



**MIDLANDS
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FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

'DRY CITY: A HISTORY OF WATER PROBLEMS IN BULAWAYO, 1980-2014.'

By

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GWERU, ZIMBABWE.

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The undersigned certify that they have read and supervised the student, Methembe Hillary Hadebe’s dissertation entitled: **‘DRY CITY: A HISTORY OF WATER PROBLEMS IN BULAWAYO, 1980-2014’**, the project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Bachelor of Arts in History Honours Degree .

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Declaration

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Dedication

To my lovely sister Mpilwenhle F. Hadebe who at the time of writing this study befell an accident. Granted that misfortune, she continued to inspire and encourage me in coming up with this dissertation.

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Last but not least, to the Almighty God for the guidance and protection.

List of Acronyms

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| ABZ | Association of Bulawayo Businesses |
| AUSAID | Australian Aid |
| BCC | Bulawayo City Council |
| BEWAP | Bulawayo Emergency Water Augmentation Project |
| BMZWP | Bulawayo Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project |
| BOWSER | Bulawayo Water and Sanitation Response |
| BPRA | Bulawayo Progressive Resident Association |
| BURA | Bulawayo United Resident Association |
| BWC | Bulawayo Waterworks Company |
| BWCSSUP | Bulawayo Water Conservation and Sector Services Upgrading Project |
| CZI | Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries |
| DWD | Department of Water and Development |
| ESAP | Economic Structural Adjustment Programme |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GIZ | Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| MAG | Matabeleland Action Group |
| MDC | Movement for Democratic Change |
| MZWP | Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project |
| MZWT | Matabeleland Zambezi Water Trust |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NMZWP | National Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project |
| NMZWP-AC | National Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project- Advisory Council |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| NRZ | National Railways of Zimbabwe |
| NUST | National University of Science and Technology |
| PF-ZAPU | Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union |
| PICU | Project Implementation and Co-ordination Unit |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency |
| SWECO | Swedish Consulting Engineering Company |
| UKAID | United Kingdom Aid |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Fund |
| WOZA | Women of Zimbabwe Arise |
| ZANU (PF) | Zimbabwe African National Unity (Patriotic Front) |
| ZESA | Zimbabwe Electric Supply Authority |
| ZIMASSET | Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation |
| ZINWA | Zimbabwe National Water Authority |
| ZNCC | Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce |

Glossary of Terms

Bambazonke simply means one who seizes and takes all valuable and nice things to themselves like an octopus. This was a term which was popularised in the 1960's by the residents in Bulawayo describing status quo that the whites amassed all nice things and valuable things against the Africans who were subjected to unruly services. This term assumed a different meaning after 1980 were the residents in Bulawayo and Matabeleland used this term to allude to the fact that the Shona's in Harare grabbed all nice things and left the Ndebele region under developed.

KoNtuthu Ziyathunqa it is a word alluding to a place that incessantly exudes smoke. This has been used to describe Bulawayo as an industries hub with massive industries exhuming smoke.

Abathengisi it is a term used to refer to someone who is a traitor or a sell-out believed to be betraying or forsaking an agreed objective.

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Abstract

Bulawayo has struggled with water scarcity since its inception in 1894 and even after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. The irony was that while the City of Bulawayo celebrated 120 years of existence in 2014, water scarcity challenges were still a living memory and a reality - a situation that has witnessed its residents living without water, the industries struggling without water and even the authorities' witch hunting a more feasible and sustainable solution to end water shortages. Although other cities in Zimbabwe have experienced water paucity problems in a similar fashion, Bulawayo finds herself with a different water scarcity version where water deficits are perceived to be a direct conspiracy by the Shona dominated government against a perceived Ndebele dominated city. Put in other words, the perceived ethnic tensions have made Bulawayo a dry city, ultimately propelling untold sufferings on the livelihoods and suffocating industries out of Bulawayo. Beneath these controversies and conspiracies they are a number of factors that account for Bulawayo's incessant water shortages which include the geographical location of the city, population density straining resources, obsolete water supply infrastructure, the decommissioning of dams, financial constraint and lack of resources to explore reservoirs. In the midst of water scarcity the government, the BCC and the non-state actors sought solutions that have reduced water shortages, but have failed to fully realize water sanity and security. The first chapter looks at the impact of water shortages on the livelihood of Bulawayo. It spells out the survival, mitigation and coping strategies of people without water. The second chapter provides solutions that the BCC, the government and non-state actors have deployed to mitigate water woes. Chapter three presents the history of the MZWP paying particular attention to its history and its controversial episodes that have delayed the implementation. Chapter four deals with the discourse of water and de-industrialization, particularly locating water in the contemporary debate of industrial relocation from Bulawayo. Nonetheless, the study used a qualitative research and proved that water scarcity of Bulawayo has been used for different scores by various organisations and thus created a new social order.

INTRODUCTION

Background of the study

The impasse that has characterised Bulawayo's water scarcity since its inception in 1894, has been widely attributed to the geographical location that receives low rainfall and ultimately the poor run off and siltation that compromised water levels at the dams- making Bulawayo a dry city.¹ Put in other words, Bulawayo is said to be an ecologically cursed region with low rainfall of between 400mm-600mm per annum, a situation that reflects drought, water scarcity and insufficient storage in its dams.² In the colonial period, the responsible government struggled to procure water for its consumers and the industries that was in dire need of water supply. However, what should be made clear from the onset is that, during the colonial period the Africans suffered rampant water woes against their counter parts as the whites used their skewed racial policy to deprive Bulawayo African townships water in favour of white suburbia. Therefore, the degree of water scarcity between the blacks and white was different. For example, for the whites it was dictated by the environment that was naturally dry and yet for the blacks it was coupled with the skewed racial policies bent on depriving Africans water security and sanity.³

It was in that context that the Independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 was welcomed with widespread euphoria, among the people who were perhaps convinced that the new government under Mugabe would surely solve the matrix of Bulawayo's water scarcity problems that threatened their livelihood and further compromised industrial production. Contrary to the anticipated, the ZANU (PF) dominated government was confronted with massive water scarcity thereby perpetuating untold sufferings. Indeed, the rise of the population in the city and the mushrooming of townships further heightened water scarcity as water demand strained water supply.⁴ For a long time, the people have lamented and appealed for help from the government to avail water solutions. It must, however be noted that, such a calamity has trivialised and equated the City of Bulawayo to a village, as long queues by residents in search of water have been acutely witnessed worse still with frequent power cuts.

The study is confined to the period of 1980-2014 for various reasons. 1980-1992 marked a turning point characterised by independence and hence many promises were made to the people by the ZANU (PF) ⁵ led government including them solving water crisis solutions of Bulawayo. More specifically, in that period a lot of socio-political policies which impacted and exacerbated the water crisis in Bulawayo were recorded especially the Zimbabwe's Civil

War of 1982-1987 (Gukurahundi) and Structural Adjustments that compromised and dithered on the implementation of water projects envisaged to end water scarcity in Bulawayo. Between 1992 up to 2000, the water crisis in Bulawayo was further entrenched by the land reform and the rise of MDC which won massive popularity in Bulawayo.⁶ As a hotbed city antagonistic to ZANU (PF), Bulawayo embraced MDC as a supposedly party to solve water scarcity against perceived failed ZANU PF policies. Sensing a political mileage that MDC had attracted in the city, ZANU (PF) deployed Water Act policy of 1999 which was endeavoured to win back and subject Bulawayo's water scarcity under its domains at the expense of solving the water problems.⁷ It also moves away from 2000-2014, a period marred by different political landscape of crisis with rampant economic woes which further entrenched the water crisis in Bulawayo. In a near point of no alternative, the period also illuminates the strategies set out by the non-state actors, BCC and the government in availing water to Bulawayo residents. Emphasis on the solutions injected by non-state actors, the government and the BCC shall be drawn from their co-ordinated work, programs and projects that they have carried since 1980 up to 2014.

Barely, two years into independence, Zimbabwe witnessed a bloody civil war because of power contestation between (PF) ZAPU and ZANU (PF). The resultant impact of this conflict on Bulawayo was that all water development projects and improvements were deferred and postponed because of insecurity and political considerations by the ZANU (PF) government.⁸ Hence the people of Bulawayo continued to succumb to water scarcity woes that ultimately resulted in them questioning and unpacking the gains of independence. Put in other words, independence never translated to bring about water security as the situation continued more severely.

With the escalation of Gukurahundi, it should be noted from the onset that the water solution for Bulawayo reached a crescendo of being politically charged. In their relations and dealings with BCC, the ZANU (PF) dominated government treated the (PF) ZAPU's controlled local authority as an extension and offspring of its former arch rival.⁹ Such a stance by ZANU (PF) was further witnessed at the turn of the millennium when the MDC won both parliamentary and municipal elections there by dominating the BCC.¹⁰ However, in no time the government greatly clashed with the BCC, as the government when on expropriating rights to procure water for the city in favour of the ZINWA- a parastatal that was to control and supply national water affairs. In the eyes of academics, civil societies, residents and politicians across their divide (ZAPU, ZANU & MDC), the government has from time immemorial been reluctant

to solve water scarcity for the region because it is antagonistic to ZANU (PF) and its policies.¹¹ Therefore, they government use water to as a machinery to fix, punish and show people that ZANU (PF) is the only party to be voted that would easily harness their problem as opposed to any other.

Essentially, water solution for Bulawayo has not materialised up to date save for lamentations by the residents and unending rhetoric's that have not translated to bring about water security and solutions. For example the solutions for water scarcity notably Matabeleland Zambezi Water project, Gwayi-Shangani Dam, revitalisation of Nyamandlovu Aquifer among others, have since been mooted, discussed and at worst used for political gains especially by ZANU (PF). Furthermore, after elections the water scarcity that would have been featuring prominently, disappears from the mouths of such politicians only to feature once more in other election period.¹² In January 2014, Senator Mathuthu lamented and challenged the government to implement and harness water problems in Bulawayo through funding water projects especially Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project, Gwayi-Shangani Dam, commissioning of Mtshabezi pipeline and rehabilitation of Nyamandlovu Aquifer.¹³ In a clear position of dilemma, the BCC has also threatened the move to rehabilitate 'dead water' from decommissioned dams like Inyakuni, Upper Ncema, Khami and reviving fully Mzingwane.¹⁴

The seeming search of water for the city attracted confusion, storms and tiff among the government, BCC and the non-state actors under the period being interrogated. The inception of *Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kahle* in Cowdry Park extension around 2004 brewed a storm against the BCC who refused to connect its resident to water arguing that the stands were 'illegal' and costly to be under the watch of the BCC since water was a problem. Besides the government had embarked on that scheme without their consent.¹⁵ On the face of it, the non-state actors bemoaned and criticised the BCC and government to give due attention to its residents. Sadly, the desperate search of water solutions for the city forced the BCC to bulldoze the implementation of prepaid water meters.¹⁶ Against all odds, the government and various non-state actors sharply blocked the BCC in view that they were breaching the constitutional right of giving water to the people and hence privatising the commodity meant depriving water to those that would not afford to buy.¹⁷ The politicization of water between the BCC and the government has robbed the Bulawayo residents their water right as enshrined in the constitution of 2013,¹⁸ hence qualifying the maxim that, it is the grass that suffers when the elephants fight.

Tired of waiting, the people sought different coping and mitigation strategies in the mould of fetching from the boreholes, hoarding water and even drawing water from unprotected sources- a clear sign of desperation, thereby heightening gender roles for women and even created a new social order among the livelihood of the residents.¹⁸ At some point the late Arnold Payne (widely known as Water Father) pushed a wheel burrow which had a loaded drum from Victoria Falls to Bulawayo.¹⁹ Such a gesture espoused everyday hardships felt by Bulawayo residents without water. The one voice campaign, 'Help Save Bulawayo', has virtually prompted even the captains of industry to clamour for water arguing that because of water shortages, some industries have relocated to Harare in search of water.²⁰ Needless to say, the population *vis-à-vis* with resources heavy industry and climate change²¹ have all exacerbated the water scarcity problem of Bulawayo which indeed seeks to be addressed. All this has exposed them to water borne diseases like typhoid and cholera which also hit Harare and Beitbridge more acutely in 2008.²² Their pains and sufferings have poignantly invoked the city fathers and the civil society to speedily intervene and provide sustainable solutions, since the same government that has been in power has failed them.²³

The study seeks to examine perennial water shortages in Bulawayo and their impact on everyday lives of the residents and industrial production. It also examines the diverse response of residents, the BCC, local politics, industry and the non-state actors in resolving these water deficits. The study is important because Bulawayo water deficits have been clouded in controversies such as the perceived conspiracy by the Shona dominated government against a perceived Ndebele dominated city. Put in other words, the perceived ethnic tensions have made Bulawayo a dry city. In spite of those controversies and conspiracies, they are a number of factors that account for incessant Bulawayo's water shortages which include: the geographical location of the city, population density straining resources, obsolete water supply infrastructure, the decommissioning of dams, financial constraint and lack of resources to explore reservoirs at places like Nyamandlovu Aquifer and the Epping Forest. In the process, it shall discuss the long awaited Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project and other projects that were deployed by the government, the BCC and the non-state actors in the quest of negotiating water scarcity.

Statement of the problem

The city of Bulawayo, since its inception in 1894 has perennially grappled with water shortages²⁴, which has undoubtedly impacted negatively the livelihood of Bulawayo residents.

Bulawayo the second largest city is located in region four, receiving between 400mm-650mm –a situation reflecting drought with low rainfall.²⁵ Against this background, the situation has also been exacerbated by poor climatic conditions (run off and high evaporation), poor catchment, high population, obsolete infrastructure and lack of funding.²⁶ Despite solutions to avail water since 1980 which have been implemented- a gap still exists as water shortages of Bulawayo are still rife and witnessed. The available scholarship on water problems in Bulawayo has largely highlighted the history and national political debate on water, paying no sufficient attention to the history of Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project and the Nyamandlovu Aquifer. Worse-still much of the literature, is silent on the discourse of water and industries, granted the fact that Bulawayo was once the industrial hub of Zimbabwe. The same literature has excluded the role played by the non-state actors in availing water for Bulawayo since 1980. Essentially, the plight of the people in search of water and the impact of water scarcity, is silenced and to some extent homogeneously treated, as women, children and institutions faced water shortages differently. Those that have perhaps written about the impact of water shortages on the livelihood of the people have failed to demonstrate the coping and mitigation strategies deployed by the people in search of water. Against this backdrop, there is also need to further illuminate how water shortages compromised the residential small/medium businesses that required water.

Main research questions

- What factors account for Bulawayo’s perennial water shortages from independence to 2014?

Sub-research questions

- How has the government, BCC and non-state actors intervened to resolve water shortages in Bulawayo?
- How has water shortages affected Bulawayo’s economic development?
- What factors account for the failure of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project to take off since it was mooted in 1912 till 2014?
- In what ways have these water shortages compromised and affected domestic lives of the residents?

Justification of the study

The study seeks to spell out the plans of the government, NGO's and the BCC to curb water shortages in Bulawayo, at a time the three sectors have found a common ground to deal with water woes using a tripartite approach. The available literature on Bulawayo's water struggles have concentrated on the political dimensions of the issue without fully interrogating the strategies and programmes that were spell out by the key authorities the quest of solving water matrix. More importantly, the available scholarship has paid little attention or perhaps no attention at all to the history of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project and other programmes that were deployed to solve water matrix. It is therefore, crucial to trace, examine and analyse methods of procuring water for the city since independence of 1980 giving an insight of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project and many more that were deployed. Essentially, the study deviates from an elitist approach, as it brings to light the views of the ordinary residents seeking and questioning sustainable water solutions.

In addition, the study will benefit those that do not understand the historical dimension of water in Bulawayo, more importantly its history which has perhaps affected the status quo of the contemporary outlook of Bulawayo. Notably, the study renders the intent feelings of the residents faced with water scarcity since independence. It is an important research, as it documents the actual episodes and loud testimonies that the residents came across when they negotiated water scarcity problems in the city. What is important is that, every resident was affected by water scarcity in their own right hence this study discusses water scarcity on women, men, children (boy and girls) and even the vulnerable.

Existing scholarship and literature has not paid sufficient attention to the relationship of Bulawayo industry and water. This study pursues that the relationship of the two has in time created strain and brewed theories in as far as relocation of industries from Bulawayo is concerned. As such the study shall interrogate and give a candid relationship between Bulawayo industries and the discourse of water. Precisely, the research refines and revises the impact of water scarcity to the people. In the existing historiography, the impact of water scarcity to the people has been treated homogenously. Therefore this study, been influenced by theories of Karl-Marx that champions class struggles arguing that women, men, children and other institutions faced water problems differently as dictated by their class.²⁷ It also illuminates the gender dimensions espousing that women suffered more in dealing with water scarcity.

Objectives of the study

The study sought to achieve the following;

- To trace the history and nature of water problems in Bulawayo.
- To show why the government has failed to curb water problems in Bulawayo since 1980.
- To outline the role of the government, non-state actors and the BCC in availing water solutions for the residents in Bulawayo since 1980 till 2014.
- To outline the challenges posed by water scarcity to the livelihoods of different classes in the society and ultimately decline of economic base of the region and country.
- To exhume the history of Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project and account for the reasons behind its failure to take off since 1912 till 2014 yet it is envisaged to be the best project to radically end water woes in the city.

Scope of the study

The study is narrowly focused in the City of Bulawayo. It is a research that is premised in Bulawayo because of its hotbed politics, massive urban population, presence of gigantic industrial base and the residential housing expansion, all being drivers of water shortages and in turn being variables that are grossly affected by water scarcity. It needs to be noted that, the study shall not in any way attempt to induce discourses of water scarcity in the peri-urban of Bulawayo, although it shall draw examples from it. Much literature that, documents the environmental historiography of Bulawayo and larger theories of environmental historiography of Southern Africa to that end, shall be narrowed down in to the context of Bulawayo. Of particular important to note is that, this study cuts across a plethora of many disciplines in the mould of Geography, Lands, and Water Management studies, however the facts gathered and mode of interpretation shall follow historical methods of writing in all its analysis and dealings although drawing lessons from the afore. As alluded by the period under study, the research confers the water argument from 1980-2014, although it needs to be emphasized that episodes prior 1980 shall be discussed and those after 2014 shall be injected and projected. Hence the past and the future are imbricated in the present.

Literature review

The literature review on the concept of water scarcity in Bulawayo has largely been drawn from the works of Musemwa and other scholars from the disciplines like geography, land and water engineering. The study selected the literature under scrutiny and discussed it briefly for the purposes of situating the study in an analytical context.

In the article, *'A tale of two cities: The evolution of the city of Bulawayo and Makokoba township under conditions of water scarcity 1894-1953'*, Musemwa demonstrates how the skewed colonial policy deprived Africans water in Makokoba and yet the same policy availed water to the whites in their suburbia.²⁸ He further postulates that the whites depicted themselves as citizens to have access to water, yet the Africans were perceived as second class citizens (subjects) who were to languish without water. This rings true as the colonial municipality went on to build parks, Khami (1928), Ncema (1943), Mzingwane (1956) and other water boreholes facilities²⁹ which were targeting whites and the same was not extended to the blacks. In Musemwa's view, it is crystal clear that water scarcity for the whites was a direct result of the climatic conditions in Bulawayo yet Africans it was a result of a skewed colonial policy and the climate.³⁰ One finds Musemwa's assertion quite relevant and apt, at a time when the racial segregation was rife hence water solution in Bulawayo were further delayed and entrenched by racial discrimination.

However, even if the whites procured water for the white suburbia, they is a possibility that water was still not enough. Apart from that it is hard to imagine how a policy could have been successful targeting a minority and neglecting majority yet all were affected. Therefore, their naïve approach to water solutions for Bulawayo, doomed the process and the city at large as the process to procure water was still a quest of chimera. No wonder why, it is a problem hitherto.

In his article, *'Early struggles over water: From private to public water utility in the City of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1894-1924'*, Musemwa advances two central arguments in the article. First, he provides an overview of the role that was played by Bulawayo Waterworks Company (BWC) a private company to procure, supply and distribute water for the city as appointed by the BSAC and ultimately illustrate demonstrates how the Bulawayo City Council (BCC) expropriated took over the mandate of procuring water from the BWC.³¹ In the same vein, the article also advances a post-colonial episode that saw the sudden takeover of bulk water control from the BCC by ZINWA (a government water authority) through the Water Act

of 1999.³² He further proposes that, water scarcity of Bulawayo always has always been clouded by power contestation between the government of the time and the municipality. One is tempted to note that the seeds were sown in the colonial period using the Water Act of 1976 and 1999 Water Act which shared similarities. Once more, no long sustainable solution of Bulawayo's water scarcity was achieved, only jostle of power struggles yet the commodity was rightly needed.

In the article, *'Politics of Water in Post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007'*, Musemwa observes the jostle of powers between the BCC and the government over the control of Bulawayo's water. Under this, he illustrates how the government was 'politically' directed ZINWA (a water authority) to oversee the development of bulk water co-ordination and water management in urban cities, hence for Bulawayo it was fashioned to politically weaken the city that was antagonistic to ZANU (PF) thereby controlling it using water.³³ Put in other words, ZANU (PF) dominated government deliberately used water as a mechanism to control Bulawayo that had been invaded by the MDC since 1999, particularly the BCC and the Bulawayo residents.³⁴ Essentially the residents criticized the sudden takeover of the water rights from the BCC in view that the ZANU (PF) dominated government was acting out of political expediency that was bent of bringing Bulawayo under the auspices of ZANU (PF). That said, the above scenario heightened water scarcity in Bulawayo, as the struggle in the face of water shortages against the backdrop of hostile authorities that continued to fight instead of forging relations and bail out the people from harsh water scarcities.

Alexander, McGregor and Ranger hold that, the civil strife (Gukurahundi) between (PF) ZAPU and ZANU (PF) derailed development in Matabeleland especially on the part of the timber, CAMPFIRE and more specifically their failure to solve water shortages of Bulawayo as the former was labelled a dissident city antagonistic to ZANU PF rule.³⁵ From their argument it is crystal clear that such a scenario back tracked strategies in arresting water shortages as the perennial city water woes were left unattended. As this civil war era came to an end, nothing had materialised in terms of water strategies save for disturbances, fear and perennial water shortages on the side of the vanquished.³⁶ Once more, no lasting solution for Bulawayo as the city continued to be neglected – a situation that is haunting the contemporary scenario of water scarcity.

Ranger and Mupfema also attribute water scarcity in Bulawayo as a political gimmick between the municipality and the state as clearly alluded by Musemwa. To them such wrestles

delayed moves of procuring water and consequently the residents succumbed to all that.³⁷ In this case, water scarcity of Bulawayo was politicised as the central state used ZINWA as a sacrificial lamb to expropriate water control thus weakening the powers of the BCC and ultimately guarding the city under its hegemony away from the MDC- a strong opposition that swayed the city.³⁸ No wonder why the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project and other projects meant to guard against water scarcity are all entrenched to such political gimmicks³⁹ hence no consensus on the solution of Bulawayo is attained fully by both parties.

Musemwa, Nel and Berry with regard to the '*city and state*' wrestle over water highlight that the ZANU (PF)-Shona dominated government punitively punished the perceived Ndebele dominated city of Bulawayo through overlooking and neglecting water woes in the city in view that the city was antagonistic to ZANU (PF).⁴⁰ Musemwa evokes a political, regional and ethnic imperative of water problems in Bulawayo dubbed, '*Hydro-politics: Disciplining the dissident city*' that believes that the ZANU (PF)- Shona dominated government deployed a naked conspiracy against the Ndebele Bulawayo city bringing the BCC dominated municipality and the resident under the hegemony of ZANU (PF) using water.⁴¹ It needs to be highlighted that the water problem of Bulawayo was not attended solely because the region was labelled Ndebele dissident area which had voted for (PF) ZAPU and not for ZANU (PF), hence the need to converting them to realise the hegemony of ZANU (PF) using water as a mechanism of control. In tandem, the central state as highlighted resorted to a policy of neglect and splendid isolation to the people Bulawayo- a clear apparatus to punish the city for being a hub of opposition. The framework is also echoed by Nel and Berry who confirm the foregoing that, the government complained of funds when the city sought water solutions from 1980-1992 when it appealed for pipeline connections. For example Insiza to Ncema, sourcing water from Gwayi/Shangani and the implementation of MZWP.⁴² Because of such political expediency the water woes continued and still linger up to 2014 a period under study as nothing was achieved.

In his book, '*Water, History and politics in Zimbabwe: Bulawayo's struggles with the environment 1894-2008*', Musemwa forwards four main themes. First, he succinctly exhumes the environmental historiography of the Ndebele state, paying particular attention to the importance of water, methods of conserving water and the modes of survival in times of drought in the pre-colonial period. In its proceedings the book describes, water scarcity in Makokoba, a situation which exposed Africans to sadistic woes and diseases during the colonial period.⁴³ As already highlighted, in chapter three Musemwa points out the impacts of

the 1980 civil war (Gukurahundi), which derailed water development in Matabeleland as the government treated the BCC and the rest of the region as dissident city, antagonistic to ZANU (PF)'s rule and hence deserved to languish without water solutions.⁴⁴ In the final analysis, he notes various strategies set by the BCC not to build dams but rather to conserve the little through the policy of, managing available water supplies.⁴⁵ It should be noted that, this was a desperate move to procure the water for its residents as by this time the BCC has attested that the dam construction projects were vividly impossible to carry out because of funds and government's biased mediation. Much as it appears, this new policy of water management detected leakages, improved water meters and even sought for water reclamation scheme that is recycling water.⁴⁶

It looks like, throughout the period of the book under scrutiny '1894-2008', Musemwa only concentrates on the historical episodes that witnessed the tiff between the Matabeleland people, BCC and the government and yet silence the role played by non-state actors in search of water. He even documents the desperate survival strategies set out by the BCC to procure water and yet fails to show the same desperate survival strategies of the residents in search of water. In tandem, one would expect the author to also show the tiff and controversial stance between the BCC, the government and the non-state actors regarding the *Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kahle* in Cowdry Park extension, who have lived without water since 2005.

Gumbo and Pan Van demonstrates how the government of Zimbabwe was swift to construct Pungwe Water Supply Pipeline project for the residents in Mutare residents⁴⁷ unlike the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project in Bulawayo that has not seen the light of the day. To them, the water problems of Bulawayo has been delayed, complicated and made an unattainable reality by the government that politicizes the project and persistently cites that they lack of funds to implement the scheme. Musemwa and Mukheli qualifies the stated view arguing that, Mutare has no history of water problems,⁴⁸ but hence the government was swift to implement it as compared to Bulawayo- an insignia of reluctance to co-operate with the people of Bulawayo. Owing to this, water scarcity of Bulawayo still lies between a dream and a nightmare although it should be applauded how the BCC has tried to deliver against all odds.

Moyo, Nel and Berry understand water scarcity of Bulawayo as a result of poor planning and massive demographic increase in Bulawayo from 1980-1994. They hold that, in 1980 the city witnessed massive rural- urban migration. The population ultimately led to a high water demand against the already debilitated water supply.⁴⁹ Needless to make mention, the

rise of African townships also strained water supply of Bulawayo as the BCC had to add more settlement to accommodate the people.⁵⁰ Therefore, to them both the BCC and the government failed to extend water supply which led to untold water woes.⁵¹ On the other hand, Moyo observes that the increase of African population which recorded approximately 830000 by 1991 were on the crusade for jobs in mines and industries.⁵² The central idea posed in this, is that such a population in Bulawayo and extension of industrial base without extending water supplies became a strain to the water supply hence water scarcity is no surprise until now.

While the above studies provide valuable information pertaining demographic increase as a variable that exacerbated water scarcity, caution needs to be exercised before qualifying it to the contemporary contexts. First, the massive de-urbanisation of Bulawayo during the Structural Adjustments in 1992⁵³ when a lot of people resorted to rural areas and still those that remained suffered even more. In tandem, Operation Murambatsvina⁵⁴ also flushed people out of Bulawayo and yet water scarcity persisted against depopulation. Once more, the period of 2007-2008 witnessed a massive demographic movement out of Zimbabwe⁵⁵ and Bulawayo was on spurred. In this regard those who remained suffered sadistic water scarcity as dictated by economic meltdown.

Ncube thinks that water scarcity in Bulawayo should be attributed to poor management of the city by the BCC. For this reason, Ncube preferred to analyse the performance indicators in the quest to investigate the performance of water utility and consumer's perception which ultimately deemed the BCC authority not fully delivering.⁵⁶ However, Musemwa and Ranger refute such sentiments. For Musemwa the BCC made major strides in procuring water solutions though it was entrenched in political and economic shelves when comparing it with Harare water crisis which is attributed to mis-management.⁵⁷ In the same vein, Ranger says that in 1980 onwards, the ZAPU dominated municipality delivered the services of water to the residents even though they had little resources to avail.⁵⁸ What distinguish the three it's is that Ranger and Musemwa qualify the under the auspices that they were able to deliver yet fighting the odds of political inclusion of ZANU PF and ZINWA. Yet Ncube allures to poor performance by the BCC qualifying the notion from what the consumers say about the BCC.

Rusinga and Taigbenu also bring in an interesting contribution to this area as they postulates that, the BCC embarked on what was called Bulawayo Water Conservation and Sector Services Upgrading Project (BWCSSUP).⁵⁹ To them, this project was tailor made to conserve water, improve water distribution and sewage system hence in the long run the BCC

will be in a position to reclaim and recycle water for domestic use. Against this background, it needs to be noted that even if the BCC got funding from Swedish and Norwegian firms⁶⁰, the project took time for it to be implemented because of human capital that had left the country. As if not enough, this programme caused a huge tiff between the industries of Bulawayo that were accused of contaminating the dams and hence were fined harshly. It is not very clear whether the scheme became a success but the remaining fact is that, water problems in Bulawayo continued after the scheme.

Gumbo postulates that, in response to desperate water scarcity scenario the BCC embarked on a policy to revive 'dead water' and reclaim wastewater into a raw water supply.⁶¹ This move was meant to argue water availability to the people, as the government in 1996 directed the BCC to recycle domestic water. It needs to be noted that, the project needed huge funding and massive human capital experienced in that field since it was their first time to embark on such a project. As put across by Gumbo, the scheme was also affected by the industrial toxics effluents which sophisticated the project even more hence the BCC was slow to implement it.⁶² However, much as it appears as real efforts to avail water, it was deemed as a slap on the face by many who could not imagine administering recycled water and hence water scarcity continued to haunt the city against such efforts.

Research methodology

The researcher used a multi-dimensional and partaking methodology that apprehended the views, thoughts and perceptions from all the stakeholders. The study deployed a qualitative methodology. Qualitative data was obtained through key informant interviews and discussions. Primary data was mainly collected through the structured and semi-structured interviews. The researcher interviewed prominent members from the Bulawayo City Council (BCC), Matabeleland Zambezi Water Trust (MZWT), Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), National Railways of Zimbabwe, the Chronicle and members from the Bulawayo's business community. Other civic organisations like the Bulawayo Agenda, Bulawayo United Resident Association (BURA), Bulawayo Progressive Resident Association (BUPRA), Habakkuk Trust, Ibhethu LikaZulu and other prominent political members of different political divide were interviewed. It ought to be noted, that even the residents were interviewed. Information gathered from these interviews were checked against the literature review and observation through a comparative analysis in order to achieve a candid and credible facts.

The archival documents were also consulted. Primary documents mainly were drawn from the National Archives of Zimbabwe, BCC, MZWT, ZINWA, Chronicle, Dabane Trust, Habakkuk Trust, Bulawayo Agenda, and BUPRA. Such documents allowed one to be in touch with the intent information. They allowed one to interpret, invoke critical thinking and decipher a relevant conclusion.

The researcher also engaged secondary sources from published books, journals, e-journals, government periodicals, workshops and seminar reports, Zimbabwean Constitution, hand outs and published reports from the civic activists. Such previous researches which informed the study helped in illustrating how other researchers have dealt or discussed the subject in relation to their past time similar to the research question which one is dealing with. Therefore, all relevant secondary sources were consulted in an attempt to achieve a candid and credible facts.

Other strategies that the researcher used was participant observation. As the resident of Bulawayo, the researcher also relied on personal observation. For example the researcher would attend community meetings, NGO's reach-out campaigns and health awareness events which touched an overlap of the subject under scrutiny. In tandem, most of the themes in line with the subject under study could be discussed in political rallies of all political divide, hence the researcher saw the need to use such.

Dissertation layout

The first chapter focuses on the impact of water shortages on the residents of Bulawayo since 1980 and most acutely after the turn of the millennium. It attempted to illustrate socio-economic implications of water scarcity on people's way of life and their plight faced to diseases and societal mal-functions. More importantly, it demonstrates the various mitigation and coping strategies that were deployed by the people in search of water. It is a study that illustrates how different people succumbed to water scarcity problems especially the women, children and even the institutions.

The second chapter concentrates on the co-ordinated efforts by the government, the BCC and the non-state actors in availing water for Bulawayo since 1980 to 2014. Also discussed are controversial water policies or solutions that brew tensions among the three key players and the residents at large in search of water sanity. In tandem, it brings to light the hidden feelings and voices of the residents, who explain the viability of the necessitated solutions that have been implemented since 1980-2014.

The third chapter unravels the history of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project as a solution which was mooted since 1912, envisaged to radically end water scarcity of Bulawayo through drawing water from the Zambezi River to Bulawayo. It proceeds to assess and examines the pros and cons of the project, paying particular attention to its challenges, strengths and the debate surrounding the project. It is a study that attempts to dissect myths and realities that have clouded the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project.

The fourth chapter discusses the nexus between water and the de-industrialization of Bulawayo. It begins by providing an overview relationship of water and the industries in the colonial period. In its proceedings, it questions the radical relocation of major industrial bases from Bulawayo to other places especially Harare, that has been attributed to water scarcity although reflecting and bringing to light other factors that have silenced at the expense of water scarcity.

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CHAPTER 1

‘LIVING WITHOUT WATER’: HISTORY OF WATER SHORTAGES AND EVERYDAY STRUGGLES FOR SURVIVAL IN BULAWAYO.’

Introduction

Bulawayo has wrestled with water scarcity problems for nearly three and a half decades under the black majority government since 1980. The paucity of water in the city of Bulawayo adversely impacted to the residents who found it challenging to cope without water yet others developed a new order through devising new strategies of alleviation and coping in search of water. The chapter intends to unravel the impact of water shortages on livelihood in Bulawayo. Water shortages affect and ultimately create disarray in the socio-economic development of the residents through its recurring water rationing regimes and strict water penalties to that end. In the absence of water, residents endured water borne diseases, struggled with the environment that became a place of squalor and produced a new social order that compromised their education and their small/medium businesses which solely relied on water.

In its progression, the chapter demonstrates how incessant water shortages became a burden more to women who were required to be productive and creative in procuring water for the family- a benchmark that heightened their gender role and further qualified stereotypes that diligent search of water was of their duty. Consequently, women’s pains against water struggles needs not to be overstated. However, the paper radically departs from a commonplace in gender perspective that sees women as the only bearers of water scarcity problems hence it confers that even girls succumbed such excruciating pains similar to their mothers. It presents that those residents that have lived in the western suburbs (African townships) succumbed to water scarcity harshly than those that resided in the eastern suburbs granted that, in the western suburbs they were no alternatives to negotiate such turmoil and more importantly their population density exposed them to such pains. Crucial to note, is to understand are the inner voices of the residents who experienced water shortages in the Bulawayo since 1980.

A Synopsis of drivers to water shortages in Bulawayo since 1980.

In 1980 residents in Bulawayo anticipated that independence of Zimbabwe would bring about water sanity since the former had discriminated the natives through colonial policies and more importantly the climate and geographical location of Bulawayo had robbed them sanity to

water.¹ The tangled tragedy undoubtedly evoked a sense of anticipation that independence had come to end such water calamities now that the latter was a black government who appeared willing to end such water turmoil. Notwithstanding the above optimism, water shortages continued to afflict residents in all angles devastating their socio-economic lifestyle.

The first episode which is perceived to have derailed and further heightened water scarcity out of proportion in Bulawayo was the *Gukurahundi* civil war of 1982/83 between (PF) ZAPU and ZANU (PF) which indubitably forced the government to put on hold all developments in the region [Bulawayo] till the end of war.² Put in other words, Musemwa holds that, water scarcity of Bulawayo became a victim of political jostles between the BCC and the government, in order to foster ZANU (PF) control in the region using water.³ Therefore, the government remained silent in solving the water scarcity matrix of the region, justifying its stance using the present of the civil strife. In addition, the massive droughts in 1982 -1992 also heightened water scarcity crescendo which resulted in the water rationing regimes by the BCC – a desperate move which was meant to conserve the little that was left.⁴

Indeed, the first strategy that the BCC resorted to was water rationing. This was meant to conserve the little that was left- a policy that was also witnessed up to 2014. Bulawayo had to introduce water restrictions first in 1983 and again in 1984/85, 1987/88 and 1991/3 when the city came very close to a complete water supply collapse.⁵ The headline of 1986 warned residents that water rationing scheme had reached hype which called every individuals to save water as possible.⁶ Once more, the 2004/5 seasons did not result in much inflows to the dams and for the fifth time the City had to introduce water rationing measures in 2005.⁷ In a similar fashion, the 2005/6 rainy seasons did not result in much inflows into the supply dams and as a result, tighter water rationing regime up to 2009 was adopted which saw the public succumbing to such shortages.

Coupled with drought and the civil war, the City of Bulawayo also witnessed a rapid urbanisation in the early 1980's as different people from rural areas migrated to Bulawayo in search of employment, education and even political reasons.⁸ It ought to be noted that the census of 1982 estimated a population of 413.814, in 1992 it estimated a total number of 621.742.⁹ In addition in 2002 it recorded 676.787 and in 2007 having 713.340.¹⁰ In 2012 the BCC noted that the population of the city had reached 1.5 million.¹¹ In the wake of this, the massive rural urban migration ultimately led to the rise of housing expansion which was meant to accommodate the fast growing numbers in the city. For example new western residential stands which constituted the high nuclear density mushroomed in the mould of Pumula,

Emganwini, Mthunzini, Habek, Robert Sinyoka and even the much disputed Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle.¹² However, few were commissioned in the eastern suburbs like Mahatshula and Harrisvale and hence that explains why excruciating water woes were felt more in the western suburbs than eastern and northern part of Bulawayo. It is such a rapid increase in population that never corresponded with the existing water supply dams and sources in Bulawayo.

Essentially, the BCC had not constructed a dam since 1976¹³ which further sow the seeds of water scarcity that was to be faced by the people in the long run. Added to this, in 1988 the BCC decommissioned Khami dam in view that its water had been polluted by industrial effluents.¹⁴ In 2007 the total inflow of major dams of Bulawayo as shown in **Table 1.1** was such that water supply would not match domestic and industrial demand till the dawn of the next rainy season. In addition the outdated infrastructure has also been the major driver to water shortages since 1980. The water distribution systems that had been constructed prior to independence made the situation worse for Bulawayo residents as burst, leakages and even sewage slugs were witnessed since such facilities became out dated and could not match the growing population.

Table 1. 1: Inflow of water into City of Bulawayo’s main supply dams, 2006-2007.

| DAM | CAPACITY.M ³ | INFLOW 2006/7 | STATUS % | VOLUME M ³ |
|--------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| INSIZA | 173 491 000 | 3 714 555 | 49.63 | 86 110 930 |
| INYAKUNI | 80 781 000 | 1 848 200 | 13.77 | 11 122 850 |
| U/NCEMA | 45 458 500 | 1 921 784 | 1.58 | 718 6000 |
| L/NCEMA | 18 237 700 | 195 590 | 30.89 | 5 633 160 |
| UMZINGWANE | 44 663 500 | 3 893 180 | 8.41 | 3 756 900 |
| TOTAL | 362 631 700 | 11 573 309 | 29.60% | 107 342 440 |

*SOURCE -BCC: MINUTES ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT-2007.

Granted the foregoing, the impact of water shortages on the livelihood of the residents was inevitable. In fact the deplorable state of affairs in relation to water shortages created a new lifestyle for the people who were forced to procure and find water by any means necessary. The squalid situation among the people in the high density was inevitable granted the facts mentioned above.

Experiencing water shortages: survival, mitigation and coping strategies in search of water.

Water scarcity was felt more by women and girls who had to fetch water each time rather than men and to some extent boys who were mere recipients of water that was fetched by women and girls. Regrettably, this scenario heightened gender roles of women and girl child's of being industrious in the community hence qualifying a gender stereotype that such was meant for women and girl children. Eve Khumalo, a senior resident in Nkulumane, poignantly summed up the scenario stating that, 'throughout all water shortages in Bulawayo, every woman would bear pains of fetching for water in wells and boreholes. Worse-still one would go back home and purify it to save the lives of the family against contamination.'¹⁵

She was right, granted that her position as dictated by stereotypes required such double roles in managing water shortages. However, this forced general all women to spend hours in long queues waiting for their turns to fetch water, which in turn took their greater part of their time hence ending neglecting other programs. Added to this, even girl children were not spared as they had to undergo such painful period fetching for water in view that they were future mothers.¹⁶ Mbalenhle Mhlanga a form two student at Hlathi High states that, 'My mother would wake me up early before I went to school to fetch water. I would go to school tired and exhausted. Even at school at times we would be required to fetch water for the toilets. After school one would also be required to fetch water for domestic consumption.'¹⁷ In a newsletter written by WOZA in 2006, they stated that water shortages created gender disparities having 80% of girl children failing to cope to school and at worse dropping out of school as the situation would be unbearable.¹⁸

Contrary to these assertions, it needs to be highlighted that water shortages also impacted negatively to children who looked upon their grandparents as their guardians without their biological parents- some perhaps died and others had gone to the neighbouring states and even diaspora. It ought to be noted that because of the economic meltdown various people migrated out of the country and Bulawayo residents were not spared having parents leaving their children's under the homage of their parents and the extended families. As such, these children succumbed water woes having to fetch water on behalf of their grandparents who could not as age was catching up.¹⁹ Similarly, Gogo Mahlangu postulated that, 'it was my clever grandchildren that would fetch water for domestic chores. I personally could not as I survived a stroke.'²⁰ It is such a scenario that children became vulnerable through by succumbing to water woes. Against this backdrop, civic activist that clamoured for children's

rights criticised such transformation in 2005 citing that such actions that required children under sixteen years to fetch water in odd hours was tantamount to child labour that was unacceptable in the 21st century.²¹ However, granted the above example children had to bear the costs of fetching water.

Fig 1.1: Impact of water shortages on women and girls in 2009.



*Source: Newsday 31/06/2009.

Besides fetching water from the boreholes and wells, some residents who resided far away the boreholes resorted to collect rain water during rainy seasons through gutters. In one particular instance in Minyela Township, residents deliberately avoided walking to boreholes to collect water in view that rain drops had performed miracles for them.²² The BCC warned its residents of hazards associated with rainwater more importantly drinking water that be mixed with dirty gutters.²³ However, this never moved the residents who were desperate to have water as little as possible. One resident in Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle cited that, ‘by any means necessary we needed water to drink. Our desperate moves justified our need of water. In any case rain water is pure and hence we needed to source it and drink it.’²⁴ Indeed, the interviewed residents never saw any danger nor evil in procuring rain water as it was the immediate source without any hustle. It needs to be noted that, some residents especially in Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle where domestic pipelines had not been erected even in 2014, went on and procured water from unprotected source citing that such water would be used in toilets and some would be boiled and drank.²⁵ The desperate conditions required desperate measures as the residents particularly in Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle resorted to use well water.

In relation to the above, another strategy that was deployed by the residents to outwit water shortages was to hoard water whenever the BCC re-opened water after water shedding.²⁶ In this regard many had to fill their containers and tubs with water as many as possible. Sikhohliso Mlalazi a resident in Lobengula West held that,

We could fill all our containers with water in view that the stored water would carry us through whenever water shedding continued. However, such a practise increased our

bills so high because the excitement of seeing water forcefully made people to waste more instead of conserving as many ended up hoarding unsystematically.²⁷

This strategy of amassing when BCC re-opened its taps was criticised by the BCC. Engineering D. Gwetu lampooned such moves citing that, ‘at some point as the BCC, we strongly educated and warned residents that hoarding water was perhaps a necessary evil but became a strain on our side as such unsystematic hoarding wasted water.’ He added that, ‘residents would do away with the old water that would have been stored and replaced it with that from the tap.’²⁸ As such this wasted water and in turn the essence of water shedding was lost. This however, resulted in high bills that would come every month. It is reported that residents often complained that the BCC was overcharging their rates yet the BCC fired back justifying that their rates were emanating from unsystematic hoarding practises.²⁹

Water scarcity as threat to human life, security and the Bulawayo landscape.

Water shortages in Bulawayo also threatened the lives of the residents since 1980 as the environment turned out to be a place of squalor in various high density suburbs. It ought to be remembered that the absence of water in the community coerced residents to diligently search for survival alternatives that posed a health hazard to the community and ultimately the entire city at large.

In the midst of the economic meltdown, water shortages in Bulawayo posed a serious threat to the livelihood, more importantly those that resided in the high density suburbs. The situation in the high density suburbs as it proved to have a lot of population than the lower eastern suburbs of Bulawayo. Problems associated with cholera outbreak were recorded more on children.³⁰ The BCC health recorded that over 55% of illness that were related to children from 1997-2005 were either typhoid, cholera or any other epidemic diseases to that end.³¹ In addition in 2008-2009 in the midst of worst cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe, Bulawayo was not spared from such a calamity. Residents in the Ngozi Mine complained of cholera outbreak that had rapidly spread over the area.³² Added to this, in Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle a small fraction was equally affected although there is no evidence to suggest that the people died because of such epidemic diseases that emanated from water shortages.

In a series of 2008 press conferences relating to the outbreak of epidemic diseases, the Provincial Medical Officer of the Bulawayo Province bemoaned that, ‘the epidemic diseases are a result of people drinking unsafe water. Some even go on to drink unprotected well water without purifying them. Therefore we strongly warn people not to drink unsafe water.’³³ He

was right as many would drink water that was unsafe out of the thirst of quenching their desire of water. Equally important were children that would play in or near burst sewage slugs³⁴ (as shown in **Fig 1.2**), this ultimately led to the outbreak of water borne diseases as children would contract the water borne diseases and obviously spread to others at home and at school. In light to the stated, Mukhuhlani *et al*, thinks that women were even burdened through accompanying their ill children's to clinics that were suffering from water borne diseases and more importantly, returning home to fetch water.³⁵ Such a calamity increased their role in the society.

Fig 1.2: Impact of water shortages on children in 2009.



*Source: Newsday 31/06/2009

The degenerate situation of water shortages also compromised personal hygiene and sanitation of the community at large. It needs to be highlighted that people ended up prioritising water for drinking and cooking than bathing water.³⁶ Put in other words, one resident in Lobengula West cited that, 'we only got worried with water to cook than water to bath. It was better to cook and eat than bath yet get hungry along the way.'³⁷ This in turn compromised personal hygiene for the residents who became vulnerable to epidemic diseases and other related one's to that end. It needs to be noted that results of poor hygiene emanating from water shortages were spread more and rapidly during social events like funerals, parties and even school setup.³⁸ Equal important, water shortages also disrupted the social events in the communities of Bulawayo. Khaliphani Mlotshwa noted that, water shortages affected the social fibre of funeral attendance as people ended up sceptical of contracting diseases especially in 2007-2008.³⁹ This therefore added burden to the organizers of the event who would be required to provide water facilities. Granted such calamities residents became vulnerable to water borne diseases who in turn became sceptical to attend nor take part in such events.

As had occurred in other cities that equally faced water shortages in Zimbabwe, water shortages in Bulawayo also resulted in the people using nearby bushes for public urination and exposed defecation- which indeed were alternative strategies against lack of water supply from their domestic toilets.⁴⁰ It needs to be remembered that their latrines and lavatories required regular running water which under the water scarcity conditions they proved otherwise. This

undoubtedly forced residents to use nearby bushes as zones of human excretion which in turn became a health hazard. This trend became more popular to the youths and to some extent adults who would engage to such activities at night.⁴¹ A popular resident in Pumula who was part of the neighbourhood watch in 2006 Wiseman Hlabangana, bemoaned such act citing that:

At first I felt angry and bitter on why people would sign death warrants through defecating in open like that bush in between Pumula South and Nkulumane. Some *Vapostori* go there for their daily services. None would be spared if the outbreak manifests emanating from such unjustifiable tricks. But well because of the situation of water shortages, people were left without any choice.⁴²

Added to this, such activities produced filthy and a place of squalor for the residents especially in those areas that experienced such. Therefore, attempts to discourage such mal-practises were erected through setting up fines and strict penalties. For example if one was caught in Nkulumane they would be required to pay fine and clear their mess.⁴³ Albeit, residents continued granted that they practised such during awkward hours more importantly at night.

Essentially, water shortages threatened personal security women and vulnerable individuals like children, young girls and even the elderly through exposing them to thieves. It needs to be noted that, some women and even girls would queue early in the morning and even during odd hours at night before they slept in preparation of the next day. As such, various gangster boys and thieves would intimidate and bully women, girls and the elderly who ended up insecure to fetch water in the boreholes.⁴⁴ The irony of it is that, such boreholes facilities were erected amidst the segregated landscapes near street corners and secluded bushes which in turn lacked security at night. Worse-still, such boreholes lacked proper lighting system save for individual torches.⁴⁵ Mukhuhlani *et al* concurs with the above noting that, in Entumbane women faced abuse and assault during their day encounter with thieves and gangster boys while fetching water in the township boreholes.⁴⁶

In tandem, thieves could frighten women, girls and vulnerable children and the elderly as Thandeka Nkala evokes, 'during times water shortages, our borehole area in Nkulumane 5 Mqamulazwe became a centre of harassment, fights and torture very early in the morning and at night. Frequent fights among residents were also recorded which frightened us more. People became scared to fetch water during odd hours granted such. Worse-still, no lighting system was erected to safeguard people.'⁴⁷ Above and beyond, water scarcity produced an uneasy environment that threatened residential security who were in need of water.

Water shortages as obstruction to people socio-economic transformation and development.

Crucial to note is that, water scarcity problems in Bulawayo adversely affected the small/medium business enterprises of residents that which required water. It ought to be remembered that, the economic decline of the country particularly since 2000- 2008 flushed most employees from their decent work.⁴⁸ Under such unemployment catastrophizes dictated by economic woes, Bulawayo was not spared. Added to this, the de-industrialization of Bulawayo also served as final blow to residential employment opportunities in the formal market. As a desperate move, residents resorted to self-employment and entrepreneurship skills that promised lucrative earnings without tax.

Precisely, residents sought employment refuge through embarking on brick moulding, domestic urban agriculture for family consumption and even car wash businesses. It should be noted that, such menial jobs required water to be carried out. This however, proved otherwise as water shortages became a major barrier to practise such. Brick moulders particularly in Nketa and Entumbane often thrived and deepened on it for survival and income as various people would need their services. However, during water scarcity woes, the BCC enacted stern fines to any individual that engaged themselves to activities like the above as they were considered a water waster.⁴⁹ For example if one was caught practicing brick molding they were required to pay a sum of \$1 000 without fail.⁵⁰ This ultimately discouraged brick molding as menial activity of survival. A situation that was driven by water shortages.

Added to the above, domestic urban agriculture was equally affected by shortages of water in Bulawayo. Prior massive water shortages, countless residents depended on urban agriculture particularly subsistence farming for household consumption.⁵¹ Such urban farming saw the farming of tomatoes, *covo*, *chomolia*, carrots and onions. These were envisaged as the best crops that add value to family diet more importantly at a low cost. Therefore, the advent of water shortages crippled to such an extent that some residents abandoned these practice of vis-à-vis threats and fines that had come from the BCC. For example, if one was caught using the hosepipe they were fined \$100. ⁵² Similarly, the same law was extended to those that practiced car wash deals at residential car parks. Hendrik Balaza a youth from Nkulumane 5 noted that:

Many of us unemployed youths had found homage in car wash deals. However, the BCC enacted strict penalties to us that were projected water wasting through using the hosepipe. Our business dwindled down and we were forced to use bucket water from

the boreholes. This became a tiresome work to carryout which ultimately forced me and my friends to back down. Besides, the same BCC required operational stand license which we never possessed.⁵³

Regrettably, water scarcity jeopardized the earnings of mindful youths that spend their time productively away from drug abuse, alcoholism and gangsterism ascribed to ghetto youths. It needs to be noted that even those that embarked on construction using domestic water were fined \$1 500⁵⁴ which derailed and discouraged people to extend their residential stands because untreated water from water dealers was equally expensive as they attested that the business of selling water was now lucrative.

Besides disturbing the economic development, residents also cited that water scarcity grossly affected education of students and the day to day operations of the school. In the dawn of new millennium in year 2000, the headline tagged, 'Bulawayo water woes looms: Schools go on forced recess.'⁵⁵ Barely, two weeks countless schools in the city had temporary shutdown in view that they faced challenges in operating without water and more importantly they feared water epidemics ascribed to water.⁵⁶ It needs to be noted that at that time the schools lacked alternative sources of water. It is only now that emergency tanks were erected by BOWER/BEWAP in 2013 that stored water incase water supply from taps run dry.⁵⁷ This therefore, made students from the high density suburbs miss out school days and lessons.

What is clear, is that those located in town and in the eastern suburbs had back up plans and indeed attendant lessons. As if not enough, water shortages also derailed the carrying out of practical subjects like building, agriculture and food and nutrition.⁵⁸ It ought to be remembered that such subjects required water for them to be carried out. Mkhuhlani *et al* holds that, teachers made attempts to improvise and postpone lessons for such subjects in view that water was at some point bounce back.⁵⁹ It remains unclear how water scarcity jeopardized results of these subject since 2000-2008, as V. Mguni a popular teacher in Agriculture summed it up, 'water shortages affected the running's of these subjects. We also got affected that such would easily led to poor results as we ended up teaching practical sections in using theoretical approaches. However, some passed.'⁶⁰ Granted such, water shortages impacted on the result outcome of the region as students poorly performed overall in 2003. ⁶¹

Conclusion

In a nutshell, the chapter has demonstrated that water scarcity problem brought about untold sufferings among the residents who had to cope through a plethora of strategies without water. What is clear is that water shortages not only fashioned a new water in their day to day living but it also disrupted their educational transformation and more importantly their small/medium businesses that relied on water. The paucity of water scarcity in Bulawayo was more felt by those in the high density who occupied the lower echelons in the society- the poor who succumbed harshly to these shortages because they lacked adequate resources to negotiate water scarcity. Therefore, the absence of water in the City of Bulawayo has threatened security and sanitation which would see more rampant untold sufferings if the responsible authorities continue to dither water policies that would eventually see water abundance in Bulawayo. If no change comes in the way, residents will further be exposed to water epidemic and other consequences ascribed to the shortages of water, discussed above.

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CHAPTER 2

GOVERNMENT, BCC AND NON-STATE ACTOR'S EFFORTS IN AVAILING WATER FOR BULAWAYO.

Introduction

This chapter attempts to capture various measures and efforts spelt out by the government, the BCC and the non-state actors in curbing water woes since 1980 up to 2014. Faced with water shortages primarily caused by drought, climate and geographical location of the city and even the perceived discourse of the civil war of 1982/3- the key players sought to harness water shortages through embarking on programs and projects that were targeted to radically end water woes and shortages. This study holds that in the event of implementing measures in arresting water shortages, the three players at times differed and ultimately clashed over the resolutions to avail water to the resident. It is such projects and co-ordinated programs that this chapter seeks to capture and document with regards to avert water crisis since 1980 to 2014.

Government's intervention strategy on Bulawayo's water scarcity since 1980.

Since the attainment of independence water problems in Bulawayo persisted under a serious hype as massive demographic patterns were witnessed. In his State of the Nation address the then, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe announced that,

I urge you, whether black or white lets join hands in a new amity and together, as Zimbabweans, trample upon racism, tribalism and regionalism and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we re-invigorate our economic machinery .¹

The government was prepared to empower the regions, country and all people. He emphasized that all developments would be carried out effectively and efficiently in realizing state of order. The sounds of hope echoed in the speech by the Prime Minister re-ignited the fact that even water woes would be solved and dealt with. To some discerning optimists in Bulawayo the government was committed in maintaining order and revisiting the contest of water in Bulawayo which was grossly affecting the industrial hub and the people of Bulawayo at large.

Barely, two years into independence the region was visited by a civil war between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU dubbed *Gukurahundi* which again saw the Prime Minister Mugabe

making a public speech emphasizing that, all development projects in Matabeleland were put on hold because of timidity and political deliberations on the part of the government.² Therefore, the antagonistic region to ZANU PF was to be submerged to its rule through suspending development in the region and hence water included. As aptly argued by Musemwa that, water scarcity of Bulawayo became a product of struggles over the control and to forcibly bring the City council, the people and the region into political submission.³ The government appeared to be maintaining a hard stance of not solving the issue at all.

As if not enough, the massive droughts in 1982–1984, 1986–1987 and 1992 also heightened water scarcity crescendo which was further accompanied by water rationing by the BCC – a desperate move which was meant to conserve the little that was left.⁴ The government vilified and neglected the region. This was clearly demonstrated by their incessant neglect, quietness and deliberate silence of spelling out a sustainable water solution. However, the then BCC Mayor, His worship Enos Mdlongwa poignantly noted that,

We are facing a difficult time as a region and as City council to deliver service to the people together with the government. We are divided in our approach to solve water scarcity which immediately serve our people and industries.⁵

Poignantly to note, no intervention strategy was set out save for promises but behind the smoke screen nothing was done expect political gimmicks that were at play. It needs to be remembered that no single dam had been built save for Mtshabezi dam by the government without consulting the BCC.

Therefore, nothing was done by the government during the period of 1980 to 1992 as alluded by the above outlined argument espoused by Musemwa.⁶ Granted that, such an analysis should not deter one in analysing the government's attitude towards water scarcity of Bulawayo outside the context of Gukurahundi. However, what needs to be furthered is government's actions towards water scarcity in Bulawayo after the Unity Accord of 1987- a situation that promised hope now that a civil strife had ended.

At the turn of 1991/2 period the government and the BCC appeared to have set aside their differences as the latter worked tirelessly hard to solve water problems in the region. The hard hit by water scarcity were the people who had to face water rationing⁷ and ultimately the industries that contributed to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the nation. Faced with all that, the 1991/92 drought prompted ad hoc measures to be adopted of which one was a groundwater abstraction programme from the Matsheumhlope well-field that underlies the city

to supplement dwindling supplies from surface reservoirs whose levels fell below critical values. In addition a preliminary study of the aquifer was undertaken, and one notable finding was the groundwater potential of the aquifer from which an annual yield of $3.5 \times 10^6 \text{m}^3$ could be obtained.⁸ However, it was noted that though it seemed a good idea the plan had to be adopted in yet another field outside Bulawayo.

It was in this context that the Government of Zimbabwe and the City Council decided, as an emergency measure, to draw water from the Nyamandlovu Aquifer some 45km North-west of the City⁹. A total number of 77 aquifer boreholes were drilled in view of augmenting water supplies to the City of Bulawayo. Two reservoirs of 2280m^3 capacity each were erected adjacent to the old Rochester Hotel in Nyamandlovu and power supplies and pumping equipment to deliver $26\,000 \text{m}^3$ of water per day to the reservoirs were installed.¹⁰ The City council constructed the pump station and the pipeline from the reservoirs at Rochester to the existing $108\,000 \text{m}^3$ reservoirs at the high density suburb in Magwegwe.¹¹ The operational arrangement was that the government was to avail water under the Department of Water and Development (DWD) and rightfully sells water for the BCC. Therefore, in that period the government played a crucial role in procuring water for the City of Bulawayo which should be applauded.

Needless to make mention, the central state also constructed the disputed Mtshabezi in 1994 with a capacity of $20\,000 \text{m}^3$ without discussion with the BCC over forecasting and roadmap to implementation.¹² During the course of surveying and designing the Mtshabezi Pipeline it became increasingly evident that the route proposed initially presented considerable challenges. As a result a more in depth study was carried out to establish whether an easier route could be identified.¹³ No wonder why, the BCC has neglected the dam as source of water citing that a lot of resource's are needed to link the city to the Mtshabezi, south of Bulawayo. The pipeline stretches through the east of Matobo communal lands south of Bulawayo. Therefore, the link project at that time in 2005 it was priced at Z\$3 trillion local currency component and US\$3.4 million foreign currency¹⁴, a scheme that was deemed expensive by the BCC to carry out. It is only after 2007 that the BCC warmed up in showing interest in exploring water from Mtshabezi dam.

Government's directive efforts in solving water scarcity since 1997: A tag of war between the BCC and the non-state actors.

At the dawn of the millennium the political-economy of Zimbabwe grossly affected the livelihood of the people and more importantly, the development projects that were carried out

during that time. Crucial to note, is that various episodes like the land reform, the sudden collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar and the rise of massive opposition, all left a deeper scar in the region of Matabeleland and Bulawayo as the same government since 1980 later exhibited veneered political solutions to the question of water scarcity which attracted a storm and a fight from the BCC and the non- state actors.¹⁵

The sudden appearance of real opposition in 1997 by the MDC, poised a threat to ZANU PF's rule which has always lost a battle ground because of the 1980 civil war which pitted the entire region through untold sufferings and deaths of people.¹⁶ Indeed, the threshold advent of MDC made it impossible for ZANU PF to regain strength and popularity Bulawayo. As such the ruling party sought to use water as a mechanism to dominate Bulawayo a lost ground to MDC using ZINWA. It is in that context that ZANU PF used water as a come-back instrument of rekindling the once popular Bulawayo constituency.¹⁷

In light to the stated, Makumbe aptly relates to a form of arbitrary government, 'which uses coercive instruments of the state to expedite its own purposes of monopolising power while denying rights and opportunities to other groups to compete for that power.'¹⁸ Pursuant to its political agenda, the government took over urban water rights from the municipality [BCC] using a new Water Act of 1999 which resulted in the formation of ZINWA. Therefore, the government directed ZINWA to oversee the development of water management and Bulawayo was definitely not spurred. As aptly captured by Musemwa that the politicization of water was through the imposition of ZINWA which was castigated by the BCC and the residents as the worst move that the government did to Bulawayo water issues.¹⁹ To the residents and the BCC, the government was acting out of a knee jack response bounded by political expediency which was bent to instil the hegemonic power of ZANU (PF). Although, the available scholarship has paid less attention to the role played by non-state actors who were primarily the main drivers to reject the sudden takeover of the BCC water rights by ZINWA. However, it ought to be remembered that they played a mammoth part through lobbying and rejecting the sudden take over.

What is clear is that, the government's attitude were heavily loaded of intending to control the Bulawayo's water, a move which was bent in realizing the political hegemony using water. Therefore, nothing concrete was achieved by government in availing water sanity to Bulawayo save for power jostles between the BCC and the central state on who should control water issues in Bulawayo.

Nevertheless, a point of difficult came to light as jostle of water control between the government and the BCC heightened this time on the Nyamandlovu Aquifer. It needs to be remembered that relevant scholarship has not documented the Nyamandlovu saga between the government and the BCC. The winter cereal farming in the area of Nyamandlovu desperately forced farmers to request for borehole from ZINWA that was to be used for irrigation and domestic use while farming.²⁰ At that conjecture, only 22 boreholes were functional and the rest were beyond repair. In no time ZINWA wrote a letter to the BCC requesting to lease 15 (not working) boreholes on behalf of the farmers for winter cereal farming in view that ZINWA would bind the farmers strictly to one season.²¹ Against this backdrop, the BCC sharply reminded ZINWA that the central government drilled boreholes in Nyamandlovu Aquifer to supply water for Bulawayo, as such it was improper for ZINWA to use these boreholes for any other purpose.²² In a series of meetings conveyed by the BCC the control of Nyamandlovu Aquifer featured prominently as the two exhibited powers upon each other. The BCC approached the issue in a radical manner citing that by allowing farmers to access boreholes a precedent may be created to claim ownership and that ZINWA was biased in intending to allow farmers to pay the ZESA bills whilst ZINWA refuses that council pays the bills directly.²³ Cognisant of the macro-politics of Zimbabwe that was swayed by the land reform programme of supporting new farmers, the BCC gave and acceded to the to the request of leasing boreholes to farmers.

What is clear, is the fact that the Government of Zimbabwe and the BCC have always fought over the ownership and control of water in Bulawayo. Therefore, the Nyamandlovu farmers issue just became victims of an established veneered battle. At some point, ZINWA and the Provincial Engineer accused BCC of an accrued debt of Z\$551 100.00 that had amounted from the production of water from the Aquifer.²⁴ As if not enough, ZINWA's bill for up to March 2001 had been \$2 569 581, September 2001 was \$6 353 290 and the total amount required for that year was \$16 644 907.²⁵ The general view during the ensuing discussion was that the council was being unduly compromised in this matter. It was not clear why council was suddenly being billed at a higher rate in the quest of providing water for Bulawayo. No doubt, lack of transparency on the part of ZINWA, as evidenced by their letter to the Town Clerk that they were not supposed to show all their detailed expenditures.²⁶ Therefore, warnings were rendered to the BCC that they would soon stop availing water to the BCC.

Owing to some misunderstandings, the water supply to Bulawayo from Nyamandlovu Aquifer in 2001 was terminated.²⁷ Panic roared over the city as various actors complained and castigated the move by ZINWA to terminate water for the city. It needs to be highlighted that, at this juncture the BCC was sceptical of ZINWA who kept increasing their water bill. In addition as moves to cut down costs the BCC had requested a quote for taking over the whole scheme, but no answer ZINWA declined such a move which ultimately forced ZINWA to cut off the BCC from the scheme.²⁸ The then City Engineer Mr J. Ndebele concluded that the control of Bulawayo's water was very critical as it was swayed by gimmicks propelled by ZINWA. However, after a heated negotiation with ZINWA it was agreed that a sum of Z\$9.1 million²⁹ was to be paid to ZINWA an amount that was set to be paid in payment plan. Henceforth, the BCC paid up the cost of \$12 438 409.61 by January 2001 to September 2001.³⁰

After the cut off of Bulawayo water supply, ZINWA embarked on sudden a resuscitation of not functioning boreholes in Nyamandlovu Aquifer. This time around the BCC released funds to help ZINWA in resuscitating the not functioning boreholes. For example, by September 2005 they had paid Z\$482 million³¹ and by November 2005 they had paid a total of Z\$2 billion. This amount was paid to order to get 45 boreholes operational but ZINWA announced that only 13 boreholes were operational because of staffing problems and lack of spares has delayed progress in executing the project. Since 2005 to 2010 the government in the face of ZINWA, exhibited slow pace in rehabilitating the boreholes because of the economic meltdown. However, in 2010 to 2011, UNICEF embarked on a massive rehabilitation project which targeted 56 boreholes.³² The remainder of the boreholes constituted those condemned for various reasons such as; equipment stuck in them, boreholes now dry or casing now bent. The UNICEF project was fronted by a contractor and spares were also procured for future maintenance work. Some of the spares are currently available on site for use. Of the 56 (from 72) boreholes rehabilitated by UNICEF, the number of functional boreholes at that time normally fluctuated between 25 to 35 as some boreholes were repaired, others also broke down.³³ It needs to be noted that in a proper planned maintenance, the number of operational boreholes is envisaged to go beyond 40 at any given time.

As if not enough since 2010, ZINWA has also embarked on Epping Forest, a scheme which was designed to provide an additional 10000m³ of clear water per day to the City of Bulawayo through a 600mm diameter AC pipeline that runs straight to the Rochester farm to augment the Rochester farm output amounting to \$ 3 091 550.00.³⁴ According to the project, water would then be pumped at a maximum 26000m³ ³⁵per day from both well fields. Crucial

to note, is that the project is envisaged to be completed by 2016 under the ZIMASSET blue print. Worse-still, after 2010, ZINWA has also partnered with GIZ and Australia Aid in executing GIZ Urban Water and Sanitation Program (UWSP) a program set speed up the Nyamandlovu rehabilitation of 17 Boreholes (plus any additional boreholes out of the contract) by a contractor (Blue Gold Drilling) and erecting pump tests on 11 Boreholes by ZINWA Gwayi Catchment.³⁶ It is envisaged that the project will include fishing/pulling, camera inspections, brushing, airlifting, step tests, cd tests and will also include purchase of submersible pumps (GrundFos Type) where necessary. It needs to be noted that at the time of writing, the afore mentioned project had not been fully completed but the hard core fact is that the government had exhibited efforts to solve water woes in Bulawayo since the launching of ZIMASSET showing a different perceived attitude of disciplining the dissident region.³⁷

BCC intervention strategies in solving water problems since 1980.

The entry point of this section provides strategies set out by the BCC in availing water for the residents in Bulawayo since 1980. As has been already noted by Musemwa that the period since 1980/9 the BCC never managed to construct a dam and the civil war between (PF) ZAPU and the ZANU (PF) heightened which compromised efforts to avail water for the residents since the latter was a predominant supporter of PF ZAPU.³⁸ Therefore, that should not further deter one in their discussion. However, Ranger thinks that even in the face of political gimmicks that deterred water solutions, the BCC remained the best municipality that gave its residents the little water that they never had.³⁹ Apart from the political sway that became the order of the day, the 1982–1983, 1986–1987 and 1991–1992⁴⁰ droughts also visited Bulawayo which exacerbated water scarcity in Bulawayo receiving an average rainfall of 521mm.⁴¹

Indeed, the first strategy that the BCC resorted to was water rationing regime which was meant to conserve the little that was left- a policy that was further adopted up to 2014. Bulawayo had to introduce water restrictions first in 1983 and again in 1984/85, 1987/88 and 1991/3 when the city came very close to a complete water supply collapse.⁴² The headline of 1986 warned residents that water rationing scheme had reached hype which called every individuals to save water as possible.⁴³ Once more, the 2004/5 seasons did not result in much inflows to the dams and for the fifth time the City had to introduce water rationing measures in 2005.⁴⁴ In addition the 2005/6 rainy seasons did not result in much inflows into the supply dams and as a result, tighter water rationing regime up to 2009 was adopted which saw the

public succumbing to such shortages. It needs to be remembered that although it appeared to be a grotesque and repressive way of providing water for the residents it became a necessary evil to conserve the little that was left. By January 2009, the BCC had allocated water consumption of 500litres/day for high density, 750litres/day for low density and residential flats with bulk meters it was 75% of average water usage for the 6months.⁴⁵

Therefore such schemes were accompanied by strict fines if any consumer engaged themselves to activities that were deemed wasting water. For example if one was caught using hosepipe they were asked to pay \$100, brick molding was \$1000, use of domestic water for construction \$1000 and illegal connections/ by passing has been \$1500.⁴⁶ Sibalo Mnkandla, a senior resident shared his view about water rationing citing that,

Water rationing schemes were and are still perhaps one of the best desperate moves set by the BCC to conserve water. But one disadvantage of them is that residents tend to hoard water and at worst do away with old hoarded water replacing them with the fresh one.⁴⁷

Granted that, the BCC also sought to avail new strategies or efforts to avail water. Essentially, in 1997 the BCC embarked on a scheme dubbed the Bulawayo Water Conservation and Sector Services Upgrading Project (BWCSSUP). This strategy was meant not to build dams but rather to conserve the little through the policy of, managing available water supplies.⁴⁸ The BCC cited that more water was lost through leakages, faulty meters and worn out pipes that resulted in burst. Through a safe water reticulation scheme the BCC was convinced they will save and avail water to the residents through such a project which was funded by NORPLAN (a Norwegian firm).⁴⁹ Under the same scheme, the BCC also sought to reclaim water as an additional source of water. It needs to be noted that recommendations were carried out by SWECO, a Swedish consulting engineering company that had carried out a feasibility study on the MZWP.⁵⁰ Such a desperate move to water recycling scheme was meant to complement water source for Bulawayo through reclaiming waste water into domestic water supply like that of Lake Chivero in Harare.⁵¹ It remains unclear how and why the BCC has suddenly went silent about the scheme. Worse-still they seems to be unclear result analysis to prove how the scheme helped to procure water for Bulawayo since its launch in 1997.

The BCC also initiated a program dubbed Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Program in partnership with GIZ (*Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*) from the governments of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany who funded a \$10 million for its

implementation.⁵² The program was launched in September 2012 and it ended 2014. The program targeted water system input volume, reduction of water losses, water reclamation, improved meter reading and procurement of plant and equipment. As such the BCC installed bulk raw and clear water meters from city's supply dams into and from the water treatment plants as well as the pumping stations.⁵³ Such a facility was extended to strategic sites such as Ncema, Criterion water treatment and Fern Hill Booster Pumping Station where sixteen bulk meters were installed to realize a balance and effective water supply to its residents. In tandem, work was also done to improve the performance of the 32km Insiza pipeline to Ncema Water Treatment capable of delivering water up to 60 000m³/day.⁵⁴ It needs to be highlighted that this project amounted \$27 821.00⁵⁵, a cost which was also funded by GIZ. This therefore, leaves one with an inescapable conclusion that in all their programmes the BCC perhaps created sanity and promised water security to its residents. It must be borne in mind that, the BCC had drilled boreholes in every residential location to avail water for the residents, as such they embarked on the above mentioned programs to guarantee water security always.

BCC imposition of prepaid water meters: Reactions from the public and civic organizations.

At the time of writing relevant documents with regards to prepaid water meters were censored in view that the issue was still sensitive among interested parties with some being defensive and others offensive. However, the crisis and challenges of sources cannot deter one in discussing the subject as it has adversely divided key players in the quest of solving the matrix of water problems in Bulawayo. Therefore, this section is based upon interviews, newspapers, newsletters, press conference, and policy documents.

The advent of prepaid water metering has been deemed as one of the controversial policies which was set out by the BCC envisaged to avail water and create water sanity/security in Bulawayo. In 2011, the BCC mooted the idea to introduce the prepaid water metering as a pilot project in Cowdry Park Hlalani Kuhle area.⁵⁶ It needs to be remembered that Hlalani Kuhle was a programme that was initiated by the government designed at providing residential stands for the people who had been displaced by *Operation Murambatsvina*⁵⁷ of 2005 which saw the demolition of squatter settlements and other illegal settlements throughout the country. Being a MDC-T run council, the BCC opposed and neglected the Hlalani Kahle scheme in view that the government had practiced political expediency in service of ZANU (PF) mantra's who had undertaken such moves without BCC consultation and consent.⁵⁸ Therefore, the new

scheme was thereby labelled a government undertaking having to provide water services, electricity and even sanity to the place. For example when the residents in Hlalani Kuhle complained of pipeline burst, the council plumbers sharply reminded them that their property was a private estate which had nothing to do with the BCC.⁵⁹ Essentially, the growth of Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle signaled danger to the BCC who saw risk of epidemic diseases necessitated by 10 294 residential stands, 6 primary schools, 4 secondary schools, 2 local authorities, 15 places of assembly and 6 commercial centers having to live without proper water supply system.⁶⁰ However, after finding a common ground with the BCC through deliberations, the government finally handed over the settlement to the City council. In tandem, the BCC realized the risk of people living without water and ablution services and installed communal taps for domestic purposes only.

It is against this backdrop that the BCC proposed to pilot the prepaid metering system in Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle before taking the project throughout the whole city in a phased approach. The project was borne out of the research under the Water Demand Management Business and also under the City of Bulawayo Water and Waste Water Master Plans which the BCC later adopted in view that prepaid water meters would serve as water demand strategy.⁶¹ It is now a fact that the BCC chose to pilot the scheme because of it had no meters to individual households and the area lacks servicing as opposed to other theories revolving around politics that the BCC sought to fire back using neglect and prepaid water meters. The headline newspaper of June 2011 caught the Bulawayo residents by surprise with an inscription tagged, 'BCC to install prepaid water meters.'⁶² In a series of press conferences in light to the above, the Mayor and the City Engineer cited that the council was on the crusade of installing prepaid water meters as it was the only way of availing water, cutting costs, improving consumer metering and the billing system. Needless to make mention, the scheme was held that residents would be required to pay an initial payment of \$50⁶³ which was to be used to install and develop the prepaid water meter.

The threat to impose the prepaid water meters became a bitter pill to swallow among residents and the civic activist who resorted to several protests and demonstrations against the BCC. To the residents, the BCC was scheming for the poor who would obviously not afford to purchase water. And yet to different civic activist, the BCC was on the crusade to privatize water which in turn would rob residents of their water right under section⁶⁴ especially to those at the bottom echelons in the society. As if not enough, the civic pressure warned the BCC that the prepaid water metering failed dismally in KwaZulu Natal in South Africa as it resulted in

serious epidemic diseases like cholera which grossly affected those with and without water. Therefore the random transferal of such scheme was projected as dangerous ultimately resulting in untold sufferings and disaster, worse-still in a poor economy like Zimbabwe.⁶⁵ In a letter addressed to the City Town Clerk, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights condemned the timing of BCC order to impose such a gadget that would privatize water.⁶⁶ One interesting similarity is that in 1999 under the Water Act, the residents and the civil society rallied behind the BCC in the quest of rejecting ZINWA fostered by the government. Indeed, this time it was the residents and civic society against a directed BCC move by the government. What is clear is that, the proposal to install the prepaid water meters provoked different versions of ire among residents.

The Bulawayo Progressive Resident Association (BPRA) Information Manager, Zibusiso Dube rejected the scheme citing that it was uncalled for, unorthodox and even ludicrous as it would deprive the residents of their water rights. He added that it was going to cause diseases and still the BCC lacked foresight in all that.⁶⁷ Precisely, Melly Dube the director of Bulawayo Agenda rejected the move as misinformed. His rejection of the idea was more bluntly as he chose to use his native language,

Uyazi ikhansili ifuna ukusitshiya egcekeni. Angifuni kuthi ngabathengisi kodwa iqiniso yikuthi sebefuna ukusenza insweli ngokusithengisela amanzi ngokungamaMeter kwabo. Othengisayo ngumthengisi' (the city council intends to desert us. I don't want to absolutely state that there are traitors but they want to reduce us to beggars through selling water to us via their prepaid water meters. ⁶⁸

He added that, 'these water gadgets will be vandalized by the people when they run out of water and the council lacks that manpower to resist anti-vandalism. It is unlike prepaid electricity that when one run out of that they have an alternative source like firewood, and charcoal, hence people will be wiped out like flies.'⁶⁹ Moses-Mzila also noted that, such a gadget will also destroy the moral fiber as residents would stop attending funerals and community ceremonies fearing epidemic diseases that would result without water.⁷⁰

Fig 2.1: Bulawayo Residents demonstrate against prepaid water meters in 2014.



*Source: The Southern Eye (05/09/14)

The above affirmations were accompanied by a series ‘Anti-prepaid water metering’ demonstrations and campaigns in the city igniting resistance among residents in opposing the scheme and ultimately forcing the BCC to back down.⁷¹ Their view was that no location or area was to have the prepaid water meters unless the idea has been clarified and accepted by the residents. The irate which surrounded the residents as various campaigns mounted, never ceased to move the council which kept reiterating that the project was to be implemented at all cost through various press conferences attended by the public relations officer.⁷² It needs to be highlighted that in the quest of piloting prepaid water meters the BCC got divided as some councilors buttering influential residents to oppose yet some were popularizing the rhetoric’s of prepaid meters to be installed.⁷³ The divided approach by the councilor’s betrayed the struggle of installing the prepaid water meters. As if not enough, the personnel responsible for prepaid water metering became exposed to abuse and beatings whenever they tried to carry out their relevant implementation. Therefore, this ultimately forced the City Mayor to publicly declare that the project was temporarily suspended granted the foregoing factors which were set for further deliberations.⁷⁴ Following such demonstrations the BCC suspended the issue although one believes, that in the near future the BCC will resurface with a similar scheme granted that other cities like Harare, Chitungwiza and Gwanda are in the struggle of implementing them.⁷⁵

It is now a fact that the residents of Bulawayo unite across their political divide in the quest of rejecting sensitive matters like water since 1999. In addition they refused to fall for

prepaid water meters in view that if one is affected and the rest are also dragged in numbers and hence, all should resist the prepaid meters. Although the BCC has shown signs of suspending the issue, there is no doubt that the issue shall resurface in a new version as they say, 'where there is smoke there is fire'. The vexing questions that now face the residents is that, what's next? Who can we trust since the BCC has demonstrated a repressive water policy? Will hydro-freedom ever be witnessed in Bulawayo? It is this authors considered view that the prepaid water meters will forever be rejected not only in Bulawayo but in the entire country. For Bulawayo it is worse, granted that, water issues have become sensitive scars that are entrenched and perceived to be linked to Gukurahundi civil war as shown in **Fig 2.1** since to some the arguments that Bulawayo is naturally dry has been relegated to the dustbins.

The role of non-state actors in solving water matrix in Bulawayo since 1980.

Various studies have paid little attention of the role played by different non-state actors in procuring and availing water solutions in Bulawayo. It must to be noted that, these non-state actors equally contributed to the transformation of Bulawayo residents in as far as water solutions are concerned. For the purposes of this study, the word non-state actor shall be subdivided into two having NGO's and the civic pressure groups.⁷⁶ The central possessed in this section is that both NGO's and the civic pressure groups have worked together in a struggle to procure and avail water for the residents in Bulawayo.

Non-governmental Organizations in solving water problems in Bulawayo

The dawn of 2009 witnessed a major program dubbed Bulawayo Emergency Water Augmentation Project (BEWAP) which was facilitated in a partnership venture between Dabane Trust and the BCC. It needs to be noted that, the program was born out of the realization that the economic meltdown had further debilitated efforts to arrest water crisis of Bulawayo as residents lacked clean water, proper sources of water and this exposed them to epidemic diseases.⁷⁷ Therefore the program was a direct response to life threatening sewage and water crisis. Supply water pipes were repaired and various schools received water supply and storage tanks that were envisaged in helping to solve water shortages during critical times. As if not enough, places like Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle received more attention from the program as they received improved water supply, rehabilitated sewage tanks and more importantly, hygiene awareness workshops were carried out in educating residents on how to conserve water and proper survival skills without water. This however, inculcated good hygienic behavior among residents.

In the same vein, another program mushroomed with a similar aim facilitated by World Vision Zimbabwe funded by the Australian Government dubbed Bulawayo Water and Sanitation Response (BOWSER).⁷⁸ The program ran from April 2010 to February 2013 which amounted \$10.1 million.⁷⁹ It was an instrumental program in reducing epidemic diseases especially cholera. In tandem, it strengthened council systems and improving customer care and revenue collection through a GIZ call center and GIS (Geographic Information System) all this in the name of improving burst pipes, leakages, emergency services and water supply system for Bulawayo. Put in other words, the call center improved the capacity of BCC to engage with residents in times of water crisis through GIZ. Added to this the program reduced incidents of cholera and diarrhea by 40% for all ages and 45% in children under five years.⁸⁰

Following a close assessment of the programs BEWAP/BOWSER, the interested parties sought to extend their results through venturing into a consortium that revamped the process of availing water in Bulawayo. It needs to be noted that such a consortium received a sum of \$5,500-00 from DFID/UK AID and World Vision UK and Switzerland.⁸¹ Major players in the program were the Dabane Trust, Medair and World Vision who were hailed of to having relevant expertise and human development in making the project a success. It needs to be noted that more emphasis was put on unserved areas like Cowdry Park/Hlalani Kuhle, Robert Sinyoka and not forgetting the people living with disabilities. In his opening speech during the launch of the program, the then Minister of Water and Infrastructural development, Hon. Samuel Sipepa Nkomo pointed out that, there was need for the key players to work tirelessly hard in availing water for the residents.⁸² Indeed, the program was the beginning of all good things. The program is applauded of having improved water supply by installing fourteen high yielding boreholes, de-sledged three main sewage collection in Magwegwe which improved the sanitation for 58, 957 people.⁸³

Added to this, the program also improved reliability of water supply in schools as 123 schools received 143 water tanks for 122, 997 children and 601 children living with disability, solely to improve water supply.⁸⁴ Therefore, the program also extended a helping hand in solving water scarcity matrix of Bulawayo.

Civic pressure groups as ‘vocal instruments’ in solving water crises in Bulawayo.

Countless civic pressure groups and activist have clamoured in one voice about water scarcity problems in Bulawayo since 1980. In their various agendas they have found a common denominator and hence water featured prominently in all their chorus. Shari maintains that, the

civic pressure groups in Zimbabwe have sung in the same hymn book although in different robes and doctrine that they believe in.⁸⁵ Indeed, this rings true about the civil pressure groups in Bulawayo that found common ground since the post-colonial state in service of advancing water reforms of a 'dry city' Bulawayo. Needless to make mention, their united voice undoubtedly forced the relevant authorities to procure and avail holistic solutions to the residents hence extending a helping hand in safeguarding water solutions for the residents.

After independence water scarcity became the order of the day granted that the city was visited by droughts and worse off by the Civil War of 1982/3 which is 'perceived' of derailing development (water included) in Bulawayo. This resulted in the mushrooming of radical civic pressure groups like *Imbovane Yamahlabezulu*, *Vukani Mahlabezulu*, *Mthwakazi People's Congress*, *Matabeleland Development Society* and the militant *Ibhetshu LikaZulu* who began to raise voices in early 1990's⁸⁶ instructing the government to act and solve 'their product of impunity' that they had created through brewing marginalisation and exclusion of the region in all developments- no doubt water included. These therefore, began lobbying for sustainable water reforms, although it should be noted that they used water as classic example to decapitate the Mugabe regime who was perceived to have failed to solve water matrix hence the need of an autonomous United State of Mthwakazi that was perhaps prepared to solve water woes.⁸⁷ Their discerning voices clamoured and pushed an agenda of Ndebele particularism in smokescreen of water reforms. Using water to push the Ndebele particularism, the above civic groups have undoubtedly contributed in solving water woes through igniting a centred debate and militant lobby for MZWP and water reforms in Bulawayo.

Essentially, in 1999 amid the imposition of 1999 Water Act that resulted in the formation of ZINWA- a parastatal that expropriated water rights from urban municipalities (Bulawayo included), various civic pressure groups rallied behind the BCC in view that the government had no right in expropriating council premises and worse-still, ZINWA had failed in other urban municipalities,⁸⁸ hence they was no way the department was going to work miracles in Bulawayo's case. Khumbulani Maphosa, a civic activist from Habakkuk Trust posited that, 'at the time of ZINWA imposition in Bulawayo, our main aim was to resist ZINWA together with other civic groups because from our background research ZINWA had failed elsewhere. Because we have people at heart, we continue to push an agenda of forcing all key actors to deliver water for the residents using holistic measures.'⁸⁹ In light to afore, a major crisis that saw a tiff between the BCC and the central state was more vivid in 2005 when the central state embarked on Operation Hlalani Kahle/Cowdry Park without consultation with

the BCC. As such, the BCC neglected to connect the location to the supply system citing claims that it was a private island which was supposedly being nestled by the government.⁹⁰ Indeed, the people had to live without adequate clean water. The director of Bulawayo Agenda, Melly Dube summed up the above scenario stating that, ‘the tiff between the BCC and the government deprived residents of their water right. As civic activists together with BUPRA and others, we forced them to forge relations and deliver water for the people. Prior that, we have facilitated water policy debate which have seen residents claiming their human entitlement of water.’⁹¹ Indeed, the civic pressure groups have played a role in providing water solutions in Bulawayo.

In recent years, civic pressure groups have tried to address the problem associated with the sudden imposition of prepaid water meters in Bulawayo in view that if such were to be implemented, the residents would pay the price of expensive water, succumb to epidemic diseases and at worst rob them of their entitlement.⁹² In 2013, a grand coalition was launched that encompassed Bulawayo Agenda, BUPRA, BURA, Bulawayo Dialogue, ZCTU, *Ibhetshu LikaZulu*, Public Policy Research, Youth Development Trust, Women Institute of Leadership, Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development, Christian Legal Society and others.⁹³ Such a coalition was meant to stop the sudden imposition of prepaid water meters and no doubt the BCC was forced to back down and suspend the scheme amid the writing of this study.

Conclusion

This chapter has sufficiently dealt with efforts implemented by the government, the BCC and the non-state actors in availing water solutions for its residents since 1980. It is also clear from this chapter that on the hunt in search of solutions the three key players have clashed and lashed each other through demonising, undermining and criticizing each other over perceived controversial policies on each part. It needs to be applauded that the dialogue among the three has also brought about major strides in the efforts to bring about water in Bulawayo. It is the contention of this paper that the conflicts that arose in search for water solutions have brought about positive light in as far as water issues are concerned as key players were forced to act fearing that they could be challenged and criticized. On the face of it, water scarcity woes would be prevented if only the players had one agenda of procuring water as opposed to drag the issue into political terrain for selfish gains.

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- 68.** Interview with M. Dube, Bulawayo Agenda's offices, 24 June 2015.
69. Ibid...
70. Moses Mzila's presentation during the Bulawayo Agenda: Water Press Conference, Fidelity House, 16 June 2015.
71. Newsday 28 March 2015, Zim News Net 05 September 2015.
72. Sunday News 10 November 2013, The Chronicle 02 April 2014.
73. Southern Eye 14 November 2013, Sunday News 15 June 2014.
74. The Chronicle 25 May 2014.
75. The Herald 02 September 2015.
76. For the purposes of this research I define the NGO's as donor agencies that have a practical agenda in communities that foster development, eradicate poverty and rescue civilians at crisis point through tangible programmes. Yet I define civic activist groups as merely mouth piece of the voiceless serving to lobby and protect civil rights to that end. Therefore, these two words are treated differently in this research.
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CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORY OF THE CONTROVESIAL MATABELELAND ZAMBEZI WATER PROJECT: A 'PIPELINE DREAM'.

Introduction

In every political manifesto, economic conference and even empowerment policy meetings in Bulawayo, Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project has immeasurably featured. But what is Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project? The chapter will attempt to exhume and document the loud and silent memories of the project focusing on those episodes that had both positive and negative bearing. It is a study that highlights and surveys the colonial period locating the project up to the contemporary setting. Tracing the project from the colonial period, it holds that the white population believed that the BMZWP was the best scheme to radically end incessant water woes but the same whites had adequate water which matched with their population density against the natives who languished without water. No wonder, why the scheme was abandoned in favour of BCC dam building policy which saw the water supply dams that were built after ten years. Therefore, this chapter is of the view that the whites generally deterred on the scheme because they were satisfied with the little water they had. Consequently, the colonial reservations to the project sow the seeds of procrastination against the implementation of the scheme which Bulawayo- 'a dry city' still longs to be quenched by the BMZWP.

While clearly concerned about its history it seeks to make sense of the continued political discourses and counter discourses that have entrenched further delayed, dithered, deterred and making it an unattainable project in all its sections. In the process it presents the idea of right versus might were politics being the might having to bend and fashion the right (the project) in its own way. The study is important because the project has been mired in controversies such as the perceived conspiracy by the Shona dominated government against the perceived Ndebele dominated City antagonistic to the Harare regime. This has ultimately deterred and slowed the implementation process. Put in other words, the project has been attributed by various commentators as a political terrain that politicians jostle and score goals for their intended self-political aggrandisement at the expense of the project.

Furthermore, this chapter locates the prospects of the project in ZIMASSET echoing the views of the residents and institutions predicting the outcome to that end. As such, it is a

study that dissects mythical versions from the facts that have clouded the BMZWP while locating the best trajectory to undertake if the project is to be a success.

Colonial Survey of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project.

The idea of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project dates back in 1912¹, were prominent white community who formed the nucleus of Bulawayo sought to end water woes in the region by drawing water from the Zambezi to Bulawayo. In this regard, they argued that water scarcity deterred industrial, housing and infrastructural development² set to upgrade Bulawayo. It should be noted that, the little water they had matched to their settlement and their day to day domestic use hence they needed it in abundance in line to their economic and social projections in the near future.³ Consequently, water scarcity challenges prompted men and women to come together and initiate a scheme which was dubbed, Bulawayo Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project (BMZWP). At that juncture, the project was still an objective solely of drawing water from the Zambezi to Bulawayo, as opposed to what was to be witnessed in the post-colonial period were BMZWP assumed a political trademark. Worse-still, the project name was heavily loaded as it envisaged that it came from the residence of Bulawayo hence once completed the scheme will deliver water for Bulawayo, Matabeleland and ultimately Southern Rhodesia with results accompanied to it.

Owing to this, relevant consultations were forwarded to the then Rhodesian government through the BCC municipality Mayor Lt Col Baxendale in 1912.⁴ The colonial government cried foul and deemed the project costly and expensive. Mindful of the fact that it was extraordinary to curb future water problems, the scheme remained costly with regards to the implementation, human resources and maintenance.⁵ In the wake of all this, the municipality had already crafted long term methods to out strip water woes in the region by building dams, ⁶hence the BMZWP hibernated and became a closed chapter in 1912 and only appeared in successive years. No doubt the scheme was relegated to the oblivions and hence the council went on to build dams in the mould of Khami (1927), Ncema (1943) and Mzingwane dam (1956).⁷

Essentially, oral evidence suggests that, the Rhodesian government down played the scheme because it was envisioned as costly, granted that the whites had enough water that matched with their population. Against this backdrop, the scheme was meant to sustain mushrooming industries in the city.⁸ Added to this, one school of thought⁸ suggested that the whites were reluctant to implement the project because its exorbitant cost was perhaps going to deter other developments that were envisaged to take off at that time.⁹ It is however, hard to

dismiss the issue of cost associated with the implementation but one is convinced that, the whites were unwilling to implement the scheme beyond any reason as the white population was happy with the little water they had.

Post-Colonial Episode of the BMZWP 1980-2008.

In 1980, Bulawayo residence witnessed a ‘flag and anthem’ independence as it never translated to bring water sanity and security ascribed to it. In fact the situation worsened. The demographic increase of Bulawayo recorded 413 814 in 1982 and 776 786 in 1983 which meant that the growth of the city was increasing from 4.5% to 6.5% per annum¹⁰. As if not enough, the demographic hike also propelled a high water demand as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Increase of water demand per year, 1978- 1990.

| YEAR | DEMAND GALLONS | YEAR | GALLONS |
|-----------|----------------|-----------|---------|
| 1978/1979 | 30.0 | 1981/1982 | 36.3 |
| 1979/1980 | 32.0 | 1982/1983 | 38.3 |
| 1980/1981 | 34.1 | 1983/1990 | 40.3 |

*SOURCE: Pre-feasibility Study Report of BMZWP (MZWT and the SIDA, October 1992).

The sudden expansion of industrial growth and urban location at the turn of 1980 like Mahatshula, Nkulumane, Mganwini, and Cowdry Park just to mention a few,¹¹ also strained the infrastructure and demand for water. Indeed, Bulawayo was in trouble. Needless to make mention, the BCC had not constructed a dam since 1976¹² which meant that the existing dams could no longer sustain industrial expansion and the growing settlements. In spite of the afore, the BCC introduced water rationing regime in 1983 and continued to 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991-93¹³ a move which was meant to conserve the little water for Bulawayo.

Faced with all these hardships the Bulawayo residents, business community, academics, captains of industry and the BCC revived the Bulawayo Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project in view that the government would accede to their lobby.¹⁴ It remains unclear how and why the resuscitation of the project saw the cancellation of the prefix ‘Bulawayo’ as the former was christened as Bulawayo Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project to Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project. One school of thought suggested that, ‘We preferred to call it Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project as short cut to Bulawayo Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project. What matters is to see the project being implemented that’s all.’¹⁵ It is clear that to some people the name was not of significance, hence they needed the results and the outcome.

Contrary to the afore-mentioned, one noted that the project cancelled the prefix Bulawayo to be popular as Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project because 'Bulawayo' nested tribal tendencies regionalizing the scheme to the Ndebele, hence the government was going to neglect the scheme.¹⁶ It appears that the project name was not an issue but well it is hard to dismiss that, the post 1983 Civil War indirectly cohered the people in the region to main stream the project's name although it should be emphasized that residences were anticipating to see the project being implemented.

However, in the post Unity Accord of 1987, the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project assumed major strides in its operations and lobby. Despite no evidence to prove his claims P. Sibanda notes, 'In 1987, after fruitful deliberations with the late Dr Joshua Nkomo, Comrade Dumiso Dabengwa (the then Home Affairs minister) approached me together with other six guys that were thought to be useful players to water issues in Bulawayo. As such, he requested us to look into the viability of Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project as was instructed by the late Joshua Nkomo. I personally, was responsible of coming up with the pipeline route which at first by passed Matabeleland South but such a route had its own challenges. This was the beginning of a powerful inquiry and lobby.'¹⁷ Without further ado the lobby group of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project also included the residents, with a sole aim of bringing water to the city. As the lead runner to the project, Dabengwa announced that the project was feasible and the lobby group was therefore on the crusade to lobby, solicit funds, research, advertise and to that end bring water for the city.¹⁸ Indeed, the news became a sigh of relief as they were accompanied by wide spread euphoria as the later promised radical end of water woes. One senior resident remarked that the news of a lobby group to bring water from Zambezi to the city were the best news in ages tantamount to the gospel of independence on the eve of 1980.¹⁹

Essentially, at the turn of 1990, the project transcended to be a major movement than just a lobby group. Latter developments saw the formation of the Matabeleland Action Group popularly known as MAG, which constituted ZANU PF's political heavy weights from the region that is members of the parliament, governors of Matabeleland and even the Mayor of Bulawayo.²⁰ This meant that the discourse of water scarcity and Zambezi project was reactivated in a broader scale. The main objective of MAG was to spearhead development in the region be it infrastructure, land and to that end water which played a salient role in the development. As representatives of the region, they claimed legitimacy over the scheme on

behalf of the people the owners of the project. Indeed the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project was later co-ordinated by the MAG.

It needs to be highlighted that major studies by Gwebu and Musemwa have argued that the government through MAG hijacked and expropriated the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project from the residents because of the tiff between the region and the central government.²¹ Precisely, given the choice of their argument which is to some extent accurate, granted that the Civil war was taking place at that time. However, their argument fails the test when checked against the archival documents from the Trust suggesting that the government never hijacked the scheme but rather the pioneers of the lobby group invited the politicians in the region hence the MAG derived the powers from the people. Residents, MAG and the pioneers of the scheme recommended the project to the government in view that it was to attract necessary recognition. No doubt, the project was envisaged to be adopted by the government since the pioneers of the scheme like Dabengwa (then Minister of Home Affairs) came from the same government.²²

There is no doubt that MAG took a central role in co-ordinating the programme and major deliberations of the under takings of Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project. Needless to make mention, MAG held that for MZWP to gain momentum it needed to expand into a trust that was to directly address the thirst of water in the region. This later led to the formation of a specific taskforce under its watch with three main objectives of co-ordinating, lobbying and soliciting funds for Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project called the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Trust in September 1993. The newly born MZWT comprised of, the Minister of Local governance, rural and urban development (the patron), the Mayor of Bulawayo, chairperson of MAG, ZANU PF chairpersons from Matabeleland {North and South}, Governors of the region, Zimbabwe Farmers Union ZFU, Commercial Farmers Union CFU, Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce and the Confederation of Zimbabwe industries representatives.²³ Given the aforementioned parties the project was set to bolt out as soon as possible in view that the key players in the project were endorsed. It is necessary to note that, from the onset the project became clouded with politicians a situation that was to be witness twenty years later were politicians jostled and claimed ownership of the project for self-aggrandizement.

Soon after the adoption of the MZWT structures, a board was established comprising of the two co-chairpersons Hon. Dumiso Dabengwa M.P and former governor the late Retired Major General Jevan Maseko. Other members included the then treasurer Mr C. Craiger (Fincor), Secretary Alderman M. L. Constandinos (BCC), Z. Nsimbi, P. Bhebhe (ZNCC), T. Ncube (ZFU), R. A. Emmet (CFU), M. P. Vaghmania (CZI), R. H. Armstrong (Chamber of


Mines), A. Masuku (Gender), Edson Ncube (ZANU PF), Jacob Mudenda (ZANU PF), A. S. Nyathi, Welshman Mabheha (former Mat. North Governor), E M Moyo, J. P. Nhliziyo (PA Mat. North), A. Dube (PA Mat. South), K. S. Njini, L. Nkomo and K. L. Dube.²⁴

From the fore-going, one is convinced that the credence ascribed to the MZWT was characterised by euphoric expectations that indeed the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project will see the light of the day. To that end, the trust's major responsibility was to co-ordinate all activities with regards to the project, fundraise, and also investigate through carrying out feasibility and consultancy studies. More importantly, the trust was to solicit and fund raise to attract huge sums to augment the government in the implementation.²⁵ With the escalation of documentation and necessary house-keeping that was carried out by the Trust, the government appreciated such a brilliant idea that came from the Trust and appeared to be interested in the project. In 1993, the MZWT decided to commission pre-feasibility studies in the area of socio-economics and environment in order to synthesize and articulate all the pertinent issues and constraints involved in the project. Three consultants teams were engaged that is the ZERO, Com-Loc and Joshua Nyoni & Associates who all managed to mobilize diverse interests groups into an alliance to lobby government for approval of this and convince NORAD to fund the costs.²⁶ However, the recommendations spell out by the stakeholders on the findings of the pre-feasibility study remains ambiguous.

Prospects and projections of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project: Envisaged views from the Feasibility study.

A major turning point was witnessed in 1994 when the MZWT saw it fit to carry out a more comprehensive feasibility study about the project in view of its viability, consequences, barriers and benefits beyond just procuring water. Thus in that same year, consultancy work by SWECO in association with HYDRO- UTILITIES LTD funded by SIDA and the MZWT through the government carried out the feasibility study.²⁷ Precisely, the-afore mentioned companies came from Sweden, hailed for having the best engineers globally. The aim here was to get the best personnel to fashion the scheme from the onset. Such a move proved advantageous as SIDA released funds for comprehensive research amounting to Z\$11.5 million together with allocated fund by MZWT portioned at Z\$3.5 million which all in all amounted to Z\$15 million.²⁸ Dominant propaganda and newspaper headlines some tagged like, 'Say goodbye to water woes: MZWP will be done by 2000'²⁹, sparked and motivated the public on the progress made by the stakeholders in realising the tangible reality of the scheme.

Fig 3.1: Pipeline route location map of BMZWP.



*Source: Executive Summary of the Final Report of the BMZWP Supply Feasibility Study (GOZ, MZWT, and the SIDA, September 1996).

In no time the feasibility study was concluded having noted the key areas that were projected to benefit from the setting up of the pipeline. It analysed the existing water supply conditions and presented a water resources development plan demonstrating that a large scale water delivery project to secure Bulawayo and Matabeleland water supplies was feasible for both an engineering and economic point of view and hence must be implemented. As if not enough, it envisaged that once implemented the scheme because of abundant water shall ignite development in consolidated villages, business centres and stimulate economic participation in the areas along the pipeline.³⁰ This meant that tourism, mining, forestry, employment and agriculture green belt irrigation through the 30km wide on either side of the main 450km pipeline was to be created once completed. It needs to be noted that, once the project was implemented they would be development of the whole Matabeleland region from Victoria Falls up to Gwanda and beyond the geographic borders of Zimbabwe. The study estimated the project in 1996 to be US\$334.5 million under an implementation frame work of Private Public Partnership (PPP) in which all stakeholders were invited to execute their part in that arrangement.³¹ This meant that the project had no owner nor chief proponents to claim rights

over it but everyone be it private or public. Therefore, all was done including the diplomatic implication of drawing water from the Zambezi as the green light was given through the SADC protocol of Helsinki Rules and work of International Law Commission of the UN on the question of watercourses. In March 1995 the jurist Prof Lammers visited the country to advice on the best trajectory to take.³²

Finally, in March 1997 the final feasibility study to the Cabinet through the Minister of Local and National housing. More importantly, on the 25th March 1997 the cabinet approved the feasibility study and declared the project a national project.³³ It should be noted that such an act revitalised the hope of making the pipeline dream into a tangible reality.

Controversial episodes of the MZWP: 1997-2008

The macro-politics and the economic crises in Zimbabwe further derailed the prospects of implementing the MZWP at the turn of the millennium. Crucial to note, is that various variables in the mould of the land reform, the Water Act of 1999, the sudden collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar and the rise of massive opposition jeopardised the implementation process. Despite the afore-mentioned hiccups, major points of difficulties among the stakeholders between the BCC and MZWT came to light. In their letter to the MZWT, the BCC insisted to take over the MZWP from the MZWT in view that they were the service provider of the residential bulk water.³⁴ To the BCC, the MZWP was to be facilitated by them and other stakeholders were projected to ‘just’ booster and help the BCC. Such a stance became a bitter pill to swallow for the MZWT who perceived BCC’s action as mere gimmicks and uncalled for. In turn, a meeting was conveyed to spell out and clarify the roles of project implementation. As such, the same roles were maintained that were spelt out in the feasibility study of 1997. For example the government was tasked to construct the Gwayi-Shangani Dam and the BCC was mandated to construct a pipeline from the Gwayi-Shangani dam to Bulawayo and the bulk distribution of water in the city. In addition, the MZWT was responsible for fundraising, research and the construction of the corridor (developing and pipe linking the Gwayi-Shangani dam with Zambezi River) and ultimately facilitating the economic development in the region.³⁵ With regards to this, perceived confusion that had surrounded the MZWP was deemed demystified.

Essentially, as agreed on the meeting that apportioned roles among its stake holders, the BCC swiftly created a committee dubbed Project Implementation and Co-ordination Unit (PICU) led by City Engineer P N Sibanda.³⁶ Its main aim was to work out and recommend the

mechanics for the implementation of the infrastructure component of the project in line with the approach adopted by the council. As such, the PICU became an integral part representing the BCC in the MZWP. In addition the MZWT went on to create another sub-committee christened as MZWT-Ltd.³⁷ It's main function was to solicit, fundraise and to operate just like any other limited company through selling shares. However, the stakeholders complained of negative development that the MZWT had created through another committee replicating the same objectives but for narrow profit making ventures. The confusion ascribed to the creation of the MZWT and MZWT-Ltd divided the attention among the people, with some perceiving the MZWT-Ltd as means of raising investment and others for associated economic developments.³⁸ One scholarship lampooned the above scenario, 'the reason why the scheme has not seen the light of the day it is because too many institutions, stake holders and even people became involved some having different objectives although.'³⁹ Perhaps he was right as too many cooks spoil the broth. Such a maxim explained the mushrooming and sprouting of different committee who disapproved, belittled or even argued often than working together for a solid unity of purpose.

Furthermore, internal storms and conflict that derailed the scheme sharply rose at the expense of the project between the MZWT and BCC. The CEO of the MZWT wrote a letter requesting for funds that were surrendered to the BCC by the late Alderman M. L. Constandinos (then board secretary) amounting \$6 595.⁴⁰ It should be noted that these funds were surrendered to then BCC town clerk in view that the council was also a stake holder in the MZWP. Against this backdrop, the BCC sharply responded citing that it was not in a position to release the requested funds solely because they was no established claim of funds and besides the revaluation of dollar in August 2006 resulted in the overdraft balance of \$187 507.70 hence there were no funds to talk about.⁴¹ The sudden transformation indeed created animosities that deterred the implementation of the MZWP. Indeed, the hydro equation propounded by Musemwa that, 'whenever you talk about Bulawayo and water one has to be prepared to mainstream politics.'⁴² He was right in his analysis.

Despite internal conflicts the RBZ extended their financial support through injecting \$152 million into the Gwayi-Shangani Dam construction (the first phase). Precisely, Dr Gono (the then RBZ Governor) even visited the site of construction- a sign that was applauded showing willingness and commitment of the government.⁴² Contrary to the-afore notion, P. Sibanda the MZWT technocrat holds that, 'we hear of this propaganda that the government gave funds to the MZWT. Truth has to be said that it was a loan not just funds without any

claim'.⁴³ The point of difficulty is that the rhetoric's, attitudes and even suspicions among the people, organisations and various players created a set back to the scheme. It remains unclear how the impact of the sudden break away of Dabengwa from ZANU (PF) affected the MZWP, although it is known that issues of national politics grossly deterred the scheme. The delay to implement the scheme and award mining rights on the side of the government, prompted Payne to write a letter to President R G Mugabe in view that the president was going to intervene.⁴⁴

Hard road to implementation: MZWP and the GNU, 2009-2013.

The post 2008 elections which were marred by controversial episodes saw the diplomatic negotiations facilitated by Thabo Mbeki (then SADC chairperson) who ultimately spear headed the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU).⁴⁵ The vanquished were integrated into government that is the MDC-T and MDC-M sharing a political space with ZANU PF. The sudden change of political environment attracted a huge euphoric anticipation from the people who wished to see change, reforms being implemented and ultimately the restoration of the country's pride she had enjoyed in 1980's. Such expectations were also echoed by the residents of Bulawayo who wished to see the MZWP implemented.

In no time, Prime Minister Tsvangirai allocated a ministerial post to Samuel Sipepa Nkomo who became the Minister of Water Resources Development and Management.⁴⁶ What is important to note is that, such a move to award Minister Nkomo a strategic portfolio was welcomed by the people of Bulawayo and Matabeleland who perceived it as both ironic and as a blessing. First, being a son of Matabeleland he was to give due attention to the region and to that end, end water problems through establishing water sources especially MZWP. Second, as a politician from the MDC-T which commanded support from Bulawayo, he would use powers to his to bring development to the people of Bulawayo perceived to be marginal.⁴⁷ Indeed, Minister Samuel Sipepa Nkomo was a supposed Messiah to bring about change in as far as water was concerned.

All was well until a press conference conveyed which attracted all key players, interested parties and even captains of industries who were eager to learn from the policy set out by Minister Nkomo to address water problems in Bulawayo and Matabeleland at large. In that meeting Minister Nkomo declared that the government was taking over the running and the implementation of the MZWP. Granted the facts, he also announced the sudden change of the project title through adding the prefix 'national' in what have in the past 20years simply called MZWP to NMZWP.⁴⁸ It needs to be highlighted that the question of project name has always been a problem but this time it was a clear political tag of war hence MZWP fell victim

to the divisive politics. In addition he emphasized that the name was been nationalised because other ministers never wanted to help because it was a Ndebele private scheme hence by nationalizing it will mean that everyone was to be involved.⁴⁹

This therefore brewed a storm among the stake holders who had attended the meeting arguing that Nkomo had no claim of expropriating a scheme that had been running smoothly under the watch of the MZWT and other recognised stakeholders. It should be noted that the MZWP has always been a government project albeit managed by the MZWT through the Public Private Partnership. Therefore, expropriating the scheme meant that the private players were being erased.⁵⁰ Different political parties that had formed the nucleus of MZWP fought back, this time it was not ZANU PF versus other opposition parties but MDC-T versus other parties that had an upper hand together with the people and the rest of the civil society. The tussle of politics was who should get the credit of having brought the water to the region. Not Dabengwa, not ZANU PF but MDC-T.⁵¹ Busani Ncube lampooned the attitude exhibited by Nkomo citing that, 'I wonder why the government under the watch of Sipepa Nkomo preferred to prefix the name of MZWP. We have NUST, National Blanket's and now NMZWP. Why can't we have similar projects in the country named national but you prefer Matabeleland. Universities in other cities/towns retained the name of their places where they are located like CUT, BUSE and GZU.'⁵² In line with the expropriation and 'nationalization' through changing name to NMZWP, Nkomo was also ambitious in correcting a colonial linguistic error with regards to the name *Shangani* instead of *Tshangane* in line with the pronunciation and syntax of the Ndebele. Indeed, this state of affairs undoubtable prompts one to conclude that the Minister was majoring in minors as the word nation never guaranteed the implementation of the project.

Politicians across the divide that is united with one voice and exhibited irk against actions of Nkomo. Even the silver tongued Prof Moyo argued that, 'Nkomo has fought a toy to play with in form of NMZWP. As a minister, he should co-ordinate not control and not dictate. What is important is to see the implementation of the project.'⁵⁴ Following such disagreements and internal storms no solution was drawn from each sides hence Nkomo bulldozed his stance as he had the upper hand as a Minister. In no time a committee under his watch was created dubbed NMZWP-Advisory Council led by Donald Khumalo was formed.⁵⁵ It needs to be noted that the duties of the Advisory Council remain unclear as it was done without consultations. On several occasions different key players to the project neglected the council perhaps on the grounds of showing that the council was futile. For example, at some

point the Advisory Council appealed for funds amounting \$68 305.00 from the BCC and in turn the BCC swept the issue under the carpet.⁵⁶ Sibanda summed up the whole idea stating that, 'I was also part of the Advisory Council created by Nkomo, but one thing for sure is that it never met even for briefings. It was just a whole lot of confusion and procrastinations. However, I blame no one but Nkomo who created tiff in the whole scheme.'⁵⁷ On countless occasions, other political parties and institutions united to reject the stance by Nkomo at the expense of the project implementation.

Financially, the government under the watch of the then Minister of Finance Tendai Biti allocated the NMZWP, a sum of US\$38 million yet it required US\$500 million.⁵⁸ In any case Minister Nkomo had assured the people that he had secured funds from China and Malaysian Company-Zim Mall Holdings amounting to US\$1.1 billion.⁵⁹ However, the major point of difficult is that if such funds were secured why has not the scheme seen the light of the day? Perhaps, then they are other factors. To make matters worse, other funds that has been collected for the same cause prior the advent of Minister Nkomo remain unclear and unaccounted for. At some point, Minister Nkomo threatened to audit and bring to light corruption ascribed to the dealing of the NMZWP.⁶⁰

Notwithstanding the about, after the 2013 elections the ZANU PF government has also dithered to implement the NMZWP only a delay of action than results. For example, as instructed by the government, ZINWA embarked on a progress study report for Gwayi-Shangani which was awarded to China International Water and Electric Corporation at a sum of US\$121 732 922.60.⁶¹ In addition the Environment Impact Assessment for the NMZWP was awarded to Outrun Investments and Green Resources in the sum of US\$299 552.47.⁶² The document went on to discuss how the government plans to build the first phase of the NMZWP that is the Gwayi-Shangani dam that has taken long to be constructed. The document also implicated the environmental impact of the project having the same results that had been spelt out by the feasibility study of 1997.⁶³ Such an action of exhibiting double standards by government has failed the scheme to such an extent of losing large sums of money in doing the same thing over and over again one without tangible results.

In many ways the period under the GNU further witnessed direct politicization of water in Bulawayo at the expense of the people and the NMZWP. As aptly captured by Musemwa, political struggles over water in Bulawayo have delayed progress and implementation ultimately exposing the residence,⁶⁴ to water borne diseases. Indeed, his argument becomes accurate when checked against various stake holders who fought and lashed each other for

political gains at the expense of the NMZWP qualifying the maxim that, 'it is the grass that suffers when the elephants fight'. The tussle over all this political gimmick over NMZWP was that any individual, party or organisation that governs and implement the project, would in turn win the hearts of the people. No doubt the people have suffered and seen the worse in the midst of such political storms. What makes it worrisome and disheartening it's the fact that politicians from the same region in fact 'home-boys' were bickering and fighting each other as opposed to the former scenario were the central state was said to be antagonistic to Matabeleland region at large. Therefore, under the GNU period the discourse of Bulawayo and water more importantly, the NMZWP remained a site of contestation of power and politics interwoven with the question of ethnicity. No doubt, the scheme remains a dream and night mare hitherto.

NMZWP as an unfinished business: Projections of the ZIMASSERT 2013-2018.

Within the current matter of fact, Bulawayo's remains dry with little attention given by the relevant authorities. In the midst of such, NMZWP remains a dream up to the point of being tagged as 'pipe dream'. By the end of 2013 the government of Zimbabwe launched an economic blue-print dubbed ZIMASSERT,⁶⁵ a policy document meant to gunner quick wins/results in a short period of time by 2018. As such NMZWP features prominently not only as solution to water scarcity of Bulawayo/Matabeleland but as key to the economic turnaround.

It is therefore complex at a time of writing to foretell the outcome of ZIMASSERT in relation to the implementation of NMZWP. Precisely, on such basis it is too early to make an informed/candid analysis as at the time of writing it has existed for only two years. Perhaps one can easily predict the outcome of the ZIMASSET with regards to NMZWP through interrogating the past more importantly analysing what the government did and thought about the scheme in all its dealings. Indeed, the past always haunt and imbricate the present and the future.

However, notwithstanding the above various institutions and individuals lampoon the promises of the government in as far as the ZIMASSET is concerned about NMZWP. The director of Bulawayo Agenda, M. Dube bluntly puts it, 'I wonder how an asset becomes asset while it has a liability in it. This talk about the government implementing the NMZWP by 2018 through the ZIMASSET, to me it is a fallacy and gimmicks of silencing the people. They have failed in the past. What will make us believe them now?'⁶⁶ Within the same line of argument, the Residence Association (BUPRA) co-ordinator Mr Z. Dube, also concurred with the afore stating that, 'If the government was serious NMZWP could have been implemented by now. It becomes more complex now that the economy has gone down deeper and deeper.'⁶⁷ The

forecast of the outcome is deeply rooted from the actions that has been exhibited by the government in the past of delaying and even politicizing the scheme. It needs to be noted that, albeit the promises of the government's residents have given up on whatever the authorities say about NMZWP.

Some loyalist and sympathisers to the throne of the ruling party hold that the government should be given chance to act and solve the problem of water. An anonymous figure loyal to ZANU PF holds that, 'ZANU PF has failed its own people through denying them water by implementing the NMZWP but I believe we should not rubbish all that they have done about water solutions to Bulawayo.'⁶⁸ People have grown weary and even tired of being fed the same old promises of a short project on detail but long on rhetoric. No doubt, their promises are yet to be seen when 2018 approaches.

Conclusion

What is clear from this chapter is that NMZWP has remained a political utterance located in political manifestos during election times. Different actors have dealt with the scheme different for selfish gains at the expense of the project, the beneficiaries and even the industry. What is more worrying is that similar mistakes of power contestations are even repeated over and over again without a reflection from the past. Having noted the roots of the scheme, nothing has materialized only lobby and everlasting meeting that even brew fights and suspicions among the interested parties. However, a million dollar question is when will the project see the light of the day? For how long will people continue to lobby and clamour for NMZWP yet it is envisaged to solve their problems? It is not easy therefore, to point out the prime deterrents of the project as all have made blunders in their own right as argued above. As such, one believes that the solution lies when different parties unite with the same voice, objectives and drive to bring about water from the Mighty Zambezi to Bulawayo, which seems to be unattainable.

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CHAPTER 4

WATER AND THE DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION OF BULAWAYO, 2000- 2014.

Introduction

The first section of this chapter examines the relationship of water scarcity and industry in the colonial setting of Bulawayo since 1897. In doing so, it emphasises that water scarcity problems have always been there and more importantly the colonial government went on to erect industries in Bulawayo- a situation that won the City of Bulawayo a tag of being the industrial hub of Southern Rhodesia, Federation and Zimbabwe. The study champions that the colonial responsible authorities established their industries against the backdrop of having water scarcity problems but because Bulawayo was strategically near to other British colonies and more importantly she was envisaged of having a potential in co-ordinating rail transport and communication. It ought to be noted that the whites derived their success through availing water to the industries and that their committed and co-ordinated efforts won then success through establishing industries against water paucity.

Section two of this chapter discusses the sudden de-industrialization of Bulawayo since 2000- a situation that is attributed to water scarcity since various industries have cited their relocation has been solely been driven by water paucity in the city. The explanation has however generated irk from the Bulawayo captains of industries, local civic activist, critiques of ZANU (PF) and the general populates who see the such a water explanation as merely an excuse and ploy by the perceived Shona government of Mugabe in stripping Bulawayo her economic status and thereby grabbing all industries to Harare so that Bulawayo remains marginal.

The third and final sections outlines the *bambazonke alibi*- a counter argument that projects the de-industrialization of industries to other cities as conspiracy by the perceived Shona dominated government to shut down Bulawayo industries, propel under development and ultimately amass and grab all nice things to themselves in Harare at the expense of the Bulawayo residents. As the name suggests *bambazonke* simply means one that amasses and grabs all nice things to themselves like an octopus; a term that was popular in the 1950/60's which meant that the whites grabbed all nice things to themselves at the expense of the Africans. In doing so, it the school of thought emphasizes that water scarcity problems cannot adequately explain the sudden relocation of industries from Bulawayo hence the argument of

water does not hold water at all. Crucial to note is that, this chapter arrives at a conclusion that water paucity alone could not be liable as the only factor for the de-industrialization of Bulawayo but a plethora of factors like the economic variables that were at play since the year 2000 up to 2014 rightfully propelled such transformations. Subsequently, water paucity was also a victim of the failed economy in Zimbabwe that could be solved if the economy was normally functioning.

An overview of water and industry in the colonial period.

The industrial potential of Bulawayo dates back prior 1893, during the reign of Ndebele Kings-Mzilikazi and latter Lobengula who settled at a site that was envisaged by the whites to be the second Eldorado of the Southern Africa¹ with rich gold deposits and other valuable minerals suitable for white man's industrial capitalism. The period represented a major colonial encounter which depicted the Ndebele Kingdom (Matabeleland) as purely valuable region that was guessed to thrive through exploring resources and ultimately erecting industries to realise profits and developments in Southern Rhodesia.²

Against this backdrop, the whites had learnt from their preceded friendly and missionary visits to the Ndebele Capital (Bulawayo) that the settlement was characterized with water paucity dictated by dry climate with low rainfall as compared to Mashonaland.³ This view was aptly captured by Jameson in 1890 that,

What a land we have discovered [Bulawayo]! Similar to Zululand with alluvial deposits. Am convinced that this land shall give us glut investments through establishing productive markets and technologies. That we shall do when we finally conquer the Ndebele state.⁴

The call to establish major industrial markets to Bulawayo was embraced by various British captains of industry who had sponsored colonialism⁵ in the quest of solving crumbling markets and more importantly, solving the problems at home. Granted that, Bulawayo was considered the second Eldorado. Needless to make mention, the whites became convinced that water scarcity problems posed by the climate were by no means to end because they could be a threat to the colonial activities that attracted investment.

The decision to erect industrial base in Bulawayo against water scarcities was largely based on the strategic geographical position of the region that the Ndebele had also enjoyed. The colonialist believed that, Bulawayo was the shortcut to South Africa and other British colonies. Added to this, Bulawayo was envisaged by the BSAC that it could be a viable co-

ordination of good transport and communication system which were necessary for the development of Southern Rhodesia.⁶ Therefore, water scarcity problems became outweighed by the benefits and projected returns of erecting industries in Bulawayo. In the midst of water scarcity the first train arrived in Bulawayo on 4 November 1897⁷ which was meant to link the city to the outside world and more importantly to bring about development. Added to this, the city ultimately became a railway industrial hub for rail transport and communication linking Bulawayo and other British colonies which was later dubbed Rhodesia Railways. By early 1900 and 1905, the rail transport had become so popular having to ferry iron ore and human capital that had come to work in Southern Rhodesia.⁸ Although, there is little evidence to suggest that the industry faced water challenges, it needs to be highlighted that whenever the train came from South Africa it carried with it water tanks that were to be used in the railway industry. By the end of 1914 the BCC noted that railway industry had consumed 110 millions of gallons a clear sign that newly incepted rail industry was in need of more water supply if it was to survive.¹⁰

On the other hand in 1913, Africans also took part in the industrial inception of Bulawayo that undoubtedly consumed more gallons of water. In that same year, the brewery of opaque beer (later dubbed MaKhumalo Beer hall) was witnessed in Makokoba which its revenue was used to build Stanley hall.¹⁰ Although it remains unclear where such water was procured to carry out African beer industry, evidence suggests that part of it was provisioned by BCC who ultimately took much of the profits in view that they would source more water supply.¹¹ The booming opaque beer industry ultimately led to the rise of Ingwebu Breweries that became popular in selling opaque beer to the African community.¹² Crucial to note is that, these industries led to an increased water demand that strained Bulawayo's water supply. However, despite such challenges the BCC promised to avail water for industrial growth in the city against an odds. Therefore the BCC enacted a policy of building a series of dams after every decade in order to fully integrate the economic base of the city.¹³ It is no wonder, why the Khami dam was built in 1927 to fulfil the gazetted plan of procuring water for the domestic and industrial usage.

Later on around 1934-1960 the responsible government sought to fully establish secondary industry in Bulawayo that solely endeavoured to manufacture products. All along Bulawayo was just a recipient of finished products that had been made out of her raw materials.¹⁴ Put in other words, Bulawayo was to become a manufacturing city that would export its finished products. However, water challenges mounted to such an extent that the

responsible government pushed the BCC to bring water for industrial usage which was accompanied by the construction of another dams like Lower Ncema, Upper Ncema, Mzingwane, Insiza, and Inyakuni.¹⁵ This was done to counter the rise of industries that were envisaged to be in need of water especially the manufacturing firms that had come due to the rise of the Second World war and the federation of 1952.¹⁶ Notably, a number of industries in the mould of Cold Storage, Tregers Group, Rhodesia Engineering, Merlin Textiles, G&D Shoes, Hubert Davies, Radar Metal and many others had started operation in Bulawayo that ultimately awarded the city a tag, ‘KoNtuthu ziyathunqa’, (a Ndebele word alluding to a place that incessantly exudes smoke).¹⁷ Indeed, Bulawayo became the industrial hub granted her strategic proximity and good rail system that she commanded against a background of water scarcity. It ought to be noted that these industries led to rise in the water demand against a strained water supply. Albeit, the BCC became worried of the industrial transformations against water supply in the city- they were able to deliver and sustain the growing industries with curtailed water facilities.¹⁸ Therefore, it needs to be applauded that in the colonial period the industries survived with limited access to water as opposed to the popular discourse that was to be witnessed in the post independent Zimbabwe were various manufacturing industries relocated from Bulawayo citing that the city had no perennial water for its operations.

The emerging discourse of water scarcity and industry: Locating water in the relocation of industries from Bulawayo.

The advent of the year 2000 represented a major era of industrial operations in Bulawayo as many of them relocated from the city citing that the curtailed water supply of Bulawayo was grossly affecting the manufacturing production. Added to this, such industries decided to relocate to other cities especially Harare and Kadoma which were perceived a ground to provide a good water supply system and investment opportunities.¹⁹ Notwithstanding the above, the micro-political variables of Zimbabwe in the mould of the land reform, Water Act of 1999 and the grand fall of Zimbabwean dollar were all at play thereby affecting the industrial operations in Bulawayo. Against this backdrop, water scarcity in Bulawayo was seen as the major reason behind the industrial relocation from Bulawayo to other cities.²⁰ Put in other words, the discourse of water scarcity against industrial relocation from Bulawayo to other cities was then popularized in the quest of justifying industrial relocation that left the city as a ghost town. Indeed, these unfortunate events came to represent a new paradigm that saw the decline of Bulawayo’s economic prospects that had been spotted in the colonial period with little smoke emissions from the industries.

Following a series of industrial shut down and relocation from the city, the business community and the captains of industry called for an emergency conference that was held in 23- 24 May 2003.²¹ In addition, the conference saw it viable to initiate a research study in the quest of finding answers to the sudden relocation of the Bulawayo industries.²² Crucial to note is that between 2000- 2006, a total of 76 manufacturing industries relocated from Bulawayo to other cities particularly Harare.²³ Among those that relocated were 46 motor industry and 25 manufacturing adding up to 76 companies.²⁴ It ought to be noted that, the research study carried out by the Bulawayo Business community cited that the drive behind the sudden relocation of the industries was solely heightened by water shortages faced by the city of Bulawayo.²⁵ Similarly, the Association of Bulawayo Businesses (ABUZ) also cited that between 2009-2011 a total number of 85 industries had closed down and at worse relocated their location having more than 20 000 people lost their jobs granted such an unfortunate event.²⁶ An interesting feature among the sudden relocation of industries from Bulawayo was that water scarcity was often brought into light as justification towards relocation against other factors like the economic variables that were at play.

On the other hand, the BCC was however slammed by most captains of industries for the failure of providing a secure adequate water supply for production and manufacturing purposes. For example National Foods wrote a letter in 2004/5²⁷ to the BCC requesting the authority to ease water rationing as it was affecting their production. Added to this, Hunyani also followed a similar fashion advocating that the BCC was to slacken their water rationing regimes.²⁸ It was on such basis that the BCC admitted in a series of Business press conferences that the city's water supply deficits compromised the operations of the industry and commerce but invited the captains of industries to co-ordinate and execute water solutions as a united front.²⁹ However, the call was too late as various firms had relocated to perceived secure and adequate water supply system. Those industries that decided to remain in Bulawayo like Ingwebu Breweries, Dunlop, Delta Beverages, Cold Storage Commission and many others sought plans to augment water supply to the BCC in order to ease water rationing regimes.³⁰ For example, in 2007 a letter from the Delta General Manager, Dr Nyandoroh to the BCC Town Clerk confirmed that they had procured spares to resuscitate Nyamandlovu Aquifer in order to maximize water supply for the city and the industry at large that was facing water rationing regimes.³¹ There is little evidence to suggest that other industries followed suit in order to save the industries against a perceived water scarcity problem, although it needs to be emphasized that more lobby to implement more water supply like the MZWP was purported.

Bambazonke alibi: Portraying industrial relocation beyond water scarcity.

The discourse of industrial relocation from Bulawayo as driven by water scarcity was widely criticized by the *bambazonke* school of thought that saw the sudden relocation of industries as a conspiracy by the perceived Shona government against Ndebele city- Bulawayo. As argued by the school of thought, they perceived that the Shona government was on the crusade of stripping Bulawayo her industrial inheritance by expropriating the industries under the smokescreen of lacking water facilities.³² *Bambazonke* simply means one who seizes and takes all valuable and nice things to themselves like an octopus.³³ Musemwa argues that it was a term that was popularised in the 1960/70's to allude to the fact that the Europeans grabbed all valuable things to themselves at the expense of the Africans.³⁴ More importantly, this term was also used after independence when citizens from Bulawayo complained how the central state was unfairly distributing resources when checked with Harare which was always a priority.³⁵ Therefore at the turn of the millennium the term assumed another synonymous meaning resonating the former. The later meaning was even vibrante granted that the scars of the Gukurandi had not escaped the people of Bulawayo and more importantly the rise of opposition politics fuelled it by popularizing the *bambazonke* alibi to lambast the Mugabe regime through portraying him as a failure in guarding against de-industrialization of Bulawayo.³⁶ In this case the school of thought championed that the Shona people under Mugabe regime had devised a veneered move of shutting industries out of Bulawayo using water so that the supposedly Ndebele city would be in turn underdeveloped- a situation that reflects the Ndebele people as second citizens after the Shona tribe.

Various captains of industries, residents, critics of ZANU (PF) and even the Bulawayo based non-state actors emerged strongly against the popularized discourse that the industries had relocated out of Bulawayo because Bulawayo was a dry city. In fact their explicit explanation was that it was common knowledge that Bulawayo had no water a situation that was perceived by the school of thought as a result of the mismanagement and neglect by the government. More importantly, the school of thought noted that such industries were relocating to places where there were erratic water shortages dictated by mismanagement especially in Harare.³⁷ There was little sympathy with regard to all those that saw Bulawayo's water woes as push factors.

With more and more industries closing down and relocating from Bulawayo, different captains of industries and Bulawayo based civic actors slammed the move and began criticizing the government of failing to save industries in Bulawayo. Put in other words, Lucky Mlilo (then

CEO of Association for Business in Zimbabwe) bluntly cited that water was used as myopic excuse to weaken industrial base of Bulawayo and yet the industries were relocating because of skewed economic policies that the government was dithering upon.³⁸ Even the Ndebele autonomous groups like Vukani Mahlabezulu and Ibhethu LikaZulu noted that it was a naïve mode of thinking in arguing that the industrial relocation was solely caused by water scarcity. In fact they cited that the relocation was a deliberate ploy by the perceived Shona dominated government to quench their unending thirst of under developing the Bulawayo and Matabeleland region at large.³⁹

In 2011 the president of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries Matabeleland region, Ruth Labode shared similar sentiments stating that, most industrial firms were relocating from Bulawayo because they were owned by Harare Shona people who were on the crusade of suffocating industries out of Bulawayo. She added that such industries were used water scarcity as ploy to justify their weird relocation agenda.⁴⁰

The Ndebele-Shona tribal explanation never escaped the discourse of industrial relocation hence, water scarcity was deemed as one of those factors that forced companies to relocate. As already cited was a factor that considered as a last factor against a skewed economic and the need of finding new investment in the capital Harare. Therefore, the *bambazonke* alibi was grounded on such basis that the water scarcity issue was no longer sufficient in explaining the relocation of the industries from Bulawayo, hence the relocation was a direct ploy to disinvest Bulawayo and ultimately make Harare (a perceived Shona city) an ever ‘shining city’ at the expense of the least developed region Bulawayo.⁴¹

In the economic field, the pragmatist policy players and economic commentators shared the above cited sentiments although they differed in degree. Among them Butler Tambo, a policy research fellow of PLZ, argued that the relocation of industries from Bulawayo was driven by the need to settle in the capital city where investment opportunities were available.⁴² Added to this some cited that the relocation to Harare was a direct sign that the NRZ as a leading rail transport has decline since most industries relied on the parastatal for bulk transportation hence the decline of such facilities stripped Bulawayo of her potential to attract industries.⁴³ It was against that background in 2009 that the Bulawayo Business community launched a programme spearheaded by the Zimbabwe National Chamber Commerce (ZNCC), dubbed ‘Help Save Bulawayo’.⁴³ The programme championed that the sudden relocation of industries from Bulawayo has created hardships in the region and further migration was going to weaken Bulawayo more, hence the need of coming up with home ground strategies of

guarding the relocation of the industries. It ought to be noted that, the campaign was purely a business oriented programme although other pressure groups organisations bulldozed themselves into the programme in view that co-ordinated efforts were the way to go.⁴⁴ It remains unclear how the programme helped in resuscitating the shuttered industries in Bulawayo.

Conclusion

The chapter has sufficiently discussed the discourse of water scarcity and the de-industrialization of Bulawayo. As has been the case in the colonial period, the chapter concludes that the colonial period has similar problems of water but because of co-ordinated work and clear policies they erected industries against the background of water scarcity. Crucial to note is that, this chapter arrives at a conclusion that water paucity alone could not be liable as the only factor for the de-industrialization of Bulawayo but a plethora of factors like the economic variables that were at play since the year 2000 up to 2014 rightfully propelled such transformations. Subsequently, water paucity was also a victim of the failed economy in Zimbabwe that could be solved if the economy was normally functioning.

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General conclusions

From the foregoing, one can conclude that water paucity of Bulawayo since 1980 has been necessitated by the geographical location of the city, population density straining water supply, obsolete water supply infrastructure, the decommissioning of dams, financial constraint and lack of resources to explore underground reservoirs in the Nyamandlovu Aquifer and Epping Forest. Added to this, Bulawayo has been visited by Gukurandi in 1982/83- a civil war that has been attributed to have delayed and further heightened water scarcity and even delayed permanent solutions in eradicating the problem. Put in other words, the perceived conspiracy by the Shona dominated government has been blamed for neglecting and under developing the Ndebele city by depriving water sanity- a situation that has been cited in causing the sudden relocation of industries from Bulawayo since 2002. Prior 1980 the Bulawayo residents struggle with water issues because the situation was marred by colonial injustices that denied water and environmental freedom to the Africans and yet after 1980 water scarcity problems of Bulawayo thrived at the face of the majority government further making Bulawayo a ‘dry city’ without straight policies in negotiating the water woes.

In the midst of water scarcity the government, the City of Bulawayo and the non-state actors have necessitated programs and projects that were envisaged to avail water for Bulawayo industrial and domestic consumption since 1980. While on the hunt in search of solutions the three key players have clashed and lashed each other through demonising, undermining and criticizing each other over perceived controversial policies on each part. It needs to be applauded that the dialogue among the three has also brought about major strides in the efforts to bring about water in Bulawayo. The research concludes that in the event of a divided efforts the three had to forge relations in order to avail water as all were affected by water scarcity.

It has been the contention of this paper that the conflicts that arose in search for water solutions have brought about positive light in as far as water issues are concerned as key players were forced to act fearing that they could be challenged and criticized. On the face of it, water scarcity woes would be prevented if only the players had one agenda of procuring water rather than dragging the issue into the political terrain for selfish gains. At the heart of water solutions in Bulawayo, is the MZWP which has been long mooted since 1912 but has failed to take off due to a number of factors more importantly politically oriented one’s.

Different actors have dealt with the scheme differently for selfish gains at the expense of the project, the beneficiaries and even the industry. What is more worrying is that similar mistakes

of power contestations are even repeated over and over again without a reflection from the past. Having noted the roots of the scheme, nothing has materialized only lobby and everlasting meeting that even brew fights and suspicions among the interested parties. However, a million dollar question is when will the project see the light of the day? For how long will people continue to lobby and clamour for NMZWP yet it is envisaged to solve their problems? It is such questions that the research sought to unravel. Currently, the hopes of MZWP being implemented is murky and the future of the project to be implemented looks bleak. It is not easy therefore, to point out the prime deters of the project as all have made blunders in their own right as argued above. All evidence suggest that, other programs and projects have been implemented although they have not realised water abundance in Bulawayo.

The research also found out that water scarcity problem brought about untold sufferings among the residents who had to cope through a plethora of strategies without water. What is clear is that water shortages not only fashioned a new social order in their livelihood but it also disrupted their educational transformation and more importantly their small/medium businesses that relied on water. It needs to be noted that water scarcity in Bulawayo was more felt by those in the high density who occupied the lower echelons in the society- the poor who succumbed harshly to these shortages because they lacked adequate resources to negotiate water scarcity. More importantly, women, children and even the vulnerable succumbed to water woes more rampant than any social class in the society. Crucial to note, water scarcity intensified women's role and gender dimensions and further necessitated child labour as argued by various civic activist who saw water scarcity intensifying labour on children. Therefore, the absence of water in the City of Bulawayo has threatened security and sanitation which would see more rampant untold sufferings if the responsible authorities continue to dither water policies that would eventually see water abundance in Bulawayo. If no change comes in the way, residents will further be exposed to water epidemic and other consequences ascribed to the shortages of water, discussed in chapter 1.

Water scarcity has also been attributed to the sudden de-industrialization of Bulawayo. As has been the case in the colonial period, the research concludes that the colonial period has similar problems of water but because of co-ordinated work and clear policies they erected industries against the background of water scarcity. Crucial to note is that, this research arrives at a conclusion that water paucity alone could not be liable as the only factor for the de-industrialization of Bulawayo but a plethora of factors like the economic variables that were at play since the year 2000 up to 2014 rightfully propelled such transformations. Put in other

words, the study seems the discourse of water scarcity being the driver of industrial relocation from Bulawayo as no longer convincing in explaining the relocation of Bulawayo industries. Therefore, water paucity was also a victim of the failed economy in Zimbabwe that could be negotiated if the economy was normally functioning.

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Appendix: Research Agreement.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR RESEARCH STUDENTS

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made between the City of Bulawayo (hereinafter referred to as Council) of the one part and Mr/Mrs/Miss Mathamba H. Haidube (Full names) I.D Number 79-134951-K-73 hereinafter referred to as "researcher" of the other part.

Contact Address 15211 NKULUMANE 12 BULAWAYO
Student Number R121912H
Name of Educational Institution MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY
Telephone/Mobile number 0712 578227
Faculty ARTS
Department HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES


This agreement witness that:

1. The Researcher agrees not to divulge any information which he/she gains as a result of his/her research at Council department/s.
2. The Researcher agrees to indemnify the Council against any injury that may occur to her/him during the Course of the research with the Council.
3. The Researcher will submit a copy of his/her research findings, including the executive summary upon completion of the project to the Council.
4. The Researcher agrees that all costs relating to the research project will be met by him/her and Council has no obligation in this regard.

Signed on behalf of Council this 26 Day of August 2015

As witness

1. Kule
2. _____



Council official

Signed at Bulawayo City Council by the researcher this 26 day of August 2015

1. H
2. Luyiso


Researcher

Educational institution

- ❖ The Education institution **Agrees without failure** that their students submit a copy of the executive summary of their research findings to Council upon completion of their research study.

Signed on behalf of the institution

Mathamba
Academic Supervisor



SCHOOL STAMP

