
Declaration


I, **Collen Chambwera (R103980Y)** do hereby sincerely declare that this dissertation is my own original work that has not been previously submitted to any other university. In writing this work I duly complied with ethical issues and laws governing intellectual property.



Certificate of Supervision

I hereby certify that I personally supervised this dissertation in accordance with Department Regulations and the University General Regulations.

On that basis, I confirm that this dissertation is examinable



Acknowledgements

Glory, honour and thanks be to the Lord God Almighty who granted me the patience, strength, wisdom and diligence to finish this study. His Word that says *Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might, for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest* (Ecclesiastes 9:10) helped me apply myself.

I would like to say a big thank you to my supervisor TheChiefIgwe Albert Chibuwe for his patience, guidance and academic incisiveness that helped shape this product. Sometimes it felt like torture but it was worthwhile.

To my family that has been there with me through it all, thank you very much. Special mention to Nicole Rutendo Chambwera who made me laugh even when stressed, thank you girl, I pray you grow up a God fearing lady.


To Cde Lyton Neube (the Dynamos son) thank you for all the help and books you offered, you threw capitalism out of the window. To Mr Z. E. Mugari thank you for not being stingy with some of your books. Many thanks as well to all the staff in the department, I owe a lot of what I know now to all of you.

To my colleagues for the past four years it has been great working with you all.



Dedications

This dissertation is dedicated to my God who makes everything beautiful in its own time.



Acronyms

AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
АМН	Alpha Media Holdings
GPA	Global Political Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change – Team
MDIF	Media Development Investment Fund
MKD	Mavambo Kusile Dawn
RPPC	Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company
UANC	United African National Council
UP	United Parties
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDP	Zimbabwe Democratic Party
ZMMT	Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust
ZUM	Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust Zimbabwe Unity Movement

ABSTRACT

The study set out to establish why there seemed to be contrasting discourses emanating from *The Herald* and *Newsday*'s framing of a proposed opposition alliance prior to the 31 July 2013 elections. While polarisation of the media in Zimbabwe had been documented before, the period in which this study takes place was unique in that the country was in a dispensation of a government of national unity (GNU). The previous polarised environment was expected to have been corrected or at least minimised during this period since all the major political parties were represented in government. A qualitative research paradigm was used for the study where archival research was used to obtain the stories which were purposively sampled and critical discourse analysis was used to analyse data. The study established that there was no break from the past in terms of the pro-ZANU PF and anti-ZANU PF discourse in media framing of the proposed alliance. The state controlled media framed the proposed alliance as a Western project to topple the nationalist ZANU PF while the privately owned media framed the proposed alliance as the most viable project to defeat ZANU PF at the polls.



Acronyms


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
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CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

Political discourse in the Zimbabwean media has largely been marked by binaries of proruling party and anti ruling party reportage. These differences become more acute during election periods of which the 2013 elections were no exception. Unlike previous elections, the 2013 elections were coming in an era of a government of national unity (GNU). The GNU had been necessitated by a disputed 2008 presidential election run-off in which Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC T), had pulled out of, citing violence against his supporters (Masunungure 2011, Koboyashi 2010).

With the signing of a Global Political Agreement (GPA) that gave birth to the GNU, media reforms had been proposed that were expected to usher in a new media environment from the previously polarised one. The reforms were proposed to create an environment where the public media would serve the interests of all citizens instead of the prevailing situation where the public media were tightly controlled by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government. Furthermore, new media players, both in print and broadcasting were supposed to be licensed under the envisaged reforms.

ZANU PF control of the public media started soon after the country gained independence in 1980 and as Chuma (2005) argues, the private press was serving largely the interests of white capital in the absence of a formidable opposition in the first decade of the country's independence. As economic conditions worsened in the 1990s, so did opposition voices intensify from civil society and labour (Chuma 2005, Ronning and Kupe 2000). The ruling ZANU PF responded by tightening its control of the public media. Notably during all the elections from 1985 the public media have demonstrated an open support for ZANU PF while vilifying the opposition (Chuma 2005).

Whereas the public media are accused of being pro ZANU PF, private media employ "thenothing-can-ever-come-out-of-this-wretched government attitude" (Mano 2005:65). Mano (2005) calls it the behaviour of the aggrieved Private newspapers have often been labelled opposition press by ruling party officials including President Robert Mugabe (Ronning and Kupe 2000).

This study therefore seeks to interrogate how the media framed the proposed alliance of opposition parties prior to the 31 July 2013 elections which were coming within the context of the GNU. The proposed alliance was that of the Morgan Tsvangirai led MDC T, Welshman Ncube led MDC, Dumiso Dabengwa led Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Simba Makoni led Mavambo Kusile Dawn (MKD) and Reketai Semwayo led Zanu Ndonga.

1.2 Background of Study

The 2013 harmonised elections took place in the context of a government of national unity (GNU). Political bickering amongst the parties in the GNU was the order of the day (*Newsday 4 March 2011, Financial Gazette 2 August 2012, The Zimbabwe Independent 17 September 2010*). ZANU PF sought to regain and continue its dominance in Zimbabwean politics while the MDC T sought to gain ascendancy to sole governance through the GPA (*Zimbabwe Institute Policy Brief March 2011*). The MDC N was accusing Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe of colluding to ostracise him (*voazimbabwe.com*).

Meanwhile ZAPU, a party that played a key role in the liberation struggle but later joined ZANU PF in 1987 was experiencing revived fortunes under the leadership of Dumiso Dabengwa. However, MDC N and ZAPU were largely regarded as regional parties whose major support base was in the Matabeleland regions. At one time Tsyangirai labelled Ncube a "village politician" (*Newsday 4 December 2012*). However, even though the MDC T had a much larger support base across the entire country, based on the distribution of seats in parliament, opinion polls pointed to ZANU PF having a slight lead although there were a few that had MDC T leading (*newzimbabwe.com, freedomhouse.org, zimbabweelection.com*). There was therefore a perception that a united opposition had a more realistic chance of defeating ZANU PF at the polls.

Simba Makoni backed by his Mavambo Kusile Dawn (MKD) party had contested in the 2008 presidential election in which he had managed to get 8 percent of the votes (Adeniyi 2011).

However, he could not make it into the GNU because his party had not managed to acquire any single seat in parliament. Zanu-Ndonga on the other hand last won a parliamentary seat in 2000 (Laakso 2003). In the run up to the 2013 elections, there were leadership contestations involving Wilson Khumbula and Reketai Semwayo (herald.co.zw, dailynews.co.zw). According to news reports, Semwayo was claiming chairmanship of the party since Khumbula had left the party to join MKD, while Khumbula was arguing that he had never left the party and therefore was the rightful leader.

Included in the GPA were constitutional, electoral and media reforms. The media reforms were meant to lessen the gap between the private and public media. Previously there had been acute media polarisation with the public media reporting in support of ZANU PF and the private media being pro opposition (Chuma 2005, Moyo 2005). New broadcasters and newspapers were expected to be licensed although only two private radio stations were licensed as well as a number of newspapers.

The Herald is one of two daily publications by Zimpapers, a publicly owned but state controlled publisher. *Newsday* is a daily publication belonging to Alpha Media Holdings, majority owned by Trevor Ncubea. As noted by Chibuwe and Nwafor (2012) the state media (which include *The Herald*) are criticised for supporting ZANU PF while the private media support MDC T. Furthermore, there is a perception that *Newsday* supports the Welshman Ncube led MDC (although Trevor Ncube himself refuted those allegations during a public lecture at Midlands State University in 2011). Trevor Ncube and Welshman Ncube are both from Matabeleland and a regional solidarity cannot be ruled out for the perceived Newsday pro MDC N reportage.

It is within the political context of GNU struggles and uncertainties of the pending poll outcome that *The Herald* and *Newsday* framed the proposed alliance of MDC T, MDC N and ZAPU to fight the dominant ZANU PF at the polls. By framing Entman (2010) contends that the media select few aspects of a perceived reality and connect them together in a narrative that promotes a particular interpretation. Thus when two media outlets in the same country are presented with the same event they will cover it at least slightly differently (Oates 2008).

De Vreese (2005) argues that through framing the news media influentially shape public opinion. Thus "those who produce the news are aware of the expectations of the audiences as consumers or as citizens or some combination of both" (Oates 2008:5). There was a general feeling among the citizens that the 2013 harmonised elections would be the most tightly contested in Zimbabwean history. The framing of the proposed alliance could therefore have been seen as an attempt to tilt the scales in favour of either ZANU PF or the opposition.

1.3 Statement of Problem

The GNU was expected to provide a conducive environment where the media would give equal, balanced and unbiased coverage to all political parties. The media are regarded as watchdog of society and therefore they hold to account those who are in positions of influence for the good of society. The watchdog role calls for fair representation of all groups in society. However, when a coalition of opposition parties was proposed, *The Herald* and *Newsday* seemed to frame the alliance in contrasting discourses leaving one wondering whether pre-GNU practices had carried over into the new dispensation.

1.4 Significance of the Study

While studies of media framing of political parties in Zimbabwe during elections have been carried out (Chuma 2006, 2008, Waldahl 2005), these were focusing on framing of individual political parties in an environment where there was a sole ruling party, ZANU PF. This study is significant in that it investigates media framing in an environment of a GNU where there was no single ruling party, the first time since independence that ZANU PF could not be referred to as the ruling party. Furthermore, the study is significant in that it focuses on media framing of a proposal for two of the three parties in the GNU to form an alliance with other parties outside of government, against the other party in government. Zimbabwe has never experienced such a unique situation before and it provided the media with supposedly unique challenges in terms of framing the new political realities. It is therefore necessary to investigate how the media responded to the new unique scenario of former opposition parties forming a grand coalition against the former ruling party ZANU PF. It is also necessary to find out if the media would stick to their framing practices prior to the GNU scenario or there

would be a departure. Such a study could help us theorise on the role of the media in a unique transitional period such as the one that had occurred in Kenya as well as in Zimbabwe.

1.5 **Objectives of Study**

By the end of this study I hope to be able to:

- ◆ Identify the frames used by *Newsday* and *The Herald* in reporting the proposed grand opposition alliance.
- Establish the discourses promoted by the framing employed by the two newspapers

Main Research Question 1.6

♦ How did *The Herald* and *Newsday* frame the proposed grand alliance of opposition parties prior to the July 31 2013 harmonised elections.

1.6.1 Sub Res<mark>earch Question</mark>

- What discourses emerged from *The Herald* framing of the proposed grand opposition alliance prior to 2013 harmonised elections?
- What discourses emerged from *Newsday* framing of the proposed grand opposition alliance prior to 2013 harmonised elections?

Assumptions 1.7

- Newsday viewed the proposed opposition alliance as having a more realistic chance of defeating ZANU PF in the pending elections.
- The Herald viewed the proposed opposed to the country. * The Herald viewed the proposed opposition alliance as a Western sponsored project that

1.8

My study will focus on framing by Newsday and The Herald and thus will be restricted to textual analysis and will not delve into whether the particular framing resulted in change in public opinion. The study will focus on framing in news reports covering the period 15 June to 15 July 2013.

1.9 Limitations of the study

Since the study focuses on two newspapers, *Newsday* and *The Herald*, findings may not be generalised to other media houses. While meticulous care will be taken to reduce subjectivity, I acknowledge that the nature of qualitative research makes it very possible for researchers to reach different interpretations of the same articles.

1.10 Ethical Considerations

As a citizen of Zimbabwe I am affected by political developments in the country. While I do not consider myself an opposition supporter, I cannot deny the fact that I am riled by the way the long ruling party ZANU PF has steered the country to economic ruin. I admit that this view could have an influence on how I interpret media coverage of the party as well as the opposition. Using critical discourse analysis as a method of analysing data gives room to my subjective perceptions. I will however endeavour to minimise my subjectivity by being reflexive. Mason (2002:7) asserts that reflexivity "means that researchers should constantly take stock of their actions and their role in the research process, and subject these to the same critical scrutiny as the rest of their data."

1.11 Conclusion

In this chapter I introduced my study while giving a background as to how the study came about and the gap that the study intends to occupy in as far as framing of political developments in Zimbabwe prior to an election is concerned. I also outlined the assumptions and prejudices I carry as I delve into the study. The questions that the study seeks to answer have also been outlined.

Our Hands Our Minds Our Destiny

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I place my study within the context of related scholarly work. According to McKinney (2008:1) "a literature review summarises, interprets, and critically evaluates existing "literature" (or published material) in order to establish current knowledge of a subject. The purpose for doing so relates to ongoing research to develop that knowledge: the literature review may resolve a controversy, establish the need for additional research, and/or define a topic of inquiry." As noted by Levy and Ellis (2006) a literature review should clearly demonstrate that new knowledge will be added to what already exists or extends what is already known in the field.

2.2 Power of opposition politics and coalitions in Zimbabwe

For an appreciation of the significance of the framing of the proposed opposition alliance by The Herald and Newsday, there is need to trace the history of opposition political parties in Zimbabwe particularly the various alliances entered into since independence and place them within the context of the power of opposition coalitions in a multi party democracy. This is important because, as noted by Karume (2003) the actors that make up opposition coalitions are seeking to control the executive. Hence the incumbent government is bound to offer some kind of response to the formation of an opposition coalition.

Zimbabwe had numerous parties contesting the 1980 elections including ZANU PF led by Robert Mugabe, PF-ZAPU led by Joshua Nkomo, United African National Council (UANC) led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, ZANU (Ndonga) led by Ndabaningi Sithole, Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) led by James Chikerema and Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front (Laakso 2003, Sachikonye 2002). When ZANU PF won the elections, the first post independent coalition was formed when PF ZAPU was allocated five of the 36 cabinet posts (Laakso 2003). Sachikonye (2002) notes that, "ZANU PF was magnanimous in victory and established a government of national unity. Joshua Nkomo was allocated the Minister of Home Affairs portfolio (Laakso 2003). While this is not exactly a coalition of opposition parties, rather ruling party and opposition, it points to a realisation that coalitions have the capability of bringing together different ethnicities (Arriola 2013), as PF ZAPU largely drew its support from Matabeleland while ZANU PF had the majority in Mashonaland.

This coalition ended when in February 1982 arms were found at farms owned by Joshua Nkomo, leading to all PF ZAPU ministers being sacked from government (Laakso 2003, Makumbe 2011). Following the sacking of PF ZAPU ministers a military campaign ensued in Matabeleland and Midlands orchestrated by the Fifth Brigade, to quell dissident activities by PF ZAPU (Laakso 2003, Makumbe 2011, Sachikonye 2002). Christine Sylvester in Laakso (2003:122-123) noted that "to the government Nkomo was simply a bad loser in the 1980 elections and was now stocking Shona – Ndebele animosities in order to get revenge." This demonstrates what is argued by Karume (2003) that the downturn of coalitions is that soon the parties discover their ideological differences, which may lead to collapse.

As far as opposition coalitions in Zimbabwe are concerned, Laakso (2003) notes that prior to the 1985 elections, ZAPU had suggested a coalition of opposition parties. It did not, however, materialise except for some UANC and ZAPU joint rallies" (Laakso 2003). It can be argued that the failure of the opposition to unite diminished the chances of the opposition to make any meaningful impact. In fact Laakso (2003) notes that the opposition was in disarray. On top of being in control of the media, the ZANU PF government was also effectively taking advantage of its monopoly of force. Laakso (2003) notes that, while PF ZAPU fielded candidates in all constituencies, the story was different with other opposition parties. Ndabaningi Sithole had gone into self-imposed exile in USA after he had been accused of soliciting arms abroad with the intention of overthrowing the government. Abel Muzorewa was released from prison just before the elections after spending nearly a year in detention (Laakso 2003).

Zimbabwe was left without any strong opposition party when ZAPU joined ZANU PF after a unity accord between the two parties was signed on 22 December 1987 (Laakso 2003, Makumbe 2011, Sachikonye 2002). Laakso (2003) asserts that after ZAPU joined ZANU PF, the ruling party ended up having 99 out of the 100 seats in parliament. It can be argued that after the unity accord, ZANU PF enjoyed one of its highest hegemonic periods in terms of parliamentary majority.

Arriola (2013) contends that multiethnic opposition coalitions find it difficult to emerge and thrive where the state remains the gatekeeper of capital. However, as argued by Adeniyi (2011) the opposition parties themselves should shoulder some of the blame for failure to unseat incumbent governments because they fail to put aside their differences until after the election where they combine to complain about rigging. In 1989 a new opposition political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) was formed (Cokorinos 1990, Sithole and Makumbe 1997, Laakso 2003). The party was led by Edgar Tekere, a former high ranking ZANU PF official. According to Laakso (2003) when Tekere broke away, there was strong speculation that other ZANU PF heavyweights, Eddison Zvbgo with strong regional support in Matabeleland, could join Tekere. This however, was not to be although Laakso (2003) contends that some ex-ZAPU members contested the 1990 elections as ZUM candidates. In spite of ZUM generating a lot of interest especially among urban and Manicaland voters, its call for a coalition was only heed by Ian Smith's Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (Cokorinos 1990, Bratton and Masunungure 2011).

The 1990 elections were marked by declining economic fortunes for the majority of the people in the country. Thus ZUM managed to attract the interest of especially urban voters and those in Tekere's home region of Manicaland (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, Laakso 2003, Cokorinos 1990). While the effectiveness of the ZUM/Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe alliance is arguable, Laakso (2003) argues that ZUM managed to garner close to 50 percent of the urban vote although it did not win any single seat there. It did manage though to secure two constituencies in Manicaland, an indication of the party's regional support. ZUM's failure though cannot be blamed on the failure to gather a bigger coalition alone. The party suffered from lack of organisational infrastructure to enter into many rural areas except in Manicaland (Laakso 2003). It was also denied access to the state controlled media (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, Laakso 2003, Cokorinos 1990). Cokorinos (1990) notes that, there were allegations by communications workers, that the government rapped them for giving too much coverage to ZUM, leading to an unofficial boycott of opposition politicians. Furthermore, commenting on the failure of the opposition in this election, Sachikonye (2002:16) notes that "so long as the main opposition parties remained moribund

under an un-inspiring leadership of such figures as Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Edgar Tekere, and as long as they did not consciously broaden their appeal to a wider social base, they stood little chance of dislodging the ZANU PF party from power."

It appears in Zimbabwe there has been a realisation that "defeating the ruling party/incumbent would require the creation of strategic coalitions of political parties in which personal ambitions are sacrificed for group goals" (Adeniyi 2011:1). However, the problem seems the failure of the opposition to let go of their big egos. Yet another opposition coalition was mooted prior to the 1995 elections. The coalition was Edgar Tekere's ZUM and Abel Muzorewa's UANC to form the United Parties (UP) (Laakso 2003). However, the coalition did not bother the ruling ZANU PF party much because it lasted only for 10 months. Thus again the election was contested by a weakened opposition. To emphasise how weak the opposition had become, Laakso (2003) highlights that, 55 constituencies were uncontested by the opposition, leaving ZANU PF with a big advantage.

Notably before the 1995 elections, Zimbabwe's first African Chief Justice, Enoch Dumbutshena had formed a new party, the Forum Party of Zimbabwe (Laakso 2003). Dumbutshena also made the call for an opposition alliance but as noted by (Laakso 2003), only Patrick Kombayi, formerly of ZUM and James Chikerema, formerly of ZDP, joined the party to contest the elections. In the end the United Parties pulled out of the polls calling for the parties to contest on a more equal basis with ZANU PF, including media access (Laakso 2003). The Forum Party only fielded candidates in 28 constituencies while ZANU Ndonga was having internal squabbles after Ndabaningi Sithole returned from the USA in 1992 (Laakso 2003).

Probably one of the most important points in terms of coalition of opposition forces was the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. While it was not exactly a coalition of opposition political parties, it was a coalition of labour, civil society, academics, business persons and farmers (Makumbe 2011; Sachikonye 2002). Sachikonye (2002:17) notes that the "MDC was woven out of a broad coalition of social forces including civil society and its various components such as labour, youth, students, the middle class and business." If we take the argument by Moyo (2005) that the *Daily News* played a midwife

role to the formation of the MDC, then it can be argued that this period was the first to witness newspaper reporting that was pro-opposition and another that was pro-ruling party (Moyo 2005).

The split of the MDC in 2005 seems to have proved a major setback for the opposition since according to Howard and Roessler (2006), opposition coalitions stand a better chance of unseating incumbent ruling parties. Adeniyi (2011) contends that there is a school of thought that in the 2008 elections, if MDC T and MDC M had combined they would have defeated Robert Mugabe at the polls. Adeniyi (2011) argues that the 47.87 percent that Morgan Tsvangirai garnered, added to the 8.3 percent garnered by Simba Makoni who was being supported by MDC M, would have easily surpassed the 50 percent plus one vote needed for an outright victory. This may be a simplistic view of the scenario but there are adequate examples in Africa, such as Kenya, Senegal and Ghana, to prove that Adeniyi's assumption can be right.

What makes opposition coalitions such a big threat, as posited by Howard and Roessler (2006:371), is that they "can mobilise people to vote against the incumbent, as the electorate have a sense that change is possible, and they begin to view the opposition as an alternative governing coalition." Furthermore, Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that the important thing is how opposition leaders are able to create strategic coalitions which can withstand government force and fraud. It is arguable that the proposed MDC T, MDC N and ZAPU alliance was strategic in its potential to bring parties with arguably sizeable voter following, that the media could not ignore it. It is therefore interesting and significant to investigate the frames used by the two newspapers, The Herald and Newsday, to frame the proposed alliance.

2.3 State controlled media in Zimbabwe expected to be patriotic

Mano (2005:58) argues that the news media work to "reproduce and reinforce the existing ideological or value system in a given society at a given time." Interests of political elites, owners and advertisers are taken into account in the production of news (Herman and Chomsky 1988, McChesney 2000). The elites are aware that the news media "provide the 'stuff' from which we build our sense of self identity, our perceptions of the world, social ties with others" (Winseck and Jin 2011:12).

Nur Minds

The idea of patriotism has never been far away from Zimbabwean society considering that even when ZANU and ZAPU went to the Lancaster House conference, they went as the Patriotic Front, a title that later became suffix to ZANU and a prefix to ZAPU. ZANU PF then dominated the political landscape from 1980, with a formidable opposition with a real chance of toppling the ruling party only coming in the form of the MDC in 1999 (Laakso 2003). ZANU PF also assumed a tight grip on the publicly owned media while having a largely confrontational relationship with the private media which was largely linked to white capital in the first decade of the country's independence. (Chuma 2005, Ronning and Kupe 2000). ZANU PF's stranglehold on the publicly owned media led to the editorial policy of Zimpapers being that of serving the government of the day (Saunders 1999)

Seeing its grip on the political landscape challenged by the MDC, starting from around the year 2000, the ZANU PF government introduced what Ranger (2005) calls 'patriotic journalism'. Patriotic journalism divides Zimbabweans into patriots and traitors (Ranger 2005:14). State controlled media including *The Herald* have been mobilised to present a "monolithic history" that emphasises on ZANU PF's role in the liberation struggle while castigating ZANU PF opponents as agents of the British who seek to reverse history and take the country back into the control of the British (Ranger 2004, Waldahl 2005).

Patriotic journalism, however, did not start with the challenge to ZANU PF hegemony by the MDC. Ranger (2005:11) argues that "patriotic journalism...is a revival or a variation of the rhetoric of nationalist division in the 1960s." According to Ranger (2005) one of the earliest displays of patriotic journalism was when a ZANU broadsheet castigated ZAPU cadres at Gonakudzingwa restriction area for having been bought by supplies from white liberals. The broadsheet castigates ZAPU for being 'recanting, revisionist, recoiling and infested with white settlers – a multi-racial mixed grill" (Ranger 2005:11). Such sell-out tendencies are contrasted with ZANU's love for Zimbabwe demonstrated by an oath: "I will take an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. I swear to avenge myself bitterly, unceasingly and mercilessly on the enemy ... I swear by my MOTHERLAND -ZIMBAWE- or DEATH" (Ranger 2005:11).

Patriotic journalism in Zimbabwe draws heavily from the country's history. As pointed out by Onslow (2011:4) "the presentation of history has been critical to the survival of the ZANU PF one party state particularly from 2000." Ranger (2002) argues that in the run up to the 2000 elections *The Herald* and *Sunday Mail* regularly carried articles dwelling on slavery, the partition, exploitation and the liberation struggle. Editorial articles in the state controlled media frequently urged Zimbabweans to uphold the values and gains of the liberation struggle and restore a sense of patriotism among Zimbabweans (Ranger 2002:160).) "The ruling party has been able, through its media monopoly and the widespread use of force, to project a much more narrow and selective vision of the past" (Raftopoulos 2005:13)

Melber cited by Raftopoulos (2005) posits that political elites employ selective narratives and memories of the liberation struggle so as to claim sole legitimacy to the post colonial governing seat. Some liberation war values such as human rights and the upholding of democratic values are erased from the narrow articulation of history by ZANU PF through patriotic journalism (Raftopoulos 2005:5) Thus framing of the opposition by newspapers that practice patriotic journalism is informed by selective narratives that border on the discourse of patriotism.

For patriotic journalism, Ranger (2005:13) argues that "nothing is too vile to be said about those allocated to the side of Judas." Any opposition to ZANU PF's rule is bound to attract sharp verbal rebuke and the media have been instrumental in making sure such verbal attacks are publicised. Ranger (2005:13) demonstrates this through a statement in *The Sunday Mail* of 9 January 2005 where the MDC is reported as "our intellectually challenged brothers in the Rhodie shadow." Ranger (2005:13) further argues that Morgan Tsvangirai, as a sell-out, is labelled as a creation of "bitter Blair and bitter white settlers". Thus by being a creation of Britain Tsvangirai is portrayed as unpatriotic but a slave of his white handlers. Mutanda (2012) adds on asserting that the state controlled media verbally attacks all the people against the country's land reform programme and brands them enemies of the motherland. Mutanda (2012) argues that the state controlled media castigates the opposition and private media as Western puppets and label them sell-outs and unpatriotic. The Herald being one of the state controlled newspapers as well as one of the leading daily publications has been at the

forefront of this vilification of the opposition. The question therefore, for this study is whether this vilification continued in the context of a GNU, which was supposed to be made up of people with Zimbabwe at their hearts.

Patriotic journalism enables those who practise it to invent desired realities (Ranger 2005). In the 2002 elections, Chuma (2006) notes that *The Herald* and *Sunday Mail* applied binary frames of patriot/traitor, friend/enemy. Thus for the state controlled media Zimbabwe was divided along patriots and traitors, friends and enemies. Regional leaders and organisations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) expressing support and solidarity with ZANU PF are often quoted to legitimise the party and its leader Robert Mugabe (Chuma 2006). Chuma (2006) further highlights that in the 2002 elections, the public owned but state controlled media sought to present Mugabe and Tsvangirai in binary opposites of magnanimity and treachery, patriotism and betrayal. Since Tsvangirai was one of the leaders behind the proposed opposition coalition as well as the Prime Minister of the government of Zimbabwe at the time, this study seeks to establish whether The Herald would change tack in its framing of the opposition led by the one it used to label as treacherous and traitor.

For Ranger (2005:15) patriotic journalism "prevents any self-reflection on the part of the regime because criticism of any kind can at once be categorised as treasonable and capitalist." Johnson cited by Ranger (2005:15) defined patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel. Viewed this way patriotism becomes some last line of defence for regimes whose fortunes appear to be waning in the face of popular opposition. In the 2002 elections the state controlled press framed the opposition MDC as the instigators of the violence that rocked the pre-election period (Chuma 2006). However, other reports at the time seemed to indicate that violence was perpetrated more by ZANU PF than the MDC (Makumbe 2002). While ZANU PF had entered the 2002 election as the ruling party, there was no ruling party at the time that this study focuses on. Any self-reflection would point to all parties in the GNU so this study seeks to investigate whether *The Herald* would divide a unity government in its framing of the proposed opposition alliance.

Patriotism is used in the media to divide the Zimbabwean population. Raftopoulos (2005) argues that:

In the journalistic world the Zimbabwean crisis since 2000 has been constructed through the dichotomy of either a radical nationalist redistributive project carried out as historical redress in the face of neoliberal orthodoxy, or a breakdown of the norms of liberal governance through the machinations of an authoritarian figure (Raftopoulos 2005:1)

The period of focus for this study was expected to have brought the people of Zimbabwe together and it was expected that the media would reflect this extraordinary phenomenon. The government could no longer be classified as authoritarian and hence the dichotomy presented by Raftopoulos (2005) was supposed to have been resolved.

According to Raftopoulos (2005) the radical nationalist position is popular with the state controlled media and some African voices in the diaspora while the authoritarian position dominates what he calls "opposition media" in Zimbabwe as well as the conservative press in South Africa and the West. Thus as argued by Chuma (2008) contrary to the assumption that the media are dispassionate observers of electoral contests, they are active participants who take sides. However, in the 2013 electoral contest the state controlled media whose editorial policy is to serve the government of the day, were expected to serve the GNU thus negating the old binaries.

According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya (2011) patriotism is closely related to nationalism. In the post 2000 Zimbabwe anyone expressing views contrary to those of ZANU PF was branded an enemy of not only the party, but the nation as well. The white minority together with their cousins in the West were accused of working in cahoots with the MDC to re-colonise the country (Waldahl 2005) and therefore became enemies not only of the party, but of the nation. Thus the state controlled media including The Herald dug up accounts of white brutality during the war of liberation so as to invoke a sense of disgust in the electorate at the thought of returning back to those dark days of colonialism (Waldahl 2005). Furthermore, Waldahl (2005) notes that participation in the liberation struggle became the highest form of patriotism for the state controlled media, in the process discrediting the opposition MDC. While these scholars focus on the period of heightened tension in the

country, the GNU period was supposed to be a transitional period to democracy and a reconciliatory frame was expected to be found in the media.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) asserts that elections are an arena where national issues are specified and opened up to rational debate. While this is the normative, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) points out that in Zimbabwe policy issues do not take centre stage in electoral campaigns. Instead questions of who is a patriot and a traitor have tended to dominate electoral campaigns. The 2013 harmonised elections were supposed to be policy driven given that the GNU comprised the major contesting political parties. Seeing that all the major political parties were in government, the expectation therefore is if at all questions of patriotism were to be raised in the media it would probably be more in support of the inclusive government.

Seeing that most of the published works on patriotism and the media in Zimbabwean elections have focused on the 2000 and 2002 elections which were marked by extreme divisions in the populace, it is therefore necessary to establish how the media responded to an event like the proposed opposition coalition as previously patriotism had been used to discredit any formidable opposition to the ruling party.

2.4 Privately owned media and adversarial journalism in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's daily newspaper market was dominated by Zimpapers publications, *The Herald* and *Chronicle* from independence until 1992 (Moyo 2005). The monopoly, as Moyo (2005) highlights, was only broken with the establishment of *Daily Gazette* in October 1992. Moyo (2005) argues that because of the lack of competition, the two dailies applied a kind of journalism that avoided confronting those in power. However, according to Djokotoe (n.d:3) "In the late 1980s Zimbabwe provided the only known example of a major investigative project being undertaken by a government-owned newspaper, refuting the myth that only the commercial media can carry out investigative reporting." The example is Geoff Nyarota's breaking of the Willowgate scandal while at Chronicle.

At the same time Moyo (2005:113) argues that the "independent" press has played the role of the opposition, "first by strongly opposing the one party state during the late 80s and early 90s, and secondly, by acting as the 'voice of the voiceless' throughout the 90s." Moyo's use

of the term independent in reference to private media is however problematic considering, as highlighted by Chuma (2005) the private press in the first decade of Zimbabwe's independence was linked to white capital, therefore it cannot be regarded as independent since it endeavoured to advance the concerns and fears of the white community who were still coming to terms with the new political dispensation. This study is placed in a context of no opposition or ruling party and therefore seeks to investigate what role the private media assumed if it was not acting as the opposition. It seeks to establish whether by its framing of the proposed coalition it was in keeping with oppositional discourses of the past.

Saunders cited in Chuma (2005) argues that in the first decade of Zimbabwe's independence although the government had a confrontational relationship with the private press, the situation was somehow mitigated by government's professed commitment to media freedom. When *Daily News* was established in 1999, Moyo (2005) asserts that it assumed the role of the opposition press, exposing corruption and holding the government accountable to its actions. This view is also held by Chuma (2005:49) who argues that in the absence of a formidable opposition, "the private press assumed by default, the role normally played by the opposition." *Daily News* adversarial reporting attracted the ire of government (Article 19/MISA Zimbabwe 2004). Furthermore, Moyo (2005) asserts that it is arguable that Daily News played a midwife role to the birth of the MDC. *Daily News* also played a role in the defeat of the government sponsored draft constitution in the 2000 constitutional referendum (Moyo 2005). According to Moyse (2009),

In many ways the constitutional referendum of 2000 defined the nature of today's media landscape, as civil society, in collaboration with the independent press and particularly the relatively new Daily News overcame a tidal wave of propaganda in the governmentcontrolled media campaigning for acceptance of the draft constitution (Moyse 2009:43)

Its adversarial reporting led to it being labelled "opposition" press from government officials and the state controlled media (Moyo 2005). In the period of concern in this study, the scenario is different. The GNU came about because the opposition had performed exceptionally well by getting parliamentary seats in areas previously dominated by ZANU PF. MDC had also ceased to be an opposition party as its two factions made up the inclusive government together with ZANU PF. Newsday was only granted a license during the GNU so how it framed the proposed opposition alliance becomes significant hence this study.

The extent to which private media have given voice to the opposition has been questioned, particularly by Waldahl (2005) who argues that while the private media have criticised the ruling ZANU PF party and its policies, they have not particularly been a voice for the opposition as they fear losing credibility. However, according to Chuma (2006) during elections editorial pages of the private press have implored readers to vote for the opposition MDC, although in news pages they concentrate on the shortcomings of ZANU PF. While it is true that the opposition in Zimbabwe has been aided by private media, I agree with Chuma (2006) that news pages of the private media try not to be too explicit in expressing their support for the opposition, but editorial pages are sometimes explicit. An example is the lead story of *Daily News* on 31 July 2013, the day of the harmonised elections, whose headline read "89 reasons why Mugabe must go".

Chari (2010:205) argues that the press in Zimbabwe was divided along political affiliation after the formation of the MDC in 1999 with the state controlled press 'unreservedly' in support of ZANU PF while the private press adopted a 'hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil' approach regarding the MDC. While opposition parties and civil society are systematically denied access to state controlled media (Moyo 2007) the private media provide the opposition the much needed space while framing ZANU PF as an incompetent party (Chuma 2010) that is leading the country to economic ruin. Waldahl (2005:64) notes that in the 2000 elections the private media portrayed ZANU PF as economically reckless, with emphasis on farm invasions "consequences for further agricultural development, for banks with large outstanding loans to farmers and for the balance of trade." With ZANU PF and the two MDCs in government it is necessary to investigate whether Newsday would continue to unreservedly support the opposition in the same mould as that noted by these scholars.

In the lead up to 2000 elections the privately owned Daily News "urged the opposition to mobilise effectively for total victory, which would ensure an abrupt discontinuation of twenty years of ZANU PF corruption, cronyism and arrogant mis-governance" (Chuma 2008:33). Perhaps to emphasise their disgust at the way ZANU PF have been running the country, the

private media have consistently sought to expose the party's shortcomings such as the use of violence at election periods (Chuma 2008, Waldahl 2005). This has led to ZANU PF officials branding the private press "Morgan Tsvangirai press" (Mlotshwa n.d:1). The oppositional stance taken by the private media (Chuma 2008) has led to some viewing them as permanent adversaries of the government (Ndlela 2005). The view of private media as permanent adversaries of the government would be tested during the GNU so this study seeks to establish whether in framing the proposed opposition alliance *Newsday* stuck with the opposition parties supported by the private media in previous periods.

However, as pointed out by Waldahl (2005:24) regarding the 2000 elections, that the private press seemed to be strongly opposed to ZANU PF did not necessarily "lead to competition on equal terms between ZANU PF and MDC on the media scene." This is because whereas the public media were clear in presenting ZANU PF's election manifesto and policies, the private media concentrated on exposing ZANU PF weaknesses and could not be seen to be opposition mouthpieces as they risked losing credibility. In this study I intent to establish whether *Newsday* became a mouth piece of the proposed opposition alliance as well as the individual parties that made up the proposed coalition.

According to Ndlela (2005) the private media have tended to focus too much on the negatives that they do not acknowledge anything positive by the ZANU PF government. They display a behaviour of the aggrieved that says "nothing-can-ever-come-out-of-this-wretched government" (Mano 2005:65). Ndlela (2005) further notes that the private media capitalise on every event and politicise everything so that they can gain political mileage. Such kind of attitude places the private media as political actors (Bartels 1996).

Mazango (2005) argues that the state can enter the media market to shape the kind of messages and content that has a bearing on political and social life. In such a scenario "the media become both a crucial setting and a tool of power struggle, with the boundaries of freedom of expression coming under stress as vulnerable governments attempt to influence public opinion in their favour" (Mazango 2005:34). In Zimbabwe Mazango (2005) notes that state controlled media constantly attack private media as instruments of neo-colonialism and Western imperialism. This is because the private media carry reports that portray ZANU PF

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as an enemy of democracy and human rights (Mazango 2005). Thus in the eyes of the state controlled media and government officials, the private media are permanent adversaries of the ZANU PF government. This study seeks to establish if *Newsday* in its coverage of the proposed opposition coalition continued with the attitude of the aggrieved.

In a survey of journalists, Mano (2005) found out that many respondents felt that journalists from the private media cannot be expected to write stories that paint ZANU PF in good light. The private media seem to have taken a permanent stance as adversaries of the government (Ndlela 2005). The ZANU PF government has sometimes pointed to foreign interference in explaining its adversarial relationship with the private media. As pointed out by Mano (2005) the government post 2000, feeling cornered, accused private and foreign media of going on a campaign to tarnish its image both locally and abroad. Mano (2005) acknowledges that there is some truth to the accusations since some local journalists were working for foreign media outlets, some of which have traditionally employed hostile reporting towards Africa. However, this view of the government is always interpreted by the private media as well as international media as indicative of a government that has a lot to hide and cannot tolerate criticism and scrutiny.

The adversarial relationship has sometimes gone to extremes. Nyaira (2009) asserts that private media journalists are branded as terrorists, mercenaries and puppets of British and American governments bend on effecting regime change in Zimbabwe and reverse Mugabe's land reform programme. The threats are exemplified in the bombing of the *Daily News* printing press (Moyse 2009). In 2000 war veterans marched on the *Daily News* where they threw stones and beat up a journalist who was covering the protest (Nyaira 2009). Melber (2004:9) also quotes Jonathan Moyo as Minister of Information and Publicity who declared that "the enemy is media who use the pen to lie about the country. Such reporters are terrorists..." According to Melber (2004:9) Jonathan Moyo branded the same journalists "willing sell-out scribes"

Mazango (2005:43) uses the phrase 'discursive demolition' to describe how the private media have been constantly labelled and vilified by government officials and state controlled media. The private media are labelled as "instruments of neo-colonialism" and "shameless surrogates of Western interests" (Mazango 2005:43). According to Mazango (2005),

Through editorials and hard hitting columns falling under by-lines such as 'Nathaniel Manheru' in The Herald, 'Tafataona Mahoso' and 'Lowani Ndlovu' in The Sunday Mail and 'Mzala Joe' in The Sunday News, a complex mixture of vitriol and intellectual discourse on pan-Africanism tries to unpack, expose, discredit and smear the opposition (including private newspapers), labelling them variously as 'misguided', 'stooges', 'terrorists', 'puppets' and 'sell-outs' (Mazango 2005:43)

According to Mahoso in Raftopoulos (2005:13) revisiting African nationalism has been necessitated by a "bitter sense of betrayal which the African majority feel at the hands of a new breed of neo-liberal African reformers and their Western allies." This point is also made by Melber (2004) who notes that as Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo emphasised the need to maintain the spirit of the liberation struggle and pan-African values since the young people of today are ignorant of the story of the liberation struggle. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) also notes that ZANU PF dismisses political opponents including the private media as puppets working in cahoots with Zimbabwe's external enemies.

On their part, the private media, as noted by Mazango (2005), criticise the government for violating the constitution and condoning a culture of violence in the country. The private media practise what Mazango (2005:44) calls "activist journalism", and portray President Robert Mugabe as "a freak tyrant". Makumbe and Compagnion cited in Chuma (2005:53) also capture this when they argue that the private press "excels in making nasty comments about the government and the ruling ZANU PF party". However, Makumbe and Compagnon also point out that the private media are too busy criticising the government and exposing government excesses and shortcomings to give any serious coverage to opposition party activities and campaigns (Chuma 2005). In this study I seek to establish whether Newsday was giving serious overt coverage to the proposed opposition alliance and why.

Mazango (2005) highlights that it seems the activities and reporting of the private press seem to be aimed at promoting an interventionist policy against an irresponsible government wantonly annihilating all democratic principles and driving the country to economic ruin. This is why as noted by Moyse (2009) the government identified the private media, alongside a vibrant civil society, as the most dangerous threat to its political survival. The government has sometimes resorted to desperate measures as noted by Nyaira (2009:3), "journalists are followed, threatened, beaten, harassed and intimidated and some journalists' houses bombed."

In the eyes of the private media, the 2000 elections "meant a choice between the sitting government that was chiefly concerned with advancing the interests of a small powerful elite, and opposition intent on working for the benefit of the entire nation" (Waldahl 2005:25). Considering that the media are crucial in providing education about the different political parties and their candidates during elections (Mazango 2005), ZANU PF could not take such framing lightly and their response would lead to an intensification of the adversarial relationship.

THEORETICA<mark>L FRAMEWORK</mark>

2.5 Framing

Framing as argued by Entman (1993:52) is the selection of "some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." This definition has been criticised though as falling short by scholars such as Scheufele and Iyengar (2011) and Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007). Scheufele and Iyengar (2011) point out that Entman (1993)'s definition of framing has caused problems in differentiating it from agenda setting and priming. It is therefore necessary to make the distinctions right away because this study is based on framing and not agenda setting or priming.

According to Scheufele and Iyengar (2011) the confusion caused by Entman's definition has led to some scholars such as McCombs calling for framing to be regarded as an extension of agenda setting. This is because Entman's definition makes reference to salience, which is a key feature of agenda setting and priming. Sheufele and Iyengar (2011:9) note that those who call for framing to be regarded as an extension of agenda setting argue that mass media "influence audience perceptions by highlighting the importance of issues (first level agenda setting) or issue attributes (second level agenda setting, which they see as equivalent to framing)".

De Vreese (2005) argues that while agenda setting deals with salience of issues, framing is concerned with the presentation of issues. This resonates with what Republican pollster Frank Luntz discovered, as argued by Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007:9), that "it's not what you say, it's how you say it". According to Scheufele and Iyengar (2011) agenda setting posits that the coverage of an issue more frequently or prominently in the news leads to a higher likelihood that audiences will consider it more important. Priming posits that if media coverage leads to an issue being more salient in people's minds, there is a higher likelihood that it will be used as one of the standards by which governments, policies and candidates vying for public office are judged.

Framing is equivalent to the choices that an art dealer or gallery owner may make about how to display a painting. Reactions among potential buyers to a painting displayed in a large, gold plated frame, for instance, will be distinctively different than they would be if the same painting was displayed in a simple aluminium frame. In other words, the art dealer can shape public reactions to the exact same painting based on fairly subtle variations in how she decides to present – or quite literally "frame" – that painting (Scheufele and Iyengar 2011:20)

The distinction between agenda setting and framing is important for this study because there appears to have been some media agenda setting in terms of a grand coalition of opposition forces in Zimbabwe after Morgan Tsvangirai nearly defeated Robert Mugabe in the 2008 presidential elections. However, this is not the focus of my study. My study is about media framing of the event (opposition coalition) when it was apparently edging to reality.

"Framing is about variations in the mode of presentation of a given stimuli, rather than manipulations of the informational or persuasive nature of messages" (Scheufele and Iyengar 2011:19-20). This becomes key for this study because it is about one event, that is, the proposed alliance of opposition parties, which seems to have been packaged differently by two newspapers. In other words this study seeks to discover the "gold frame", "silver frame" or any other colour frame that was used by the two newspapers in their coverage of the proposed opposition alliance against ZANU PF.

Another distinct feature of frames is how they are strengthened or weakened depending on how relevant they appeal to particular existing cognitive schema of the audience (Scheufele and Iyengar 2011, Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, De Vreese 2005). This places frames in what Price and Tewksbury in Scheufele and Iyengar (2011:12) call "applicability effect". Agenda setting and priming audiences do not have to have heard about an issue before whereas with framing if there are no relevant schemas among audiences, there is unlikely to be a framing effect (Scheufele and Iyengar 2011). Entman (2010:389) also notes that "frames must call to mind congruent elements of schemas that were stored in the past."

Fiske and Taylor (1991:131) define schemas as "cognitive structures that represent knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus including its attributes and the relations among attributes." Entman (2010) notes that these schemas help audiences make sense of new information by deciding, consciously or unconsciously, how the incoming messages fit into their understanding and feelings about the world. If the news media are to be successful in inducing audiences to think or behave in a desired manner, then they need to select what to tell them, how to tell them and embed "cues on how this little narrative coheres with their prior attitudes and values" Entman (2010:392). The 2013 elections were coming after a 2008 election where a divided opposition had failed to dislodge ZANU PF and its leader President Robert Mugabe. Framing of the proposed opposition alliance was therefore appealing to previous experiences of audiences which could determine how they interpreted the frames.

Entman (1993) asserts that frames have at least four locations in the communication process. The locations are the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture. All these locations are important in analysing the frames that were employed by the two newspapers in framing the proposed opposition alliance. In explaining the four locations Entman (1993) posits that communicators are guided by schemas that organise their belief systems in deciding what to say. The text contains frames evidenced by "the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements." (Entman 1993:52) The receiver, according to Entman (1993), is guided to make conclusions about a communication, by frames that may or may not reflect the frames in the text. The culture can be defined "as the empirically demonstratable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping" (Entman 1993:53). It is therefore possible that an idea highlighted in a text can prove difficult for receivers to notice, interpret or remember because of existing schemata (Entman 1993).

De Vreese et al (2001) also argue that a frame is employed to select, organise and emphasise some aspects of reality while excluding others. The proposed coalition of opposition parties was a reality that the media were presented with and it was up to them to package that reality in a way that would induce certain kinds of readings while suppressing others. According to Chuma (2008:24-25) "a framing analysis enables journalists to place myriad and complex events and issues into specific categories defined partly by how they have covered them in the past as well as the media's editorial policy approaches to the subjects in question." This is echoed by Matthes (2012:248-249) who posits that "frames are a part of culture, they guide how the elite construct information, they affect journalists' information selection, they are manifest in media texts and they influence cognitions and attitudes of audience members."

Framing can be viewed as both a "macro-level" and "micro-level" construct as contended by Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007:12) who argue that as a macro-construct framing "refers to modes of presentation that journalists and other communicators use to present information in a way that resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audiences" However, this does not mean that journalists necessarily set out to deceive their audiences but frames are employed as a way of breaking down complex issues for lay audiences by appealing to their existing schemas (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). As a micro-construct, framing refers to the way audiences make use of information and presentation features pertaining to issues as they form impressions (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

The macro-construct view of framing is relevant for this study because the framing of the proposed coalition of opposition parties was likely to have been informed by the events of previous elections. Framing the grand coalition would therefore resonate with the schemas of audiences as informed by the knowledge of the events of previous elections. This view is argued by Goffman cited in Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) who contends that in order to efficiently process new information audiences apply interpretive schemas to classify information and interpret it meaningfully. Viewed this way De Vreese (2005) argues that framing in the news media shapes public opinion.

De Vreese (2005) contends that communication is "a dynamic process that involves framebuilding (how frames emerge) and frame-setting (the interplay between media frames and audience predispositions)". Frame-building refers to factors influencing the structural qualities of news frames. De Vreese (2005) notes that, factors internal to journalists and news organisations determine the framing of issues in addition to external factors such as journalists' interaction with elites and social movements. Frame-setting refers to "the interaction between media frames and individuals' prior knowledge and predispositions" (De Vreese 2005:52).

This leads to frames being either independent or dependent variables (De Vreese 2005, De Vreese et al 2001). As dependent variables frames are defined by political economy issues. Organisational pressures (ownership and control), journalistic routines and elite discourses play an influential role in the frame building exercise. In this study this is important because the frames that I seek to establish as having been employed by the two newspapers relate to production processes. As independent variables frames are subject to prior audience interpretations. This relates to the frame setting role. In this study although I do not intent to investigate whether the framing managed to influence public opinion, I assume that the particular framing was influenced by existing schemas in the audiences that the producers of the frames were aware of.


Framing the proposed alliance of opposition parties prior to 31 July 2013 elections. A case of The Herald and Newsday

De Vreese et al (2001) distinguish between issue-specific news frames and generic news frames. While issue-specific news frames relate to specific topics and news events, generic news frames can be applied to a broad range of news topics and events, which can be over time and even possibly in different cultural set-ups. De Vreese et al (2001:108) contend that issue-specific approach "allows for investigation of the framing of particular events in great specifity and detail". They assert that an issue-specific investigation "may capture specific aspects of selection, organisation and elaboration that are present in news coverage and pertain specifically to a well-defined issue" (De Vreese et al 2001:108). However, the drawback is that it may be problematic to generalise or compare and it is difficult to make use of it in theory building. On the other hand generic frames may not examine an event in finer detail but they make it possible to compare between frame topics and can even be used for cross cultural comparisons (De Vreese et 2001). Studies based on electoral processes have tended to make use of issue-specific frames as noted by De Vreese et al (2001) and my study will also employ issue-specific frame investigation.

Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) note that there are two possible approaches to doing a content analysis of frames in news, that is, inductive and deductive. The inductive approach "involves analysing a news story in an open view to attempt to reveal the array of possible frames, beginning with very loosely defined preconceptions of these frames" (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000:94). This approach has a disadvantage that it is labour intensive and usually it is based on small samples and replicating it may be difficult. "A deductive approach involves predefining certain frames as content analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news" (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000:94). In this approach there is need to thoroughly determine the potential frames likely to be present in the news because only those frames defined a priori will be used. The approach as highlighted by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) can be easily replicated and it has no problems with large samples. It can also be used to compare differences in framing between different media such as television and newspapers as well as within media like from just the press. The inductive approach can be likened to De Vreese et al (2001)'s issue-specific framing while the deductive approach can be equated to the generic frame analysis.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed literature related to the study as well as outlined the theoretical framework that informs the study. The literature reviewed was indicating that there has been a media divide in Zimbabwe. The state controlled media have performed a "patriotic duty" of supporting ZANU PF in the period before the GNU while private media have tended to engage in what has been termed "oppositional journalism". The framing theory in which this study is placed is about how issues are packaged and presented by the media for public consumption.



CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an account of how the research is to be carried out. It demonstrates the practical steps to be taken from the beginning to the presentation of results. It outlines the research paradigm employed, the unit of analysis, sampling methods, data gathering methods, methods of data analysis as well as data presentation methods. Research methodology according to Rajasekar et al (2013) outlines the procedures undertaken by the researcher as he seeks to describe, explain and predict phenomena. In the research methodology the researcher specifies precisely decisions undertaken and why.

3.2 Research Paradigm

Qualitative research paradigm was used for this research. Guba and Lincoln (1994:107) assert that a paradigm "represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the world, the individual's place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts." In research Wanyuni (2012) assert that a paradigm becomes the framework guiding how a researcher will carry out the research. It sets the parameters for how one thinks about and does his research (www.uk.sagepub.com).

Joubish, Khuram, Ahmed, Fatima and Haider (2011) note that qualitative research seeks to gain a deeper understanding of why people say the things they say or do the things they do. In other words it is interested in meanings. This study is interested in finding out how *The Herald* and *Newsday* framed the proposed opposition grand alliance and the reasons why the two newspapers framed it that way hence qualitative research is suitable.

Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest & Namey (2005:1) assert that qualitative research "is especially effective in obtaining culturally specific information about the values, opinions, behaviours and social contexts of particular populations." This paradigm was suitable for my study because framing by the two newspapers has to do with the culture, political, economic and social values of their owners, controllers, employees as well as other parties with vested interests. Mack et al (2005) also note that qualitative research provides information about the human side of an issue such as beliefs, opinions, emotions and relationships of individuals. The frames used by the two newspapers have the imprint of those who produce them and therefore I set out to get some information about them as well.

Joubish et al (2012:2082) argue that a qualitative research worldview believes that "there is no single reality, reality (is) based upon perceptions that are different for each person and change over time and what we know has meaning only within a given situation or context." My research is also based on the belief that the framing of the proposed grand opposition coalition by the two newspapers took place within the context of many realities prevailing in Zimbabwe at the time informed by historical, cultural, social, political and economic conditions of the country. The study acknowledges that framing of the proposed opposition coalition was based on the different interpretations of the two newspapers. The different interpretations led to contrasting discourses emerging as different frames were employed.

Patton (1990) argues that qualitative research is naturalistic and open to whatever emerges and does not impose prior constraints on findings. This makes it possible for me to try and unpack all the meanings intended in the framing of the proposed opposition coalition by *The Herald* and *Newsday*. It has the advantage of freeing up the mind to explore all the possibilities without any preconditions. If we consider that many players are involved in the production of news including but not limited to owners, politicians, key economic partners like advertisers, editors and journalists, a range of meanings are likely to emerge from the news. Lack of preconditions enables my research to be able to explore the wide array of meanings that emerged from the two newspapers' coverage of the proposed opposition coalition.

Although findings can be applied to situations similar, the main aim of a qualitative study is to gain a deeper and complex understanding of a particular social context (Mack et al 2005). Generalisability is not high on the agenda of qualitative studies (Bryman 2012). In this study I sought to gain a rich understanding of the frames employed as well as the discourses promoted by such frames in the context of a particular proposed opposition alliance prior to the particular election in Zimbabwe that was scheduled for 31 July 2013. While similar findings can be found in a different context, it is not the intention of this study to generalise its findings.

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3.3 Unit of Analysis

The study made use of newspaper articles from *Newsday* and *The Herald* that reported on the proposed alliance. The period of concern to the study was from 15 June to 31 July 2013. Gunter (2000) describes a unit of analysis as the entity that is used in an analysis. It is the smallest element of such an analysis. It can be a word, a symbol, a theme or an entire article or story. In this study it is entire articles that reported the proposed opposition alliance. Entire articles were used because preferred frames are usually constituted in the entire story.

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3.4 Sampling Methods

Three newspaper articles from each of the two newspapers under study were purposively sampled. These articles were those that focused on the proposed opposition alliance. Only three articles per newspaper were chosen so as to give proper and adequate attention to each since the process of analysing them is time consuming. Three articles per newspaper were chosen because in the archives I found four articles from *Newsday* focusing on the proposed coalition in the period 15 June to 31 July 2013 and three were selected as they contained the most relevant information to the study. In *The Herald* seven articles were found in the archives for the period under study. While more than three had relevant information to the study, three were selected to create an equal number with *Newsday*.

Purposive sampling was used because the research focuses on particular stories that focused on a particular event, meaning anything else outside was not relevant. Sampling is "a process of selecting subjects to take part in a research investigation on the ground that they provide information considered relevant to the research problem." (Oppong 2013:203). Many scholars (Oppong 2013, Onwuengbuzie and Collins 2007, Marshall 1996, Koerber and McMichael 2008, Coyne 1997) are agreed that purposive sampling is the most appropriate for qualitative research. It is suitable for this study because as Patton in Coyne (1997) notes, it selects information-rich cases. As noted by Koerber and McMichael (2008) by doing purposive sampling the researcher is looking for participants who possess certain traits or qualities.

Marshall (1996) also adds that in purposive sampling there is active selection of the most productive sample that answers the research question. From the stories published and appearing in the online archives of the two newspapers I selected only the stories focusing on the proposed coalition. From *The Herald* I selected three stories that focused on the proposed coalition while from *Newsday* I selected three stories, to make up my statistical universe (Oppong 2013). In doing this I used the a priori approach as posited by Hood cited in Bryman (2012). In this approach there is a pre-determination of the criteria for selection of participants in the study. My statistical universe was made up of two stories from each newspaper under the category 'Local News' and one under 'Editorial/Comment/Analysis'.

Attention was paid to periods or time as well. The time when the proposed coalition hit the headlines was important so stories around the 18th of June were considered. This is because the first reaction to the breaking of the news was key to the coverage that ensued thereafter and the frames employed in the beginning were likely to have continued throughout the discursive period. Within the period under study I also found one editorial story and one analysis story from The Herald with relevant information that captured key editorial positions regarding the proposed opposition coalition.

3.5 Methods of Data Gathering

Archival research was used to gather data. This is because the news articles that demonstrated the framing of the proposed opposition alliance were to be found either in old newspapers or archived stories on the newspapers' websites. For my research online archives of the two newspapers were scoured to get the relevant material. Marshall (2006:107) argues that "archival data are the routinely gathered records of a society, community or organisation." Marshall (2006) further points out that it involves skimming recent newspaper editorials or obtaining information from a website and is suitable for portraying the values and beliefs of the participants.

According to Marshall (2006) when choosing the documents for analysis one must bear in mind the research questions. As I sought to establish the frames employed by *The Herald* and *Newsday*, it follows that I had to use archival research to find the newspaper articles in which the frames were to be found. Key words related to the proposed opposition coalition were entered into the search sections of the two newspapers so as to retrieve the relevant articles

from the archives. Consequently three stories were found from *The Herald* as well as three from *Newsday*.

3.6 Methods of Data Analysis

Critical discourse analysis was used as a method of analysing data. This is because as highlighted by Bryman (2012) critical discourse analysis looks at the role of language as a power resource for the articulation of ideology and socio-cultural change. Fourie (2009) notes that, the use of language is a practical social action, and therefore a discursive practice. The framing of the proposed alliance of opposition parties prior to the 2013 harmonised elections was a discursive event which I intended to analyse within its contextual social practices. Van Dijk (2001) contends that critical discourse analysis investigates the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.

Wodak (2002:8) describes discourse as "social practice which implies a dialectical relationship between a discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it." Critical discourse analysis is used to analyse this dialectical relationship and in my case I used it to analyse the relationship between the framing of the proposed opposition alliance and the situation in which it was done, the institutions as well as the social practices that framed it.

In carrying out the critical discourse analysis I employed the approach articulated by Bryman (2012). He posits that a discursive event can be analysed according to a three dimensional framework. First there is the text dimension which examines the actual content, structure and meaning of the text. Secondly is the discursive practice dimension which examines the form of discursive interaction used to communicate meaning and beliefs. Thirdly is the social practice dimension which looks at the social context in which the discursive event is taking place.

In employing the three dimension approach I analysed the selected articles at word/phrase level, sentence/utterance level, text level as well as higher level concepts (Huckin 2002). At word/phrase level I analysed metaphors, classification, presupposition, and register. Huckin

(2002) gives brief explanations of these items: Metaphor is a way of casting ideas in another light. In my study I analysed metaphors such as "headache" in reference to the proposed opposition coalition. Classification is the deliberate labelling of things or people. In my study I was looking at how the proponents of the opposition as well as those opposed to it were classified, for example the labelling of opposition parties as puppets. Presupposition is the use of words or phrases that assume truth of a statement. In this study I analysed meanings of such presuppositions as "their constituencies barely go beyond the doorstep" in reference to the support for some opposition politicians.

At sentence level according to Huckin (2002) I analysed transitivity, deletion, topicalisation, insinuation and intertextuality. "Transitivity refers to the agent-patient relations in a sentence" (Huckin 2002:8). In this study transitivity was found for example in West-opposition relationship. Deletion analyses the intentional omission of information in a sentence. Deletion was analysed for example where a story in *Newsday* deleted information of who was pushing the opposition parties to form a coalition. Topicalisation is to position an element at the top of sentence with the intention to give it prominence. In the study topicalisation was found, for example of "foreigners pushing MDCs… into panicky alliance." Intertextuality is "the recognisable borrowing of words or phrases from another source" (Huckin 2002:8). Intertextuality was analysed for instance use of the phrase "empowerment programmes" by *The Herald*.

At text level I analysed features highlighted by Huckin (2002) such as heteroglossia, foregrounding, and omission. Heteroglossia is "the inclusion of discursive differences, register shifts or multiple voices in a text...identifying these different voices enables the analyst to point out intertextual linkages, thus situating the text more firmly in a socio-cultural context" (Huckin 2002:9). Foregrounding is giving prominence to parts of a text for example the foregrounding of "scores of people" supporting the opposition alliance by *Newsday*. Omission is the deliberate leaving out of information in a text for example omission by *The Herald* of the particular polling agencies that had predicted a ZANU PF victory.

The higher level concepts highlighted by Huckin (2002) correspond with the discursive practice dimension and social practice dimension of Bryman (2012). In explaining the higher level concepts Huckin (2002) notes that text producers take advantage of the fact that most text readers are usually time-pressed to give a critical thought to what they read. Instead they use cognitive shortcuts or heuristics. If text producers repeat the same heuristics and reading positions over time it may lead to the ideas being transmitted ending up in the minds of readers as natural or commonsensical. This is especially so if they appeal to the readers' schema. In cases where there is reader resistance, sophisticated text producers co-opt such resistance by appealing to "common interests". The ideology running through a text should also be identified as well as the apparent interests that motivate text producers. Argumentation in a text can also serve to persuade readers and therefore needs to be analysed. Heuristics pertaining to the viable option of opposition coalition as well as Western support for MDC-T were analysed.

3.7 Methods of Data Presentation

I used the thematic analysis method to present data because as I analysed the relationship between the framing of the opposition alliance and the social and institutional practices influencing it, patterns (themes) began to emerge that I then used to present my findings. Anderson (2007) asserts that thematic content analysis is a descriptive presentation of qualitative data. Furthermore, Braun and Clarke (2006:6) note that "thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data.

Braun and Clarke (2006:10) argue that "a theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and it represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set." They also argue that the importance of a theme is measured in terms of how much it captures something important regarding the research question. Braun and Clarke (2006) also provide six phases of thematic analysis which I used in the presentation of my data. It should be noted though that the first three phases were part of the critical discourse analysis I had already done.

Phase one entailed familiarising with the data. The data was read and re-read with the intention of understanding the depth and breadth of the content. In this case I had to

familiarise myself with my selected articles which were the two local news stories apiece as well as one editorial or comment for each of the two newspapers. According to Braun and Clarke (2006) the time consuming nature of this process is one of the reasons why small samples are preferred. An active reading of the data at this point will note the emergence of some meanings and patterns as noted in a *sagepub* publication (www.sagepub.com).

The second phase was the generation of initial codes. Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) posit that the process of coding involves the recognition of an important moment and noting it prior to the process of interpretation. Braun and Clarke (2006) note that coding can be done either manually or by a software programme. In this research I used the manual method of coding. This coding as highlighted by Braun and Clarke (2006) involves some analysis as it involves the organisation of data into meaningful groups.

Third phase was the search for themes. Boyatzis in Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006:4) argues that a theme is "a pattern in the information that at minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of a phenomenon." At this stage the established codes are analysed with the aim of establishing the possibility of linking related codes to form an overarching theme. Braun and Clarke (2006) assert that in this process some codes may result in the formation of main themes and sub-themes while others may be discarded. At the end I had a collection of all noted themes and sub-themes together with all the extracts of data that related to them.

The fourth phase involved the reviewing of themes. This is the phase in which themes are refined according to Braun and Clarke (2006). The refinement process saw some themes being thrown away for example if there was no sufficient data to support them while others ended up being collapsed into one theme. The validity of the established individual themes were weighed in relation to the data set.

Phase five involved defining and naming of the themes. There was careful consideration of what each theme was about and I had to be clear about what aspect of the data any single theme captured. There was also identification of the interesting points of the content of the data extracts and noting why they were interesting. Names that the themes would assume in

the final analysis were thought about in this phase. Braun and Clarke (2006) contend that the names need to be concise, punchy and convey a sense of what the theme is about.

Phase six was the write-up or production of the report. The data collected needed to tell a story and this story had to be presented in a "concise, coherent, logical, non-repetitive and interesting way" (Braun and Clarke 2006:6). Data extracts were provided to demonstrate the authenticity and prevalence of a theme. Finally the argument presented had to be linked to the research question(s).

3.8 Conclus<mark>io</mark>n

This chapter laid down the procedures undertaken in the carrying out of the research. While I acknowledge that someone can do it in a different way, I sought to demonstrate how I did it so that if anyone were to replicate them, the only major difference would be in our interpretation of the data.



CHAPTER 4: ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I outline the organisational structures of *The Herald* and *Newsday* as they have a material impact on the framing of the proposed opposition alliance. A political economy approach will be used to analyse the relationship between capital and the range of discourses that emanate from the two newspapers. Golding and Murdock (2005) argue that political economy examines patterns of ownership and control of media organisations and the consequences of such ownership and control on the activities of the media organisations.

4.2 The Herald Historical Background

The Herald was first published as The Mashonaland and Zambezian Times on 27 June 1891, as a weekly handwritten news sheet (Mutsvairo 2012). It only became a printed newspaper in October 1892 as it changed its name to The Rhodesia Herald (Mutsvairo 2012). Mutsvairo (2012) further asserts that the newspaper was later taken over by the South African based Argus Company through its subsidiary, Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company. Saunders (1999) states that Argus Printing and Publishing Company was invited to Rhodesia by Cecil John Rhodes' British South Africa Company. Mukasa (2003) argues that during the colonial period The Rhodesia Herald served the interests and ideology of the minority white ruling elite. It had the role of supporting the exploitation of resources by the British South African Company as Cecil John Rhodes had interests in Argus Printing and Publishing Company (Nyahunzvi 2001).

At the attainment of independence, the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC) was renamed Zimpapers. However, according to Saunders (1999) though it had a name reflecting the new country, it was still controlled by Argus of South Africa and this was even reflected in the composition of the editorial team which was all white. To remedy the situation the new ZANU PF government established the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) in January 1981 (Daniels 2009, Saunders 1999). With a grant of US6 million from the Nigerian government, the government of Zimbabwe bought 45 percent of the shares in Zimpapers and placed them in the custody of ZMMT (Saunders 1999). Waldahl (2004) notes that

the creation of the ZMMT had a two pronged purpose; to safeguard state interests as well as to remove Zimpapers from control by the Minister of Information, which would jeopardise the government's drive to be viewed by the international community as promoting democracy. ZMMT was supposed to provide a buffer between the publicly owned media and the government. Nyahunzvi (2001:2) cites an extract from a ZMMT pamphlet which states that the trust was established "with the idea of facilitating the development of a media in a free independent manner and of altering its orientation to bring it into line with the democratic political system brought about by Zimbabwe's independence."

However, the ZMMT's duty of providing a buffer was severely compromised by organisational weaknesses that were "financial, managerial and political" in nature (Saunders 1999:17). There was lack of skills to effectively implement the trust's media responsibilities, leading to the Ministry of Information intervening to provide policy direction (Saunders 1999). As a result the government found a way to dictate what the newspapers under Zimpapers like *The Herald*, reported (Waldahl 2004). Ronning and Khupe (2000) argue that ZMMT was compromised from the beginning because it operated by a Deed of Donation from government which the government could amend any time it felt the need. While in legal terms ZMMT was autonomous, in practice it was beholden to the government.

Moving away from its initial stated position of non-interference, the government through the Minister of Information appointed people that were close to the ZANU PF leadership into management positions both in Zimpapers and individual publications like *The Herald* (Waldahl 2004). These political appointees consequently sought to advance the interests of the party. The ZMMT has since been dissolved (Gandari 2010).


Our Minds

4.3 The Herald Ownership, Structure and Control

According to Munyuki (2005) the shareholding structure of Zimpapers is as follows:

ZMMT	51.09%
Old Mutual Life Assurance	23.80%
Intermarket Nominees	3.38%

Framing the proposed alliance of opposition parties prior to 31 July 2013 elections. A case of The Herald and Newsday



This shareholding structure is relevant in this study because with the dissolution of the ZMMT it appears the government has assumed full control of Zimpapers, making it a defacto state owned company. ZANU PF as the ruling party has had unfettered access to Zimpapers without any objection from a non-existent board. The other shareholders have found themselves being passengers in an organisation they are supposed to have a say in. While Zimpapers as a publicly listed organisation should have a board reflecting interests of shareholders in the company, the Minister of Information is the one who appoints the Zimpapers board members hence technically it is problematic to classify Zimpapers either as a public company or a publicly owned organisation. If it is not publicly owned then serving public interest cannot be its priority. In an environment where the Minister is partisan it follows then that Zimpapers publications like *The Herald* serve the party and not the public. While the Nigerian government donated the money that bought Zimpapers shares to the people of Zimbabwe. The hijacking of the same shares by ZANU PF is a classic case of the party becoming the people and the people becoming the party.

As the government has assumed control of Zimpapers, *The Herald* has consequently become subservient to the dictates of the government of the day, which in the period before GNU, was run by ZANU PF. However, during the period of the GNU it was expected that *The Herald* would serve the inclusive government, and not one particular party. This study

therefore seeks to establish why there seemed to be bias in the newspaper's reportage of the proposed opposition alliance prior to the 2013 harmonised elections when it was supposed to be serving the interests of the government of the day.

4.4 Editorial Policy of The Herald

Mutsvairo (2013) argues that *The Herald* makes it no secret that its allegiance is with ZANU PF. This is because the editorial policy of Zimpapers is to support the government of the day, which in the period before the GNU was controlled by the ruling party ZANU PF. Thus prior to the GNU the newspaper had a symbiotic relationship with the government in that while it provided an outlet for the dissemination of ZANU PF ideology, it was guaranteed of breaking exclusive news from the government (Mutsvairo 2013). In fact President Robert Mugabe is usually accompanied by a Herald reporter and none from the private media when he travels, thus creating an ethically questionable relationship between the news media and sources of news. While the phenomenon of journalists accompanying government officials is not unique to Zimbabwe, this one is unique in that only those reporters from the state controlled media are given such access while private media reporters are shunned. It evokes questions about whether such journalists can be objective when President Mugabe is challenged by other presidential aspirants.

Waldahl (2004) states that government's direct intervention in the editorial policies of *The Herald* and *The Chronicle* has seen a number of prominent editors being sacked for publication of reports unfavourable to ZANU PF. Examples include Farai Munyuki and Tommy Sithole (Gandari 2010). Mukasa (2003) states that a former Minister of Information, Witness Mangwende at one time declared that the idea of press freedom is utopian. He declared that freedom of the press should only be in tandem with the prevailing politics and economics of the country in which the media operate. Unfortunately this statement has been interpreted to mean that state controlled media support the ruling party without question. During the tenure of the GNU it was expected that the editorial policy of *The Herald* would shift towards inclusivity since Zimpapers editorial policy demands that the newspaper supports the government of the day.

4.5 Newsday Ownership structure and control

Newsday was launched in June 2010 after the formation of the GNU. *Newsday* of 5 September 2011 quotes Trevor Ncube, the owner, stating that *Newsday* is published by Newsday Publishers, a company wholly owned by Zimind Publishers, which in turn is wholly owned by Alpha Media Holdings (AMH). He further stated that Alpha Media Holdings is 61 percent owned by Vusumuzi Investments and 39 percent owned by Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF). Trevor Ncube himself is the owner of Vusumuzi Investments. According to its website, MDLF has since changed its name to Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF) and it is based in the USA. On its website *www.mdif.org*, MDIF claims that since 1996 it has provided affordable finance to 100 businesses in 31 countries where access to free and independent media is under threat. These countries MDIF claims are diverse including Zimbabwe, Russia and Nepal. MDIF has seconded its chief financial officer, Mari Budesa to the board of AMH (*Zimbabwe Independent August 6 2012*).

The involvement of MDIF in AMH has raised eyebrows with allegations that the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is helping fund the group. In its exposes Wikileaks alleged that the CIA was funding AMH (*thezimbabwean.co.uk*). These allegations were also raised by Iqbal Surve the new owner of Independent Media Group of South Africa (*iol.co.za*). Noting that Wikileaks exposes were diplomatic cables it would not be too far-fetched to assume that there could be some truth in it. Trevor Ncube complicated matters a little bit for himself when he was quoted by Mail and Guardian in reference to the allegations that MDIF is linked to the CIA. He was quoted stating: "I am not aware of any links between the CIA and the fund, and doubt any exist" (*mg.co.za*). He can hardly be said to be denying the allegations in this statement. The allegations also seem to have some substance considering that on its website MDIF claims to fund media ventures in countries where freedom of expression is under threat, but it has 10 percent shareholding in Mail and Guardian of South Africa. The country cannot be classified as one that lacks freedom of expression or freedom of the media. Links between Ncube and the CIA would explain the seemingly oppositional stories from newspapers under AMH if it were not for other facts.

According to a cable from the USA embassy in Pretoria dated 22 January 2008, leaked by Wikileaks (available at wikileaks.org), Trevor Ncube was quoted advocating for what is termed a Third Way in Zimbabwean politics just before the 2008 elections. In the Third Way Ncube is said to have no faith in Morgan Tsvangirai's leadership of the opposition MDC and would rather have an alliance of people from ZANU PF, MDC, civil society and churches. Interestingly his choices for leadership of that Third Way are all ZANU PF or former ZANU PF people, Simba Makoni, Gideon Gono and Nkosana Moyo. Furthermore, the cable claims that the people behind the Third Way were Jonathan Moyo and Ibbo Mandaza. Jonathan Moyo is the man who as Minister of Information crafted the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA). These laws have been described as draconian and *Daily News* was shut down for failure to register under AIPPA in September 2003. Ibbo Mandaza used to run the private *Mirror* newspaper which claimed to be a- middle- of-the- road newspaper. In the cable Jonathan Moyo and Ibbo Mandaza are alleged to be former Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) members. During the tenure of the GNU Ncube calls for a New Way in which he criticises the cosy relationship between ZANU PF and MDC-T and their collusion to marginalise Welshman Ncube (mg.co.za). Interestingly he proposes that this New Way be led by people from the diaspora. One of his preferred leaders for the Third Way, Nkosana Moyo is in the diaspora.

What emerges from Trevor Ncube's alleged links with Jonathan Moyo could explain why newspapers he controls were not shut down when others were being shut down at the height of Jonathan Moyo's crusade against the private media. *Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* continued operating even as others like *Daily News, Mirror* and *Tribune* were shut down. While journalists from the stable were occasionally arrested, the newspapers' licenses were never threatened with revocation. On the other hand it can be argued that in order to please CIA interests the newspapers had to publish stories that were critical of ZANU PF and in line with American foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.

4.6 Newsday Editorial Policy


The alleged link of Trevor Ncube to the CIA and CIO appears to play out in Newsday editorial policy. In *Newsday of 14 December 2013* Trevor Ncube is quoted as having declared

that the editorial policies of the newspapers he owns are based on reporting fairly and accurately. However, reading through all of the newspaper titles such as *Newsday*, *Zimbabwe Independent, The Standard and Southern Eye* one cannot fail to notice that there seems to be a deliberate vilification of ZANU PF and its interests while there seems to be some support for the opposition, especially that which seems to have a Matabeleland look to it such as MDC and ZAPU. Ncube's lack of faith in Morgan Tsvangirai seems to also be reflected in Newsday editorial policy. The Zimbabwean of 16 February 2011 had an open letter that accused a *Newsday* editorial comment of seeking to belittle Morgan Tsvangirai (*thezimbabwean.co*). In the open letter Trevor Ncube is accused of supporting supposed ZANU PF defectors like he did in supporting Mayambo (*thezimbabwean.co*). Waldahl (2005) notes that the private media in Zimbabwe have not shown an open support for the opposition in the mould that state controlled media do for ZANU PF. Considering that during the period noted by Waldahl (2005) Zimbabwe Independent and The Standard were considered some of the opposition papers, Trevor Ncube's alleged links to the CIO can be said to have influenced the lack of open opposition support, apart from the desire to be seen as objective and credible.

It can be argued that Trevor Ncube advocates for an end to the alleged marginalisation of his home area of Matabeleland hence there used to be a *Newsday Southern Edition* which covered stories from the Southern region of Zimbabwe. He has since started a daily newspaper that caters for the Southern region called *Southern Eye*. This newspaper apart from catering for Matabeleland and Midlands, also carries some stories from *Newsday*. In a statement at a media consultative forum held by the Zimbabwe National Army, Trevor Ncube is quoted by *Newsday of 14 December 2013* as having stated the need for the recognition of all sides that participated in the liberation struggle instead of the "regrettable" tendency of sidelining others. It can be argued that Ncube's call for the due recognition of Matabeleland is likely to be mirrored in the editorial policies of his newspapers such as *Newsday*. This is bound to have a material effect on *Newsday* framing of political parties considering that some of the parties to the proposed opposition alliance were coming from a largely Matabeleland support base.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the organisational structures of *The Herald* and *Newsday* and argued that the ownership and control patterns of the organisations have possible implications to the way the two newspapers framed the proposed opposition coalition. The chapter argued that discourses available in the two newspapers can be influenced by those who fund their operations. Through shareholding and funding elites can exercise some power over the output of the two newspapers.



CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I present my findings to the study. The findings will be presented in thematic format to capture the themes that emerged as I analysed the selected newspaper articles. The themes were trying to capture the answers to the research question as well as the sub research questions. Therefore the themes captured the frames that I found to have been employed by The Herald and Newsday in their coverage of the proposed grand coalition of opposition parties and the discourses promoted by such frames.

5.2 MDC-T and Morgan Tsvangirai behind moves for coalition

MDC-T was framed as the party more eager to get into an alliance with other parties against ZANU PF. Two of the three stories in *The Herald* presented MDC-T and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai as the one behind all the moves for the proposed coalition while all the three stories in *Newsday* framed the proposed alliance as MDC-T's brainchild. *The Herald* of 18 June 2013 claimed that "*The MDC formation led by Professor Welshman Ncube has scoffed at calls by MDC-T leader Mr Morgan Tsvangirai for a pact of all opposition parties opposed to Zanu-PF*". In *Newsday* of 18 June 2013 MDC-T senior officials are reported to be pushing their leader Morgan Tsvangirai to enter into an alliance with other opposition parties. An unnamed source is claimed to have said that "*We have arranged a meeting where the Prime Minister is meeting other political party leaders to discuss issues to do with uniting and challenging Mugabe*".

For *The Herald* MDC-T needed the alliance more because "several" surveys had pointed to a ZANU PF victory. There was a deliberate framing of MDC-T as running scared and seeing the alliance as the only option for ascendency into power. *Newsday* of 5 July had a headline titled "*Tsvangirai courts Ncube*" to emphasise that it was Tsvangirai and his party who were making the proposal for the grand alliance. Nathaniel Manheru in an analysis story in *The Herald* of 28 June 2013 claimed the alliance had always been Tsvangirai's "anguished wish". The phrase describes the pains Tsvangirai was getting to in order to have an alliance with other opposition parties.

In presenting Tsvangirai as the one behind the alliance, there was a deliberate portrayal of Tsvangirai as greedy especially by *The Herald*. His call to other parties was to rally behind him as the sole presidential candidate in the upcoming elections. He was framed not only as greedy but as big headed to believe that only he can become the leader of a united opposition. For that he came under attack from the Welshman Ncube led MDC whose spokesperson Kurauone Chihwayi was quoted in *The Herald* of 18 June 2013 saying that Tsvangirai was not unique in any way to become the anointed leader of such a coalition. Prominence is given in the story to Chihwayi's response to the Tsvangirai moves for the alliance while for the MDC-T mainly unnamed sources are quoted. *Newsday* of 18 June also relied more on unnamed sources declaring that there were senior MDC-T officials making frantic efforts to see the coalition happening. It is interesting to note that in *Newsday* story of 5 July 2013 while the headline claims that Tsvangirai was courting Ncube there are no MDC-T sources confirming it but rather the story relies on MDC-N sources for confirmation.

For Morgan Tsvangirai anyone standing against an opposition alliance was not worthy of being a leader. In *The Herald* of 18 June 2013 he is quoted saying "If it means Tsvangirai and Welshman are the impediments to that alliance or that coalition then Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube should not be leaders of political parties". The statement insinuates that any leader worth his salt could not be seen to believe that he could make it on his own against ZANU PF at the polls. It is an admission of defeat. Thus for *The Herald* Tsvangirai's desperation for the proposed alliance was an indicator that ZANU PF was in a much stronger position than its nemesis. For *Newsday* the call from MDC-T and Tsvangirai stemmed from what happened at a SADC summit where MDC-T and MDC had combined forces to "successfully" lobby against Mugabe's declaration of 31 July as the date set for elections. MDC-T had therefore seen some sense in the power of unity and hence was now making moves for such an alliance in the elections. In the story on 18 June 2013 the one political analyst quoted in the story, Pedzisayi Ruhanya, said "We had Tsvangirai destroying the political shenanigans of Zanu PF and Ncube destroying the legal shenanigans of Zanu PF. If they combine or unite, they can ensure a political redemption of this country."

The framing of MDC-T and Morgan Tsvangirai was a power game played by the two parties. Foucault describes discourse as a game of power (Van Dijk n.d) and in the framing of the proposed alliance as the brainchild of the MDC-T, for *The Herald*, it was meant to imply that the party had lost all the influence it had in the 2008 elections where Tsvangirai nearly defeated Mugabe in the presidential election. Morgan Tsvangirai as the face of an opposition party that had proved to be a headache for ZANU PF since its emergence in 1999, had to be stripped of the power that had made him such a headache. By casting him then as the one desperate for a coalition, *The Herald* was making a point that the man was not as powerful as readers may have assumed. Instead by stripping him of his power *The Herald* was giving back power to ZANU PF that the newspaper claimed to have made strides to regain its support in the wake of the near disaster of 2008.

For *Newsday* there seemed to be a desire to frame MDC-T as a party that had realised their mistake in rejecting to enter into an alliance with the Welshman Ncube led MDC prior to the 2008 elections. The proposal for a coalition then was reported to have come to naught after MDC-T wanted to claim all the senior positions in the coalition. By reporting its seeming desperation now *Newsday* was making sure the MDC-T got its position right. It was not as powerful as it thought it was. It needed others in order to make it. It could be interpreted as an admonition of the party that it had acted foolishly in denying to form an alliance with MDC then led by Arthur Mutambara.

As noted by Entman (1993) the idea behind making some ideas of a text more noticeable is to emphasise a certain way of defining a particular problem, define why things are the way they are as well as attract moral judgements for the illuminated ideas. By framing MDC-T as the party behind all the shenanigans of a proposed opposition alliance, *Newsday* was squarely laying the blame on MDC-T for the way things are, that is, opposition failure to dislodge ZANU PF. It casts MDC-T as a power hungry lot that promoted selfish interests at the expense of the good of all. MDC-T had been the stubborn one but now they had realised their folly.

The omission of MDC-T sources in the stories was meant to promote what other parties were saying that was in line with editorial policy of the newspaper concerning the proposed coalition. The majority shareholder in the newspaper, Trevor Ncube was not favourable to the idea of Morgan Tsvangirai becoming the President of the country thus he had proposed a Third way that excluded Tsvangirai. Framing him as a power hungry leader who had now realised his mistakes was a way of putting him in his place. Being careful not to alienate readers as well as being too open in criticism it would appear that *Newsday* was taking a more calculated approach in its portrayal of Tsvangirai as a leader lacking the leadership qualities. It had to come from other political voices such as Kurauone Chihwayi. That way the newspaper would avoid any allegations of being biased because it was in its interests to be seen as credible.

5.3 Welshman Ncube not keen on coalition

While Tsvangirai and MDC-T were framed as eager for the coalition, Weshman Ncube and his MDC were framed as not too keen on the proposed alliance. In all the stories from The Herald and Newsday Welshman Ncube was portrayed as someone who did not care much if the alliance happened or not. It was almost as if he was assured that on his own he could win the elections. In *The Herald* of 18 June 2013 the headline was "MDC scoffs at marriage with Tsvangirai. By "scoffing" at the "marriage" a picture of a potential partner spurning a marriage proposal was created for the reader. In *Newsday* of 18 June 2013 Ncube is quoted saying that anyone thinking of forming an alliance had to "satisfy certain conditions" first. It is a statement of someone who is self-assured. While the same picture of a marriage proposal was painted, in *Newsday* it was more of a potential partner who feels special and was not going to be pushed into anything. If it is a woman then it has to be at her own terms and not the other way round. It was more like Tsyangirai as the potential suitor had to go out of his way to meet the demands of a special someone. It is either the demands are met or there is Hands Our nothing. Our

Furthermore, Ncube declared that he would not to be bothered with issues to do with the proposed coalition. While Tsvangirai was framed as the one leading the overtures for a coalition on behalf of his party, Welshman Ncube had delegated the duty to his juniors, the treasurer general and secretary general. Party spokesperson Nhlahla Dube was quoted in *Newsday* of 20 June declaring that *"it is a matter of public record that the MDC stated after*

its National Standing Committee last week and in very clear terms its attitude towards coalition. It has also publicly stated who among its leaders should be approached with regards to conversations for political cooperation of any nature." In other words those issues were too mundane for the MDC leader to be seen to be involved in. It is a picture of someone who has more important issues to deal with than the proposed coalition business. Interestingly in the editorial story of 20 June 2013 *Newsday* omitted any MDC-T voices to comment on the call by readers for opposition unity to overthrow ZANU PF.

In *The Herald* of 18 June 2013 Lloyd Gumbo the writer described all other opposition parties as minor while MDC was portrayed as major. Gumbo stated that "While other minor political parties are open to the so-called coalition, Prof Ncube's formation that has gained significant ground in areas currently under Mr Tsvangirai's party, insists that it will not form an alliance with its erstwhile colleagues." A picture of someone rising in stature is framed pertaining to Ncube and his party. Not only was he growing but he was gaining ground in Tsvangirai strongholds. The presupposition was that Ncube was growing while Tsvangirai was getting weaker. As a result of his growing stature *The Herald* of 5 July framed a picture of a Welshman Ncube who had entered into a forced alliance. The newspaper declared that "Up until now, the parties – particularly Ncube's MDC – were reluctant to forge an electoral alliance". The singling out of Ncube's MDC was meant to frame a picture of the odd one out in terms of unwillingness to join the proposed coalition

There was a deliberate comparison of the two leaders in *Newsday* of 18 June 2013 with Tsvangirai being framed as more of political and nothing else while Ncube was described as crucial legal brains. Analyst Pedzisai Ruhanya was quoted stating that *"we had Tsvangirai destroying the political shenanigans of Zanu PF and Ncube destroying the legal shenanigans of Zanu PF"*. *The Herald* of 18 June 2013 gave prominence to Kurauone Chihwayi as he attacked Tsvangirai's personality as a leader. He described Tsvangirai as a risky partner. The prominence given to Chihwayi was framing a picture for comparison. If Tsvangirai was risky then Ncube was supposed to be a safe choice. Chihwayi also claimed that *"To us, Tsvangirai does not hold keys for Zimbabwe's future."* In other words MDC did not need Tsvangirai or any coalition to get into government. They had their destiny in their own hands. *The Herald*

deliberately gave acres of space to Chihwayi to denigrate the person of Morgan Tsvangirai without any response from the MDC-T.

In an analysis in *The Herald* of 28 June 2013 the writer Nathaniel Manheru stated that the coalition failed "*thanks to Ncube himself the big fish baited by the West*" Ncube was deliberately given an elevated status as the one who held the keys to the coalition. His refusal to enter into a coalition purportedly had seen the proposed coalition failing to take off. In *The Herald* of 20 June 2013 the MDC spokesperson Kurauone Chihwayi stated that the whole coalition agenda had nothing to do with MDC but a creation of "pro-Tsvangirai" newspapers. It was to say MDC did not have on their agenda to enter to enter into a coalition since they are "the big fish". Even as *Newsday* of 5 July reported of an intensification of efforts to form a coalition MDC secretary general Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga was only saying "*All I can say is that I received a proposal from MDC-T today (yesterday) and we are looking at it.*" Interestingly as *Newsday* was reporting Misihairabwi-Mushonga stating that she had only received a proposal from MDC-T today, *The Herald* was running with a story claiming that all opposition parties had been coerced into forming a "panicky" alliance.

Clearly the two newspapers were deliberately framing a growing MDC and a declining MDC-T. The editorial policy of *The Herald* is that it supports the government of the day but in this case the newspaper was clearly fighting in Welshman Ncube's corner. However, *The Herald* was always quick to highlight that ZANU PF was the most powerful force in Zimbabwean politics. Framing an MDC that was gaining ground was meant to promote a conflict frame intended for the supporters of especially Morgan Tsvangirai. It was necessary for the newspaper's greater strategy of supporting ZANU PF. If discord could be created between MDC-T and MDC then the one party that would benefit is ZANU PF if the discord led to a failure of the proposed opposition coalition.

The opposition coalition was a headache for the former ruling party ZANU PF. Nathaniel Manheru used the metaphor of a headache in his story in *The Herald* of 28 June 2013 because that is what it was to ZANU PF. ZANU PF had been secure in the knowledge that it was fighting a divided opposition and just like happened in 2008 the chances of a split of votes would benefit the former ruling party. There have been suspicions that Manheru is the

permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, George Charamba. Charamba is also President Robert Mugabe's spokesperson and sometimes the lines have been blurred on whether he is a civil servant or a ZANU PF official. He has tended to be more of the latter. The Ministry of Information and Publicity was instrumental in advancing interests of ZANU PF as it controlled both the public broadcaster and the state controlled print media. Manheru's celebration of the apparent failure of the proposed grand coalition due to Welshman Ncube's intransigence can be argued to have been an admission that the idea of the coalition had caused anxiety in ZANU PF.

The divide and rule tactic promoted by *The Herald* was a strategy to suit the demands of the one who has become the de-facto major shareholder in the newspaper, the Minister of Information and Publicity (now Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services). Schudson in Murdock and Golding (2005:63) argues that "political economy relates the outcome of the news process directly to the economic structure of news organisations" As a newspaper whose major decision maker was the Minister of Information and Publicity, *The Herald* had to help the greater strategy of ZANU PF in this election. Dividing the opposition was one sure way of looking after the interests of its major shareholder. Thus ZANU PF was well aware of a broader strategy when the then Minister of Information and Publicity dissolved the ZMMT board.

For *Newsday* on the other hand it was about discrediting the chances of Morgan Tsvangirai, the one whom its major shareholder Trevor Ncube did not have faith in. The broader context however, was more mischievous. *Newsday* was playing to the Shona versus Ndebele discourse. By claiming that Ncube is the one who held the key to the fruition of the alliance, *Newsday* was seizing discourse on behalf of the Ndebele. For a long time powerful political leaders have been Shona except for Joshua Nkomo who however was swallowed up by Robert Mugabe's ZANU PF. People from Matabeleland have been complaining of marginalisation because of lack of political representation at the top. There has also been some discourse that no-one from Matabeleland can be acceptable as a national leader. The evidence being the fact that when Ncube and his colleagues separated with Tsvangirai, their MDC went on to call Arthur Mutambara to become their leader. Mutambara was seen to be

more of an acceptable national leader because he was Shona. If therefore Welshman Ncube could raise the popularity of MDC as someone from Matabeleland, then discourse would have been seized. Someone from Matabeleland could appeal to people at national level. MDC had to shrug off the label of being a regional party. Welshman Ncube had to shame his detractors that called him "a village politician." Trevor Ncube through his newspaper, *Newsday* was seizing discourse.

5.4 Opposition alliance Western project: The Herald

There was a deliberate classification of the opposition alliance as a creation of the West in contrast to ZANU PF that was classified as "the revolutionary party." Two of the three stories in *The Herald* were emphasising the fact that the proposed opposition alliance was a Western project. *The Herald* of 5 July 2013 in its headline titled "Foreigners push MDCs, Mavambo, ZAPU to strike panicky alliance" transitivity was employed to frame a picture of foreigners as the agent while the opposition parties are the patient. Use of the word "push" was to highlight the use of coercion on the part of the foreigners. Nathaniel Manheru claimed in *The Herald* of 28 June that "*I said the grand alliance was driven by outsiders*. *That it was*." Manheru spoke like he had hard evidence that the alliance was Western sponsored.

The alliance is described in the story on 5 July 2013 as "*a panicky alliance*" engineered by the USA. While stating that alliance was a Western project the play on the word "panic" was to portray a sense of confusion in opposition camp. *The Herald* emphasised that the panic was brought about by the realisation that chances of the opposition winning the elections were slim. In *The Herald* of 5 July it is claimed that "Washington, worried by the poor electoral chances of the four parties, hatched the plan for the grand alliance." Washington was credited with "hatching" the plan thus framing a picture of a hen producing its own kind. The opposition alliance was therefore a "baby" of the West and therefore dependent upon it.

The plan was "presented to them fait accompli" (The Herald 5 July 2013). The opposition parties were framed as parties without a choice but to accept what the West was telling them to do. It is almost as if opposition parties are zombies that cannot question why things are being done the way they are. To make the story more believable *The Herald* claimed that a

neighbouring country was the instrument used by the USA to bring about the opposition coalition.

Nathaniel Manheru in *The Herald* of 28 June claimed that the West had discovered that Tsvangirai had become weak as a project hence it was necessary for them to come up with a new project. Manheru claimed that the West had always been working on a coalition albeit covertly and now they had become overt because of Tsvangirai's increasingly weakening position. He stated that the coalition *"was founded on a terrified discovery of serious weaknesses by those who had created an opposition project here to oust Zanu-PF. Tsvangirai has become weak, very weak."* All these are presuppositions that Manheru knows he can get away with.

Morgan Tsvangirai and his MDC-T are accused of having "soiled the façade of integrity and democracy." They had been laid bare and their true colours had been revealed because they had pressed the self-destruct button. To emphasise how the West had become disillusioned with the MDC-T Manheru claimed that the West had published it to the whole world that they were no longer satisfied with the performance of the former opposition party. *The Herald* claimed that the West had devised a strategy to counter the waning fortunes of the MDC-T hence they had come up with the strategy of an alliance of opposition parties.

The framing of MDC-T as a Western project was meant to play into the schema of the readers who had been told especially by the state controlled media that the West was behind the formation of the MDC in 1999. Readers had been told that the West created the MDC so that it could effect regime change in the country in order to protect white interests in the country. If the MDC was a puppet of the West and the proposed opposition alliance was a Western project, then there was no reason for Zimbabweans to trust their votes in a puppet.

By claiming that the opposition alliance was a Western project readers were being called upon to compare it with the revolutionary party ZANU PF. It was a call upon Zimbabweans to choose a party that stood for their interests by embarking on such empowerment programmes as the land reform programme and the indigenisation programme. This portrayal of the opposition alliance as a Western project could also appeal to the schema of readers who had experienced Bishop Abel Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It was an arrangement that many Zimbabweans loathed because of the deceit behind the project. It was therefore a call to readers to choose between Zimbabwe-Rhodesia represented by the proposed opposition alliance and the real Zimbabwe represented by ZANU PF.


Interestingly in both stories that frame the proposed opposition alliance there was deliberate omission of sources from the opposition so as to balance the stories. It was a case of "othering" that which had no opportunity to respond. This is indicative of a newspaper that was advancing a position so as to discredit the opposition. The newspaper was performing its "patriotic" duty of defending ZANU PF by annihilating opposition voices from its content thus concurring with Ranger (2005) who argues that patriotic journalism enables those who practice it to invent desired realities. Furthermore, by aligning with Western interests at the expense of local motivations, the proposed opposition alliance and the opposition parties were cast as treacherous and in Zimbabwe there is no room for traitors (Chuma 2006).

Through the topicalisation of foreigners *The Herald* was playing to the patriotic schema of the readers. The insinuation was that no-one in Zimbabwe would tolerate re-colonisation of the country by foreigners especially the USA and Britain. ZANU PF through the state controlled media had emphasised covert overtures by Britain to re-colonise the country with the help of its friends like the USA. Any party therefore that chose to align with elements of re-colonisation could not be considered as patriotic but sell-outs. If forming an alliance of opposition parties was an act of selling out, then the readers were being warned to shun them and remain patriotic. By linking the opposition alliance to the USA MDC-T and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai are framed as *zvimbwasungata*. The word refers to political adultery where the MDC- would go to the highest bidder, first to the British and now to the Americans.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented the findings of the study and discussed what the findings meant to the political discourse of the country. The recurring themes in the stories were that MDC-T and Morgan Tsvangirai were the instigators of the proposed opposition coalition, Welshman Ncube and his MDC were indifferent and the opposition alliance was a Western project. It

was argued that the reasons behind the framing of the opposition this way was a power game. There was an acknowledgement by *The Herald* that a united opposition was a threat to ZANU PF survival therefore there was a calculated move to seize the power from the opposition on behalf of ZANU PF. For *Newsday* there was an effort to seize power from MDC-T and Morgan Tsvangirai on behalf of MDC and Welshman Ncube. By giving power to Welshman Ncube, *Newsday* was seizing the discourse of Ndebeles not being good enough to be national leaders. For both newspapers it was a game of legitimating and delegitimizing Zimbabwe's political parties according to preferences.



CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I summarise the findings of the research as well as a summary of the methods used to carry out the research. I make recommendations to the two organisations studied as well as areas of further research.

6.2 Concluding Remarks

This study was carried out to establish how *The Herald* and *Newsday* framed the proposed opposition alliance of five parties against ZANU PF prior to the July 31 2013 elections. The parties involved were MDC, MDC-T, ZAPU, Mavambo and Zanu-Ndonga. Literature from other scholars that focused on framing of political parties in Zimbabwe was reviewed. It was found out that while studies have been carried out about framing of political parties, the conditions in which such framing was carried out and studied were markedly different from the conditions prevailing prior to the 31 July 2013 elections. While scholars had focused on framing of political parties in conditions where there was one ruling party, ZANU PF and different opposition parties since independence, this study was unique in its location in a period where there was no ruling party. It was a period of a GNU which comprised ZANU PF, MDC and MDC-T. The use of the word opposition was therefore almost a misnomer since all the major parties were in government. It was only an opposition to the former ruling party. A review of the related literature helped the study compare whether the framing during the GNU was any different from previous periods.

Framing theory was used as the theoretical framework for the study. The theory was used as the study sought to determine the frames prevalent in the two newspapers' coverage of the proposed opposition alliance. The study acknowledged that such frames are not random but are influenced by factors that are present in the production of news. Qualitative research was used to carry out the study since I was interested in establishing meanings behind the framing of the proposed opposition alliance. Archival research was used to obtain the material that was used for analysis. Online archives of the two newspapers were scoured for relevant articles that were purposively sampled. A critique of the two organisations behind the publication of *The Herald* and *Newsday* was carried out as it has a material impact on what is

produced. Critical discourse analysis was then used to analyse the data which was presented thematically.

For this study it was found out that even though it was a period of inclusivity, *The Herald* remained firmly under the control of ZANU PF since the Ministry of Information and Publicity was headed by a ZANU PF minister. Since the government was not exactly united but a collection of parties seeking to score individual scores against one another, the Minister of Information and Publicity continued to advance ZANU PF interests through *The Herald*. At the same time *Newsday* continued with oppositional journalism that had been practiced before perhaps because the parties in government continued as if there was still a ruling party and opposition parties. However, it was established that there was a deliberate pitting MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC leader Welshman Ncube against one another in the two newspapers. Both newspapers were elevating Ncube's significance while downplaying that of Tsvangirai. However the reasons for such framing were different for the two newspapers. For Newsday it seemed to be a regional solidarity while for *The Herald* it was more of a divide and rule tactic.

6.3 Recommendations

As the study established that the media in Zimbabwe remain acutely polarised along partisan lines, I recommend that there is need for consideration normative role of the media. The media are there to keep citizens informed so that they make informed choices. These choices are political in nature during elections. If Zimbabweans are to be able to make informed political choices I recommend that the media try to give balanced and objective stories about the activities of political parties. While it may be utopian to envisage media that are completely impartial in Zimbabwe the media have tended to brazenly carry ideologies of either ZANU PF or the opposition. I recommend that such kind of reporting should be left to party owned newspapers while national newspapers like *The Herald* and *Newsday* should strive for some semblance of objectivity. We now have a single ruling party again and perhaps unlikely to have another GNU any time soon, but The Herald and Newsday need to represent all sections of the society fairly without bias. During elections there is need for the media to articulate issues and policies of the different political parties without bias so as to

Framing the proposed alliance of opposition parties prior to 31 July 2013 elections. A case of The Herald and Newsday

promote a culture of policy or issue based voting in the Zimbabwean electorate. State controlled media like The Herald need to be removed from the clutches of a single political party. While serving the interests of the government of the day, The Herald needs to hold that government to account for the benefit of both those in government as well as citizens. Newsday also needs to avoid the tendency of being regional when reporting political parties but needs to question what each party is offering the electorate.

6.4 Suggestions for further study

There is potential to broaden the interplay between news production and its consumption or reception dynamics. It would be interesting to find out how readers interpreted the frames that were by the two newspapers in framing the proposed opposition coalition.

6.5 Conclus<mark>io</mark>n

This chapter concluded the research giving a summary of what was found out during the study. It also summarised the methods that were used to carry out the research. It further gave recommendations to The Herald as well as Newsday owners and controllers as well as recommendations for further study.



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Appendix 1

The Herald

BREAKING: Foreigners push MDCs, Mavambo, ZAPU to strike panicky alliance

July 5, 2013 <u>SuperAdmin Local News</u>



HARARE – The two MDC formations, Zapu and Mavambo have struck a panicky electoral alliance, pushed by the US, to improve their chances against Zanu-PF in the harmonised elections at the end of this month, sources close to the parties said on Friday.

Washington, worried by the poor electoral chances of the four parties, hatched the plan for the grand alliance and presented it to them, fait accompli, through a neighbouring country sympathetic to some officials of the parties in the coalition.

Under the deal, MDC-T leader Morgan Tsyangirai becomes the sole presidential candidate, the party's secretary-general Tendai Biti first vice president, and MDC-N leader Welshman Ncube the second vice president.

The sources said the coalition was finalised on Thursday, and was due to be simultaneously announced by Tsvangirai and Mavambo leader Simba Makoni in Harare, and Ncube and Zapu president Dumiso Dabengwa in Bulawayo around mid-day on Friday.

It follows a series of shuttle meetings in Harare and Bulawayo by representatives of the neighbouring country running on behalf of the US.

Up until now, the parties – particularly Ncube's MDC – were reluctant to forge an electoral alliance due to personal political ambitions of the leaders, and differing ideologies.

But sources said they were "whipped into line" by the US and the neighbouring country, both worried the parties stood little chance of defeating Zanu-PF in the July 31, 2013 elections.

Several local, regional and international polling agencies have predicted a Zanu-PF victory in the elections, with voters attracted by the party's broad-based economic empowerment policies such as land reforms and indigenization which have transformed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people across the country.

The sources said the announcement of the grand coalition was timed to "lift up the spirits" among the parties following Tsvangirai and Ncube's failure to delay the poll.

The Constitutional Court on Thursday dismissed applications by the two to delay the poll, a judgment which dealt a psychological blow to their parties ahead of the election.

The timing was also meant to "steal the thunder" from Zanu-PF's launch of its election manifesto today at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield.

But analysts said the coalition created more problems for the parties involved, than it solved.

The most pertinent of these is how to select prospective legislators to be withdrawn from the July 31 election race, and how to manage the subsequent fallout.

This also includes managing the bruised egos of some of the top leaders of the parties, most of whom are avowed ideological and professional foes.

For instance, the sources said, Ncube only grudgingly accepted the second vice presidency in the coalition, having originally preferred to be ahead of Biti as was the case in the MDC before the party split into two.

The two, both lawyers, also harbour professional jealousies believed to have driven the parties further apart since the 2005 split.

Ncube is also believed to have sour relations with MDC-T vice president Thokozani Khupe, who has been dropped completely from the presidency in the coalition, over the Makokoba constituency.

"This is a panicky alliance cobbled together through the spirited efforts of the Americans and other players from outside, and nothing ideological or otherwise holds the parties together," a political analyst, who declined to be named, said.

"It cements the parties' puppet image among voters, and the alliance is a mere parody of the 1987 Unity Accord between Zanu-PF and PF-Zapu," he said.

Unlike the members of the MDC-T led alliance, Zanu-PF and PF-Zapu shared the same liberation war background and ideology, having fought jointly to free the country from colonial rule.

The alliance, analysts said, also creates a perception problem among the parties' supporters who until now had been told the coalition had collapsed.

"Campaigning is at an advanced stage, and these leaders have been telling their voters to vote for their individual parties, only for them to now change and say something else. This creates a serious perception problem among voters," said the analyst.

"This is a reaction to the legal setback in the Constitutional Court, and the parties are scrambling to find anything that could possibly salvage their threatened political careers," he said.

A top political science lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe said this election is being fought on substance, and not emotion as was the case in 2008, and the grand coalition had nothing to counter offer to ZANU-PF's successful empowerment agenda.

Zanu-PF spearheaded land reforms in 2000 under which nearly 400 000 formerly landless blacks were resettled on farms taken from white farmers, and is now pushing for indigenization, especially in the mining sector.

Several rural communities surrounding mines have already been made shareholders in the mining ventures in their areas, something that has transformed the communities.

This, the University of Zimbabwe lecturer noted, is what the coalition has to match if it is to beat Zanu-PF in the harmonised elections.

"It is a tall order. Merely coming together is no substance. They have to find the substance which the electorate can buy into," he said.

Appendix 2

Newsday

Coalition against Mugabe grows

June 18, 2013 in <u>National</u>, <u>News</u>, <u>Politics</u>

MDC-T leader Prime Minister Morgan Tsyangirai and his MDC counterpart Welshman Ncube are under increasing pressure to forge a united front with other political forces to confront Zanu PF ahead of elections set for later this year.

REPORT BY MOSES MATENGA

This comes after the two MDC formations, Zapu, Zanu Ndonga and Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD) recently ganged up against President Robert Mugabe's unilateral declaration of July 31 as the election date.

The parties appealed to Sadc, the regional bloc, through South African President Jacob Zuma to reverse Mugabe's decision.

They are today set to meet for the third time in as many weeks.

The first meeting was attended by Tsyangirai, MDC deputy president Edwin Mushoriwa, Zapu leader Dumiso Dabengwa, MKD leader Simba Makoni and Zanu Ndonga's Reketai Semwayo.

Sources said MDC-T senior officials were pushing Tsvangirai to engage other forces with a view to forge an alliance to dislodge Mugabe.

"We have arranged a meeting where the Prime Minister is meeting other political party leaders to discuss issues to do with uniting and challenging Mugabe," a source said.

A senior MDC-T national executive member said the only way Mugabe could be defeated this time was by uniting all democratic forces and the MDC-T was alive to that fact.

"My take is let's roll out our campaign and instill confidence in people. Let's turn the challenge into an opportunity especially by forming one united front," the official said.

Party spokesperson Douglas Mwonzora said the MDC-T was open to a coalition especially now that the people had realised how important it was to speak with one voice, both locally and regionally.

"The need to unite all forces for the dislodging of dictatorship is obvious to every rightthinking Zimbabwean," Mwonzora said.

"The MDC will strive for unity of purpose of all progressive forces for the purposes of bringing change in Zimbabwe. Therefore, all political parties that want to enter into a political coalition with us are welcome.

"There is now evidence that the political forces fare better nationally and internationally if they are speaking with one voice."

MDC leader Ncube on Sunday said anyone who wanted a coalition with his party "should satisfy certain conditions" and deal with secretary-general Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga and senior party official Paul Themba Nyathi.

"The standing committee made a position on that and I can only refer you to their position that anyone who wants any coalition with us should satisfy certain conditions and can talk to the treasurer-general (Nyathi) and the secretary-general," Ncube said.

MKD leader Makoni said: "I think we have made our position clear that we are working together and there are consultations that are taking place."

Zanu Ndonga chairman Semwayo said there were ongoing talks for the formation of a coalition and he was in support of a move that would result in the defeat of Zanu PF.

"There are talks to come up with a coalition by the parties and I am in support of such a move. We are supposed to meet tomorrow (today) to discuss issues around that," he said.

Political analyst Pedzisai Ruhanya said of the mooted coalition: "During the Sadc summit, we saw what happens if Tsvangirai and Ncube have unity of purpose.

"We had Tsvangirai destroying the political shenanigans of Zanu PF and Ncube destroying the legal shenanigans of Zanu PF. If they combine or unite, they can ensure a political redemption of this country."

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