



Faculty of Social Sciences

Department of Politics and Public Management

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) IN COMBATING  
AL SHABAAB TERRORISM IN SOMALIA; 2006-2016**

**BY**

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**DECLARATION**

I **Felistas Chitsiku** I declare that this research is of my own work. It has never been submitted at any other University in support of a Master of Science Degree in International Affairs Studies.

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Sign

Date

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Date

## **DEDICATION**

This research is dedicated to my husband Peter, my sons Simbarashe and Brighton for their unwavering support. I also dedicate the study to my parents for teaching me the value of education and hard work. Not forgetting the Almighty God for taking me through.

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## **ABSTRACT**

The study sought to evaluate the impact of the African Union (AU) in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia and proffer recommendations on how the AU's counter-terrorism mission could lead to peace and stability in Somalia. The study was prompted by the escalating incidents of terror attacks and activities which include suicide bombings, killings of civilians, military assaults and destruction of property. This research was accomplished through qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, namely e-mailed questionnaire, textual analysis and in-depth interviews. Findings from this research reveal that the AU has played a fundamental role in bringing the military and political achievements so far in Somalia after a long period of anarchy. Security has greatly improved. AU mission to Somalia, AMISOM, has ousted Al Shabaab from urban centers including the capital city Mogadishu and other small settlements in Somalia. An interim government and some administrative institutions are in place and efforts for restoring peace in the country are underway. Despite the achievements, findings also reveal that Al Shabaab continues to launch attacks on AMISOM bases, for example El Adde recently, on restaurants, beaches etc and has changed tactics to asymmetric attacks using guerrilla tactics. The findings have also indicated AMISOM's major challenge of inadequate funding to increase equipment and human resources to continue fighting and securing liberated areas as well as blocking Al Shabaab's supply routes and sources. In light of the setbacks and challenges encountered by the AU's mission to Somalia, several recommendations have been proffered for the African Union to ensure sustainable peace, security and economic development in Somalia and the whole East African region.

## **ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS**

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| <b>ACSRT</b>        | African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism          |
| <b>AFP</b>          | Agence France- Presse                                       |
| <b>AMISOM</b>       | African Mission to Somalia                                  |
| <b>APF</b>          | African Peace Facility                                      |
| <b>AQIM</b>         | Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb                             |
| <b>ARPCT</b>        | Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism |
| <b>AU</b>           | African Union   |
| <b>AUPSC</b>        | African Union Peace and Security Council                    |
| <b>AUPSO</b>        | African Union-led Peace Support Operation                   |
| <b>CAR</b>          | Central African Republic                                    |
| <b>DRC</b>          | Democratic Republic of Congo                                |
| <b>ECOMOG</b>       | Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  |
| <b>ENDF</b>         | Ethiopian National Defense Force                            |
| <b>EU</b>           | European Union  |
| <b>EUCAP Nestor</b> | European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity        |
| <b>EUNAVFOR</b>     | European Union Naval Force                                  |
| <b>EUTM</b>         | European Union Training Mission in Somalia                  |
| <b>FBI</b>          | Federal Bureau of Investigation                             |
| <b>FGS</b>          | Federal Government of Somalia                               |

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| <b>FPU</b>       | Formed Police Units   |
| <b>IDP</b>       | Internally Displaced Persons  |
| <b>IED</b>       | Improvised Explosive Devices  |
| <b>IGAD</b>      | Inter-governmental Authority on Development                             |
| <b>IGASOM</b>    | Inter-governmental Authority and Development Support Mission to Somalia |
| <b>IMO</b>       | International Maritime Organization                                     |
| <b>IPO</b>       | Individual Police Officer   |
| <b>ISIS/ISIL</b> | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant                                  |
| <b>KDF</b>       | Kenyan Defence Force  |
| <b>LRA</b>       | Lord's Resistance Army  |
| <b>MCRS</b>      | Mogadishu Center For Research Studies                                   |
| <b>MNJTF</b>     | Multinational Joint Task Force  |
| <b>NCOs</b>      | Non-Commissioned Officers   |
| <b>NGOs</b>      | Non-Governmental Organisations  |
| <b>NISA</b>      | National Intelligence and Security Agency                               |
| <b>NOAS</b>      | Norwegian Organisation for Asylum                                       |
| <b>OAU</b>       | Organisation of African Unity   |
| <b>P5</b>        | United States of America, Britain, France, Russia and China             |
| <b>PSC</b>       | Peace and Security Council  |
| <b>SADC</b>      | Southern African Development Community                                  |
| <b>SHADE</b>     | Shared Awareness and Deconfliction                                      |

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| <b>SLT</b>   | Senior Leadership Team  |
| <b>SNA</b>   | Somali National Army  |
| <b>SNSF</b>  | Somali National Security Forces   |
| <b>SPF</b>   | Somali Police Force   |
| <b>SRCC</b>  | Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission |
| <b>TCCs</b>  | Troop Contributing Countries  |
| <b>TNG</b>   | Transitional National Government  |
| <b>UK</b>    | United Kingdom  |
| <b>UN</b>    | United Nations  |
| <b>UNHCR</b> | United Nations High Commission for Refugees                               |
| <b>UNSC</b>  | United Nations Security Council   |
| <b>UNSOA</b> | United Nations Support Office for AMISOM                                  |
| <b>UNSOM</b> | United Nations Operations in Somalia                                      |
| <b>US</b>    | United States   |
| <b>WFP</b>   | World Food Program  |



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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **1.0 Introduction to the Study**

The African continent is bedeviled by political, social-economic and security threats to peace that have one way or the other affected the continent's development momentum. Terrorism phenomenon has become a great security threat to peace, security and economic development in the international arena particularly the Middle East and the African continent and has left hundreds of people dead, incapacitated, displaced and homeless. Parts of Africa mainly East Africa and the Maghreb region have been plagued by periods of terrorism with devastating effects on human life, stability and development since the 1990s. These areas have become battlefields in the fight against terrorism perpetrated by jihadists and other extremists. The terrorist groups posing a security threat in Africa include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) operating in Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania and Tunisia, Al Shabaab operating in Somalia and making incursions into Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti, Boko Haram in Nigeria also threatening Cameroon, Chad and Niger, Islamic State (also known as ISIS and ISIL) which split from AL Qaeda in Iraq in 2014 and the Lord's Resistance Army(LRM) operating in Central African Republic (CAR) and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

This research focuses on Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia and evaluating African Union (AU) efforts in combating this security threat since 2007 when the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed. Challenges encountered by AU in its endeavor to eradicate this terrorist group are examined and suggestions proffered as to how best the AU can overcome this quagmire of terrorism insecurity that has plagued Somalia for a decade. The research progresses in five chapters. The first chapter focuses on the proposal of the study which provides the background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives and research questions, significance of the study, hypothesis, delimitations, limitations and a conclusion. The second chapter presents literature review; third chapter focuses on methodology, fourth chapter on data presentation and analysis and chapter five presents the summary, conclusion and recommendations made on the study.

## **1.1 Background of the Study**

### **1.1.1 The African Union and its Anti-Terrorism Initiatives**

Since its inception, the African Union has played a crucial role in crafting legal instruments to combat terrorism. The East African Center for Law and Justice (2012) states that the AU is a continental body of the African Union (AU) which consists of 54 countries in Africa. Morocco is said to be the only country that is not a member of the AU, due to the status of the Western Sahara. According to Moki (2010, p.265), though the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted in 2000, the organization was officially launched in Durban, South Africa, on July 19, 2002 with the aim of replacing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Moki clarifies that the OAU was replaced due to the fact that the African leaders needed an organization that could react more robustly to the arising needs of the continent. The OAU, founded in 1963 on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, drew criticism throughout the 1990s for its lack of intervention as crises unfolded in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia among others (Murithi, 2008). According to The African Union Handbook (2014), throughout the 1990s, leaders discussed the necessity to modify the structures of the OAU to reflect the challenges of a changing world. It is further explained that frustration at its ineffectiveness led African leaders, spearheaded by Libyan leader, Muammar el- Qaddafi, to launch the African Union, a body with a structure modeled on that of the European Union. The African Union objectives at its inception include the following:

- To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa.
- To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states.
- To accelerate the political and social-economic integration of the continent.
- To promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples.
- To encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- To promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.

- To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.
- To promote and protect human and people's rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and other relevant human rights instruments
- To establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations
- To promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies
- To promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples (AU Compendium, 2012, pp.10-11) and (East African Center for Law and Justice, 2012).

The African Union Organisation has an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is the umbrella term for the important AU mechanisms for promoting peace, stability and security on the African continent (African Union Handbook, 2014, p.28).

The African Union Handbook maintains that, the APSA has several key elements including the:

- Peace and Security Council, which is the standing decision-making organ of the AU on matters of peace and security.
- Continental Early Warning System, which monitors and reports on emerging crises
- Panel of the wise, which is a consultative body established to provide advice
- African Standby Force, which is intended to provide rapid deployment of Peacekeeping Forces
- Peace Fund, which is intended to fund peacekeeping and peace support operations

Immediately after its formation, the AU faced many significant challenges. Moki (2010, p.266) asserts that the African Union inherited the many problems that plagued the defunct Organisation of the African Unity. It had to deal with the prevalence of poverty, deplorable educational and healthcare conditions, massive trade deficits and external debts, stagnant and in some cases negative economic growth, armed conflicts between African states, civil wars, and other security



related issues like piracy and terrorism. According to Moki (2010, pp.261-267), immediately, however, the fight against terrorism became a major preoccupation of the African Union. Moki affirms that by its very definition and nature, terrorism is a strategy and phenomenon that must be confronted or at the very least checked. It is postulated that the frenzy that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States resulted in the passage of United Nations Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. Moki further notes that the resolution described in detail the measures that each member state must adopt and implement to deal with terrorism.

In the context of counterterrorism which is the main thrust of this research, the AU has taken a comprehensive approach based on a framework of treaties aimed to counter the threat of terrorism. According to the African Union Peace and security (2015), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution in which it pledged to combat the phenomena of extremism and terrorism at its 28<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session meeting that was held in Dakar, Senegal in 1992. Allison (2015, p.3) asserts that this was the first continental position on terrorism in response to a wave of violence from Islamist groups in Algeria. Ford (2011, pp.24-30) avows that the most significant part of the global legal frameworks to counter terrorism is of course resolution 1373 of 2001 adopted in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the U.S. Ford further affirms that this was a particularly significant instrument being open-ended (not time limited) and universal in application, while imposing significant legal obligations on states.

The African Union Peace and security (2015) and Allison (2015) assert that the OAU Resolution 213 on the Strengthening of Cooperation as well as Coordination among African states undertook not to allow any movement using religion, ethnic or other social and cultural differences to indulge in hostile activities against member states and to strengthen cooperation and coordination among African countries in order to circumvent the phenomenon of terrorism and extremism.

The African Union Peace and Security (2015) and Allison (2015) further state that the OAU adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-Africa Relations at its 30<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session which was held in June 1994 in Tunis, Tunisia. In this meeting, the OAU rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, be it based on sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion. The African Union Peace and Security again maintains that the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit that was held in July 1999 in Algiers, Algeria adopted the OAU Convention on the

Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Allison explains that this was adopted following the twin bombings of United States (US) embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and this forced terrorism onto the OAU agenda. Allison again affirms that over 250 people were killed and thousands injured in the al-Qaeda attacks which made headlines across the world. It is also stated that the Convention requires that state parties criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws as defined in the Convention and defines areas of cooperation among states, establishes state jurisdiction over terrorist acts, and provides a legal framework for extradition as well as extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance. The Convention entered into force in December 2002 and had been ratified by 40 member States by June 2014 (African Union Peace and Security, 2015).

The African Union Peace and Security further states that the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was adopted in Algiers in September 2002. The Plan of Action adopts practical Counter Terrorism (CT) measures that address Africa's security challenges, which include measures in areas such as border control and police, legislative and judicial, exchange of information and financing of terrorism. The African Union Peace and Security, also affirms that the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in Algiers in 2004 as part of the implementation of the 2002 Plan of Action. According to the African Union Peace and Security (2013), the purpose of the ACSRT is to serve as a structure for studies, centralizing information as well as carrying out analyses on terrorism and terrorist groups and to nurture Counter-Terrorism capacity building programs. The African Union Peace and Security has also explained that the ACSRT is in charge for organizing functions aimed at improving counter terrorism capabilities and collaboration among the AU member states. According to Kimunguyi (2013 pp.13-14) and the African Union Peace and Security (2013) the ACSRT aims to:

- Educate members about the threat of terrorism in Africa
- Provide capacity- building assistance to enhance national and regional capabilities
- Create a mechanism for all member states to access expert guidance
- Build a database to facilitate the sharing of intelligence and other terrorism-related information

- Harmonize and standardize domestic legal frameworks with the AU and international counter terrorism frameworks
- Disseminate counter terrorism research across the continent.

The ACSRT also provides a forum for interaction and cooperation among Member States and Regional Mechanisms. The Centre plays an important role in guiding the AU's CT efforts and works in collaboration with a number of regional and international partners (African Union Peace and Security, 2015).

According to the African Union Peace and Security, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ordinary Session of the assembly of the Union that was held in July 2004 in Addis Ababa, adopted an additional Protocol to the 1999 Convention on Combating and Prevention of Terrorism. It is stated that the 28 heads of states who met in Dakar on the 17<sup>th</sup> of October 2001 made the suggestion and adopted the Dakar Declaration against Terrorism. According to Okereke (2011, p.23), this document contains among other things, the commitments by state parties to fully implement the provisions of the OAU Convention on Terrorism. He further expounds that Article 3(1) c expressly commits parties to identify, detect, confiscate and freeze or seize funds and any other assets used or allocated for the purpose of committing a terrorist act, and to establish a mechanism to use such funds to compensate victims of terrorist acts or their families.

. The African Union Peace and Security (2015) postulates that the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union appointed the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in October 2010. The African Union Peace and Security furthermore states that the Special Representative serves concurrently as the Director of the ACSRT. The African Union Peace and Security has praised this Special Representative, stating that since his appointment vital tasks have been undertaken to drum up support for the continent to fight the menace of terrorism and to evaluate the situation in several member countries.

Over the years the African Union has built the counter terrorism framework and structures under its Peace and Security Council (PSC). The AU has in many instances condemned acts of terrorism which are barbaric and has taken measures to deal with the threat by deploying missions like the AMISOM fighting Al Shabaab and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) tackling Boko Haram in Nigeria. It has helped bring relative stability to Somalia with

support from international partners both financially and technically. Though the AU has made some achievements in Somalia so far, the organisation still has challenges preventing it from fully realizing its mandate. The successes and the constraints encountered have been explored in detail in the following chapters and suggestions made for peace and security in Somalia.

### **1.1.2 Conceptualizing Terrorism**

There is no universal agreement regarding the definition of terrorism. It is controversial. Various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions. Demeke and Gebru (2014, p.219) argue that the phenomenon of terrorism did not commence with the end of the Soviet Union or with the September 9/11 attacks. These researchers assert that the term terrorism started to be used when it had entered the English Language during the time of the French Revolution in 1789. It is further argued that during the period (1793-1794) terrorism used to refer to a time when a radical group, the Jacobins who controlled the government killed many people at the guillotine whom were alleged to be threats of the revolution. Demeke and Gebru propound that different actors have since then used the term to refer to different forms of political violence. These two researchers also assert that the usage of the modern term which developed in the twentieth century, regards terrorism as a tool of ethnic and religious extremists to serve political ends, such as liberation from a foreign occupying group, or simply to exact virtuous revenge against a group considered as an enemy or threat. Someone considered a terrorist by one group may be labeled a freedom fighter for the other. The guerrilla fighters in Zimbabwe were labeled as (terrorists) by the Western governments or media but as freedom fighters by the Zimbabweans.

Different authorities have defined terrorism in various ways. The United Nations Secretary Report of November 2004 defined terrorism as any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of frightening a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act (UN Report, 2004). Others define it as a form of political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is intended to induce terror and indiscriminate psychological fear through the violent destruction of non-combatant targets and victimization (Demeke and Gebru 2014, p.219). The deliberate killings of innocent people are widely considered as the central characteristic that defines terrorism from other forms of political ferocity and war.

Allyson (2012) also asserts that most explanations typically involve key criteria such as violence, a psychological impact and fear, political goals, deliberate targeting of noncombatants, and unlawfulness or illegitimacy. He provides a definition of terrorism given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce governments or societies. Allyson notes that terrorism is often motivated by religious, political or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. According to Allyson again, the U.S. Code, chapter 38, section 2656f (d) (2) defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Laqueur (1999, p.5) asserts that the U.S Department of Defense in 1990, described terrorism as “the unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives’.

Odhiambo et al (2013, p.125) define terrorism as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.

Stepanova (2008, p.13) maintains that while terrorism is a specific tactic that necessitates victims, and while civilians remain the most immediate targets of terrorism, those victims are not the intended end recipients of terrorists’ message. Stepanova defines terrorism as a performance that involves the use or threat to use violence against civilians, but which is staged specifically for someone else to watch. He further maintains that most commonly, the intended audience is a state (or a group or community of state) and the terrorist act is meant to blackmail the state into doing or abstaining from doing something. Hoffman (2006, p.174) concurs with Stepanova that terrorists do not commit actions randomly or senselessly. Hoffman postulates that each wants maximum publicity to be generated by its actions and, moreover, aims at intimidation and subjection to attain its objectives. He further argues that terrorists seek to frighten and, by frightening to dominate and control. Hoffman also affirms that terrorists want to impress and play to and for an audience, and solicit audience participation. Terrorism, therefore, may be seen

as a violent act that is conceived specifically to attract and then, through the publicity it generates, to communicate a message.

Terrorism is a much more debated notion. However, the general agreement though is that terrorism has the following traits: i) violent acts or threat of violence against combatant and non-combatant personnel including civilians ii) perpetrated for religious, political or ideological goals iii) intended to affect or influence the conduct of government.

### **1.1.3 Tracing the historical dynamics of Somalis' Radicalization to Al Shabaab**

The current terrorist threat in Somalia can best be comprehended through tracing the historical dynamics of Somalis' motives behind joining Al Shabaab as well as the objectives of the terrorist group. The understanding of the factors that promoted terrorism forms the basis of countering Al Shabaab in Somalia. Masters (2014) and many other researchers proclaim that Al Shabaab is a Somali-based Islamic terrorist group made up mainly of Somalis. Al Shabaab, or "The Youth," is an al-Qaida-linked militant group and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation fighting for the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia with sharia law implemented. Masters further explains that the group, also known as Harakat-al-Shabaab-Mujahedeen, and its Islamist affiliates once held sway over Mogadishu and major portions of the Somali countryside, but a sustained African Union military campaign in recent years has weakened the group considerably. Though degraded, security analysts warn that the group remains the principal threat in the politically, volatile, war-torn state.

The al-Qaeda, to whom Al Shabaab is linked to, is more than just an organization, but an ideology and a popular global brand that employs terrorism as a tactic to further its goals (Venhaus, 2010). It is further highlighted that al-Qaeda has affiliated and associated movements which include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Salafist group for Call and Combat (also known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and a host of smaller groups and movements that have aligned themselves with al-Qaeda's principles. It is generally believed that the group was founded by Osama bin Laden who masterminded the 9/11 U.S. attack.

In July 2006 Osama Bin Laden (the leader of al-Qaeda) is said to have issued a message urging Somalis to build an Islamic state and back the Islamic Courts Union in their fight against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. The current leader of the Islamic group Al

Shabaab is Ahmad Umar who succeeded former leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was killed in a US air strike on 1 September 2015 (United Nations Security Council Report, 2015, p.3)

Beary (2015) posits that in 1991 Somalia's socialist government led by 1969 coup leader Siad Barre, collapsed and the country descended into civil war, anarchy and famine. In 1993, the US deployed troops to lead a United Nations (UN) force sent to provide humanitarian and peacekeeping aid. It is further stated that in a battle with local militias, about 18 US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis were killed. Agbiboa (2014) also propounds that the United States withdrew its troops and the UN also discontinued its mission having failed to restore order.

For the next decade, Somalia was engulfed in clan warfare, with no functioning central government. Shinn (2015) posits that the Islamic Courts Union who wanted to impose Sharia law succeeded warlords in 2006 and Al Shabaab which means "The Youth" was formed as a splinter group and continued to fight against the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) troops who took over from the Ethiopians. Beary (2015) claims that Al Shabaab came to prominence aiming to establish a caliphate with Islamic ministers, regional administrators and courts. Pflanz (2015) claims that its group's ranks were swelled with eager young recruits keen to carry the group's jihadist mission around East Africa and beyond.

Botha and Abdile (2014, p.4-6) propound factors that pushed people mainly youths in Somalia to join terrorism. Among these factors or enabling circumstances include lack of education. Botha and Abdile maintain that the formal education system came to a halt when the Somali government led by Siad Barre collapsed in 1991, and this left the whole generation without education. The lack of schooling adversely affects employment opportunities. These factors that made people join terrorism have been expounded as including political exclusion, poor governance, adverse economic circumstances, sociological circumstances for example religious and ethnic discrimination, lack of civil liberties and human rights abuses. Wise (2011, p.2-5) asserts that inadequate governance allowed Al Shabaab to operate unfettered in large safe havens throughout the south-central region of the country. Al Shabaab exploited this operating space by building a secure network of camps to train its fighters and establishing a system of taxation and extortion to raise funds. Furthermore Wise postulates that by providing Somalis in these areas with basic governmental services, Al Shabaab gained a great deal of goodwill and popular support, which bolstered its recruiting. Al Shabaab is also said to have earned respect and

recruits among Somalis for helping to fight the Ethiopians who invaded Somalia in 2006 after the civil war threatened to spill over into Ethiopia (Beary, 2014). Under this backdrop Botha and Abdile 2014) affirm that strategies that are effective for countering Al Shabaab should be based on an understanding of reasons why people join terrorism.

Al Shabaab has caused terror throughout the Horn of Africa and has been involved in piracy. The group has bombed government and non-government premises including hotels, restaurants, beaches and AMISOM bases in and around Somalia. Harnisch (2010) posits that three al Shabaab suicide bombers killed 76 and injured at least another 85 people as they watched the world cup soccer match in Kampala, Uganda in 2010. In recent years the group has continued to lash out at its neighbours for supporting AMISOM. Al Shabaab also killed many people at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013 as well as a total of 147 people at the Garissa University in Kenya in early 2015 (Leus and Yan, 2015). According to many reports, the killers particularly targeted Christians and non-Muslims. The group has also bombed hotels and restaurants on the Kenyan coast drawing Kenya into the conflict. To date, the terrorist group is still a menace to the East African region as a whole though having roots in Somalia.

#### **1.1.4 AU's Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)**

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a peace support mission operated by the African Union with authorization from the United Nations. Segui (2013, p.2) asserts that the AMISOM was launched by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 19 January 2007 as a result of a failure to implement the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). It is further stated that IGASOM was intended to replace the Ethiopian forces that were defending Mogadishu's government from the rebel Islamic movement, Al Shabaab. Segui further affirms that transferring the mandate from IGAD resulted in the AU needing greater African involvement in the operation propelled by the reluctance of Western states to dispatch their troops to Somalia.

Segui maintains that on 20 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council authorized AMISOM thereby endorsing the previous AU decision. Freear and Coning (2013) proclaim that AMISOM was initially deployed with the expectation that when conditions permitted, the UN Security Council would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the



AU effort. These conditions have not yet materialized and the Security Council has continued to rely on AMISOM as the lead International peace operation for Somalia. However, the UN has since played a crucial role in supporting AMISOM. Nduwimana (2013) has also explained on the origin of AMISOM stating that AMISOM took over from IGASOM that had been created as a peacekeeping mission in 2005. He further states that the IGASOM was incapable to deploy fruitfully due to insufficient funding and constraints encountered with the neutrality of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The possible contributing countries were most likely to be Somali's immediate neighbours. According to Nduwimana (2013) the deployment also failed because of the notion that IGASOM was seen as a mission that was US backed to restrain the growth of Islamic movement. These hindrances led the AU to deploy AMISOM on January 19, 2007 with a mandate to counter and avert the threat posed by al- Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to create a conducive environment for operational and legitimate governance across Somalia. While AMISOM may not be the first AU Mission, its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is the first one to intervene in terrorist backed armed conflicts.

The mandate of the AMISOM outlined in the 69<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the African Union of 19 January 2007 has expanded and the current one is as follows:

- Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somali National Defense and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.
- Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) over its national territory.
- Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services.
- Provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somali state institutions, particularly the National Defense, Public Safety and public Service Institutions.

- Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution.
- Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees.
- Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia.
- Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence (AMISOM , 2014)

The mission has three components: civilian, military and police. The mission currently has slightly over 22,000 troops drawn in from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia (AMISOM, 2016)

## **1.2 Hypothesis**

Despite the existence of a robust counter terrorism framework, the African Union continues to encounter mounting challenges in combating terrorism in Africa with regards to Al Shabaab in Somalia.

## **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

The problem of terrorism has been there in Somalia since 2006 and has increased over the years with incursions into neighbouring countries as well as increased levels of violence in terms of casualties. Despite efforts by the African Union through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and assistance from international partners resulting in the degradation of Al Shabaab, the levels of insecurity are still high within Somalia and its neighbours. The role of the AU in combating Al Shabaab has to be revisited in terms of its effectiveness and likelihood of ending Al Shabaab reign of terror. Failure by the AU to contain the terrorism threat is a pointer to the fact that there are challenges which the AU is facing. These challenges have to be identified and suggestions proffered as to how best the AU can overcome them.

## **1.4 Research Objectives**

The objectives of the research study are:

1. To evaluate the impact of AU operations in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia
2. To identify challenges that impede AU from achieving its mandate
3. To proffer recommendations on how the AU's counter- terrorism mission could lead to peace and stability in Somalia.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

1. What is the role of the AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia?
2. Why is the AU failing to bring a lasting solution to this threat of terrorism in Somalia?
3. How best can AU deal effectively with this insecurity threat of terrorism to ensure peace, security and sustainable development in Somalia?

## **1.6 Significance/ Justification of the study**

This research aims to uncover how the African Union (AU) is trying to combat Al Shabaab in Somalia and in turn try to find the challenges they are encountering on their mission to combat terrorism. With this research, gaps can be closed on how to deal with these challenges and by dealing with these challenges the AU can eliminate terrorism. A lasting solution will be suggested so that affected areas in Somalia can be restored again and civilians can live in peace and harmony without fear. The same strategies can also be extended to terrorist affected areas in Africa. If this Al Shabaab terrorism is not stopped, it will become as big as ISIS and more people will die and continue to migrate to safer areas and create more problems of refugees. This research is also going to contribute some useful ideas to the African Union's Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the AMISOM, the Federal Government of Somalia and all stakeholders involved in peace and security of Somalia and Africa.

## **1.7 Delimitations of the study**

This research has chosen the period from 2006 to 2016 because Al Shabaab was formed in 2006 and its terrorist activities grew over the years until from 2011 when it was being driven out of Mogadishu. Before then, there were terrorist activities mainly associated with Al Qaeda and

some Islamic fundamentalist groups in North Africa. The group Al Shabaab's activities are unique for they actually want to rule unlike other terrorist groups which mainly target western interests and also carry out revenge attacks on their governments. The group poses a bigger challenge to the AU due to problems created in Somalia, in the region and in the continent as a whole. The group has made incursions into neighboring countries drawing those affected countries into the conflict. In addition, the AU has actively been participating in trying to combat terrorism in Somalia since 2007. The AU has not been actively involved in combating terrorism in North Africa in the same manner. In West Africa it has not done much apart from endorsing the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) through the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and requesting funds from the United Nations (UN) as compared to what it has done so far in Somalia.

### **1.8 Limitations**

Limitations to this research were that the researcher encountered challenges to get more people for interviewing and also that some questionnaires sent via the e-mail were not returned. The other limitation of the research was on financial constraints to travel to look for people to interview one on one at the AU and AMISOM offices. In short, lack of participants and cost were major hitches in completion of the research. However, despite the challenges, the researcher managed to obtain valuable information from the AMISOM itself via e-mailed questionnaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe National Defence Force as well as from other researchers involved in peace and security of Somalia who responded positively to a questionnaire sent via e-mail. The researcher also managed to overcome the constraints by the use of varied secondary sources and in-depth interviews.

### **1.9 Summary**

The chapter addressed issues which constitute the general introduction to the study, background of the study, statement of the problem, justification of the study, hypothesis, research objectives and research questions as the key concepts of Chapter One. Background of the study explores the counter terrorism frameworks adopted by the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) now the African Union (AU) since 1992 and AU deployment of AMISOM in Somalia with a mandate which includes countering the threat of Al Shabaab terrorism so as to stabilise the country and the region. The objectives of the study have also been itemized as well as the research questions.

Delimitations and limitations of the research are also discussed in this chapter. The next chapter focuses on literature review.

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## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.0 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Although there is a plethora of counter- terrorism frameworks adopted, the AU is facing challenges in implementing the counter measures to terrorism. This is because Al Shabaab has continued to carry out suicide bombings, killing many people and destroying property. This chapter seeks to examine available literature on the role of the African Union (AU) in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. A review of the African Union Counter terrorism measures is carried out as well as the possible root causes for joining Al Shabaab. This research carries out a review on the successes and challenges encountered by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Possible solutions proffered by other researchers to combat Al Shabaab are also reviewed. The chapter starts with a theoretical framework, discussing theories embedded in this research. It is hoped that this dissertation will contribute to filling gaps in the academic literature.

#### **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

There are many theories that can be used in this study to describe what is happening in Somalia and explain why it is happening but the researcher used collective security and classical realism. Theories shape and guide research effort. The theory of classical realism was used to explain the motivations of some East African countries and the international community in combating Al Shabaab.

*Collective security* proponents include Claude, Woodrow Wilson, Martin Wight and Immanuel Kant. Ubelejit (2014, p.25) claims that collective security is a conception which proposes that an attack, aggression or violent behavior of a nation state against another nation state would be jointly resisted. The aggressor would be compelled to face the combined force of all other nations. In this research, the violent attacks of Al Shabaab terrorist group on civilians, property and western interests have been jointly resisted by the AU and the international community. Ubelejit (2014, p.31) further argues that there is no better hope than to see states cooperating and working together to ease the common challenges to peace and security. Ubelejit (2014, p.26) affirms that collective security is an international translation of the slogan ‘one for all and all for one’. It is further argued that this is because the nomenclature of society is such that threat to

peace anywhere can degenerate to turmoil everywhere as portrayed in the concept of the indivisibility of peace. The threat of Al Shabaab which has roots in Somalia has made incursions into neighbouring countries. Ubelejit further notes that the ideal way to deal with issues of peace and security is indeed to act as a collective as what AMISOM is doing in Somalia.

Helal (2015, p.402) asserts that collective security aspires to achieve peace by establishing the principle that 'everyone is his brother's keeper'. Collective security can therefore be understood as a security arrangement, political, regional, or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of everyone, and therefore commits to a combined response to threats, and breaches of peace. Al Shabaab has breached peace in Somalia, in the East African region, the continent and the international peace, and this has resulted in a collective security of AMISOM being arranged to counter the terrorism threat. Collective security is more ambitious than systems of alliance security or collective defense in that it seeks to encompass the totality of states within a region or indeed globally and to address a wide range of possible threats. States in East Africa including Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda backed by the international world formed a collective security to counterattack Al Shabaab threat that has threatened peace and security in Somalia and the region as a whole. Raju (2012, p.32) has defined collective security as machinery for combined action to avert or counter any attack on an established global order. Its major goal is to maintain peace and security. He propounds further that collective security clearly implies collective measures for dealing with threats to peace.

Raju (2012, p.33) defines collective security in the following way:

In a working system of collective security, the problem of security is no longer the concern of the individual state, to be taken care of by armaments and other elements of national power. Security becomes the concern of all nations, which will take care of the security of each of them as though their own security were at stake. If A threatens B's security, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K, will take measures on behalf of B and against A as though A threatened them as well as B, and vice versa. One for all and all for one is the watchword of collective security.

In principle, collective security is designed on a common understanding that peace and security is indivisible in which the load of order-keeping should be shared among all members of the collective security institution. Under this backdrop, the AU was created to achieve regional

security through the Peace and Security Council (PSC) through collective measures. The PSC is the African Union's (AU's) standing-making body responsible for the maintenance of continental peace and security. At the AU inauguration meeting in Durban, the African leaders signed the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU which came into force on 26 December 2003 (African Union Peace and Security, 2014). The Protocol defines the PSC as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. According to the African Union Peace and Security, the PSC was set up to be a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and effective response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa

According to the Mogadishu Center For Research Studies (MCRS) (2016), AMISOM is deployed under chapter 7 of the UN Security Council decisions. The MCRS states that it was under Article 51 of the same chapter which recognizes "the inherent right of individualism or collective self-defense" that Kenya invaded Somalia in October 2011. According to the MCRS and the United Nations Security Council (2007, p. 2), AMISOM is authorized to employ "all necessary measures" in the fight against Al Shabaab. It is further stated that rule No. 1.27 of its rules of engagement also authorizes "use of force to and including deadly force in support of offensive actions." This research therefore seeks to assess the AU efforts as a regional collective security in combating the security threat of terrorism with regards to Al Shabaab.

*Realist theory* is said to have emerged partly as a reaction to the failure to preserve the peace after World War1 (1914-1918). Classical realism embedded in this research emphasizes the concept of national interest. Classical realists represented by such twentieth-century theorists include Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau and John H. Herz. The keystone of Morgenthau realist theory is the concept of power or 'of interest defined in terms of power', which informs his second principle: the assumption that political leaders "think and act in terms of interest defined as power (Morgenthau, 1978). The intervention of the international community in assisting the AU is said to be based on vested interests to stabilize Somalia due to two major threats to the international community's interests in Somalia which are:

- *International terrorism*-Many scholars claim that Al Shabaab is a major threat to the West and Somalia's instability has created a haven and training grounds for international terrorists. The fear is that they will train and go back and operate in their countries of

origin in Europe and the U.S. For that reason the stabilization of Somalia is a high priority and is the top in US counter terrorism strategies. For that reason huge budgets are allocated to this sphere by the US and the European Union (EU) as well as other parties making the AU's job much easier in this sphere.

- *Piracy*-The waters off the coast of Somalia are a busy international shipping lane. Ships from all over the world pass off the coast of Somalia daily and they have been targeted by pirates coming from the lawless areas of Somalia. Scholars have affirmed that this has resulted in heavy ransom payments as well as loss of business. It is also argued that part of these spoils funds the Al Shabaab operations. The international community knows that as long as there is instability in Somalia, the threat will remain and for that reason have co-operated very well with AU to fund AMISOM (Baugh, 2012).

It is argued that although the US is by far the largest player in Somalia's counter-terrorism, other western countries-including the UK, France and Italy- maintain active interest. Some researchers like Miyandazi (2012) have also claimed that some countries in the East African region which include Kenya and Ethiopia have also intervened due to self-national interest of security and economy. According to the Congress Research Service Report of 17 January 2002, Ethiopia's principal interest appears to be to ensure that a united Somalia does not pose a threat to Ethiopia and that the Somali-inhabited-region of Ethiopia remains stable. Also geographically whatever happens in Somalia invariably affects Ethiopia and other neighboring countries.

### **2.3 Overview of the African Union (AU) Counter-Terrorism Initiatives**

According to the African Union Peace and security (2015), efforts in preventing and fighting terrorism on the African continent have been taking place a long time. Allison (2015, p.3) postulates that the first continental position on terrorism came in 1992 in response to a wave of violence from Islamist groups in Algeria. The African Union Peace and Security and Allison further affirm that the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) Resolution 213 on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination amongst African states, undertook not to allow any movement using religion, ethnic or other social and cultural differences to indulge in hostile activities against member states and to strengthen cooperation and coordination among African countries in order to circumvent the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism. Allison again

asserts that although couched in general language, the OAU clearly saw religious extremism and state support for such activities as fundamental causes of terrorism. At the OAU 28<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session meeting held in Dakar, Senegal, Allison and The African Union Peace and Security, state that all African Union countries vowed to fight the phenomenon of terrorism and extremism.

The African Union Peace and Security (2015) states that following the 30<sup>th</sup> Ordinary session that was held in June 1994 in Tunis, Tunisia, the Organisation of the African Union adopted the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations or the Declaration. In this session the OAU renounced all forms of terrorism and extremism, whether on the grounds of tribalism, sectarianism, religion or ethnicity. It is further stated that the declaration also condemned, as criminal, all terrorist acts, methods and practices and expressed its resolve to enhance cooperation to combat such acts. Allison (2015, p.4) postulates that the twin bombings of United States (US) embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 again forced terrorism onto the continental agenda. It is reported that over 250 people were killed and thousands injured in the al-Qaeda attacks which made headlines across the world. It is also stated that the OAU realized it needed to toughen up and formalize its counter-terrorism strategy. The African Union Peace and Security (2015) further assert that the efforts resulted in the adoption of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism held in July 1999 in Algiers, Algeria. The treaty also entails that state parties outlaw terrorist activities under their national regulations as stated in the convention. It defines areas of cooperation among states, establishes state jurisdiction over terrorist acts, and provides a legal framework for extradition as well as extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance. The resolution is said to have entered into force in December 2002.

After the 9/11 attacks in the US, the Algiers Convention was reinforced by the Dakar Declaration against Terrorism, which unequivocally condemned terrorism and acknowledged it as an unacceptable infringement of human rights (Allison, 2015, p.4)

The AU High-level Inter-Governmental Meeting that was held in Algiers in September 2002 on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa adopted the AU Plan of action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The Plan of Action adopts practical Counter terrorism (CT) procedures that substantially address Africa's security challenges, which include measures

in areas such as police and border control, financing of terrorism, exchange of information, legislature and judicial measures (African Union Peace and Security, 2015).

As part of the implementation of the 2002 Plan of action, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in Algiers in 2004 to function as a structure for studies and analysis on terrorism and terrorist groups, to develop Counter- Terrorism capacity building programmes and to centralise information (African Union Peace and security, 2015). According to the African Union Peace and Security and Allison (2015, p.4) the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), also came into being to assist states to develop counter-terrorism strategies in line with AU and international norms. Kimunguyi (2013, p.13) elaborates that the ACSRT has the responsibility to organise functions with the aim of improving counter-terrorism capacities and collaboration among AU member states. According to Kimunguyi the ACSRT aims to:

- a) Educate members about the threat of terrorism in Africa
- b) Provide capacity-building assistance to enhance national and regional capabilities
- c) Create a mechanism for all member states to access expert guidance
- d) Build a database to facilitate the sharing of intelligence and other terrorism-related information
- e) Harmonise and standardize domestic legal framework with the AU and international counterterrorism framework
- f) Disseminate counterterrorism research across the continent.

The AU further adopted a Protocol to the OAU Convention on Terrorism in 2004. This document contains among other things, the commitments by state parties to fully implement the provisions of the OAU Convention on Terrorism (Allison, 2015, p.5). The African Union Peace and Security (2015) has it that the chairperson of the commission of the African Union appointed, in October 2010, the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. It is further stated that since his appointment, the Special Representative undertook a number of important assignments to mobilize support for the continent to fight the scourge of terrorism, assess the situation in various member states and identify, with the concerned national authorities, priority security issues to be addressed.

The AU has used its Peace and Security Council (PSC) to co-ordinate war efforts with its regional communities and the United Nations. The PSC is responsible for all security issues which include peacekeeping, interventions, counter-terrorism and co-ordination with international partners. The AU comprises of the Peace and Security Council, the Assembly, African Union Commission and several other organs. Over the years the AU has developed its own counter terrorism framework with protocols, conventions, Counter Terrorism Research Institute, Special Representative responsible for its Anti-Terror Operations as well as Afripol.

On anti-terror activities and peace initiatives it operates mainly by:

- Endorsement of regional counter terrorism initiatives
- Escalating to United nations (UN) for permission to use force
- Requesting war trust funds to finance its operations

The African Union has been involved in countering terrorism in Somalia since 2007 when AMISOM was deployed. In Nigeria it began to take action in 2014 when the Chibok girls had been abducted.

#### **2.4 Al Shabaab in Somalia**

Kimunguyi (2013, p.2), states that since the overthrow of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, civil war in Somalia has left the country without a fully functioning national government making it the most unstable and insecure region of the continent. The East African region has experienced protracted and severe intra-and inter-state conflict leading to instability, political isolation and poverty that make it vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. It is further stated that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took over the control of Mogadishu after defeating the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT). The clan-based warlords had ruled this part of Somalia until June 2006. Shinn (2015) asserts that Al Shabaab which means "The Youth" was formed as a splinter group of the Islamic Courts who had been defeated by Ethiopian forces in 2006 and Al Shabaab continued to fight against the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) troops comprising forces from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Djibout and Ethiopia who took over from the Ethiopians in 2007.

Researchers wrote that Al Shabaab attacked soccer fans in Kampala in 2010, the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013 as well as the Garissa University in Kenya recently in 2015, killing and

injuring many people in each incident. The group Al Shabaab has also bombed hotels and restaurants on the Kenyan coast drawing Kenya into the conflict. Despite these brutal acts, Pflanz, (2015) affirms that Al Shabaab has been on the back foot during the past few years as they have lost ground to Somali national troops and African Mission to Somalia( AMISOM). Anderson and McKnight (2014) have explored on AMISOM operations and concluded that the AMISOM force capably led by Uganda, has undoubtedly gained significant ground against Al Shabaab's mujahideen. Anderson and McKnight have also asserted that despite its defeats, this Islamist organization remains a potent and dangerous force as it still controls much of the countryside of Southern Somalia, hampering the movement of the Kenyan military and other components of AMISOM through regular ambushes.

## **2.5 The African Union role in countering Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia**

Al Shabaab terrorism has posed a bigger threat to peace, security and economic development in Somalia and the region as a whole. Kovac (2013, p.1) postulates that the country of Somalia failed to form a viable government and developed into a civil war which lasted over twenty years after the demise of the Siad Barre regime in 1990. He also notes that Al Shabaab radical Islamist group emerged as a major security challenge when in the late 2009 took control of large parts of southern and central Somalia. Kovac also asserts that the Kenyan forces, Ethiopian forces and the United Nations (UN) mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) succeeded in removing Al Shabaab from Mogadishu and other important cities in mid-2012. The African Union through its Peace and Security Council has deployed the (AMISOM) with a mandate which include countering Al Shabaab threat to stabilize Somalia. Since its inception in 2007, some researchers have applauded AMISOM for making notable contributions in stabilizing Somalia, however other researchers criticize the mission on the grounds that terror activities are still being mounted which include suicide bombings, killings and kidnappings despite the fact that Al Shabaab has been degraded.

According to Monahl (2012) and Nduwimana (2013) the former UN Secretary General's Deputy Special Representative for Somalia and a political advisor to the European Union, argues that the intervention of AMISOM and the end of transition steered a new political era in Somalia bringing hope for a long-term stabilization of the Southern part of the country, which has been plagued by poverty, clan rivalries, and factional violence. Kovac (2013) expounds that the battle



of October 2012 was the landmark that drove Al Shabaab from Kismayo, its last major area of control. He further posits that the success of AMISOM and Mogadishu's security improvement paved the way for major political achievements. Many scholars including Kovac have noted these successes and assert that Somalia installed a new parliament for the first time since the early 1990s when the Federal Government of Somalia was formed on 20 August 2012, upon termination of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) mandate. Somalis subsequently elected their first president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, marking another political milestone. Manahl (2012) and Nduwimana (2013) state that the new Federal government would require substantial and sustained international support to counter the challenges ahead and to succeed in its effort to bring peace, effective administration and reconciliation back to the country.

Nduwimana (2013), also applauds the African Union that it has made great strides in Somalia in trying to bring stability after years of lawlessness and a protracted war with Al Shabaab. It is stated that the opportunity to bring stability came when the Ethiopians drove out the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 and the AU set up the Inter-Governmental Authority and Development Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) approved by AU and the UN in 2006 which was then replaced by AMISOM created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19<sup>th</sup> January 2007. According to Nduwimana (2013, pp.12-13), the mandate of AMISOM has changed since its deployment with the recent one being outlined in an African Union Peace and Security Council Communique and in a United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2124. It is said that the mandate continued to change as the threat of Al Shabaab grew until it was turned into a protection and fighting force to tackle and defeat it. The AMISOM mandate include: assisting the Somali government and its institutions in their efforts to bring stability in the country, advancing the process of reconciliation and dialogue, reconstruction and development in Somalia, facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and creating conditions for long-term stability (Nduwimana, 2013, p.12). To sum up, the AMISOM mandate includes undertaking the counter offensive and restrictive measures to curtail the threat posed by Al- Shabaab terrorist group and other armed divergent groups in order to establish an environment and conditions conducive for effective and legislative governance throughout Somalia.

Nduwimana has evaluated the success of the AMISOM basing on the specific contributions made by the three AMISOM components which are the military, police and the civilian component. He shares the same sentiments with Kovac (2013) that since the inception of AMISOM in Somalia the security situation has changed significantly. It is argued that what has been achieved by AMISOM has begun to lay strong foundations for the restoration of peace and security though the entire country has not yet been liberated and security still remains a cause of concern in many parts of Somalia. Nduwimana (2013) gave an example that as a result of improved security, the country has managed to engage in democratic governance. This has also enabled Somalia to move from a form of transitional to an elected central government. This school maintains that the first elections were held nearly after 21 years and in addition, local administration structures have been established in parts of the country, particularly in areas recaptured from Al-Shabaab, by the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) with the support of AMISOM.

Anderson and McKnight (2014, p.2) posit that Al Shabaab has lost its economic stronghold of Kismayo resulting in failure to get arms as before, port taxes, money from charcoal and also taxes from general businesses. Kovac (2013, p.2) affirms that the turning point in Al Shabaab's campaign was the loss of Kismayo their last major stronghold which served as the militants' main financial and operational centre. He also asserts that its loss denoted the end of the terrorist group's most profitable sources of funding. It is also stated that local sources suggested that senior leadership escaped to Yemen while more junior fighters dispersed throughout Somalia and some onto the northern part of Kenya. Recently Al Shabaab suffered the death of Al Shabaab leaders like Ahmed Godane (September 2014) in an American attack, Abdi Nur Mahdi who was the External Intelligence Chief (in March 2015) and Adnan Garar (the Westgate Mall mastermind) and has also been forced to retreat from its training base and operational headquarters at Barawe. This has demoralized a lot of the fighters (Phlanz, 2015). Most scholars postulate that most towns in the southern and central Somalia are under government control though Al Shabaab continues to infiltrate and wages asymmetric war in order to create instability.

Segui (2013, p.3) and Nduwimana (2013) also affirms that with AMISOM's support, the Somali national forces have successfully evicted Al Shabaab from major urban centres in Southern

Somalia including Mogadishu, Baidoa, Marka and Kismayo as well as many other towns, including Afgooye, Afmadow, Bay, Bakool and Hiran.

The Norwegian Organisation for Asylum (2014, p.7) has also reported on the successes of the AMISOM stating that in August 2011, Al-Shabaab forces withdrew from Mogadishu and the African Union Mission in Somalia took control of the capital. The Norwegian Organisation for Asylum further states that since then, there have been no front lines within the city and confrontations between military units have more or less ended. However, Al-Shabaab continues to infiltrate the areas it does not control and wages an asymmetric war in order to create instability.

The AMISOM military component has supported the training of 4500 soldiers of the Somali National Army (SNA) conducted by the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) in Bihanga, Uganda (Nduwimana 2013, p.13). However, Nduwimana notes that the majority of troops trained so far are mostly from the rank and file, thus leaving loopholes in junior and middle leadership positions and resulting in a critical void in terms of control and command of the SNA. To fill these voids, it is stated that AMISOM began to work with the Federal Governments (FGs) and other partners to commence the training of a new corps of junior officers to undertake Platoon and Company command positions in the SNSF. According to Nduwimana again, initial training of Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs) and 96 junior officers began on 15 April 2013 which was run by AMISOM at the newly renovated Jazeera Training Camp in Mogadishu. The training undertaken was on platoon Commanders and Senior NCOs.

On the Police Component, it has been reported that the AMISOM police has continued to back the restructuring, reform, reorganizing and professionalization of the Somali police Force through various activities and programs Nduwimana (2013, pp.14-15). According to Nduwimana, during the period, AMISOM police, including the Formed Police Units (FPUs), operated hand in hand with the Somali Police Force (SPF) at police establishments in Mogadishu to train, guide and advise Somali police officers on several policing issues which includes management of crime and human rights. However, despite working on the mandate, AMISOM still requires more staff and equipment for the FPUs to be able to effectively respond to public disorder and assist the Somali Police Force in expanding the number of operational police officers in the country (Nduwimana, 2013, p.15).

Nduwimana furthermore states that the AMISOM civilian component is also said to be carrying out massive work in the country to win the hearts of the people so that they realize they are better off with peace and this will result in loss of support for Al Shabaab. The AMISOM component that deals with humanitarian work, functions closely with the office for the coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Children's Fund, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other UN agencies as well as Somali and international NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the share of information. It is stated by Nduwimana that the civilian component also functions together with important Somali government agencies and ministries.

The African Union Peace and security (2013) on the 356<sup>th</sup> meeting, reported on successes of the AU, stating that the security situation had significantly improved in those areas recovered to date but it is still fragile and the gains can be reversed if not consolidated. At the end of 2013, AMISOM forces and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) took over from Al Shabaab the 240km Mogadishu- Baidoa road (African Union Peace and Security, 2013). The African Union further reports that there are efforts on consolidating control over towns recovered but the hindrance is on lack of operational resources and there have been no significant advances to regain territory from Al Shabaab group. The AU has also given an overall statement that the Al Shabaab threat has decreased due to power fights within the group and defeats from the military operations of the coalition's forces.

Despite the fact that Al Shabaab has been degraded, this terrorist organization remains a strong and dangerous force. It is reported that the group still controls much of the country side of Southern Somalia, carrying out regular ambushes. According to Al Jazeera News (2016), Al Shabaab attacked AMISOM base El-Ade, and earlier on had attacked other AMISOM bases including Burundian and Ugandan killing soldiers in each case. Al Shabaab suicide bombers and gunmen were also attacking hotels and restaurants in Mogadishu killing many people and destroying property. A car packed with explosives recently, rammed into the Beach View Hotel on Lido beach in Mogadishu on the 21<sup>st</sup> of January 2016 and left many people dead and injured (Mohamed, 2016). The fact that the terrorist group is still very much alive is a pointer to gaps that are still there which need to be addressed. The fact which is there is that Al Shabaab has been weakened but not eliminated.

According to Nduwimana (2013), other scholars criticise AMISOM on the grounds that it lacks the military resources and funding as well as the institutional capacity to manage its operations. Nduwimana concluded that the above listed factors have inhibited AMISOM from fulfilling its mandate. As a result, AMISOM contribution to the overall security situation in Somalia was insignificant except securing the presidential palace, the Airport and the road in between the two. Moyo (2014) also affirms that though the AU celebrated its 51<sup>st</sup> birthday on 25 May, it has done little to contain terrorism. Moyo (2014) feels that the AU has over the years become lax, leaving the developed world to play the rescue role in African conflicts. Over the years, the AU has folded its hands and has become used to having the super powers intervening in its conflicts. Moyo further argues that for example, instead of the AU creeping to thwart Boko Haram insurgency, we have the US, Israel and France deploying military personnel at the border between Chad and Nigeria to help find the kidnapped girls.

Botha (2014) argues that despite having Counter- Terrorism Frameworks, Protocols and plans, Al Shabaab still remains a bigger threat though degraded now. Al Shabaab terrorists have continued with their heinous activities including killings and suicide bombings. The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) is encountering challenges to bring a lasting solution to the insecurity threat of terrorism. Kimunguyi (2013) has also argued that although significant progress was made by the AU to develop coherent counter terrorism approaches, many challenges remain. For example, Al Shabaab fighters recently in February 2016 retook the port of Merka though AMISOM managed to take it back. This is one of the reverses for the multinational AU force in its decade of long battle against Al Shabaab.

## **2.6 Challenges encountered by the AU in countering Al Shabaab**

Researchers like Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014, p.331) on challenges encountered by AU in combating Al Shabaab, argue that the AU mission face financial barriers engendered by extreme poverty among its members as well as dearth of technical capacity. It is further argued that in 2006 only 12 countries paid their yearly contributions. Oguonu and Ezeibe further state that some countries are too poor and internally devastated by their own conflicts, and cannot afford to participate in other conflicts. It has been found out that AU relies on the political and economic support from the regional institutions and the international community who also has limited resources and is often too slow in decision-making and rigid in their decisions about funding.

Segui (2013, pp.7-9) argues that even though AMISOM has been defined as an AU- led PSO, reflecting the idea of African Solutions to African Problems, the fact that in practical terms the sustainability of its functions is heavily dependent on external resources, has had enormous implications for its multiple levels of governance, such as in the decision-making process, the implementation of its mandate and the outcomes on the ground. According to Segui, the fact that AMISOM's performance has depended on how and where external partners were willing to allocate financial resources to the mission reflects some of the implications provoked by external dependence. Segui further affirms that there is also the likelihood of a possible reduction of funds allocated to the mission. The AMISOM has also been complaining of salaries and working conditions. According to Segui again, France has already announced its interest in reallocating financial resources from AMISOM to a probable AU-led military intervention in Mali. This is a clear Franco- phone mentality.

Another challenge confronted by AMISOM is lack of cooperation. Segui (2013, p.6) posits that the trend in" liberated areas and partially in Mogadishu is that the willingness and capacity of AMISOM to enhance relations with the government is low and its strategy is largely divorced from the state- building strategies of the government. It is stated that the AMISOM troops are still being perceived by the local population as" occupying" troops.

The researcher Segui has also postulated that the AU PSO forces are also limited by the variety of languages spoken among them as well as lack of Somali speakers who could play a vital role in the understanding of the indigenous people and the Somali National Security Force.

Kimunguyi (2013, p.13) propounds that some or any AU member states have not yet ratified the AU Plan of Action of 2004 so that they implement it to be implemented. Kimunguyi further posits that the AU resources are limited and this has reduced its capability to actively fully realize its policy of CT. It is further argued that like the AU Commission, a lack of both human and financial resources has restricted AMISOM to accomplish its mandate. The Chairperson's Report on the AU's Peace and Security Council of June 2013, claims that though the threat posed by Al Shabaab has decreased, the terrorist group is still striking and as a result the fight against Al Shabaab cannot be professed won (African Union Peace and Security, 2013). The report further states that the terrorist group, Al Shabaab has carried out a number of probing and asymmetrical attacks against SNSF, AMISOM and Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)

positions. The report affirms that Al Shabaab operations have escalated and this has been demonstrated by suicide attack on the 14<sup>th</sup> of April 2013 on the Supreme Court Complex in Mogadishu. The group's fighters are said to have melted into several communities in different regions, with the intention of exploiting political disagreements and clan rivalries, as well as the lack of social services in certain areas and the absence of effective local administrations (African Union Peace and Security, 2013). The fact that Al Shabaab is embedded in society becomes a big challenge to AMISOM for the groups can easily regroup and attack innocent souls and destroy property. The African Union Peace and security, states that in Mogadishu, the situation necessitated the launching of a combined operation which involved the SNSF, AMISOM and the Somalia National Intelligence and Security agency (NISA), code-named "Operation stabilize Mogadishu", with the intention to curtail AL Shabaab attacks in the Mogadishu capital.

Bryden (2014, pp.52-60) points out that the Al Shabaab's attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013 put the international spotlight back on Somalia. He argues further that it provided further evidence of Al Shabaab military potency and raised questions about the state of the international effort to defeat it. Recently in 2015, the group attacked the Garissa University and about 148 people mainly students were killed and about 79 more were wounded (Bryden, 2014, p.52). According to Bryden again, some commentators were quick to portray the attack operation as an act of 'desperation' by an organization in decline while some argue that the Garissa operation was not a new departure in terms of strategy or tactics, or a sign that Al Shabaab was desperate, but was a manifestation of the group's adaptability, strategic continuity and resilience.

Bryden also argues that though in recent years Al Shabaab has been steadily conceding ground to the AMISOM forces and its Somali partners, and that the ranks of Al Shabaab senior leadership have been depleted by deaths and defections-including the loss of Amir Ahmed Abdi Godane in an American airstrike in September 2014, Al- Shabaab's modus operandi inside Somalia and its ability to strike beyond Somali's borders appears to remain intact. Bryden further asserts that since 2012, however, the principal military instrument in that effort-the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had been largely hunkered down in defensive posture because it lacked the resources to conduct sustained offensive operations against Al Shabaab strongholds. In October 2013, this led the UN Secretary- general to the conclusion that the political progress

made over in 2012 and the military gains against Al Shabaab that have been achieved in recent years are at a serious risk of being reversed (Bryden, 2014, pp.52-60).

According to the United Nations Security Council (2014), the Monitoring Group's assessment on Somalia is that strategic strikes have in general resulted in short-term gains, but significantly failed to diminish Al Shabaab's operational capacity. This report maintains that there is no current evidence that they have the potential to degrade and destroy Al Shabaab. The report further argues that while the recent removal of Amed Godane from the battlefield represents a significant achievement for AMISOM and the Federal Government in their efforts to defeat Al Shabaab, the departure of such an important figure does not mark the end of Al Shabaab or its capabilities.

Allison (2015, pp.5-6) postulates that individual states have different relationships with terrorism. For some, it is an immediate and existential threat that must be addressed urgently, while others it is a more abstract concept with little direct impact. In other words, terrorism is not a pressing priority for all leaders. Allison further points out that, even if it is a priority, many countries simply lack sufficient resources to implement the recommended counter-terrorism measures. He further notes that activities like securing national borders and upgrading border crossings are enormously expensive, and states face many competing claims on their limited funding and capacity. Allison's argument is that so far, the AU has not convinced the majority of states that counter-terrorism is an urgent priority. He argues that the AU counter-terrorism framework has limitations especially in terms of implementation and some states have been said to be reluctant to adopt the continental policy. Allison also expounds that at a special meeting on terrorism in September 2014, the PSC has also noted in its final communiqué that, despite the progress made in developing a comprehensive normative and operational counter-terrorism framework, serious gaps continue to exist in terms of implementation and follow-up, thus undermining the effectiveness of Africa's response to the threat of terrorism and violent extremism.

Allison further points out that lack of resources prevents the purpose-built terrorism research centre from operating at full capacity. The AU is advised to encourage states to meet their obligation and take more prominent role through its own institutions, such as the Peace and Security Council.



Added big challenge of AMISOM highlighted by researchers is the decentralized nature of the group, which is currently a source of resilience. Al Shabaab is spread through the country of Somalia and some groups in neighbouring countries. With this kind of situation it is very difficult to defeat each and every group. Also what has been noted is that Al Shabaab has changed tactics. The literature reviewed, divulge that there is incremental occurrence of guerrilla warfare as well as the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) by Al Shabaab in their attacks on civilians and property inside and beyond Somali's borders.

## **2.7 Suggested Solutions to Challenges of Al Shabaab**

Sheriff, Uke and Adams (2015, pp.52-53) have recommended that other regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African states Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and AU, must contribute their own quota, strongly in seeing that peace is restored in the horn of Africa and to destroy the stronghold of Boko Haram in Nigeria. These researchers further argue that failure to attain this level, may lead to the spread of terrorism all over Africa. This is because when Al Shabaab was unleashed, it started in Somalia, but it is now operating in Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and many more places in the horn. Sheriff, Uke and Adams (2015, pp.52-54) affirm that if the situation is not curbed through a consolidated sub-regional cooperation, it may continue to spread even down to central and southern Africa and the Maghreb will not be an exception.

Bryden (2014, p.11) suggests that one key objective of the campaign against Al Shabaab should be to turn its decentralized nature, which is currently a source of resilience, to movement's disadvantage-exploiting the increasingly multipolar nature of its decision-making and membership to fragment the movement. Bryden also recommended that military action needs to be firmly situated with a broader politically led strategy that acknowledges and addresses the residual sources of support for Al- Shabaab- including monopolistic political practices and predatory governance.

Botha and Abdile (2014, pp.15-17) strongly propose that measures adapted to counter-radicalisation have to be based on an understanding of reasons why people join terrorism. These researchers argue that measures to counter-radicalisation and even counterproductive have proved to be futile if they are not based on reasons that drive people to join terrorism. They have recommended that measures should be taken to build trust in order to win hearts and minds of

the people while continuing to recapture territories Botha and Abdile (2014, p.15) argue that the best effective method to counter- Al Shabaab is showing ordinary people that the government can offer life which is better than the one experienced under the control of Al-Shabaab.

Another suggestion put forward by Botha and Abdile is of transferring power from the armed forces to the police. The argument put forward is that the police are in a better position to isolate insurgents through collaborating with the public since they are trained to interact with the public and solve crimes. It is also stated that the police would have to keep in mind that the abuse of power and the use of force will harm the overall objective of countering terrorist activities.

Rose (2014) also asserts that whilst military degrading Al Shabaab is a necessary first step, more must be done to counter the ideology of radicalization. It is suggested that the Somali government needs to help to develop policy for the reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as to re-establish the rule of law and revive the national economy. The Special Representative of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Francisco Madeira, who is the Head of AU mission in Somalia, stated that countries have been encouraged to invest in youth empowerment programs to lure them away from joining radical groups (Lagat, 2015)

Segui (2013, p.5) has recommended that communication amongst AMISOM personnel and between AMISOM and local people is key to the successful undertaking of the operations. Segui goes further to state that in some stabilized areas; AMISOM should consider a de-escalation of military action in favor of an increased deployment of the civilian component.

## **2.8 Summary**

This chapter explored the view points and opinions postulated by other researchers on the effectiveness of AU in combating the threat of terrorism in Somalia. Many researchers noted that since the inception of the AMISOM, Al Shabaab has been degraded and lost some towns which the group had been controlling. The AU with the assistance of the international community has registered some successes in countering Al Shabaab as evidenced by some towns which were recaptured from the terrorist group such as Mogadishu and Kismayo, a Somali major port. The group also lost many of their top leaders including Godane. The improvement of security situation has enabled the country to have elections and democratic governance in 2012 since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991. However, despite being degraded, researchers have noted

that the group continues to carry out asymmetric attacks with deadly effects. With counter-terrorism conventions, protocols, plans and the like, terrorism still remains a big threat not only to the Somalis and the East African region, but to the continent as a whole. This is a pointer that there are gaps which have to be addressed for the AU to be able to completely wipe out this threat which has become international with incursions into neighbouring countries. The main challenges highlighted by many researchers include lack of funds, lack of human resources, capacitation, political will and commitment among AU members. Suggested solutions have been proffered but Al Shabaab terrorist attacks continue. This research therefore seeks to explore these shortcomings and propose solutions that if implemented, may completely wipe out Al Shabaab threat that has plagued Somalia and other East African countries for a decade. The next chapter focuses on the methods used by the researcher to collect data.

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## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3.0 Research Methodology**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the methods employed by the researcher to collect data. This phase deals with how the research was carried out. It involves describing the research design, the research method, population, sample, the sampling procedure, and the methods used to collect data. The reliability and validity of the research instruments are addressed. Ethical considerations pertaining to the research are also discussed.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), a design is a summary of procedures that a researcher uses to collect, analyse, interpret and present his or her data. This implies that a research design is the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. It provides the overall framework for data collection. Research design is vital because it allows a smooth sailing of various study operations making research efficient to yield maximum information with minimal expenditure of effort money and time. The researcher in the study applied qualitative approach due to the nature of the data gathered. Due to the increase of terrorism and its growth from national to international, and due to the increase of terrorist activities which include suicide bombings, kidnappings and killings, the research assessed the impact of AU in combating the threat of terrorism that has plagued Somalia and its neighbouring countries since 2006 when it started.

#### **3.3 Qualitative Approach**

Creswell (2009, p.4) defines qualitative research as a means for exploring and undertaking the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. It is defined as involving various kinds of non-numerical data which include interviews, written common text or documents, visual images and observations of behaviour. It entails collecting, analyzing and interpreting data by observing what people do and say. It is a method of choice when research questions require an understanding of processes, events, and relationships in the context of social and cultural situation. This approach is usually used for understanding, discovery and description. The rationale behind adopting this research design is because it is descriptive and

explanatory. Creswell (2003, p.22) is of the view that qualitative research is exploratory and is useful when the researcher does not know the important variables to examine. Anderson (2010) posits that issues can be examined in detail and in depth. Interviews can be guided or redirected by the researcher and are not restricted to specific questions. The other strength of this research design is that the framework of the research and direction can be quickly reviewed as new information develops. Sinaga (2014) asserts that qualitative approach is used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions and motivations. Choy (2014, p.102) maintains that the great benefit with a qualitative approach is that the inquiry is broad and open-ended, allowing the participants to raise issues that matter most to them. It has the ability to probe for underlying values, benefits and assumptions. This research approach was useful as it allowed participants to give detailed information on the achievements of the AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. The researcher also obtained useful information through probing on challenges encountered by the AU in countering this threat of terrorism that has disturbed the peace and security of Somalia, the East African region as a whole and the peace of the international world.

However, qualitative approach has its own limitations. Anderson (2010) postulates that the quality of the research heavily relies on the individual skills of the researcher and more easily influenced by the researcher's personal preconceptions and idiosyncrasies. It is further argued that impartiality is more difficult to assess, demonstrate and maintain. Anderson further affirms that the volume of data makes analysis and interpretation time consuming. Choy (2014, p.102) points out that with qualitative approach, a particular important issue could be overlooked and also, because qualitative inquiry is generally open-ended, the participants have more control over the content of the data collected. However, the researcher guarded against issues of biases by making use of varied secondary sources to come up with a piece of work that can be relied upon.

### **3.4 Population**

Polit and Hungler (1999, p.37) refer to the population as an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications. Bhattacharjee (2012, p.65) also defines population as all people or items (unit of analysis) with the characteristics that one wishes to study. The population of interest identified in a particular study is called the target population. The target population for this study involved researchers in Peace and Security



Studies of Somalia from various institutions globally, personnel from the AMISOM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe National Defence College and embassies of East African countries contributing troops to AMISOM. The researcher unearthed rich information from participants who responded positively to this study especially personnel in the AMISOM and the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Zimbabwe on the role and impact of the AU in combating Al Shabaab threat in Somalia.

### **3.5 Sample**

A sample is a subset of a population selected to participate in the study. It is a fraction of the whole, selected to participate in the research project (Pilot and Hungler 1999, p.227). According to Al-Busaidi (2008, pp.11-19) and Cohen et al (2007, p.177) other scholars state that in qualitative inquiry there are no rules for sample size. Al Busaidi and Cohen et al further state that other scholars argue that the size of the sample depends on the aim of the research and what is possible, given the time and resources available. In this study, a subset of ten personnel involved in Peace and Security issues of Somalia were selected out of the entire population to represent the entire population from which it was drawn. However, five people participated and provided very rich information on the topic under study. Borrington and Stimpson (2008) assert that the sample helps getting results quicker and more accurate than the involvement of the whole population.

#### **3.5.1 Sampling Procedure**

Sampling procedure defines the rules that specify how the system calculates the sample size. The sampling technique used was purposive sampling.

#### **3.5.2 Purposive Sampling**

Purposive sampling also commonly known as judgemental sample is a non-probability sampling technique where the researcher chooses a specific people within a population to a use in a particular research project and the idea is to concentrate on people with particular characteristic who will better be able to assist with the research. This is sampling that is carried out with a specific purpose in mind, whereby researchers already have a predefined group which they are targeting for their sample. Cohen et al (2007, p.115) posits that a researcher uses purposive sampling in order to access people who are knowledgeable about particular issues to be

researched. These may be selected by virtue of their power, professional role, and access to networks, experience or expertise. These scholars further argue that it is of no use to employ random sample when most of the random sample may not be aware of particular issues and not able to comment on issues of interest to the researcher. A purposive sample was therefore important. Collen et al (2007) further argue that despite the fact that a purposive sample may not be representative and that comments made may not be generalizable, the primary concern is to acquire in-depth information from those who are able to provide it.

Polit and Hungler (1999) posit that judgemental sampling design is usually used when a limited number of individuals possess the trait of interest. In this study, the number of individuals who possessed information on the role of AU in countering Al Shabaab was limited. Polit and Hungler further assert that purposive sampling is the only viable sampling technique in obtaining information from a very specific group of people. It is also stated that it is possible to use judgemental sampling if the researcher knows a reliable professional that he or she thinks is capable of assembling a representative sample. Wyse (2011) postulates that the researcher uses his or her judgment to select population members who are good for accurate information and that the sample size can be as small as one. In this study, the researcher selected personnel in Peace and Security Studies of Somalia, Ministry of Foreign affairs in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe National Defence College, embassies of East African countries in Zimbabwe and the AMISOM. The researcher conducted face to face and over the phone interviews. The researcher also e-mailed a questionnaire and obtained valuable information on the role of the AU in countering terrorism in Somalia. Information on challenges encountered by the mission was also obtained.

With purposive sampling, the researcher incurred low costs and there was less time taken to select perspective sampling group members for the study. However, purposive sampling is said to have low level of reliability and high levels of bias. It is further argued that with purposive sampling, samples are not representative of the whole population and provide no objective method for determining whether one person's judgment is better than another's. However, the researcher guarded against these weaknesses by making use of other sources which included Journals, books, Articles from websites and Reports. Also the researcher chose the best personnel in the AMISOM who are countering the threat of terrorism in Somalia.

### **3.6 Sources of Data**

These included the various areas where the researcher obtained information for the study. For this study purpose, both primary and secondary sources were used to collect data on the role and impact of AU in countering Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia and its neighbouring countries. Cohen, et al (2007, p.193) posits that primary data is original in nature and directly related to the issue or problem and is current data. It is the data which the researcher collects through various methods which include interviews, surveys and questionnaires. Secondary sources are information sources that interpret, include, describe or draw conclusions based on the works written by others. Cohen et al (2007) maintain that a secondary source entails someone describing events which he or she did not witness but got the information from another source or person. Secondary sources used included books, documentary movies, biographies, internet sources and journal articles.

### **3.7 Research Instruments**

These are the tools that the researcher used to collect data from the respondents. This research used in-depth interviews, a questionnaire and secondary sources which included YouTube clips, online news outfits, articles, online data sources, journals and reports as instruments to gather data on the effectiveness of AU in countering Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia.

#### **3.7.1 Questionnaire**

According to Bird (2009), a questionnaire is a well-established tool within social science research for acquiring information on participant social characteristics, present and past behaviour, standards of behaviour or attitudes and their beliefs and reasons for action with respect to the topic under investigation. Bird further expounds that it is an inquiry from which comprises of systematically compiled questions that are also organized and then administered to the population sample. It is simply a 'tool' for collecting and recording information about a particular issue of interest. In this research, a questionnaire was used to collect data on the effectiveness of AU in combating the threat of Al Shabaab. The research instrument was also used to gather data on challenges encountered by the AMISOM in eradicating terrorism in Somalia and the region as a whole. The questionnaire that was used comprised of open-ended questions which invited free ranging responses and varied views pertaining to the study. The questionnaire was delivered via e-mail.

The questionnaire had its own strengths and weaknesses. The strengths that the questionnaire had were that the administration was comparatively inexpensive and easy. This tool reduced chances of evaluator bias because the same questions were asked of all respondents. Another advantage was that some people felt more comfortable in responding to a questionnaire than participating in an interview. The use of questionnaire permitted respondents' time to consider their responses carefully without interference from, for example, an interviewer.

However, the challenges encountered with the questionnaire were that there was low response rate. Some individuals to whom the questionnaire was sent never responded. The researcher was also unable to probe for additional details for some questions that were answered. The investigator however managed to overcome the weaknesses by the use of other instruments such as interviews and internet sources to obtain more information on the topic under study.

### **3.7.2 In-depth interview**

Manson, (2002) defines in-depth interviews as semi-structured or loosely structured form of interviewing which are designed to capitalize the consistency afforded by the highly structured interviews and the level of the detail offered by open-ended or emergent interviews. Cohen et al (2011, p.349) define in-depth interviews as a tool for data collection which is flexible and allows many channels to be used which include spoken, heard, non-verbal, and verbal. These in-depth interviews have their own merits and demerits.

Atkins and Wallace (2012) postulate that interviews are a very flexible research tool which can be used to gather a range of different types of information, including factual data, views and opinions, personal narratives and histories, which makes them useful as a means of answering a wide range of research questions. Cohen et al (2011, p.349) propound that the interviewer can press not only for complete answers but also for responses about complex and deep issues and the order of the interview may be controlled while still giving space for spontaneity. Legard et al (2003, p.138) assert that the in-depth format also permits the researcher to explore fully all the factors that underpin participants' answers: reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs. Another strength that Legard et al (2003) point out is that the interview is generative in the sense that new knowledge or thoughts are likely, at some stage to be created. This research used unstructured interviews on the effectiveness of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. The researcher managed to probe for more detail to be provided on the topic under study.

However, the weak spots encountered with this research instrument were that it was expensive in time and open to interviewer bias. However, to overcome challenges of bias, the researcher employed same questions in questionnaire to obtain varied views and also used internet sources as instruments for data collection.

### **3.7.3 Secondary sources**

The researcher made use of a variety of secondary sources including Reports, Journal articles and books to collect data on the role and impact of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. Cohen et al (2007, p.194) noted that though various commentators stress the importance of primary sources, secondary sources are also of great value for they provide valid and reliable historical information. Cohen and other scholars maintain that the literature review carried out in other forms of educational study is considered as a preparation stage to gathering data and helps to acquaint researchers with work of other researchers on topics under study. It is further argued that this will enable researchers to learn from earlier endeavors, and place their research in context.

Secondary sources had the advantages that they were cheaper and faster to access. Precise information was obtained via search engines. They saved time, efforts and money to the value of the research study. Secondary data provided a way to access the work of the best scholars all over the world. Also the use of secondary research helped the researcher to clarify the research question.

However, secondary sources had their own disadvantages that some documents found on the internet were incomplete, inaccurate and reflected personal biases. In some cases, the researcher found information that appeared valuable and promising but the researcher failed to get the full version of the research to gain the full value of the study. With some documents, there was uncertainty over source and it was not always easy to ensure data reliable, authentic or representative. Another disadvantage was that with the passage of time, some data could no longer be accessible from the internet, may be it could have been removed.

Prescott (2008) postulates that the secondary research used must be scrutinized closely since the origins of the information may be questionable and that the researcher needs to critically evaluate the validity and reliability of the information provided. In this study, the researcher identified,

reduced and managed the disadvantages that were accompanied by the use of secondary research. A wide range of internet sources were identified and scrutinised to come up with valid and reliable data on the effectiveness of AU in combating Al- Shabaab in Somalia and in the neighbouring countries.

### **3.8 Ethical considerations**

The researcher considered the ethical issues which included the voluntary participation which requires that people not be coerced into participating in research, informed consent, the right to privacy, anonymity and confidentiality.

In this study, the researcher recognized informed consent by sending letters to seek permission to carry out research via the e-mail to the AMISOM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe National Defence College, and the embassies of the East African countries and to other professionals involved in Peace and Security Studies of Somalia. Trochim (2006) asserts that the prospective research participants must give their consent to participate and must be fully informed about the procedures and risks involved in research.

The researcher also considered respect of privacy and confidentiality in carrying out this study. According to Trochim (2006), those ethical standards also require that researchers not put participants in circumstances where they might be exposed to risk because of participating. Before the research, participants were assured that the identification of information would not be made available to anyone who was not part of the research. The stricter standard put forward by Trochim, the principle of anonymity, which essentially means that the participant will remain anonymous throughout the study- even to the researchers themselves, was another ethical issue which was also considered by the researcher.

### **3.9 Summary**

This chapter discussed the research methodology of the study and described the research design, population, sample and sampling procedure, data collection instruments and ethical considerations. The next chapter presented and analyzed key findings of the research.

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## **CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the results of the research study. It also analyses, interprets and discusses the findings made on the role and impact of AU in combating the security threat of Al Shabaab in Somalia. Data is presented thematically within the boundaries of the study objectives mentioned in the first chapter. The findings have been presented in the form of tables, maps, narratives and a graph. The Business Dictionary has also defined data analysis as a process of obtaining raw data and converting it into information useful for decision-making by users. Anderson (2010) maintains that a researcher is expected to analyse data in a manner that avoids misstatements, misinterpretations, or fraudulent analysis.

### **4.1 Data Presentation and Discussion**

Data presented first answers the research question on, ‘What is the role of the AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia?’

### **4.2 The role and impact of AU in combating Al Shabaab in Somalia**

#### **4.2.1. Deployment of AMISOM**

Findings from both primary and secondary sources used, reveal that the African Union has played a crucial role and made great positive impact in mitigating Al Shabaab threat in Somalia. The AU deployed (AMISOM) with the following mandate to:

- Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,
- Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory,
- Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services,
- Provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somali State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions,

- Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution,
- Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees,
- Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and
- Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence (AMISOM, 2014).

#### **4.2.2 AU Funding**

In order to run a mission of AMISOM's nature, the African Union has to ensure that there are funds to run the administration and programmes of the mission. The African Union has this as its first role. Data collected from internet sources indicate that the AU managed to mobilise financial resources for the mission through own AU funds, Bi-lateral donations, United Nations Trust fund in support of AMISOM and international partners like the European Union, the United States and other interested donors (Nduwimana, 2013). The fund grew over the years since 2008 with each new resolution and increase in troop numbers and expanded operations.

A respondent from a questionnaire also states that the AU has made progress in this area of funding in view of the fact that it is getting support from the UN, USA, EU and its member countries who are the major AU partners in peace and security and development to support its efforts in Somalia. This respondent stated that furthermore, the AU member countries have agreed to increase funding to the organisation in the next five years to contribute about 25% to peacekeeping budget. According to this respondent, more funding is still required because substantial resources are needed to maintain about 20 000 soldiers. The respondent however, further notes that it is difficult to get enough resources due to the global challenges facing the UN and its member states but a lot is being done by the AU to seek funding for Somalia. This responded also stated that it is also important to note that the AU is also facing peace and security challenges in West Africa- Boko Haram, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Darfur-Sudan, Libya etc. which all compete for resources.

It is however, important to note that there are principles that govern AU finances and there is a lot of non-compliance by member states. There is increasing dependence on donors for AU programme operations. According to (Engel, 2015 the AU Commission prepares the budget, collects the approved revenue from various sources and manages the assets and liabilities. The AMISOM operation is different in that it also involves the UN control on the funds as well as donor control especially troop allowances and welfare which is handled by the European Union.

Data collected from the secondary sources indicate that member contributions are based on a scale of assessment by the UN of which the criteria include but are not limited to:

- Estimates of gross national income
- Conversion rates based on market exchange rates
- Debt burden and
- Low per capita income adjustment (Engel, 2015)

Below are some graphs and statistics with regards to AU funding and AMISOM.

**Table 1: Below are some statistics with regards to AU funding and AMISOM**

|                             | 2009     | 2010     | 2011     | 2012     | 2013     | 2014     | 2015     | Total    |
|-----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| AMISOM/ UNSOA (Somalia)     | 75.642   | 213.58   | 171.436  | 291.093  | 436.905  | 435.801  | 489.968  | 2114.425 |
| UNMIS/ UNMISS (South Sudan) | 876.894  | 958.35   | 1008.026 | 482.461  | 839.49   | 476.33   | 580.83   | 5222.381 |
| MONUC/MONUSCO (DRC)         | 1191.103 | 1351.539 | 1334.426 | 1419.89  | 1347.539 | 1456.378 | 1398.475 | 9499.35  |
| MINURSO (Western Sahara)    | 48.375   | 56.576   | 60.039   | 63.219   | 61.3     | 60.476   | 55.99    | 405.975  |
| UNAMID (Darfur)             | 1499.71  | 1598.942 | 1776.155 | 1689.306 | 1448.574 | 1335.248 | 639.654  | 9987.589 |
| UNMIL (Liberia)             | 603.761  | 561.032  | 524.053  | 525.613  | 496.458  | 924.426  | 427.32   | 4062.663 |

Table 1: Funding for Amisom and selected missions in Africa from 2009 to 2015  
Source: Extract from a Table 6: UN resources for peacekeeping operations in Africa by Ulf Engel)

Source: Extract from UN resources for peace keeping operations in Africa (Engel, 2015)

From the above table (Table 1) it can be realised that funding for AMISOM increased quite rapidly from 2009 to 2015. This coincided with the expanded operations that followed the routing of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu. The table also shows relative levels of funding for other major missions on the continent over the same period although these are purely UN missions.

#### 4.2.2.1 AU Member States Funding vs Partners


The graph below (Figure 1) shows AU member states contribution against partner contributions. The AU member contributions started higher, but were soon overtaken by international partners due to non-compliance by member states while the international community showered more commitment and interest in bringing peace and stability to Somalia. Facts concerning AU member states from Engel (2015) are as follows:

- Members default left, right and centre
- In 2003, nine (9) out of 53 countries were listed as not having paid
- In 2005 only 12 states were up to date with payments
- In January 2007 they had increased to 23
- In January 2009 they had increased to 29

About 65.49% of the AU budget was paid by Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa before the Arab Spring. Between 2007 and 2015 expenditure increased from US\$133m to US\$522.1m (Table 2). During the same period member states contributions increased from US\$96.7m to US\$147.3m which is way below requirement while at the same time donor contributions increased from US\$36.3m to US\$374 (Engel, 2015).

This performance by AU member states has a profound negative bearing on the AMISOM funding because if the AU total is what it has available for its expenses and programmes, the withdrawal of international partners at any given point will have serious effects on AMISOM operations as well as even the administration of the AU itself. From all the above information and data, it is evident that the AU is very dependent on donor funding to the extent that all its operations have become vulnerable. An economic meltdown globally or regionally can easily see donors trimming their budgets towards AMISOM and consequently negatively affecting its operations. A good example is the proposal by the EU to reduce funding for AMISOM troop allowances in 2016. This will slow down the momentum, demoralise the troops as well as bolster Al Shabaab's resolve to fight back. The AU uses some sanctions against defaulting members, but these do not seem to have the desired effect since less and less money continues to get into the AU coffers. The bulk of funding for AMISOM comes from the UN P5 countries comprising the US, Britain, France, China and Russia as well as other interested donors (Engel, 2015). However the fact that there is funding for the AMISOM mission is good enough irrespective of the source.

A respondent in an interview also showed concern about AU's dependence on external sources and stated that the African Union should think of ways to provide maintainable funding for AMISOM. African countries should be committed to African solutions to African problems. The table (Table 2) below sourced from Engel, also demonstrates the AU's dependence on foreign funding.



**Figure 1: AU member states contribution vs partners (drawn from figures in Table 2). No figures were provided in 2012 according to table below.**

**Table 2 : Showing AU revenue and expenditure as well as partners' contributions over the years. Source: (Engel, 2015)**

| Financial Year     | 2007  | 2008 (1) | 2009  | 2010  | 2011 (2) | 2012 (3) | 2013 (4) | 2014 (5) | 2014 (6) | 2015 (7) |
|--------------------|-------|----------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| <b>Expenditure</b> |       |          |       |       |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| AU total           | 133.0 | 140.0    | 164.3 | 250.5 | 256.8    | 274.9    | 278.2    | 308.0    | 395.2    | 522.1    |
| • Operational      | n.a.  | n.a.     | 95.6  | 105.6 | 112.4    | 114.8    | 117.5    | 137.9    | 137.9    | 142.7    |
| • Programmes       | n.a.  | n.a.     | 68.7  | 144.9 | 144.3    | 159.3    | 160.7    | 170.2    | 257.3    | 379.4    |
| AUC                | n.a.  | n.a.     | 137.9 | 217.5 | 221.5    | n.a.     | 216.5    | 222.9    | 197.4    | 435.0    |
| PAP                | 6.4   | –        | 13.5  | 14.2  | 11.9     | n.a.     | 10.5     | 14.3     | 14.3     | 29.5     |
| ACHPR              | 2.4   | –        | 3.7   | 4.9   | 7.9      | n.a.     | 9.0      | 8.6      | 8.6      | 9.9      |
| AfCHPR             | –     | –        | 7.6   | 7.9   | 9.4      | n.a.     | 8.5      | 5.6      | 5.6      | 5.9      |
| ECOSOC             | –     | –        | 1.6   | 1.5   | 1.6      | n.a.     | 1.0      | 1.0      | 1.0      | 1.0      |
| AUCIL              | –     | –        | –     | 0.2   | 0.2      | n.a.     | 0.6      | 0.6      | 0.6      | 0.6      |
| NEPAD              | –     | –        | –     | 3.0   | 3.2      | n.a.     | 30.1     | 40.4     | 40.4     | 36.0     |
| ABoC               | –     | –        | –     | 0.5   | 0.5      | n.a.     | 1.0      | 1.5      | 1.5      | 1.8      |
| PSC                | –     | –        | –     | 0.7   | 0.5      | n.a.     | 0.7      | 0.8      | 0.8      | 0.8      |
| ACERWC             | –     | –        | –     | –     | –        | n.a.     | 0.3      | 0.4      | 0.4      | 0.6      |
| AFREC              | –     | –        | –     | –     | –        | –        | –        | –        | –        | 0.9      |
| <b>Revenue</b>     |       |          |       |       |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| AU MS: AUC         | n.a.  | n.a.     | 75.2  | n.a.  | 97.0     | n.a.     | 95.4     | 97.0     | 97.0     | 111.0    |
| Partners: AUC      | n.a.  | n.a.     | 62.7  | n.a.  | 134.2    | n.a.     | 121.2    | 125.9    | 104.0    | 323.9    |
| AU MS: total       | 96.7  | 107.7    | 93.8  | 111.8 | 122.6    | n.a.     | 122.9    | 137.9    | 137.9    | 147.3    |
| Partners: total    | 36.3  | 32.4     | 57.4  | 133.7 | 134.1    | n.a.     | 155.4    | 170.1    | 257.3    | 374.8    |

Table 2 above shows that the partners' contributions are way above what the AU has been contributing and this has to be a cause for concern even to AMISOM itself. African Union members have to be committed to African problems for peace and security in the continent.

Data from the internet sources indicate that since 2007, the United States has provided US\$550 million to train and equip African troops in Somalia (Ibrahim, 2015). In addition to a lot of previous funding over the years, Ibrahim goes on to state that in October 2015 the European Union agreed to provide more than US\$186 million to speed up efforts to fight Al Shabaab militants. This continental body plays a pivotal role in funding AMISOM both in humanitarian and military terms. Kelly (2016) asserts that the European Union covers the full cost of payments to AMISOM soldiers through contributions it makes to the AU. Kelly further points out that the EU's total yearly payments amount to about \$200 million and that the AMISOM soldiers receive a monthly allowance of \$828 after their respective governments deduct a \$200 administrative cost per soldier.

According to Lorenz (2016), the AMISOM soldiers are paid by their national governments, which received €1.08 billion in stipends and allowances from the EU's African Peace Facility (APF) since March 2007. These allowances have allowed the AMISOM force to forge ahead and drive Al Shabaab from many small settlements and major towns in south and central Somalia

#### **4.2.3 Data from secondary sources on AU and Security in Somalia**

Data collected showed that one of AMISOM's main parts of the mandate is to defeat Al Shabaab and bring stability to Somalia. This can only be brought about by fighting Al Shabaab and taking over all the areas it controls as well as consolidating the gains. Below (Figure 2) is the vast map of Somalia from which Al Shabaab operates showing the towns, cities and infrastructure. Al Shabaab is mainly active in the southern and central regions of the country.



**Figure 2: Map of Somalia showing all areas including semi-autonomous areas of Somaliland and Puntland. Source: (United Nations Political Office for Somalia , 2015)**

Kenya operates mainly in the Middle Juba and lower Juba and Gedo regions where Al Shabaab carries out cross border incursions into Kenya to commit atrocities. Both sides of the Kenyan border with Somalia are occupied by mainly Somali speaking people and this has been fertile ground for Al Shabaab recruitment.



### **4.2.3.1 Structure of AMISOM Security**

According to the AMISOM (2014), the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is made up of the Military, Police and Civilian components. These are the components responsible for ensuring the mandate given to AMISOM comes to fruition. Various levels of achievement have been attained by these components with the military having made tremendous headway.

#### **4.2.3.1.1 Military Component**

The military component comprises of troops contributed by the African Union member states namely:

Uganda – deployed in Sector 1, the Banair and lower Shabelle area.

Kenya - deployed in Sector 2, Lower and Middle Juba


Ethiopia - Bay and Bakool as well as the Gedo region.

Djibouti - deployed in Sector 4, Hiraan and Galgaduud.

Burundi - Middle Shabelle region (AMISOM, 2014)

According to the AMISOM (2014), the strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel stands now at 22,126. This includes both troops and police. Along with the current Force Headquarters staff of 81, the military component has 5,432 troops from Burundi, 1000 troops from Djibouti, 3,664 from Kenya, , Ethiopia 4,395 and 6,223 troops from Uganda. A round figure of 22000 troops including police is quoted in most recent documentation, but the exact numbers contributed by each country vary from source to source.

Since 2011 AMISOM has managed to drive Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and most towns. However, Al Shabaab has managed to blend into the local population and carry out unconventional attacks on AMISOM troops. The map below (Figure 5) shows the different sectors manned by different countries as well as the Al Shabaab remaining hotspots between January 2014 and October 2014.




**Figure 3: Map showing the geographical locations of the sectors from which different country troops operate within Somalia and Al Shabaab territory losses in 2014. Source: (Tojeiro, 2015)**

It is clear from the maps above that Al Shabaab was severely degraded between January 2014 and October 2014 with the trend continuing into 2015 as evidenced by Figure 6 below. Figure 6 shows areas of Al Shabaab presence and not control as before. This shows tremendous work and great positive impact by AMISOM in Somalia.

Data collected from secondary sources indicate that while AMISOM is a collective AU force, there are signs of self-national interests especially with Ethiopia and Kenya (Albrecht, 2014). It is stated that Kenya entered Somalia to pursue Al Shabaab militants after attacks on hotels and other businesses only to become part of AMISOM later. Ethiopia is deployed mainly along its own borders to ensure its own national security as well as honouring the UN mandate (Figure 6) while Kenya is deployed in the South in its own border area as well.

The map below also shows vast areas of south and central Somalia with Al Shabaab presence. These areas are in the rural villages off the highways. Al Shabaab can carry out ambushes and return to the sanctuary of these areas thus prolonging the conflict. The fact that it is mainly the highways and towns that have been cleared of Al Shabaab is a cause for concern. The question

that comes to mind is: Are the 22000 forces available enough to fight Al Shabaab, hold onto the recovered territory as well as pursue Al Shabaab into the countryside? Are the trained Somali troops equipped enough to assist, hold recovered territory and complement the work of AMISOM?



**Figure 4: Map showing political and military set up as at September 2015. Source: (BBC News, 2015)**

Data collected from internet sources reveal that the military component of AMISOM is responsible for fighting Al Shabaab and recovering territory as well as training and setting up a professional Somali national army to take over from AMISOM troops when they disband (AMISOM, 2014). Findings of the research also reveal that in April 2013, Somalia’s Defence Minister Adihakim Hayi Mohamad Fiqi, said he would start recruiting clan militias’ into the national army (Global Security, 2015). It is also stated that the Somalia’s new leaders aim to train and equip a professional army of 28000 soldiers by end of 2016. According to this Global Security, a total of 13829 Somali National Army and 5134 Somali troops were biometrically registered. 9495 soldiers began receiving support funded by the US (Global Security, 2015). The Global Security further states that in July 2015, 1350 personnel were officially integrated into the Somali National Army from Gedo and Juba areas with technical and logistical support from

UNSOM and UNSOA and that a total of 16780 members of the SNA and 5200 police were biometrically registered by end of August 2015. The Global Security also states that some 1350 additional troops received training on human rights in Kismayo and became eligible for UNSOA support bringing total beneficiaries to 10507. This shows that AU mission to Somalia is doing immense work of facilitation to ensure there is sustainable peace and security in Somalia.

Findings from both primary and secondary sources used indicate that the military component has also made great achievements in fighting Al Shabaab. Remarkable military success for AMISOM started in 2011 when AMISOM and government- aligned militia forced Al Shabaab to tactically retreat from Mogadishu in August 2011. Several key towns were liberated in lower and middle Shabelle. According to the BBC News (2012), in February 2012 a combined force of Ethiopian and Somali troops backed by fighting vehicles including tanks took over the strategic militant town of Baidoa from Al Shabaab. This was the home town of many Al Shabaab leaders and fighters.

Data from the internet sources also reveal that in September 2012, the Kenyan and Somali defence forces launched an amphibious attack on the port city of Kisimayo and captured it (Chonghaile, 2016). According to Chonghaile, this was Al Shabaab's last major stronghold and key source of revenue. It is stated that the militants were heavily dependent on earnings from charcoal exports through the port, and taxes levied on businesses.

In March 2014 AMISOM and SNA liberated six strategic towns of Hudur, Rabdhure, Ted, Weeldheyn and Burdhubow in Gedo and Bakool regions in Sector 3 and Bunlo Burde in Hiraan region (AMISOM, 2014). The Ethiopian Herald of 17 August 2015 reported that Somali, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops had captured a series of towns and villages including Taraka, Jungal, Duraned, Eel-elaan, Habakhaliul, Meyon, Magalay and major town of Bhadheere (The Ethiopian Herald, 2015). The Ethiopian Herald also reports that in Bakool, operations resulted in the recovery of Buur-dhuhunle, Kulun-jareer, Moragabey, Legaly and Gelowoyni. In Bay region, Ufurow, Eosow, Hasanow-Mumin, Wlidaade, Makoon, Dhargo and Manaas were also taken. The Ethiopian Herald also reported that on August 12 2015, AMISOM troops drove Al Shabaab from the town of Algen. Literature reviewed share the same sentiments with the findings of the research on military successes of the military component of AMISOM on territory recovered from Al Shabaab.

#### **4.2.3.1.2 AMISOM Police**

According to the AMISOM (2014), the AMISOM Police has the mandate to train, mentor, and monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF). It is reported that the AMISOM police comprises of 386 police officers. The Individual Police Officers (IPO) are from Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe while the Formed Police Units (FPU) from Nigeria and Uganda each comprise of 140 officers. The IPO are deployed in all the AMISOM sectors (AMISOM, 2014). Some 280 FPU are from Nigeria and Uganda and 3 Senior Leadership Team (SLT) officers are from South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria. The AMISOM (2014) expounds that the Formed Police Units ensure improved security in the liberated areas through joint patrols with SPF, assisting in Public Order Management and providing VIP escorts to AU IPOs and relocated with SPF to new locations. Findings from internet sources also reveal that to date over 5000 Somali police officers have been trained in different categories of police work including human rights and gender (AMISOM, 2014).

#### **4.2.3.1.3 AMISOM Civilian Component**

Findings from secondary sources indicate that the AMISOM civilian component comprises of a unit that is political which is responsible for monitoring, interpreting and reporting on political and other progresses throughout Somalia as well as giving advice on political developments. It helps to build the capacity of the country's public service and implements political resolutions made by the African union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). It has also tried to launch civil reconciliation initiatives between the government and clansmen with the intention to seek representation and political inclusion (AMISOM, 2014).

The African Union Peace and Security (2013) reports that in September 2012, the AMISOM civilian component managed to transfer power from the Transitional National Government (TNG) to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and elect a president in 2013. In addition to supporting the process, the political section undertook capacity building programmes for the government including training of civil servants, facilitating job mentoring and improving office accommodation for government. It is also stated that this civilian component also revamped local governance in liberated areas as well as facilitate humanitarian assist. It also enhanced gender based training for troops and the general population and undertook to train Somali women on their possible role in governance (African Union Peace and Security, 2013).

From the findings of the research, the humanitarian mandate of AMISOM is limited to a facilitation role. The mandate provides that AMISOM shall “Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (AMISOM, 2014). The achievements reported are that it has secured roads and seaports to enable UN humanitarian work. Findings also reveal that it has provided escorts for humanitarian convoys and used their army medical facilities to treat locals.

#### **4.2.4 Findings from Questionnaires and Interviews on AU and Security in Somalia**

A respondent from data gathered through a questionnaire indicate that Somalia is a permanent agenda on the AU Peace and Security Council and the Summits as the AU tries to bring an end to this conflict which has consumed that country for more than two decades now. The respondent clearly stated that, “Without peace in Somalia, there is no lasting peace in East Africa. The forces of destabilization cannot be allowed to prosper as this will send a wrong signal to Somalis and the world. Progress has been made given the presence of a Somali government in Mogadishu which was not possible five years ago. While the struggle continues, Africa has to be commended for its efforts especially undertaking to build institutions which were no longer in existence and in particular a Somali security apparatus and force that can defend the country.”

Findings from an interview as well as from a questionnaire indicate that African countries are committed to peace in Somalia as evidenced by AMISOM and troops contributing to fight Al Shabaab. It is also indicated that many countries have lost troops in Somalia meaning that they have made the ultimate sacrifice to bring peace to Somalia. The other data collected from the questionnaire is that the AU has committed substantial resources to Somalia in the form of both financial, human, military equipment and time. The same questionnaire specified that African countries have committed to a peaceful Africa by 2020 in order to focus on development on the continent.

Data gathered from the same questionnaire has explained well achievements made by the AMISOM in border policing, curbing arms trafficking, capacity building-Somali army and local governance as well as blocking Funds to Al Shabaab.

#### **4.2.4.1 Border Policing**

Data from a questionnaire strongly applauds the AMISOM that it has trained Somali police to be up to the task of border policing to stop smuggling of charcoal out of Somalia by Al Shabaab. The respondent further states that AMISOM has helped to control movement of people and to screen Al Shabaab movements in and out of the country. The respondent further points out that at the request of the AU, there is the support of the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union's activities. This is taking place under the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), which is working with the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen its criminal justice system, and recognizing the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully. There is support for the development of a coastal police force.

#### **4.2.4.2 Curbing arms trafficking**

The data gathered from questionnaires indicate that the police, army and intelligence have also been trained to control arms inflow in Somalia. Without arms AL Shabaab's threat will be limited. The data collected also specified that a realistic police plan linked with medium term rule of law programmes and in line with the federal vision is now in operation.

#### **4.2.4.3 Capacity building- Somali army and local governance**

Findings from a questionnaire with data researched from the UNSC (2015) indicate that the implementation of the Guulwade (Victory) Plan of AMISOM's provision of training and mentoring to the SNA was a critical step towards the development of the capacity of a more effective and sustainable SNA, including the initial priority of backing up and developing the 10,900 SNA troops that can tackle Al Shabaab. According to a respondent of this questionnaire, the Government has made efforts in establishing an integrated army. Findings also indicate that the Somali National Security Sector architecture, as well as a definition of the roles of relevant national security sector institutions as a way of improving coordination between AMISOM and the SNA to tackle Al Shabaab has been completed.

#### **4.2.4.4 Blocking Funds to Al Shabaab**

Data collected from a questionnaire specified that the AU pushed to have the UN Security Council list Al Shabaab as a terrorist organization and is therefore under sanctions. This questionnaire also indicated that Eritrea is also under sanctions for being the conduit of funding to Al Shabaab. Furthermore the findings also reveal that the AU also pushed for the UNSC to ban the export or import of charcoal from Somalia which was one of the sources of funding for Al Shabaab.

Findings from a questionnaire with data extracted from the UNSC (2015) indicate that the AU has also pushed against piracy off the Somali coast with the support partners. Findings reveal that the efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Ocean Shield, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151, counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia have been commended. Other States who are acting in a national capacity cooperate with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to guard ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia. Findings also reveal that there are also the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Russia in conjunction with AMISOM and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) UNSC (2015).

A respondent from an interview strongly applauded the work of AU in terms of combating terrorism and cited conventions and protocols made to combat terrorism even well before the OAU transitioned into AU. According to this respondent, the AU has condemned Al Shabaab terrorism as well as other terrorists elsewhere plaguing the African continent.

Data collected, has revealed great achievements made by the AU since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007 in stabilising Somalia. The literature reviewed has also discussed the military and political achievements made by the AMISOM. However, findings also reveal that, despite achievements made so far, AMISOM is still suffering from setbacks and challenges some of which were also noted in the literature reviewed.



### **4.3 AMISOM Military Setbacks**

Findings from various secondary sources reveal that the AMISOM has encountered setbacks during the fight against Al Shabaab. Major setbacks in military losses involved attacks on troop bases with significant troop losses. According to Laing (2016), in June 2015, 54 Burundians were killed in an attack on their base in Leego. It also reported that on 01 September 2015, an estimated 50 Ugandan troops were feared dead while an equivalent number was said to be missing after Al Shabaab attacked a Ugandan AMISOM base in Janaale south west of Mogadishu in the Shabelle region (Aljazeera News, 2015). Despite a string of successes in routing Al Shabaab out of the towns and other small settlements, Al Shabaab still carries out unconventional attacks like these where their aim is to cause casualties rather than gain territory (Agence France-Presse (AFP), 2015).

Data collected also reveal that in January 2016, Al-Shabaab terrorists launched a suicide and gun attack on a Kenyan African Union base (Lang, 2016). According to Lang, this took place on an outpost manned by Kenyan troops near the town of el Adde, about 340 miles west of the capital Mogadishu near Kenya's northern border. It is stated that the gates were rammed by a suicide bomber in a car followed by gunfire. Initial reports by Al Shabaab said 63 had been killed (Laing, 2016)

Lang further notes that of the 31 military vehicles inside the camp, 28 were confiscated plus all the arms and ammunition in the stores.” According to Lang, the Kenyan military denied the death toll but said that fighters on both sides had been killed and declined to give numbers.



**Figure 5: Kenyan soldiers attend a memorial service at Eldoret in Kenya on 27 January 2016 for colleagues who were killed in an Al Shabaab attack. (Source: Gaffey, 2016)**

Later on the Somali President torched a storm when he claimed about 180 Kenyan soldiers had died in the attack (Gaffey, 2016)

The attack on El Adde exposed some serious shortcomings of AMISOM. AMISOM did not manage to provide relief for the attacked soldiers and recover the situation leaving Kenya to send its own forces from Wajir, El Wak and Mandera in Kenya to contain the situation (Githae, 2016). This is probably because AMISOM lacked the relevant resources for rapid deployment. The KDF Chief Gen Samson Mwathethe was quoted in Gathae (2015) saying that AMISOM lacked the necessary capacity of assisting the Kenyan troops in Eldde and this forced Kenya to mobilise its resources to react to the situation.

Data collected indicate that the Al Shabaab terrorists have been attacking AMISOM bases at about dawn, soon after a new set of armed forces arrive in the battlefields (Gathae, 2015).

According to Gathae, it has also emerged that the staged attacks by Al Shabaab group occur within a few weeks following deployment of new troops. It is argued that the attack on Kenyan base has exposed a tactic which AMISOM was supposed to be prepared for following the attacks on the Ugandan and Burundian bases earlier where ISIS style methods of using suicide vehicles to break into the camps were used. Gathae has exposed some loopholes in AMISOM that it does not allow troops to be replaced in sequence but demands that new troops come in and old ones go out at one time. Gathae's argument is that troops are replaced by a new set that is not acquainted with the situation on the ground. It has also been pointed out that the worst part of it is that military intelligence officers are also replaced together with other troops in the rotations. According to Gathae (2015) this should not happen in combat ones like Somalia but in peacekeeping missions. He recommends that troops be replaced in sequence where few soldiers are left behind to help the new set of troops acquaint to the situation on the ground.

In addition it has also been stated that intelligence failed as the attack was too massive for the preparations and execution to go unnoticed to such proportions with the possibility of the majority of the locals going along with the militants.

Civilian lives have been lost and property destroyed in the fight between Al Shabaab and AMISOM and countries contributing troops have suffered attacks in their countries by Al Shabaab for their role for example, the attacks on the West Gate Mall and the Garissa University in Kenya, bombing of soccer fans in Uganda etc.

Findings also reveal that AMISOM has lost territory to the Al Shabaab militants in some cases. It is reported that in September 2015 Al Shabaab retook the town of Janale from AMISOM as well as Buqda, El Saliindi and Kuntuwarey. An AMISOM spokesman said the towns were not of strategic value, but this left the residents at the mercy of AL Shabaab again (Eremionkhale, 2015). Other small towns have also exchanged hands elsewhere. Eremionkhale has also pointed out some reasons as to why the AMISOM troops have been losing captured territory. Reasons given from the finding are as follows:

- Locals are wary of AMISOM troops as they claim they treat them no better than Al Shabaab and as a result some even celebrate the militants' return.

- AMISOM is not a Somali standing army and as such Al Shabaab may feel un-intimidated.
- AMISOM does not have enough capacity to airlift fighting equipment to areas in demand and provide timely reinforcements. It is not just a case of numbers, but rapid deployment of both firepower and personnel is paramount.

#### **4.4 AU Challenges**

Findings from internet sources, questionnaire and interviews indicate that there are a lot of challenges encountered by AMISOM in fighting Al Shabaab menace. The challenges being encountered include lack of sustainable funding, equipment and human resources to fight Al Shabaab, secure the recovered territory as well as pursue Al Shabaab into the countryside. Data collected showed that there are about 22 000 troops who cannot cover the whole country.

Findings from the questionnaire stress that the main challenge of AU is financial resources; otherwise member states are willing to provide troops to fight Al Shabaab. A respondent from a questionnaire again pointed out that it is hoped that with more funding, the African Standby Force will be operationalized soon to tackle conflicts on the continent. This respondent further indicates that most African countries participate in UN peacekeeping because under the UN there is more and secure funding for their troops. It has also been noted from the findings that most funds to support AMISOM come from external sources. If these sources withdraw their aid, it would pose a big challenge to Africa.

The findings also specified that a divided Somalia is also a challenge and political process is taking time to consolidate for the Government to be in control. Clan rivalries are rife and reconciliation process is slow.

There are not enough trained public administration personnel with the capacity to set up and run government institutions in areas captured from Al Shabaab. Many Somalis have fled the country and are outside the region in USA and Europe.

The other challenge from findings is that though degraded, Al Shabaab continues to launch asymmetric attacks making the liberated areas unsafe.

The police component is short of skilled and specialised trainers. The rotational deployment of trainers also disrupts continuity as well as the language barrier. On the same note, findings also reveal that the rotational deployment of fighting troops has made AMISOM bases vulnerable to Al Shabaab terrorists.

Also the fact that Al Shabaab is now embedded in the community makes it very challenging for AMISOM to identify and fight them.

#### **4.5 Summary**

This chapter has presented and analysed findings on the role, impact and challenges encountered by AU in fighting Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. The findings were presented in the form of tables, maps, graphs and summaries. From the findings on the role of AU, it has been noted that the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), heavily buttressed by the international partners has and is still playing a vital role and has made great positive impact in countering Al Shabaab threat in Somalia. This is evidenced by the notable military and political achievements made so far since its inception in 2007. However, despite the achievements, findings have also shown that the mission is still suffering setbacks due to quite a number of challenges the mission is confronting. Also despite some territorial gains, most areas in the south and central Somalia still have Al-Shabaab presence mainly in the rural areas while major towns and smaller towns along the main highways are controlled by the AU troops and the SNA. In captured areas, asymmetric attacks are being carried out by Al Shabaab due to lack or weak administrative structures to support the military gains. This serves to argue that the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) still has mounting challenges to defeat Al Shabaab for peace, security and sustainable economic development in Somalia. The following chapter focuses on the summary and conclusion of the study. The chapter also makes recommendations on how best the AU can effectively deal with the challenges encountered to bring a lasting solution to the quagmire of terrorism in Somalia and the East African region as a whole.

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## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5.0 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter's main focus is to summarise the entire survey and how the study was conducted and also to summarise the findings as well as presenting the conclusion and recommendations. The researcher's conclusion is based on the findings of the study. The recommendations highlight what the AU can do to overcome some of the challenges and effectively deal with Al Shabaab for sustainable peace, security and economic development in Somalia.

#### **5.2 Summary of the Study**

The study set out to assess the role of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. The study was prompted by the escalating incidents of deadly terror attacks including suicide bombings, killings and military assaults using sophisticated kinds of weapons leaving hundreds dead and property destroyed. The study is structured in five chapters. Chapter one of the research focuses on the introduction of the study, background to the study, research objectives, research questions, limitations, delimitations, hypothesis, conceptualization of terrorism and the structure of the study. Chapter two is premised on reviewing works of other researchers on the role of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism. Literature reviewed indicate that Al Shabaab has been degraded despite the fact that the AU Mission to Somalia is encountering challenges which include lack of funding, human resources, military equipment including helicopters. Solutions were also proffered as to how best the Al Shabaab threat could be eradicated.

The third chapter provides methods employed to collect data on the role of AU in combating Al Shabaab. The qualitative research design was employed and both primary and secondary sources were used to collect data. The research instruments used to collect data were unstructured questionnaires and interviews. The research also made use of varied secondary sources which include Journal articles, AU Reports and Summits, UN Reports, books and newspapers. On sampling, purposive also commonly known as judgemental method was selected as it best suited the topic under study. A sample size of ten personnel involved in peace and security studies of Somalia had been selected, but only five participated in the research by providing answers to a set of questions asked through questionnaires and in interviews.

The fourth chapter set out to present the findings of the research on the impact of AU in combating Al Shabaab in Somalia. The findings indicate that the AU, assisted by the international partners has done a lot in reducing the threat of terrorism in Somalia. The AU deployed AMISOM to Somalia in December 2007 and the mission has managed to mobilise funds from the USA, UN, EU and other international partners to bring sanity to Somalia. The AMISOM, fighting alongside the National Somali Army has degraded Al Shabaab and most major towns like Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo are under government control. Security has greatly improved in most areas of Somalia. Findings have also shown that due to the presence of AMISOM in Somalia, for the first time after 21 years of civil war, Somalia has an interim government and elections have been scheduled to be held in 2016.

However, findings also reveal that while the presence of AMISOM and US drone strikes have reduced the terror attacks in the country, Al Shabaab has not been defeated and continues to destabilise the country. Its links to both ISIS and Al Qaeda shows that it wants to stay relevant and get support from these major terrorist groups. Despite the remarkable achievements, findings have also indicated setbacks of the AU Mission to Somalia. Findings have shown that though degraded, Al Shabaab is still very much alive and have changed strategy to asymmetrical attacks using guerrilla tactics and suicide bombings. Their attacks beyond Somali borders particularly in Kenya have intensified with notable examples including the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, 2013, Garissa University College on April 2, 2015, and El- Adde on Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) base that killed many soldiers serving under AMISOM recently, in January 2016. This shows that Al Shabaab is a complex phenomenon to deal with and their decentralized nature complicates the matter more. The group continues to launch deadly guerrilla tactics across the Horn of Africa country.

From the findings of the study, it has emerged that the major challenge encountered by AMISOM is inadequate funding to increase equipment and human resources to continue fighting Al Shabaab and effectively secure areas liberated.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

The conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that despite the setbacks and challenges encountered, the AU has done a great job to enforce peace and security in Somalia. The AU's Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has played a successful role in fighting and degrading Al

Shabaab. Relative secure environment has been created in most major towns and cities such as Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo as well as smaller towns which used to be controlled by Al Shabaab and are now under government control. The AU mobilization of funds from its international partners such as UN, EU, USA and many others to fight Al Shabaab has played a major role in bringing sanity to Somalia and to the East African region as a whole. General security has improved in most areas of the country. An interim government and some local administration institutions are in place though still weak in some of the captured areas. The AU's resolve and successful securing of AMISOM's unique mandate contributed a lot to the success of the AU for it allowed all necessary measures to be taken to secure and consolidate military gains. However, more still has to be done to stabilize the situation for sustainable peace, security and economic development in Somalia and in the East African region as a whole.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

For a lasting solution to Al Shabaab terrorism, the following recommendations have been proffered:

##### **Policy recommendations:**

- There is need for AU to urgently make an appeal to the UN and other International partners for sustainable funding to make an increase in human resources and equipment for AMISOM to effectively carry out its mandate and also the AU to pursue member countries to implement and remit funds collected from tourism levy and airport taxes to reduce reliance from external sources.
- Since Al Shabaab is now embedded in the community, there is need for AMISOM and the Somali government to win the hearts and minds of Somalis so as to be able to recruit reliable informers from the communities.
- There is need for securing all main supply routes of Al Shabaab throughout the country and urgently expand the national army with an additional focus on community-centred approaches to safety and security through community policing.
- The rotation of personnel in detachments should be carried out in a phased sequence so as to allow the new forces time to acclimatize and get re-oriented to a hostile combat situation.
- There is need for AMISOM to ensure that all recaptured areas including those outside the cities/towns are permanently secured by capacitating the local army to take over in those areas especially relying more on local recruits.

- There is need by the Somali government to deal with issues of underdevelopment and poverty in Somalia as most people are very vulnerable to manipulation by Al Shabaab due to their hardships; to be achieved by the delivery of basic services of humanitarian assistance.
- For a lasting peace in Somalia, there is need for a commitment to an inclusive and credible electoral process by government and all Somalis as soon as the security environment becomes conducive.
- There is also the need to establish a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration across the country as the basis of any long term approach to stability, uphold human rights and hold accountable those responsible for such crimes.

**Scholarly recommendation:**

- There is need for more thinktank on factors that trigger terrorism in Somalia and the whole East African region for sustainable peace, security and economic development.

**APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX 1**

**Letter for permission to carry out research**

02 February 2016

Dear Sir/Madam

**Subject: POSTGRADUATE DISSERTATION RESEARCH FOR ...Felistas Chitsiku**

This letter serves to inform you that the above named student is carrying out research as part of her fulfillment for postgraduate studies. The research topic reads: **An assessment of the role of the African Union (AU) in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia; 2006-2016**.....

For more information feel free to contact the Department.

Yours sincerely

Prof Percyslage Chigora  
Chigorap2000@yahoo.com  
**(Chairperson)**

## APPENDIX 2

### Unstructured Interview Guide

My name is Felistas Chitsiku. I am a student at Midlands State University studying for a Master of Science Degree in International Affairs. I am carrying out research **on the role of the African Union (AU) in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia**. The data collected shall be used for the purpose of this study only. You are assured that your responses will be treated with privacy and confidentiality. Your contribution is greatly acknowledged.

1. The African continent is bedeviled by threats to peace, security and development which include armed rebellions, terrorism and human trafficking. What is the role of AU in combating terrorism on the continent?
2. The AU mission to Somalia AMISOM fighting Al Shabaab, is comprised of volunteer countries, what can you say are the commitments of African countries in this regard?
3. One of the AU's roles is to mobilise funding for AMISOM, how successful has it been in this area?
4. In your opinion what is the source of weapons used by Al Shabaab, and how has AU been successful in curbing arms trafficking and in border policing?
5. AU has an early warning system in its modus operandi, how has this been used effectively to combat Al Shabaab?
6. How effective has AU been in capacitating Somali National Force?
7. Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti appear to be fighting Al Shabaab because of their national security concerns, to what extent is this likely to compromise the objectives of the African Union in Somalia?
8. Al Shabaab is said to have been degraded over the years, in your opinion what needs to be done to ensure there is no resurgence?
9. I understand Al Shabaab is a home-grown terrorist organization and as such has local support, what must AU do to help win the hearts and minds of Somalis so that they stop supporting Al Shabaab terror?

10. What challenges do you think are the major setbacks of AU in defeating Al Shabaab?

11. Apart from winning the hearts and minds of the Somalis, What solutions do you proffer to ensure lasting peace in Somalia?

12. Lastly, following the attack on the El Adde army base in Southern Somalia recently, how has the attack strengthened or weakened AMISOM will and zeal to fight Al Shabaab?

**APPENDIX 3**

**Questionnaire**

My name is **Felistas Chitsiku**. I am a student at Midlands State University studying for a Master of Science Degree in International Affairs. I am carrying out research **on the role of the African Union (AU) in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia**. The data collected shall be used for the purpose of this study only. To ensure data privacy, integrity and confidentiality, there are no names that will be used.

- 1. African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is a brainchild of the AU, but the forces which are fighting Al Shabaab are from volunteer countries, what can you say are the commitments of African countries in this regard?

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- 2. One of AU's roles is to mobilise funding for AMISOM, how successful has it been in this area?

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3. Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti appear to be fighting Al Shabaab because of their national security concerns, to what extent is this likely to compromise the objectives of the African Union in Somalia?

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4. In your opinion, what must the African Union do to solicit more participation by member states in peace and stabilization missions on the continent in terms of financial and personnel contributions?

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5. What role has AMISOM played in the following areas towards defeat of Al Shabaab?

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b) Curbing arms trafficking  
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c) Capacity building- Somali army and local governance  
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d) Intelligence gathering  
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e) Blocking Al Shabaab funding  
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6. Al Shabaab is said to have been degraded over the years, in your opinion what needs to be done to ensure there is no resurgence?  
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7. Al Shabaab is a home-grown terrorist organization and as such has local support, what must AU do to help win the hearts and minds of Somalis so that they stop supporting Al Shabaab terror?

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8. What challenges do you think are the major setbacks of AU in defeating Al Shabaab?

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9. Apart from winning the hearts and minds of the Somalis, what possible solutions do you proffer to ensure lasting peace in Somalia?

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10. Following the attack on the El Ade army base in Southern Somalia recently, how has the attack strengthened or weakened AMISOM’s will and zeal to fight Al Shabaab?

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Thank you for your cooperation

## APPENDIX 4

### Turnitin Report

Turnitin Originality Report

F.\_Chitsiku\_Dissertation turnitin by Felistas chitsiku  
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