the characteristics of an efficient and effective Zimbabwe National Army. Please rank the following characteristics of the Zimbabwe National Army that is 1 to least or 4 to most)

Statement	1	2	3	4
Should be free from political interference				
Should be under commanders appointed on the basis of ability than patronage and nepotism				
Should not be under one centre of power but should show transparency and accountability				
Should guarantee military professionalism				

11. In your opinion, has the government of Zimbabwe managed to formulate policies which promote governance with the help of the army.

(a) Yes (b) No

(i) If yes, what could be the role of the Zimbabwe National Army on promoting sound policies for good governance? Please rank 1 to least or 5 to most)

(a) To promote a peaceful internal and external environment for policy implementation	1	2	3	4	5
(b) Ensures that those in authority (policy makers) have been removed and replaced constitutionally.					
(c) Ensures that both government and civilians comply with relevant laws and regulations which safeguard policies					
(d) Ensures that it defends the national security and national interest of Zimbabwe on policy implementation					
(e) To be deployed internally or externally on the basis of peace keeping in areas which threatens policy implementation					

If any other, specify

(a).....

(b).....

(c).....

SECTION D: The challenges faced by the security sector on the case of Zimbabwe National Army.

12. The Zimbabwe National Army is still facing the following challenges. Please rank 1 to least or 6 to most)

Statement	1	2	3	4	5	6
Lack of militarily skilled human resources						
Economic incapability						
Technological incompetent						
Lack of industrial base						
Lack of natural resources to support the military base						
Politicisation of the military						

If any other, specify

(a).....

(b).....

(c).....

13.The following are the policies and operations in which the Zimbabwe National Army influenced (please rank 1 to least or 4 to most)

Statement	1	2	3	4
Land reform programme				
The Indigenisation policy				
Operation Garikai (Live well)				
Operation Maguta (Eat Well)				

If any other, specify.....

14. As an individual are you satisfied with the influence of the Zimbabwe National Army in promoting good governance?

(a) Fully satisfied (40-80%)

(b) Partially satisfied (80-100%)

(c) Not at all (00-40%)

Thank you very much for your cooperation



AppendixII: Respondent Interview Guide

APPENDIX I: Interview Guide

My name is Hopewell Mupanganyama. I am studying on the road to completion of a BSc in Politics and Public Management with Midlands State University. I am researching on **the influence of security sector in governance. Case study of the Zimbabwe National Army from 1980 to 2015**. I kindly ask for your assistance by answering all the questions included in this questionnaire. Your response shall be kept confidential and only used for academic reference.

1. Gender of the respondents
 2. Marital status
 3. Highest level of education attained
 4. Occupation of respondents
 5. Do you think there is any relationship between the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and governance in Zimbabwe?
 6. What are the contributions made by ZNA which promoted governance in Zimbabwe?
 7. What are the activities or actions carried by the ZNA which threatens governance in Zimbabwe?
 8. What is your comment on the influence of the ZNA on the land reform policy, indigenization policy, Operation Garikai (Live Well) and Operation Maguta (Eat Well)?
 9. What are the major challenges threatening the efficiency and effectiveness of the ZNA in governance?
 10. What are achievements made by the Zimbabwe National Army in governance?
- Any other comments on the nexus between the Zimbabwe National Army and governance?

Thank you for your responses.