

**MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY**



**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT**

**AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUB REGIONAL BODIES IN  
OFFERING REMEDY TO POST ELECTION VIOLENCE IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA:  
THE CASE OF SADC ON ZIMBABWE 2008-2014.**

**BY**

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PUBLIC MANAGEMENT HONOURS DEGREE AT MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY**

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## APPROVAL FORM

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## Dedication

This research is dedicated to my beloved family Lucy, Mpho and Muthungamatto Chibi for the love and support offered throughout my studies.

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## Abstract

The defeat of ZANU PF party in first round of the March 2008 election resulted in a massive violence against its oppositions the MDCs. The violence attracted attention from the international communities, thereby leading to the intervention of SADC in Zimbabwe. The research noted that a summit was held to discuss Zimbabwe's political violence. The former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki was to lead a peace keeping mission as a mediator between the ZANU PF party and the MDCs. The negotiations gave birth to the GNU which has been criticized as a marriage of convenience and a method of postponing the problem. The research notes that the GNU was characterized by clash of interests within the government due to its difference in ideologies. Therefore, the research is an analysis of the effectiveness of sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post election violence in Sub Saharan Africa. The study uses the case of SADC on Zimbabwe 2008-2014. The findings of the research includes lack of unity within SADC members and limited resources within the organization to fund its peace keeping mission, thereby making it challenge to be effective when depending on a donor's budget. The research notes that the principle of Sovereignty and non-state intervention continue impose constraints on the ability of SADC to intervene at an early stage. The study note that SADC managed to normalise the political environment in Zimbabwe 2008 -2014, however it failed to address the cases of violence that were already reported ,thereby denying justice to the victim of the post-election .

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
AUPW	African Union Panel of Wise
GPA	Global Political Agreement
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GPA	Global Political Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
IG	Inclusive Government
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MSU	Midlands State University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PF ZAPU	Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development -coordinating Conference
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

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# CHAPTER 1

## 1.0 Introduction

This research is an analysis of the effectiveness of regional bodies in offering solution to post election violence in Sub Saharan Africa. The intervention of Southern African Development Community (SADC) on Zimbabwe after the 2008 post-election violence is used as a case study. The study examines the possible causes of disputes over the legitimacy of elections and the reason behind post-election violence in Sub Saharan African. It further examines the present legal structures of SADC, to find out whether they can effectively address the problem in question. The research highlighted a number of the challenges faced by SADC as a regional body in maintaining positive peace in the region.

## 1.1 Background to the Study

The African continent is common with deep scares of undemocratic changes in government since the attainment of political independence by most Sub-Saharan African countries. These countries include Zimbabwe, Angola, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and others. The regional and sub-regional bodies include the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU).

The objectives of regional integration range from promoting common political values and systems, strengthening legitimate and democratic institutions and consolidating peace, security and stability. According to Institute for democracy in Africa report of 2004, in Southern Africa, political integration involves the establishment of shared values and norms that guide the goals of regional co-operation and development. These norms and values are embodied in the agreements, declarations and protocols that cover a wide range of economic and social sectors, such as SADC's recent procedure on Elections and Democracy.

Elections play a critical role in democracy, allowing citizens to articulate their interests and hold government accountable. Yet, in many Sub-Saharan African countries with weak institutions and a history of conflict, high stakes electoral competition leads to violence and threatens the stability

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of democratic institutions for instance the 2007/2008 election in Kenya and Zimbabwe which were characterized by violence and electoral fraud. 2007–2008 post-election violence in Kenya that displaced over 300 000 people (Mchomvu, 2011). Therefore this research is an analysis of the effectiveness of sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post election violence.

Political disagreement and uprisings has been on the rise in Southern Africa after the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century over the validity of election results. Nathan (2006) noted that the region as a whole faced many violent conflict, specifically in countries such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) ,Lesotho ,Namibia ,Malawi ,Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This is due to political, economic, domestic governance and International relations. There have been many elections results which have been disputed by opposition parties, movements, election observers, non-governmental organizations and the international community on grounds of unprofessional conduct such as vote rigging; vote buying, intimidation and stealing of elections. According to Adejumobi (2000) there are cases of conflict and electoral violence in numerous states in the Southern Africa and there have been circumstances in which election results have not been satisfactory to all parties involved, resulting in violence and instability. More so, European International Studies Associations Report(2004) state that, even in some states where there is a certain degree of recognition of election results, elements of discontent has been recognized after elections results have been announced. Regarding such aspect it can be noted that the study seeks to analyse the effectiveness of regional bodies in ensuring solution to post election violence in the Sub Saharan region.

Adejumobi (2000) noted that elections in Southern Africa in their form and implementation appear to be a fading shadow of democracy threatening the frail democratic project itself. Hence in other regions they have brought sound good governance, economic prosperity and government legitimacy while in other nations it has brought isolation from the international community, election violence and conflict with other erupting into a civil war like for instance in Zimbabwe. Mchomvu (2011) argues that, in some states, there have been instances where the Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) has fabricated results in favour of the incumbent regime for instance some analyst argue that the Zimbabwe Electoral Board (ZEC) is said to have been biased and being in favour of the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) because some of the ZEC board members are appointed by the president. It is due to these

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allegations, that some candidates mainly from opposition parties have been refusing to concede defeat arguing that the elections have been fabricated (Slaa, 2010). For instance, during 2010 Tanzania general elections, the presidential candidate for the main opposition party, Dr Slaa called the National Electoral Commission to rescind presidential results on the ground that they were fabricated in favour of the ruling party and refused to concede defeat. Therefore the study is an analysis of the effectiveness of regional bodies in offering remedy to post election irregularities in Sub Saharan Africa.

Moreover, in 1998, riots and rumours of a coup after an election dispute in Lesotho resulted in one of the first SADC-backed interventions, in which South Africa and Botswana troops were deployed to the mountainous kingdom. A separate regional body, the Front-Line States, had been created in 1979 with the aim of liberating all the southern African states. This group had an instrumental role of negotiating peace in Angola and Mozambique's civil wars as well as in the apartheid struggles of Namibia and South Africa. The SADC's precursor, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), was formed in 1980 by nine founding states, whose main focus was on economic and social development and did not include peace and security issues. Originally known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), the Organisation was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980, following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration. The Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which has replaced the Co-ordination Conference was signed at the Summit of Heads of State or Government on 17 August 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia (Mchomvu 2011).

Basically, Zimbabwe has a history of elections that fall far short of international and regional standards, and of government-sponsored repression of opposition parties. The government has not alleviated the serious flaws in the electoral process documented by local and international observers in the 2005 elections. Instead, the government has been responsible again for similar patterns of violence in the 2008 pre-election campaign period. According to Mudyanadzo (2011) the presidential elections were covered by political intimidation, political violence and allegations of electoral irregularities leading to the condemnation of the outcomes by the SADC region. The platform for candidates and their parties is not equal in elections and elections have appeared in Zimbabwe's contested political environment as a ground through which conflicts have emerged

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with violence and intimidation being used as tools for silencing alternate views. The regularity and frequency of elections generated a worrying trend and has created a tense atmosphere due to elections related to violence, thus some scholars argue that elections have never been a happy moment for Zimbabweans because, since the country's first elections in 1980, elections campaigns and post elections have gone hand in glove with violence and death. Regarding such aspects the study is an analysis of the effectiveness of SADC in offering solution to post election violence in Zimbabwe.

Nyakudya (2013) noted that before the run-off presidential election in June, the security services and ZANU-PF militia unleashed a campaign of intimidation, torture and murder against opposition activists, journalists, polling agents, public servants, civic leaders and ordinary citizens suspected of voting for the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The violence came to a climax after losing the March 2008 presidential election, the Zanu PF party carried out widespread state-sponsored violence and terror. The European International Studies Association Report (2008) states that a controversial outcome that entailed a run-off between the two candidates. A wave of politically-motivated violence erupted in several parts of the country, leaving hundreds of MDC supporters dead and many more injured, and prompted Tsvangirai to withdraw from the June run-off. Human rights violations, including torture, beatings, mutilations, and rapes were perpetrated against leaders and supporters of the opposition. Mchomvu (2011) states that Mugabe swept to victory in what was effectively a one-man race. However, election observer teams from SADC and the Pan African Parliament were unanimous in condemning the run-off election as neither free nor fair. Therefore, the above scenario highlights the rate of political motivated violence perpetrated by the ZANU PF to its opponents thereby analysing the effectiveness of Sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post election violence.

Nyakudya (2013) noted that after a disputed presidential election run-off in June 2008, mediation by the SADC brokered a political settlement creating a power-sharing government between Mugabe and his two main opposition rivals Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara. Disagreements between the rivalries delayed the coalition from coming into office until February 2009, and political differences continued to plague the government with both Mugabe and Tsvangirai declaring it a dysfunctional "marriage of convenience". Leon Hartwell Netherlands diplomat notes that several analysts have written about the government of national unity (GNU)'s shortcomings

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and disappointments, especially with regards to outstanding issues in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that have not been implemented. Zimbabwean politicians also sometimes talk about the GNU as if it is a “marriage of inconvenience” or more scornfully, an “unholy trinity”. However, failure to reflect on some of the processes and important moments since the formation of the GNU in 2009 would mean failing to recognize that Zimbabweans have shaped important values and institutions that can be built upon.

Mchomvu (2011) noted that in Zimbabwe, the SADC's engagement has resulted in mixed success against the inflexible Zanu PF party. To its credit, the bloc has managed to rein in Mugabe and prevent the dysfunctional power-sharing government from imploding. But the SADC has failed to enforce its calls for much-needed security, media and civil liberties reforms. Zimbabwe entered a state of violent political crisis in the aftermath of the presidential elections held in two rounds on March 29 and June 27, 2008. President Robert Mugabe led a campaign of terror against the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its supporters in the lead up to the electoral process. State-sponsored violence resulted in massive human rights violations, including rape, torture, and forced disappearance. Despite winning the June election, President Mugabe continued to implement brutal attacks against the political opposition. Responses by the United Nations and the African Union failed to undertake effective measures to address the crisis. Civil society groups, such as Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group, swiftly responded and condemned the repression and human rights abuses of the government. Despite the establishment of a unity government through the signing of the Global Political Agreement, the situation remained dangerous as political reforms were not implemented and Mugabe's party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) continued to engage in political violence. (Mchomvu 2011).

Regional response to the crisis was minimal and inadequate. Across the continent, Heads of State and governments condemned Mugabe's regime and called for him to step down in order to end the suffering in Zimbabwe. However, the African Union (AU) did not question Mugabe's right to assume Zimbabwe's seat at the AU summit in Egypt from June 30 to July 1, 2008 and Tanzanian president, Jakaya Kikwete, who chaired the summit, referred to the elections as “historic.” The AU condemned the post-election violence and deferred the situation to the South African Development Community (Mchomvu, 2011)

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Scholars like Mchomvu (2011), Nyakudya (2013) and Mudyanadzo (2011) note that the case of election-related violence in Zimbabwe was deliberated upon and was considered to be a threat to regional security. The above scholars argue that the Zimbabwe experience was informative to other states in the region, particularly on the handling of elections and their aftermath. SADC's response to the crisis was widely criticized, as civil society groups and leaders within SADC denounced its lack of reaction and involvement. SADC's strategy consisted of quiet diplomacy, including mediation efforts led by South African President Thabo Mbeki. Cawthra (2010) argues that as for the year 2008 contested elections, SADC remained silent until the matter was discussed by the AU at its ordinary session in Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt from 30 June - 1 July 2008, in which the AU decided that mediation of the crisis, be vested into SADC. It is on this ground, it has been argued, that SADC's role in the 2008 Zimbabwe disputed elections, emanated from the AU. Therefore the research is an analysis of the effectiveness of SADC in offering solution to Zimbabwe's post-election violence of 2008-2014.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

Sub regional bodies have a critical role to play in remedying post-election violence. The study is an investigation into the effectiveness of SADC's solution in Zimbabwe 2008 - 2014

### 1.3.0 Objectives of the study

- To analyse the effectiveness of SADC in offering remedy to post-election violence in Zimbabwe.
- To examine the political methods and legal frameworks used in offering to post-election violence in Southern Africa.
- To examine the role of SADC in preventing and resolving election violence using Zimbabwe as a case study.

### 1.3.1 Research Questions

- How effective is SADC as a regional body in offering remedy to post election violence in Southern Africa?
- How effective was SADC's legal mechanism in offering remedy to post election violence in Zimbabwe?



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- What are the constraints for SADC's effectiveness in resolving post-election violence in Zimbabwe?
  - What are the roles played by SADC in ensuring free and fair elections?

### 1.3.2 Significance of the study

This study seeks to examine SADC's response in the 2008 Zimbabwe disputed elections. It begins with a brief look into the disputed elections before embarking on a discussion of the regional body's response. Disputes over election results and electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa have been dominant for years now. There have been serious complaints from opposition parties claiming that officials fabricate election results. This study seeks to provide an insight into what measures need to be put in place so as to eradicate such disputes in Sub Saharan Africa in order to maintain positive peace and stability on the region. It will also offer suggestions that may be adopted by SADC to prevent electoral violence in the Sub Saharan region. The electoral violence writings exist in several articles, journals, newspapers as well as books. The research seeks to fill loopholes left by different academic writers on the actual causes of violence during, before or after elections. Also offer a way forward after electoral irregularities

### 1.3.3 Delimitations of the study

The research mainly investigates the effectiveness of SADC on offering solutions to the post-election violence in Zimbabwe. It examines the impact of SADC's intervention in Zimbabwe's affairs.

### 1.3.4 Assumptions and Limitations of the study

This study proceeds from the assumption that disputes over election results can only be effectively addressed by a regional body. It also takes a preliminary position that for the problem in question to be addressed effectively, the sub regional bodies need to put in place sufficient legal mechanisms.

One of the main limitation of the research has been on the legal framework of the state on issues concerning to access the information and protection of the privacy .In a nutshell with ethical consideration of a research no party was compelled to provide information, therefore involved party were mostly likely to produce biased information. Also, the area of study is likely to be

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sensitive due to the political environmental

## 1.4 Literature review

Electoral violence has drawn a huge attention on the international platform and a number of scholars argued that elections create a tense atmosphere in any state thus making the environment vulnerable to politically motivated violence. Mudyamadzo(2011) states that June 2008 electoral outcomes, because of its unacceptability within the domestic body politics, destabilize the domestic political environment and in turn affected Zimbabwe's regional and International relations in particular with the Western countries who responded by tightening economic and travel sanctions leading to the Global Political Agreement. Thus in some way elections have paved way for violence by creating tensions amongst citizens who belong to different political parties in many countries especially in Africa violence has become a norm before, during or after elections and this has been named electoral violence. Electoral violence has been witnessed in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mali, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria among others. Olumide (2007) asserts that the real reason to why there have been sky-rocketing incidents of electoral violence in Africa particularly has remained a ghost never to be seen. Therefore this study seeks to address the gaps left by various scholars, such as finding the ways to reduce the rate of post-election violence in the region and to find a survival strategy after the occurrence of violence.

Generally elections should be free and fair. The election environment should be peaceful, violence free, no electoral fraud and free from other electoral irregularities. According to Smith (2007) "for an election to be fair, it must be administered by politically impartial people". He argues that, in most cases the impartiality of Election Management Bodies Elections is compromised because election officials 'come under intolerable pressure to mismanage the process in favour of the incumbents.' This study focuses on Zimbabwe's 2008 electoral violence and the role played by SADC as a regional body in ensuring stability to post election violence.

Problems facing elections in Africa and how the international community can work towards promoting free and fair elections in Africa are generally discussed by Rukambe (2008). He argues that, in Africa elections take place at a 'high stake environment' where winning mean shaving control over all state resources and institutions including the Election Management Body, thus

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African elections are characterized by violence. He further argues that all these are mobilized in such a way that, they protect the incumbent from being 'dislodged from power'. However, in his work, Rukambe did not discuss the role of the Regional Economic Communities in ensuring free and fair elections in Africa.

Furthermore, Nyakudya (2013) notes that, the crisis in Zimbabwe has generally exposed SADC as a toothless bulldog with no capacity to enforce its will in conflicts within relatively powerful member states. It shows that SADC faces major challenges in this area, notably the need to bridge the divide between the legacy of liberation and post-liberation politics. Then there is the paradox of the regional integration agenda versus the need to respect the sovereignty of member states. Therefore, the research is an analysis the effectiveness of SADC as a regional body in offering solution to the post-election violence in Zimbabwe 2008-2014 without undermining its sovereignty.

The importance of building relevant institutions to manage elections in Africa is noted by the African Union Panel of Wise (AUPW) report. The AUPW notes that although elections are vital in the democratic process, they do not always ensure democracy. To enable elections enhance democracy, the AUPW argues that peace and security and relevant institutions need to be put in place. The current study focuses on the role of the SADC (as a regional Body) in ensuring legitimacy of election results in Africa as one of initiatives towards enhancing credibility of elections to make them promote democracy, peace and security on the continent.

Crawford Bough Macpherson is one of the first scholars to explore the principle of participatory democracy. Basing his analysis on some of the arguments that were advanced by John Stuart Mill, he argued that the realm of democracy can be extended from periodic involvement in elections to participation in decision-making in all aspects of life and this would concretize the reality that elections are only an aspect of the democratic process. The research has noted that elections can positively contribute to participatory democracy only when they are free and fair, also if people are left to choose their leaders without fear and intimidation.

Mismanagement and manipulation of elections in favour of the ruling parties is also explored by Fombad (2003) in his journal article. He argues that for elections to be free and fair, EMBs must be sufficiently independent. He contends that many EMBs in Africa lack 'power autonomy and

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capacity' hence have 'merely served as instruments for perpetuating rituals of symbolic elections and disguise signs of authoritarian revival.' His study focused on the role of the EMBs in Africa with a particular reference to Cameroon's National Election Observatory. This study focuses on the role of the SADC in ensuring legality of election results in their regions. More so, Zimbabwe is used as a case study.

It can be noted that violence can also undermine the entire election itself. With the presence or threat of violence, voters may opt not to register or decide to stay away from the polls altogether, candidates may withdraw, or politicians may use it as a reason to cancel or postpone the election. Höglund (2009) notes that when domestic and international observers judge that an election has been marred by violence; the legitimacy of the result is jeopardized, as is the legitimacy of the elected official. For example, at the start of Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua's term, he had to acknowledge the problems in Nigeria's electoral process, and he was forced to submit to a review of his own electoral victory. Many other elected officials also saw their victories reviewed and, in a number of cases, reversed. Since the above focuses on Nigeria this study focuses on Zimbabwe during the 2008 elections and its aftermath.

Liberal democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa has reduced citizen political participation to visits to the ballot box. Carothers (2002) has observed that under liberal democracy. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting and there is little, if any, citizen participation in decision-making in-between elections. Dzinesa and Zambara (2011) argue that the lack of a regional monitoring mechanism to oversee the implementation of the agreement and of a strict timetable to review progress contributed to the slow pace of reform in Zimbabwe.

## 1.5 Theoretical framework

The issue of violence and elections is one of the critical trends since the introduction of multiparty state politics in the world. The study uses two theories which are the realist theory and the psychological theory of frustration and aggression. The above stated theories have been employed to explain post-election violence in Zimbabwe and the reaction of SADC. The theory expose characteristics and actors responsible for occurrence of violence, this include participants, perpetrators, victims designation type of violence involved, geographical location, time and violation of electoral law.

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## 1.6.0 Research Design.

Aaker (1999) defines a research design as a systematic step used to achieve the purpose of the study. Research design can also be viewed as step by step procedures which you can following order to gather data and analyse data for the information that it contains (Jankowicz 200; 125). According to Saunder (2009; 136) a research design is a general plan on how you go about answering your researches. A research design produces a framework for the collection and analysis of data (Keeves, 1997:13).

### 1.6.1 Research Paradigm.

The study employs qualitative research because its focus is to establish the extent to which these illegalities and irregularities hinder the smooth flow of elections in the face of democracy and the degree on which these perceptions were a reality basing on perceptions, opinions and views of different actors and actresses within and outside Zimbabwe. The reasons for using exploration of research design are threefold.

First it helped the research to refine and specify the research method used in the study. This is classified as the overall research strategy used, including the type of the evidence gathered and its origin; how it had to be interpreted and how it helped to answer the research questions posed. The research strategy was thus to collect the varied opinions of all the plays in the irregularities and illegalities hindering transparency in general elections across the continuum using literature reviews.

Second, knowledge of the research design enabled the researcher to evaluate and use appropriate approaches by identifying the limitations of particular approaches at an early stage.

Third, the researcher was creative and innovative in either selection/adaptation of methods that were previously outside her own exposure. Smith et al (1997) place significance on the research design as it forms the foundation upon which the research methodology is of the natural setting as the direct source of information anchored.

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## 1.6.2 Qualitative research.

The research had the possession of the natural setting as the direct source of information and the researcher is the key collector without experimental manipulation. The sole and main purpose was to collect information and analyse the effectiveness of sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post election violence.

Qualitative design deals with a phenomenon which is not easily quantifiable and in this it was more relevant in this investigation where perceptions played a greater part in explaining the actions of the involved. The researcher was taking the information from within the context of the people who witnessed the irregularities, thus getting perspectives of people who were in direct contact to the events that built up to the situations under discussion and the findings could only be generalized to Zimbabwe. Fryer (1991) assert that qualitative research defines the reality it purports to measure meaning that the context under which the issues are discussed help to give meaning to the issues.

In depth the research examines the effective and behavioural domains in an effort to find the real issues affecting Zimbabwe after elections. A wide range of academic material focusing on the effectiveness of Sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post-election violence in the Sub Saharan Africa and a variety lecture papers by scholars, politicians and civil practitioners in the SADC region, EU and Asia were examined. Morgan (1980) states that qualitative research bonds theoretical assumptions of the interpretive paradigm, which is based on the notion that social reality is created and sustained through the subject exposing the people connected to it.

Qualitative researchers are concerned in their research with trying to precisely describe and interpret the meanings of phenomena happening in their normal social contexts (Fryer, 1991). The Research operating within the framework of the interpretive paradigm focused on examining and finding out the verdict and shared subjectivity of the research.

The researcher used the qualitative research design because it attained a more realistic feel of the world that can't be experienced in the numerical data and statistical analysis used in quantitative research. It provided flexible data collection, subsequent analysis and the interpretation of collected information and it also provided a holistic view of the phenomena which was under investigation (Bodgan and Tylor, 1975, Patton 1980).

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## 1.7 Data collection techniques

This study is qualitative and as such secondary sources of data (that would include an analysis of literature available on the subject matter such as books, speeches articles, and newspapers, reports from all actors and stakeholders, campaigning materials among others) has been utilized for the analysis. Journal articles works have been studied for inferences. Studies in strategies for preventing electoral violence have been done. This aid arrives at an appropriate conclusion and recommendations for the research.

### 1.7.1 Validity of data.

Best and Khan (1993:208) define validity as that to be quality of data gathering instrument that enables it to measure .It's the extent to which a research instrument can measure what is supposed to be measured. Cooper and Schindler (2003) go on to explain content validity as measuring instruments as the extent that which provides adequate coverage of the investigative questions guiding the study. According to Sattler (1982:23) validity is the 'extent to which inferences can be made on the basis of the test realists'. The research used the literature available on the issue related to the effectiveness of SADC in offering remedy to post election violence in Zimbabwe.

## 1.8 Conclusion

The research is an analysis of the effectiveness of Sub regional Bodies in offering remedy to post election violence in Sub Saharan Africa. The study focuses on the case of SADC in addressing Zimbabwe's post-election violence from 2008 to 2014.

## Overview of Chapters

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Chapter 2 – Role of SADC in resolving post-election violence

Chapter 3- Post electoral violence in Zimbabwe

Chapter 4- Effectiveness of SADC in offering remedy to post election violence in Zimbabwe

Chapter 5- Conclusion and recommendations.

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## Chapter 2

### Role of SADC in resolving post-election violence

#### 2.0 Introduction

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is an organization which was conceived under the auspices and virtues of the gospel of peace and security and it's supposed to exude qualities of democracy. Its efficacy has always been put to a test as the organization has been forced to intervene in different cases arising making attempts to curb and arrest these calamities. Coup de tats, upheavals and electoral violence has been witnessed in some parts of SADC which include Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, DRC, Zimbabwe most notably, thereby giving threat to the spark of civil wars.

This chapter examines the role of SADC in tackling and offering remedy to post-election violence in the Zimbabwean situation. This is with a view to locate different interpretations of the crisis, within the contextual framework of politics and public management. The striking aspect of Zimbabwe as a case study is of a revolutionary party (ZANU PF) which bring into usage all means of tilting and maintaining the grip in power through Machiavellian ideologies. They tie everything linked to their dynamics which may include the army and the electoral watchdogs which when reformed may scupper their chances of staying in power thereby relegating them off power. Zimbabwe has been largely witnessing attempts to defeat the patronage of democracy by eroding and highly decomposing the values and characteristics of an ideal state, especially with what transpired in 2008 which had to catch the eye of the sub-regional body SADC.

Basically SADC had a mandate of bringing the Zimbabwean 2008 rampant violence into an end. SADC as regional body which aims at preserving peace had an obligation of investigating all the cases of violence and deliver justice to the victims.

#### 2.1 The role of SADC in resolving post-election violence in Southern Africa

SADC has been active in resolving post-election violence and other political related crisis in Southern Africa. The research noted that SADC as a regional body with the obligation of



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preserving peace in the region has been using the same yardstick in resolving the political instability in the region. Kapinga (2015) noted that SADC played a major role in resolving the DRC crisis after the Coup. He further notes that SADC intervened both militarily and diplomatically in an attempt to solve the DRC crisis. The SADC members South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania intervened using a diplomatic way in an attempt to end the war. Curtis (2007) noted that South Africa played a prominent role as intermediary, facilitator and guarantor of the DRC peace process. The research notes that SADC has been occupied with offering remedy to post election violence and other related political crisis in Southern Africa as a whole. South Africa played a crucial role in bringing about peace in DRC on behalf of SADC.

Nathan (2006) noted that SADC has addressed the issue of post-election violence specifically in countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho and most recently Madagascar. Therefore SADC had to intervene in all of above stated countries in a peace keeping mission so as to maintain peace and security in the region. Cawthra (2010) noted that the Foreign Minister of Swaziland Lufto Dlamini visited Madagascar in February 2009 at the beginning of the crisis. Cawthra also states that SADC held an extra ordinary summit at heads of state levels to discuss the crisis in Madagascar and it appointed the former president of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano and team of mediators thereby leading to new elections. Zambara (2014) argued that South Africa has played a midwifery to game changing plebiscites in Madagascar December 2013 to bring political stability on behalf of SADC. Basing on the above the research notes that SADC played a pivotal in solving the crisis in Madagascar through holding the summits and appointing a mediator to solve the conflict.

Moreover, Lesotho is one of the countries in the region that experienced electoral disputes. SADC had to intervene in the country again to facilitate the peace keeping process. The prime minister of Lesotho Tom Thabane fled to South Africa after a military coup. SADC conducted a summit to discuss Lesotho's crisis. South African Deputy President Ramaphosa was mandated as the Lesotho SADC facilitator to further guide the implementation of the road map (Motsamai 2015). Basing on the above one can note that SADC has played a crucial role in solving post-election violence and political crisis in Southern African. This is evidence by SADC's effort in holding summits of heads of states and governance to address pressing issues in the region and find a way forward for

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instance in the case of Lesotho , Madagascar, Zimbabwe and DRC among other Southern African countries.

## 2.2 Methods used by SADC in resolving post election violence in Zimbabwe 2008-2014

SADC held a number of summits pertaining Zimbabwe's post-election violence and the roadmap relating to its future. SADC had to play its role by making sure that a state of normality returns to Harare by cooling the tempers down. It had to summon the regional heads of state for summits to map the way forward. Freeman (2005) postulates that the SADC summit in Angola promised so much in terms of solving the Zimbabwe's crisis and yet delivered so little as the country's feuding parties came back literally empty handed.

Political analysts had termed the heads of state summit in Luanda as a make or break meeting for Zimbabwe, but as with so many summits little was gained in terms of solving the year's long-impasse highlighting the country's political, economic and political prospects. According to Palmer (2008) analysts described the meetings as more of the same pointing out that the same issues that were raised in Livingstone Zambia and Sandton South Africa were echoed by the Angolan summit as the regional leaders failed to take a definitive stand on Zimbabwe.

According to Raftopoulos (2013) the Maputo Agreement in 2013 proved to be a blessing in disguise for Robert Mugabe and the ZANU PF people in their quest to maintain a firm grip on power. They had to have a spring under their foot. Gigantic strides had to be made in leaps and bounds and notable progress had to result at the SADC summit in 2013 which then levelled, paved and established the ground for general elections to come into effect. Zimbabwe had to spill into an electoral swing mood without necessary complete preparations being in position and moreover with pending electoral irregularities outstanding.

A combination of international pressure and the obligation by SADC to be seen to be taking action on the Zimbabwean question led to an extraordinary SADC Heads of State summit in Tanzania at the end of March 2007 at which South Africa was granted the facilitation mandate on Zimbabwe. However, it also presented an opportunity for national, regional and international forces to navigate

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a common approach out of the Zimbabwean debacle by reaching a political agreement that would be broadly acceptable to all sides.

Political analysts Dzinesa and Zambara (2013) noted that on the signing of the global political agreement at the Rainbow Towers Hotel in Harare in front of all the Heads of state in the region, the nation exhibited the political aspect that it was one step frontwards and two backwards. The theoretical aspect of the deal proved to be a success, whilst in relation to its practicalities it signified doom for the nation as in his acceptance speech President Mugabe uttered out his usual tirade and barrage of attacks towards the opposition as having been still at the behest of the nation though after attaining independence in 1980. Furthermore, during the process disharmony had to be noted outside the conference room at the grounds as youths from the two mainline parties (ZANU PF and MDC-T) assembled with banners denouncing the formation of the unity government.

Dzinesa and Zambara (2013) noted that these summits came about after the political violence where hundreds of the MDC supporters had lost their lives and many more were injured. These were meant to restore peace and security in the post-election period as all elections must produce results which are beyond mere contestation. Various summits have increasingly been a waste of time and a disappointment because of their imprecise resolutions

Furthermore, SADC had to implement the talks by appointing a mediator who was going to make sure that the affected parties come to the fore and let bygones remain bygones for restoration and progress in the country which was in tatters.

## 2.3 Mediation

Hartman (2013) states that SADC's mediation structure is based on core principles that guide SADC led mediation mission in line with the UN guidance for effective mediation. These include the ownership of agreements with the conflict parties, the ultimate goal of restoration of relationships, flexibility and adaptability of intervention and presenting both the conflict and its cause (Hartman 2013). Mediation is a diplomatic tool which is used to bring peace and understanding between conflicting parties.

Under the changed conditions after the March 2007 events in Harare Thabo Mbeki (the former president of South Africa) received a mandate from an extraordinary summit of SADC held in

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Tanzania on 29 March to facilitate dialogue in Zimbabwe between the major political parties. The central objective of the facilitation was to create the conditions for broadly acceptable elections in the country that would in Mbeki's words begin the process leading to the normalization of the situation in Zimbabwe and the resumption of its development and the reconstruction process intended to achieve a better life for all Zimbabweans regardless of political, religious and social affiliations and creeds which different people in the society affirm to on a sustainable basis.

SADC appointed Thabo Mbeki to lead the negotiations with the MDC T, MDC M and the ZANU PF. Mbeki initiated a dialogue between ZANU PF and MDC's which didn't make much headway. The 2008 elections took place in the context of the SADC mediation and with relatively little violence. Cawthra (2010) argues that the appointment of Mbeki as a mediator, was not well received by the MDC on the ground that he was partial and pro Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Thereby creating a lot of question on Mbeki's credibility as a mediator

Palmer (2008) notes that Mbeki started out with the intention that the dialogue between ZANU PF and the MDC's should achieve three objectives which include, both parties should endorse the decision to broker a government of national unity which shall witness all parties sharing cabinet posts according to an equal representation. Secondly, they should agree on the steps that should be taken to ensure that all concerned accept the elections as being truly representative and resembling the 'will' of the Zimbabwean people. Thirdly, that there should be agreement by all parties and other social forces on the measures that should be implemented and respected in order to facilitate a free and fair legitimate election.

Some critiques however questioned the political yardstick which the former president Thabo Mbeki the mediator was using in regard to his soft stance, bias and ineffectiveness, in particular towards Mugabe and thereby prevaricating the real political climate in the country. An article by Chris McGreal a reporter on the Guardian US (2008) notes that during the negotiations Thabo Mbeki had to draw harsh criticism from the political terrain across the globe as he was once quoted as having said, "there is no crisis in Zimbabwe" when actually Harare was ablaze, besieged with a plethora of cases of violence and the country had tumbled due to economic conflagration and the comatose economy which had sky-rocketed.

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## 2.4 Formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

Dzinesa and Zambara (2013) notes that in September 2008, after a decade-long socio-political and economic crisis, Zimbabwe's warring political parties reached an agreement entitled the Global Political Agreement (GPA). It came in the wake of a mediation process led by South Africa under the direction of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It was therefore the guarantor and facilitator of the GPA. The first step in implementing the GPA was the formation of an Inclusive Government (IG), generally known as the Government of National Unity (GNU), which governed the country from February 2009 up to the general elections in July 2013. The GNU's term of office was tumultuous, and it barely delivered on its basic mandate. The parties to this shaky marriage of convenience continued to fail to find common ground on the fundamental reforms needed before democratic elections could be held (Dzinesa and Zambara 2013). Given that the GPA – and the GNU – represented the results of SADC's approach to resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe, it has also put the SADC crisis management system under the spotlight

Therefore a global political agreement had to be reached in Zimbabwe by a stroke of a pen in September 2009 after a litany of disagreements in issues such as the allocation of key ministries such as Home Affairs had to almost collapse the talks. Co-sharing had to be the best resort for such issues and finality had to be reached and a deal struck. According to Tendai Marima's article (A general election Crisis haunts Zimbabwe at Aljazeera on 13 June 2013) Arrangements had to be put in place for the leader of MDC-T Morgan Richard Tsvangirai to be sworn in at state house as the new prime minister, being deputized by one of his own Thokozani Khuphe and the leader of a smaller faction Auther Mutambara and yet it is justified to argue that the GPA was more of theoretical than practical as its practicalities were often put to the test in the tenure of the inclusive government as power was cramped and confined to ZANU PF. The two were supposed to amicable work together for a period amounting to eighteen months according to the GPA stipulations until such a time the electoral field was said to be level. This was going to usher as well a new political dispensation as all parties which were signatories in the GPA were supposed to work together to craft a new constitution which would then see the holding of general elections (Nhede 2012).

Furthermore, Moyo (2005) couched in diplomatic language, SADC urged the parties to the GPA to remain committed to the implementation and finalize the roadmap on the outstanding issues. Coalition governments to a certain degree they seem to ignore the people's plight with regard to

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the citizen's needs. In the inclusive government, though traditional weekly Monday briefings preceded the Tuesday cabinet meetings, ZANU PF always out-muscled its fellow counterparts in the government of national unity as its DNA (meaning its political) character does not allow it to share power. President Mugabe once had to say; "Sometimes you will have to be forced to smile though the circumstances won't be allowing one to." Some scholars advocate the notion that it had to be just a 'marriage of convenience'. In addition President Robert Mugabe was quoted having said "tenuous and fraught coalition forged by regional leaders, characterized with uneasy partners" (Mchomvu 2011).

In line with the above point, Goredema (2013) notes that, although there was an air of political stability, there were undercurrents between the political parties....the GNU has been characterised by squabbles and disagreements among the main actors. Power was still tied to the dynamics of ZANU PF as President Mugabe had to often override his executive powers in regard to unilateral appointments of persons who hold office such as provincial governors, ambassadors, the post of the RBZ governor, the post of the Attorney General only to mention a few. Overall one can argue that the GNU was rather successful in theory than on the actual ground since it was still controlled by the same leader though it accommodated the other parties.

The renewed international pressure on Zimbabwe pushed SADC into a new effort to deal with the so-called Zimbabwe crisis. Badza (2008) notes it has been contended that SADC has been restraining from issuing public and direct criticism against Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government and instead, it has preferred 'quiet diplomacy'. Palmer (2008) observes that in political terms this meant attempting to walk on a tight rope of keeping South Africa's continental ambitions alive, without sacrificing western support. Colder (2007) notes that it took a month for the presidential election results to be announced. The results came out as follows; combined MDC's won 109 seats and ZANU PF won 97, while the presidential result failed to yield a decisive winner with a 50% plus 1 majority, thus requiring a run-off election. Therefore the research is an analysis of the effectiveness of Sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post election violence.

Raftopolous (2005) further argues that the SADC's endorsement of an outcome that didn't take into cognizant democratic principles was in fact an endorsement of Mugabe. Colder (2007) posits that the 2007 SADC mandate to South Africa to broker an agreement between ZANU PF and

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MDC's should have been seen as an extension of the 'quiet diplomacy' that had been the hallmark of South Africa and SADC approach to the Zimbabwe crisis since 2000. Palmer (2000) suggests that the mediation took on an added urgency after the brutal public beating, arrest, torture of opposition and civic leaders in March 2007 and the widespread attacks of the MDC structures that followed thereafter. Overallly the research notes that SADC had a mandate of bringing the rampant post election violence in Zimbabwe to an end. SADC as regional body which aims at preserving peace had a mandate of investigating all the cases of violence and offer help to all those who need it.

## 2.5 Conclusion.

This chapter concentrated on the roles played by SADC in resolving post-election violence in Southern Africa. These include negotiating for a peace environment, insuring that the government of Zimbabwe implements the global political agreement, protection of human rights, investigating and prosecuting cases of political violence. It then had to shift into the main thrust of the dissertation which involves the assessment of the effectiveness of sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post-election violence in the Sub Saharan Africa, with Zimbabwe being the case study. Bloody violence which had to take its toll in the aftermath of the 2008 general elections had to be put into the picture and the role of the SADC, including the international responses.

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## CHAPTER 3

### Post election violence in Zimbabwe.

#### 3.0 Introduction

Post-election violence is rampant in Africa as evidence in countries like Kenya 2007, Zimbabwe 2008, Madagascar, Lesotho and Nigeria 2011 among other African countries. SM Atuobi(2008) noted that electoral violence refers to ‘political violence aimed at the electoral process.’ Most of the post electoral violence are triggered by disputed results where losing parties question legitimacy of the results. As a matter of fact, electoral violence is the main consequence following most of the disputed elections. Electoral violence is manifested by acts such as murder, looting, destruction of properties, assault, torture, fighting, rape and violent street protests.

Elections promotes citizen participation, thus they are regarded as one of the major principles of democracy. In Zimbabwe presidential elections are conducted after every five years since the attainment of independence in 1980. Elections should be free and fair, so the citizens can be administered by the representative of their choice. In Zimbabwe elections are conducted by the Zimbabwe electoral commission board (ZEC). The 2008 harmonised elections were conducted during economic hardship in Zimbabwe. The general people were suffering due to the high rate of inflation and basic commodities were very expensive in the black market. Therefore President Mugabe and the ZANU PF party were losing their popularity and support.

After March 2008 elections the political climate was so tense to the extent that unceremonious and rampant arrests were taking place. Detentions were the order of the day and opposition political leaders had to be on target and they bare scars from the political struggle. This chapter examines post-election violence in Zimbabwe 2008-2014. It explains what post-election violence is, its possible cause and aftermath. Post-election violence in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2014 was a state planned militarization of retribution and intimidation on the opposition MDC officials, activist, members and supporters.



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### 3.1 Post-election violence in Zimbabwe

The political motivated violence which was at times known as ‘the campaign of violence ‘or operation Mavhoterapapi (Where you put your ‘X’ and how you voted in the election) increased a number of death and missing persons in the state. Sachikonye (2012) noted that people were brutally beaten with poles and iron rods. He further notes that in some cases there were issues of destruction property, victim’s chickens, cattle and goats as well as people’s homes were burnt in Mudzi and Mutoko rural areas. Basing on the above one can argue that the state of violence was on its highest level. It is justified to describe is as a period of bloodshed and loss of property.

Sachikonye (2011) argues that violence and terror perpetrated by the ruling party was directed to opposition parties. The members and supporters of the opposition were viewed as traitors who wanted to give back land to the whites. Therefore it is watertight to argue that perhaps the use of violence was used as a tool by ZANU PF to stay in power. As a political science student it is justified to note that in 2008 the carrot had failed therefore it was the turn of the stick to play its role in winning the re-run elections.

According to the report of Zimbabwe human rights NGO Forum on (if you can’t join them, beat them!)Post election violence in Zimbabwe state of 2008 noted that “the state sponsored political violence of 2008 violated human rights at its highest levels. Over 500 reports of assault and 700 cases of political intimidation were reported to Zimbabwe NGO Forum. Women were sexually abused; some women were raped, whilst others were stripped naked in the public”. Basing on the above report one can note that the violence in Zimbabwe was the order of the day and people where living in fear of the unknown. It was indeed an act of terror against human race, which goes against the humanitarian laws and the principles of democracy.

According Sachikonye (2011) the ZANU PF supporters commenced a country wide campaign of violence and intimidation in a bid to ensure that it will win the anticipated re-run of the Presidential Election. The country wide terror campaign has been directed mainly against rural people suspected of having voted for the MDC in the election. This act of violence left the Zimbabwean citizens living in fear in their own motherland. Overallly one can argue that the citizens were no longer free to vote for their desired leader but rather they were coerced to vote ZANU PF.

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Electoral violence is directly orchestrated by one or more of the political parties involved, or it occurs with political parties' approval. Thus, political parties, both those in power and those in the opposition are to blame for the emergence and continued occurrence of electoral violence. Höglund (2010), an associate professor of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Uppsala, has studied the links between political leadership and electoral violence. She argues that political leaders are, in most cases, key instigators of electoral violence and explains how their political leadership serves two main functions in the emergence of electoral violence. First, political leaders motivate electoral violence through framing, that is, socially constructing certain identities for and images of supporters and rivals of the party that are often bipolar through militant rhetoric's and hate speech. The more exclusive the rhetoric and the constructed identity, the more likely it is to motivate acts of violence. The second function is implementing, which refers to the process of mobilizing perpetrators from deeds to acts in carrying out the actual violence. This includes creating concrete and selective incentives for those involved in carrying out the violence.

In line with the above idea, Höglund, (2010 ) notes that such incentives are often channelled in the form of patronage, such as cash payments, provisions of food, alcohol and drugs, or in the form of longer-term incentives such as expectations of getting employment for family members, gaining powerful positions or state contracts for various jobs. Höglund (2010) also argued that having better access to state resources provides incumbent politicians with an advantage over their opposition counterparts in the sense that they can use these resources to create incentives for potential perpetrators of electoral violence and to mobilize them in order to advance their own political aims. Access to national resources may be subject to legal constraints, and the degree to which these constraints are followed might be determined by corruption, lack of transparency and accountability. Basing on the above one can argue that such acts contribute toward the loss of democratic principles, the sense that the grievances of the citizenry are ignored and the loss of confidence in the electoral system.

According to Przeworski et al (2000); Hyde and Marinov (2012) most modern dictatorships hold elections even though citizens hardly expect to peacefully replace political leaders via the ballot box, but through the barrel of a gun. Earlier on a couple of years back the leader of the opposition party Morgan Tsvangirai he mentioned to the ZANU PF candidate that if he didn't want to leave peacefully, he was going to be removed violently. Although not being free and fair (Schedleretal,

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2006; Levistky and Way 2010) there is remarkable variation with respect to how much political leaders rig authoritarian elections. Dictators resort to whatever fraudulent measures they can take to secure an overwhelming electoral victory, while others are rather loath to commit electoral malpractices and even willingly make efforts to keep the electoral field fairer through electoral reforms. The result of the 2008 general election saw the country plunging into political turmoil as the elections proved to be shambolic. The former liberation struggle movement could not allow reality to take effect by letting the former labour movement ascend to the throne hence modes of electoral thievery had been applied. This is solidified by the fact of the delay in announcing the outcome of the election results up to eight weeks which seemed to communicate the message that the results were being altered and engineered.

Dzamara (2013) notes that the leader of the opposition movement (MDC-T) Morgan Tsvangirai had to come face to face with the wrath of injustice, with the cloud of dust hanging on him and had to escape the 'jaws of a crocodile' by seeking refuge at the Dutch embassy. Remand prisons had to be filled up with political prisoners and individuals like Jestina Mukoko a political activist had to be for months on the missing list only to resurface after the international fraternity had intervened and instilled much pressure on the state. As of date history has repeated itself as Itai Dzamara an activist was abducted by state agents a year ago and no hope is present as the state has often disassociated itself from the issue which it states to be political resulting in no massive action being performed. Repressive laws such as AIPPA and POSA were passed and the media was limited in the coverage of details involving the sporadic violence which had gripped the nation. Having noted the above one can argue that between 2008 and 2014 Zimbabwe was characterized by violence and unfavourable conditions for the people.

The researcher notes that it was during this period (2008 -2014) that the country suffered a lot from brain drain to human capital as most of the people migrated to south African both educated and uneducated due to the worsening of political instability and the violence. Sachikonye (2011) noted that the combination of economic distress and political repressive for standing up teacher's rights 20 000 teachers leaving their professions by 2008. Overallly it is justified to argue that the post-election violence of 2008 to 2014 did not only cost the state but rather it caused family disintegration through migration with the hope of greener pastures and security in the receiving country. Therefore the study notes that post election violence in Zimbabwe 2008-2014 caused

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more harm than good. Overall, the research notes that post election violence in Zimbabwe of 2008-2014 contributed to the outbreak of xenophobia in South Africa in the sense that South African citizens feels threatened by foreigners .

Raftopolous (2005) postulates that in 2005 SADC monitors were barred from the parliamentary elections which were marked by gross intimidation, ballot stuffing and inflating ballot counts, but still the election was declared 'free and fair' by the SADC and the SADC member countries Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. Moyo (2005) postulates that even as the economy descended into anarchy SADC was quiet adamant to assist Zimbabwe with nothing rather than rhetoric. Regarding one can argue that SADC needs to improve the areas of promoting peace and unity in the region. The collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar and the rate of political violence in Zimbabwe portray SADC as a toothless bulldog .According to Raftopoulos (2005) while SADC leaders may have verbal communicated to Mugabe confidentially, regarding the situation in Zimbabwe with their public statements which were very supportive of Mugabe and critical of a western propaganda war. Basing on the above scenario, it is justified for one to question the credibility of election as a tenet of democracy. Overall it is justified for one to question the effectiveness of SADC as regional body in such a scenario.

According to Hassan (2008) not withstanding some small changes to the media and the public legislation the ruling party proved unwilling to make substantive changes on the issues that would affect the transitional political arrangements that would precede the 2008 elections. This would then be tantamount to offloading and legislating itself off the political spectrum of the country, hence casting itself to the political wilderness. For instance ZANU PF was unwilling to consent to the eradication of the irregularities which were besmirching the country's electoral system like the appointment of the judiciary bench and the composure of the electoral watchdogs and the tutelage of vital and key ministries such as Home Affairs just to outline a few.

Moreover, Hassan (2008) noted that the president's unilateral proclamation of the election date for 2008, outside an agreement of these substantive issues effectively put an end to the SADC facilitation process. Palmer (2008) notes that civic society felt that the SADC announcement on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February 2008 that Mbeki's facilitation had resulted in the political parties reaching an agreement on all substantive matters relating to the political situation in Zimbabwe and that the matters outstanding were merely procedural was the worst kind of political dishonesty. In

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agreement Scholars argue that what might have been a principled stand by the outgoing SA president Mbeki it turned into another disgraceful endorsement of the politics of a repressive (despotic) regime. He further notes that the opposition felt that the SADC has once again exhibited its inability to distinguish between African's concern for imperialist interventions and its commitment to the democratic and human rights of the region's citizens. Basing on the above one can note that the MDC party had its doubts on the appointment of Thabo Mbeki as a mediator due the assumption that Thabo Mbeki might not meet the principle and requirements of an independent mediator since he has business ventures in Zimbabwe and he acquired them during the ZANU PF's reign. The research noted that, perhaps during the negotiation there was suppose to be two independent mediators who were to be neutral.

The regional organization had an opportunity to send a definite message to Mugabe that unless he fulfilled the objective of establishing the conditions for a broadly acceptable free and fair election, he could not expect the customary solidarity of SADC.

### 3.2 The core factors fuelling post-election violence in Zimbabwe.

The cause of post-election violence in Zimbabwe is clouded with controversy depending on who is reporting the story. Dzinesa and Zambara (2013) notes that post election violence was fuelled by the loss of ZANU PF in the first round of the 2008 elections. Sachikonye (2011) notes that the Zimbabwean post election violence of 2008 to 2014 was directed to the Zimbabweans who voted for MDC. Therefore making it justified to argue that the loss of ZANU PF in the first round played a role to the outbreak of the political motivated violence.

According to the Aljazeera report 2008 'Zimbabwean violence; MDC claims intimidation by Zanu PF' state that the reason used by the perpetrators of violence included the idea that it was the impact of their betrayal. The above report note that perpetrators used terms such as you vote for MDC you suffer, because you are giving the country back to the whites, you have invited us here to beat you by voting for Tsvangirai. Overallly it is justified to note that post election violence in Zimbabwe was fuelled by the loss of the ZANU PF party as it was seen as an act of betrayal to the government and those who went to war of the liberation for independence. Notably by adopting such instrument of violence ZANU PF was to instil fear on the voters thereby voting for them was

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the only choice to stop the violence. Thus one can argue that fear is used as a political socialisation instrument.

Realist assumptions are rooted on the anarchic nature of the international system. In the international system power is permanent and intrinsic and from a realists perspective anarchy and chaos are the natural order of politics. The researcher used this theory in order to identify the irregularities which are illegalities hindering the smooth holding of elections in Zimbabwe in the past fifteen years. The position of ZANU PF in Zimbabwe is explained by the realist perspective as it borders more on national security in defence against the aspirations of the opposition MDC-T in marching to the corridors of power. According to Hobbes a human being is by nature selfish and unethical and always looking for an opportunity to exploit the one other. Basing on the above explanation of human nature by Thomas Hobbes one can note that violence was prone to take place since men is selfish and also the idea that states are governed by the same model described as natural to all human beings. Politics is the struggle for power as Thomas Hobbes put it as 'for war of all against all'. Lasswell define power as determination of who gets what, when and how. Overally basing on the above one can argue that the realist theory has played a key role in explaining post election violence in Zimbabwe.

Basing on the Psychological theory of frustration and aggression one can note the Zanu Pf 'youth militia' and 'war vets' used the above mentioned theory to secure their victory on the upcoming elections. The ZANU Pf noted that intimidation, by installing fear on the 'anti-Zanu PF' would eliminate possible competition. The theory can groom one's patterns of thought, feeling and behaviour among others.

### 3.3 Actors in post-election violence of 2008 in Zimbabwe

The research notes that most of the evidence exposes the youth militia and war veterans of ZANU PF as the real culprits who perpetrated the 2008 post-election violence in Zimbabwe. This evidenced by an article written by Dumisani Nkomo (2011) he observed that "war veterans and ZANU PF youths engaged in the looting and violence". Basing on the above scenario it is beyond doubt that the war veterans and the youth militia of ZANU PF played a major role in the political motivated violence. However, one should not overlook the involvement of other players in the above stated act of terror, such as the suppliers of weapons and funders.

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The Zimbabwean Human Right NGO Forum Report (2008), the government has sought to hide its role in the abuses by using groups of “war veterans” and youth militias as proxy forces to commit violent acts and the links between the government and ZANU-PF, the youth militia, and “war veterans” involvement in post-election violence of 2008. Mlambo noted that Mugabe urged ZANU PF supporters to crush the opposition MDC, because he regarded them as puppets of the Whites. Therefore it is justified to argue the government also played a role in serious human rights violations. It could be through encouraging the youth militia or by supplying it with the weapons. Overallly one can argue that government played a pivotal role in the escalation of the 2008 post election in Zimbabwe.

There are also allegations that states that members of the defence force were also involved in the 2008 act of terror against humanity. Basing on the Aljazeera Report, “Zimbabwe violence; MDC claims intimidation by ZANU PF” and other writing one can note that most of the victims were the MDC members and supporters. Therefore it is justified for one to argue that the ZANU PF youth militia and the war veterans were the key perpetrators of the violence, though it can also be noted that they were acting on the orders of the government, which were motivated by ZANU PF’s loss in the first round of the 2008 elections.

### 3.4 Lack of trust in electoral system.

The 2008 post election violence has left a number of people with very little faith and confidence in elections as a democratic principle. Scholars such as Mchomvu (2011), Sachikonye (2011) among others noted that Zimbabwean elections are tainted by violence, fear and irregularities we have confidence in both the electoral process and electoral board in charge. Basing on the above observation, it is justified for one to question the credibility of election in Zimbabwe. The research notes that the citizens of Zimbabwe are living in fear of what might happen if the ZANU PF party is defeated in elections. Also the thought of the 2008 post election violence give ZANU PF the upper hand in election. Therefore discouraging the anti ZANU PF from voting thus leading to a serious drop of number of voters.

In line with the above scenario, Sachikonye (2011) argues that in Zimbabwe most people have very little confidence in the electoral process. Having noted the above evidence one can argue that indeed elections are a fading shadow of democracy (Adejumobi 2000). Overallly, it is thus justified

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note that elections have become meaningless to the Zimbabwean people. Furthermore one can argue that in elections create political, social and economic instability if they are not properly conducted or if they are undemocratic as evidenced by the Zimbabwe case 2008.

### 3.5 International response to Zimbabwe post-election violence

The study noted that the results of the 2007-2008 elections attracted a lot of attention from the different civic groups as well as the international world and regional body among others. The international observers and fraternity laid hopes on SADC hoping that the security sector reform would finally top the agenda, following the post 2008 violence in which the security services were implicated. The West was very critical of Zimbabwe and had to grapple and wrestle with two scenarios either to engage Mugabe, lift sanctions and support the GNU or to isolate him and preserve; if not make tighter the sanctions Nyakudya (2013). The Western world had to be quite instrumental in exposing how diabolical the Mugabe regime was by opening a can of worms about the Zimbabwean post-election violence through documentaries and other global forums which the local state-run media couldn't broadcast.

The country's economy tumbled to the extreme and its alarming inflation was sky-rocketing each and every day. Due to this, there was high brain drain in the country as thousands resorted to seeking employment in first world countries. The countries' industrial sector had to undergo closure as it couldn't cope with the high costs. The country had to be dependent on aid from Western nations as it had now become a basket case.

The Western world hugely denigrated the government of national unity as the modus operandi because elections had gone against or departed from the people's will of ejecting the Mugabe regime. Despite this, the then premier Tsvangirai embarked on marathon trips across the length and breadth of Europe to source out funds meant to redeem the country's comatose economy and calling for the 'upliftment of the economic sanctions'.

As a result, most of the first world countries have imposed targeted sanctions and ZIDERA on Zimbabwe in particular up until such a point when stability has been restored and are unwilling to lift the sanctions up until such a time when the recognition of human rights is implemented.



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### 3.6 Conclusion

Although elections are a major tenant of democracy, they have lost their credibility in Zimbabwe basing on the conflict which usually arises during and after elections. Some scholars argue that elections may be viewed as an indirect cause of conflict, especially when the electoral process is mismanaged. This is evidence by post-election violence in Zimbabwe 2008 which shows that people suffer violence because of their own political affiliation. The chapter unravelled the negative impacts of post-election violence in a Country which include loss of life, destruction of property, brain drain and family disintegration due to immigration

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## CHAPTER 4

### The effectiveness of SADC in offering remedy to post election violence

#### 4.0 Introduction

The chapter analyses the role played by SADC in ending the post-election post in Zimbabwe 2008-2014. SADC managed to reduce the cases of political motivated violence in Zimbabwe intervening in the situation. The former president of South Africa was engaged as the mediator between the ZANU PF party and its opposition. This chapter analyses the effectiveness of SADC in offering remedy to post election violence Zimbabwe 2008 -2014. The research acknowledges the role played by SADC in the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

The study notes that the effectiveness of SADC's in resolving post election violence in Zimbabwe will mainly be unravelled in the performance and success of the GNU. The inclusive government had an obligation of the normalisation of Zimbabwe's politics, restoration of economic stability and growth, duty of the Zimbabwean people to make their own constitution and recognition of fundamental human rights among others.

#### 4.1 Effectiveness of SADC in offering remedy.

After the 2008 political instability in Zimbabwe, the period between July and December 2008 was marked by further SADC attempts to bring finality to the mediation efforts, with strong intense criticism from the West, as well as from church and civic bodies in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa region about the perceived complicity of SADC in not bringing stronger pressure to bear in solving politics in Zimbabwe. Eppel and Raftopolous (2008) argues that the SADC mediated talks between the countries' mainline parties ZANU PF and the MDC's was undermined by the unwillingness of the revolutionary party ZANU PF to allow for a significant opening up of political spaces in the country. Overallly it is justified to acknowledge the success of SADC in managing to end the violence. Also it can be noted that SADC played an important role uniting the ZANU PF party and its oppositions.

The research notes that after Thabo Mbeki's negotiation with ZANU PF and its opposition party some uninformed source had the mind-set that in 2009 the implementation of the GPA history

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was repeating itself of blending the main parties ZANU Pf and MDC together just like in 1987 when ZANU PF united with PF ZAPU. Basically it is justified to argue that the idea of uniting ZANU Pf and its oppositions was not a new phenomenon. Kriger (2012) noted that parallel government demonstrates the relative powerlessness of the Inclusive Government and dominance of the ZANU PF in its competition with the MDC. Overall, one can conclude that the focus of the inclusive Government was mainly centred on acquiring state control.

More so, the research noted that the SADC's negotiated GNU facilitated negative peace, in the sense that though there was no wars in Zimbabwe but the people of Zimbabwe were divided in their own thereby making it difficult to reach an agreement. Chigora and Guzura (2011) noted that "In the Cabinet, the Division are glaring as the ministers drawn from three political parties put party loyalty first when they discuss policies." Parties interest were considered before the public interest and safety. The research noted that SADC's prescribed solution of joining ZANU PF and its opposition created more conflicts within the government. Also the idea of different political ideologies created more conflicts and problems. Nhede (2012) notes that in ideological and political terms ZANU PF and the MDC formations are like oil and water and they cannot mix to make a totally legal, fully representative and functional inclusive government capable of delivering good services to the people. Basing on the above point one can note that there was very little co-operations between the officials, rather it was characterized by suspicions and lack of trust among officials.

Furthermore, one can note that the solution offered by SADC addressed part of the main issues, when it intervened the post-election crisis in Zimbabwe. Chigora and Guzura (2011) note that the power sharing agreement offers little scope for dealing with past human rights abuses hence national healing has been received with mixed feelings. Basing on the above one can note that the strategy used by SADC in resolving post-election in Zimbabwe was insufficient since it kind of tried to stop future political motivated violence and also concentrated on bringing peace between ZANU PF and its opposition. Rather it ignored to address the already reported cases of violence.

More so, SADC as a sub-regional body whose mandate is to preserve peace should have ensured justice for the victims of the post-election violence. However it only concentrated on ending the conflict within the country. The research notes that the victims of the 2007-2008 post election violence in Zimbabwe deserved justice. Perhaps their families' should have been compensated and

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the perpetrators of post-election violence deserved to be punished for their actions. Cheese and Tendi (2010) observe that power sharing serves to postpone conflict rather than resolve it. Basing on the above one argue that SADC's solution to post election violence in Zimbabwe 2008-2014 managed to calm the crisis for the moment without the guarantee of lasting peace in Zimbabwe between ZANU PF and its opposition parties.

Saunders (2011) condemns the GPA as ineffective in meeting its key objectives and for providing a flimsy but sufficient veneer of legitimacy while facilitating ZANU PF's lever of power. Regarding the above observation one can argue that indeed the GPA facilitated the battle for the control of state with every party yearning to hold the hard power (Muzondidya 2011). Overall, it is justified for one to note that the GPA might have attempted to solve part of the Zimbabwean crisis whilst creating other political irregularities.

Freeman (2005) proposes that the political and economy decline in Zimbabwe indicated the inability of the mother body SADC to uphold its founding and guiding principles of regional self-reliance and economic cooperation. The study note that SADC as a mother body should have intervened and offer a way forward before the total collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. Raftopoulos (2000) suggests that it was designed to improve the economic conditions of its member states. Therefore, SADC had been unable to intervene evocatively in Zimbabwe and remains ineffective.

Scholars such as Dzinesa and Zambara (2013), Expel S and Raftopoulos B (2008) have acknowledged the crucial role played by SADC in dealing with Zimbabwean dispute of 2008. However, it will be unfair to turn a blind eye on its failure to punish the perpetrators of violence and to preserve justice for the victims but rather.

The research notes that the formation of the GNU also had its positive aspects. These include the idea that the rate of violence was reduced and there were other economics changes. Scholars note that some of the GNU's success was the introduction of multi-currency, improvement in the health and education sector. Overall one can argue that SADC played a pivotal role in facilitating the GNU which managed to end the terror and bloodshed in Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2014.

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## 4.2 Findings.

The research has come up with the following findings after a research on the analysis of the effectiveness of sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post election violence.

The first finding is lack of unity within SADC members. It does not subscribe to the popular saying, 'United we stand divided we fall'. For instance which is perceived by some sections of the political angle as a 'colony' of the West has always been adamant in the Zimbabwean issue, with Ian Khama the president being a vocal sharp critique of the Mugabe government in Harare and often boycotting some of the summits.

The research noted that there is lack of wisdom and integrity; it has lacked foresight in various cases (abuse of human rights, abuse of power and poverty among others) which have been a threat to the peace and security of the region. The body was quick to offload Zimbabwe off its agenda in 2013 just for the sake of their progress and not being considerate of the people as victims. Premature judgment was passed without a thorough assessment of the political dispensation affecting the country culminating into the country tumbling into an electoral mood.

The other finding is that SADC's resources are limited therefore depending on donors, aid and membership fee among others. SADC's coffers are largely depended on the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. In 2008 in the post electoral violence in Zimbabwe it failed to intervene financial as the country plummeted both left right, as well as centre due to the dysfunctionality of the health system and the economy which had nose-dived and crashed.

The organization has been adversely crippled in its mandate to promote the region's peace and security by lack of political what can be termed as 'political stamina' in enforcing decisions and hence being used by some states as a bandwagon in the political fray to attain and quench their political appetite and zest. Therefore the organization has been largely approving elections in Zimbabwe which are seen as 'field days' by ZANU PF and instead retain power.

The study also noted its inability of being democratic on its own, resolutions meant to address individual ambitions. Scholars and the MDC –T has argued that during the negotiations ZANU PF had been treated with kid gloves and instead the revolutionary party took advantage of the situation

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by strategizing and regrouping in prep for the elections which were to be pencilled for the period soon after a new constitution had been issued out.

Furthermore the writer noted that the organization failed to proffer justice for the victims. For unknown reasons they quickly shy away from making straight forward decisions. The mother body SADC concentrated on facilitating the normalisation of the Zimbabwean politics and failed to punish the ZANU PF war veteran and the youth militia for the abuse of human rights during the post-election violence in Zimbabwe 2008 -2014.

The study notes that the principle of sovereignty and non-state intervention continues to impose constraints on the ability of SADC to intervene at an early stage. Furthermore, the study notes that the decision or solution offered by SADC depends on the consent and willingness of the country. Member states can decide to withdraw its membership from the board.

#### **4.3 Conclusion.**

The effectiveness of Sub Regional bodies in the form of SADC in the Sub Saharan Africa is compromised as shown by the results and this has contributed to its failure in giving a convincing fair outcome in regards to credible free and fair elections in Zimbabwe between 2008-2014 period, though it has made a steadfast attempt to avert violence in the 2013 general elections no case of violence was reported. The research also observed that the effectiveness of sub regional bodies depends on the willingness of the involved parties in accepting and adopting the solution. Basing on the Zimbabwean scenario, the study notes the solution offered by SADC on the Zimbabwean Crisis addressed part of its core problems.

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## CHAPTER 5

### Conclusion and recommendations.

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter consists of the conclusion and recommendations that can perfect a smooth roadmap to the efficacy of sub-regional bodies in offering remedy to post-election violence in the Sub-Saharan region.

#### 5.1 Recommendations.

The effectiveness of sub-regional organizations in offering remedy to post-election violence in the Sub-Saharan Africa has been a matter which has sought to bring the region unto its knees and tragic demise as a post-mortem to the Zimbabwean case in 2008 proves otherwise. Voices have often busted up from around the globe for reform to be implemented as for the organization to perform in such an effective way in dealing with cases affecting the region.

By the term recommendation a general meaning may refer to one being of the suggestion that something must be worthy and acceptable to the majority. The research note the following suggestions approvable and worthy to be put into consideration in the quest to witness a revived organization able to function according to the mandates.

##### 5.1.1 Joint summits with other regional bodies.

Constitution with western bodies to share ideas and seek ways of averting electoral violence should be seen as a necessity. Organizations such as EU, COMESA, and Group of 4 can brush shoulders with SADC in order to promote the spirit of peace and security. Various affinities speed up the doctrine of self-introspection in the issues governing democracy. The international law must encourage all regional bodies to be fully involved in elections surrounding as guardians of democracy. These can be annually rotational with each regional body having to host such a summit and assessments can be tabled on issues paralyzing these organizations. Also have to mirror and copy other regional bodies which has presided peaceful elections in their jurisdictive dominions.

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### 5.1.2 Quarterly subscriptions by the member states.

For an organization or institution to function effectively cash is supposed to be available. In order to maintain the status of the coffers in regard to SADC a policy and a decree must be passed for each member state to input sums of money which shall result in the body having a financial muscle to advance developmental issues in the region and halt situations which can prove to be disasters to fellow nations. At present the organization is circumscribed in its endeavours to undertake developmental programmes.

### 5.1.3 At least two mediators in future negotiations.

Negotiation talks have always been spearheaded by a single mediator who journeys with the political parties that would be in dispute. With reference to the Zimbabwean situation, Thabo Mbeki latter had to be labelled as having been charmed and enticed by Mugabe and ZANU PF as the MDC's had nothing on offer.

Unverified reports even go to the degree that Mbeki due to the multi-resources which include mines and vast wealth he had in the country due to the Mugabe regime wouldn't fail to subscribe to ZANU PF's favours. He could not be neutral.

Trust and confidence cannot be reposed on a single person as he /she is prone to bias hence overriding his/her powers thereby affecting the outcomes.

### 5.1.4 Opposition parties to have representation in SADC

For the organization to effectively run and function, by virtue of democracy opposition party members from all member countries should be included as their voice also matters in the run of the mother organization SADC. The tribunal must not only include ruling parties as they may be one sided in their decisions. The body's decisions at times prove to be hollow, full of bias hence side-lining the opposition's quests. Moreover the opposition has proved to be having less influence in the organization as its demands are often swept under the carpet or the response if positive it does require patience.



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## 5.2 Conclusion.

In conclusion it can be noted that Sub-regional bodies have been designed to preserve peace in the region and promote co-operation among states. The research observed the high rate of political motivated violence in the region, for instance in Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho and Zimbabwe among others. Kaldor (1999) described them as “new wars”. The research noted that these wars have imposed a threat on the peace and security of the region, since its aftermath includes loss of life, destruction of property and creating refugee problems in the receiving states ,thereby contributing to the outbreak of xenophobia for instance in South African 2014-2015.

SADC played a principal role in addressing post election violence in Zimbabwe. The mother body held a summit to discuss post election violence. SADC appointed Thabo Mbeki the former president of South African to facilitate the negotiations between ZANU PF party and the two MDC’s. The negotiations led to the formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwean GNU was a brainchild of SADC in an attempt to solve post election violence. The Inclusive government was criticised by various scholars such as Kriger (2012), Saunders (2011), Cheeseman and Tendi (2010) for its ineffectiveness. Some Scholars branded it as compromise or a marriage of inconvenience. Having noted the above from various schools of thoughts, the study notes that SADC’s intervention in Zimbabwe managed to cool the political instability in Zimbabwe though it failed to address other critical issues after the post-election violence in Zimbabwe 2008-2014. Therefore, the effectiveness of Sub regional bodies in offering remedy to post election violence in Sub Saharan African, using the case of SADC in Zimbabwe 2008-2014 was to a lesser extent. The study notes that the solution offered by SADC was mainly focused on reconciliation of the ZANU PF and its opposition whilst neglecting other key issues such as poverty, economic hardships and proffering justice for the victims of the post-election violence in Zimbabwe.

The research concludes that indeed the solution offered by SADC in Zimbabwe after the post-election violence managed to temporarily unite the ZANU PF and it opposition parties, this is evidenced by the end of the coalition government in 2013. Therefore it justified to argue that indeed power sharing serves to postpone the conflict rather than solving (Cheese and Tendi

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2010).The study concludes that the effectiveness of SADC on Zimbabwe was minimal and ineffective, it's also evidenced by the current situation in Zimbabwe where there is more off presidential democracy than liberal democracy, transparency and accountability is questionable.

REMBULUWANI CHIBI

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