



FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

**AN ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AFRICAN UNION STANDBY
FORCE IN COMBATING RELIGIOUS TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF
SOMALIA**

BY

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*Submitted to the Department of Development Studies in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Bachelor of Arts in Development Studies Honors Degree*

DECLARATION

I, Registration number R173486F, hereby solemnly declare that this research is my own piece of work and is not a production of someone else's effort, unless where otherwise acknowledged.

Signature

Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this piece of work to my lovely wife Melody Vee Mudzimurega for the love and support. Thank you for believing in me, you never gave up on me. To my late Brother Edmore Shekede who was a shining beacon in my life and my pillar of strength thank you for being there when I needed you the most this work would not have been complete without your guidance.

APPROVAL FORM

The undersigned certify that they have read and recommended to the Midlands State University for acceptance, the research titled:

**AN ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AFRICAN UNION STANDBY
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ABSTRACT

The study sought to assess the effectiveness of AU Standby Force in combating religious terrorism in Somalia and proffer recommendations on how the AU's counter-terrorism operation could lead to stability in Somalia. The study was provoked by the intensifying cases of terror attacks and activities which comprise suicide bombings, killings of civilians, military attacks and demolition of property thereby throttling development. This study was carried out through qualitative methods of data collection such as textual analysis, unstructured questionnaire and in-depth interviews. Findings from this study unveil that the AU has played a significant role in bringing the military and political realizations so far in Somalia after a protracted period of anarchy. Security has enormously improved and the AMISOM has ousted Al Shabaab from urban hubs comprising the capital city Mogadishu and other minor settlements in Somalia. A provisional government and some administrative institutions were put in place and efforts for restoring peace in the country are now underway. Notwithstanding the accomplishments, the findings also disclose that Al Shabaab continues to launch attacks on AMISOM headquarters, for instance El Adde recently, on restaurants, beaches and has altered strategies to asymmetric attacks using guerrilla strategies. The findings have also shown AMISOM's main challenge of inadequate funding to increase equipment and human resources to continue fighting and securing liberated areas as well as obstructing Al Shabaab's supply routes and bases. In light of the setbacks and challenges faced by the AMISOM, several recommendations have been submitted for the AU to safeguard sustainable security, peace and economic development in Somalia and the entire East African region.

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ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ACSRT	African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism
AMISOM	African Mission to Somalia
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
AUPSO	African Union-led Peace Support Operation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EU	European Union
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUTM	European Union Training Mission in Somalia
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Devises
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	Inter-governmental Authority and Development Support Mission to Somalia

IMO	International Maritime Organization
ISIS/ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant
KDF	Kenyan Defense Force
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MCRS	Mogadishu Center for Research Studies
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NISA	National Intelligence and Security Agency
OAU	Organization of African Unity
P5	United States of America, Britain, France, Russia and China
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SNA	Somali National Army
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM	Nations Operations in Somalia

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0. Introduction to the Study

Past and ongoing events in the international system are testimony to the fact that no country is immune to the threat of terrorism. Security threats are no longer the traditional ones where a states' pre-occupation were the defence against an invasion or attack from another sovereign. The turn of the new millennium has witnessed violent confrontations in different parts of the globe and the most devastating has been terrorism perpetrated by either domestic or international terror groups. To that end, loss of lives and destruction of infrastructure through acts of terror have affected the socio-economic and political activities in a number of countries. The London Bridge attack of 2017, Nice Truck attack in 2016 in France, Manchester arena bombing of 2017, Hanau shootings in Germany of 2020 and Barcelona attacks in 2017 are some of the notable terrorist activities which have threatened peace and security within the international system.

Africa as a continent has not been spared of this menace and indications are that terrorism is fast emerging as a major security threat across the African continent. Bedevilled by political, socio-economic threats to peace and security the continent has lost its developmental trajectory over the years. Terrorism phenomenon has become a great threat to economic development. The human capital base has also been depleted through loss of lives and forced migration. Parts of Africa predominantly East Africa and the Maghreb region have been afflicted by periods of terrorism with devastating impacts on human life, stability and development since the 1990s. These areas have become battlegrounds in the fight against terrorism perpetrated by jihadists and other extremists. To this end development has been stalled and the need to reactivate all security apparatus and systems becomes a major prerequisite if any given country wants to succeed in its counter terrorism strategies.

Al-Shabaab has been operating in Somalia and making invasions into Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti. This study focuses on Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia and assessing African Union (AU) Standby Force's effectiveness in combating this security threat since 2007 when the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed. Challenges faced by AU Standby Force in its attempt to exterminate this terrorist group are scrutinised and recommendations submitted as to how best the AU can overcome this predicament of terrorism insecurity that has beleaguered Somalia for more than a decade. The study

progresses in five chapters. The first chapter focuses on the introduction of the study which provides the background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives and research questions, significance of the study, delimitations, limitations and a conclusion. The second chapter presents literature review; third chapter presents on methodology, fourth chapter outlines on data presentation and analysis and chapter five presents the summary, conclusion and recommendations made on the study.

1.1 Background to Study

Terrorism is today considered one of the most serious global security threats to most countries (Okoye, 2017). Ever since the September 11 attacks in the United States of America, a number of major terrorist attacks have consistently shocked Europe and other parts of the world (Humenberger, 2018). Numerous terrorist attacks have been registered in different parts of the globe and the most recent ones include Paris attacks in 2015, Brussels bombing in 2016, Nice truck attack in 2016, Southern Germany attacks of 2016, the St Petersburg attack in 2017 and the Manchester terrorist attack of May 2017 to mention just but a few (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). In 2016 alone, more than 13400 terrorist attacks took place around the world, the majority (87%) of which occurred in the Middle East and South Asia.

More so, recent years have been saturated with commentaries and reports of Africa becoming a new hunting ground and frontier for terrorism in general as Islamist fundamentalism in particular has become much more frequent and a serious cause for concern in this part of the globe (Alfa-Wali et al 2015). According to Will and Waterfield (2016), it is indisputable that Africa may be emerging as a target and centre of gravity for the Islamist militants with worrying signs of increased terrorist activities spreading to cover the whole giant continent. Unfortunately, Africa has a conducive environment for the growth of terrorism because of a plethora of characteristics among which are religious fundamentalism, poverty, tribal and ethnic tensions, growing regional and political instability and ideologies of extremist groups that are lobbying for the establishment of new states in replacement of old ones (Fazel, 2013).

In addition, weak governance structures have provided a fertile ground for radicalization while constraints on the capacities of security forces facilitated the growth of jihadi and separatist groups in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Central Africa Republic, Somalia and Sudan. Even though Al Qaeda and its offshoots maintained a strong position internationally and continued to pose a serious threat, their

position was challenged by the so-called 'Islamic State' Group (Alfa-Wali et al 2015). A closer look at the past two decades attests to the fact that the African continent has either directly or indirectly been involved in terror related activities (Rifer, 2005). The bomb attacks during the bizarre Black Mamba episode of 1996 in Zambia and the arrest of Khalfan Khamis Mohammed for bombing the American Embassy in Dar es Salam in 1999 are just but a few cases in point. Currently Mozambique is battling to deal with an Islamic inspired terrorism group called Al-Shabaab. The group is linked to radicals in Tanzania, Somalia and Uganda. After Tanzanian radicals became violent particularly in early 2017, some of them took refuge with the Mozambican “Al-Shabaab”. This has reinforced and partially internationalized the insurgency (Morier-Genand, 2018).

It is significant to note that Somalia has also not been spared from terrorism. The country has experienced devastating effects of terrorism as they grapple to combat terrorism. The terror group in Somalia is called Al- Shabab. There have also been numerous reports that Al-Shabab may have formed some links with other militant groups in Africa, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, based in the Sahara desert (Wanta and Kalyango 2007). The AU Standby Force has worked very hard in trying to combat terrorism in Somalia but their efforts have not managed to combat terrorism in war torn country. The researcher thus seeks to analyse the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) Standby Force in combating terrorism in Somalia and come up with recommendations that can assist in improving the effectiveness of the AU Standby Force in combating terrorism in Somalia

1.2 Statement of the Problem

There is terrorism in Somalia, thousands of people have died and more people continue to die on daily basis. Al-shabaab has intensified its operations in recent years. Many people have actually left Somalia as refugees to other countries that have peace. The government has made efforts to use the military in support of AU Standby Force to combat terrorism but these efforts have not brought about remarkable peace in the country. Efforts to concretise the general populace on the need to desist from cooperating with terrorist organisations have been conducted with little success. Countries that comprise the AU Standby Force have also been targeted. Terror attacks in Kenya and Nigeria have been witnessed. Yussuf(2018) argues that the bombing of the Ugandan capital, Kampala, where patrons were watching the 2010 World Cup final on TV was carried out because Ugandans at the time made up the bulk of the African Union force in Somalia (AMISOM). Despite efforts by the government and AU

Standby Force to combat terrorism in Somalia, acts of terror have been on an exponential rise on daily basis. The problem of terrorism has been there in Somalia since 2006 and has increased over the years with incursions into neighboring countries as well as increased levels of violence in terms of casualties. Despite efforts by the African Union through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and assistance from international partners resulting in the degradation of Al Shabaab, there is still insecurity within Somalia and its neighbors. Violent acts have derailed the developmental discourse in Somalia and its neighboring countries due to the spillover effect. Resources have been plundered and the human capital base cannot be empowered to champion development. Many lives have been lost and are being lost on daily basis. Destruction of infrastructure is the order of the day. There is therefore need to assess the effectiveness of AU Standby Force in combating Al Shabaab and the likelihood of ending Al Shabaab reign of terror. Ultimately the researcher seeks to proffer ways or suggestions on how the AU Standby Force can improve its counter terrorism strategies so as to effectively combat religious terrorism in Somalia.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

The research sought to achieve the following general objective:

- a. To analyse the effectiveness of the African Union Standby Force in combating religious terrorism in Somalia.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The research sought to achieve the following specific objectives:

- a. To analyse the factors that are likely to motivate terrorism in Somalia and its impact on the country.
- b. To examine the success of AU Standby Force in combating terrorism in Somalia.
- c. To come up with counter terrorism strategies in the combating of terrorism in Somalia.

1.4 Research Questions

The following questions need to be answered by this research:

- a. What are the likely factors that breed terrorism in Somalia and its impact on the country?
- b. How successful has been the AU Standby Force in combating terrorism in Somalia?
- c. What strategies and mechanisms can be used by the African Union Standby Force to combat terrorism in Somalia?

1.5 Assumptions

According to Best and Kahn (1993) assumptions “are statements of what the researcher believes to be the facts but cannot verify”. In line with this thinking the researcher assumed that the respondents would cooperate and provide useful information for the research. It is also assumed that the laws of Somalia would not negatively affect the research. The constitution of Somalia would not limit the researcher’s scope. The researcher also assumed that religion would not affect his research.

1.6 Significance/Rational of the Research

This study aims to uncover how the AU Standby Force is trying to combat Al Shabaab in Somalia and in turn try to find the challenges they are encountering on their mission to combat terrorism. With this research, gaps can be closed on how to deal with these challenges and by dealing with these challenges the AU can eliminate terrorism. The study will bring out manifestations and various facets of terrorism and their implications to national security with a view to enable the AU Standby Force to come up with effective counter terrorism response strategies and mechanisms that match the current dynamic security environment. The study will also fill in the gap on the continent’s counter terrorism mechanisms in place. The results of the study would benefit security apparatus such as those in the SADC, ECOWAS, Maghreb, EGAD, Interpol, Intelligence personnel, Institute for Security Studies in South Africa and enable them to review their counter terrorism strategies. The study will also add value to the Midlands State University body of knowledge on Peace and Security Studies. It is also significant to note that the head of AU Standby Force during the period under study is a top general from Zimbabwe hence this would assist in adding value to the research and correct information on the challenges being experienced by AU Standby Force will be well articulated.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The inherent but perceived predisposition that the researcher will, in the course of this investigation discuss sensitive issues may result in key respondents rendering limited support to the research. Nevertheless a lot of measures will be taken to ensure maximum output in both the amount and quality of data needed thus the researcher will use Somalia Embassy in Zimbabwe, Defence Attaches, and Skype calls to contact relevant security officials in Somalia. The researcher could not interview terrorists as it was not possible to get their contact details

1.8 Delimitations

The study was restricted to Somalia where AU Standby Force is operating. The study is limited to the period between 2007 and 2020.

1.9 Conceptual Framework

1.9.1 Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative Deprivation Theory shall be used to explain the emergency of terrorism. It is significant first to understand relative deprivation as a theory of political violence. The major proponent of the theory is Gurr. The scholar explains in “Why Men Rebel” (1970) that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent. This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves. In this paper the researcher will examine how relative deprivation theory has been used to explain different kinds of political violence, and whether it might also account for terrorist attacks in Somalia. Gurr explains political violence as the result of collective discontent caused by a sense of relative deprivation. He writes, “Relative deprivation” is the term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence.” This gap between an individual’s expected and achieved welfare results in collective discontent.

Runciman (1966) defines the preconditions of “relative” deprivation as follows (where Person A feels deprived of object X): Person A does not have X; Person A wants to have X; Person A knows of other people who have X; Person A believes obtaining X is realistic. How might feelings of relative deprivation translate into terrorism? Gurr provides a psychological approach to explain how collective discontent is manifested as political violence: “The primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression

mechanism the anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.” Nevertheless, Gurr was not the first in his field to propose a link between frustration and aggression. Dollard, Millard, et al. (2009) were the first to propose the theory, postulating that frustration leads men to act aggressively. Accordingly, this frustration is caused by relative deprivation and the resulting aggression is manifested as terrorism. Many scholars believe that the existing political circumstances and opportunities within the state under study explicitly constrict the potential range of actions in which challengers can engage there by leading to the precipitation of frustration which causes terrorism (Meyer: 2004). It is thus clear that the difference between the have and have not in Somalia accounts for the rise in terrorism in that country.

1.9.2 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

In order to proffer positive strategies that can be used to counter terrorism, the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) shall also be used. Barry Buzan and Waever (2003) posit that the existence of regional sub-systems as objects of security analysis and offers an analytical framework for dealing with them. The theory focuses primarily on the state as unit and on the political and military sectors as the principal forum for security relations. The essential logic of the theory is rooted in the fact that all the states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence, but because most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity. RSCT posits that actors’ actions and motivations in the field of international security are heavily regional in character. This means that an actor’s security concerns are primarily generated in their immediate neighborhood. The security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of the other actors. Most security concerns do not travel well over distances, and threats within an actor’s immediate neighborhood are thus most likely felt the strongest.

For the purposes of this study the RSCT will be used since it best explains the existence of regional cooperation and it explains the existence of the AU and AU Standby Force which is under study. The member states thus formed the standby force to assist in dealing with security threats that may threaten peace and security among its member states. The employment of the AU Standby Force to combat terrorism in Somalia is best explained by the RSCT. Hence the AU member states can achieve peace and security through the use of Standby Brigades as a coalition effort. Nevertheless, such alliances have been less effective in dealing with non-state actors such as AQIM and Islamic State’s West Africa Province.

1.9.3 Definition of Terms

1.9.3.1 Terrorism

Buzan (1991) propounds that terrorism, is the systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population in order to bring about a particular political objective. Terrorism has been practiced by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by revolutionaries, and even by state institutions. Another scholar (Gunning 2007) posits that terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of combat, or a strategy to achieve certain target. It aims to induce a state of fear in the victim that is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian rules. Schmid and Jongman (1997) also argues that “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.

1.9.3.2 Security

Coghlan et al (2006) defines security as a contested concept which defies pursuit of an agreed general definition a position that is also taken by Baylis et al (2008). Williams (2008) argues that security is the alleviation of threats (which threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future) to cherished values.” Booth (2007) also defines it as, “survival plus, the ‘plus’ being some freedom from life-determining threats, and thus some life choices.” Thus security involves freedom from threats (alleviation of threats) to attainment of choices.

1.9.3.3 Global Security

Baylis et al (2008) argues that global security also called international security is the amalgamation of measures taken by states and international organizations such as the United Nations, European Union and others, to ensure mutual survival and safety. These measures include military action and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. International and national security is invariably linked. International security is national security or state security in the global arena. There are many security issues that the world will have to face as a global community, from drug trafficking to border disputes.

1.9.3.4 Regional Security

Bilgin (2005) Regional Security is an arrangement of an international region that originates from inter- governmental consensus to cooperate on dealing with security threats and the enhancement of stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of

agreements, instruments and mechanisms such as formal security treaties, international organisations and joint action agreements.

1.9.3.5 Suicide

Javier (2009) defines suicide as a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual who actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target

1.9.3.6 Counter Terrorism.

Counter terrorism (CT) refers to all preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts, to respond to terrorist acts. In the frame of the NATO Comprehensive Approach, this can be combined with or followed by measures enabling recovery after terrorist acts (Bloom, 2005).

1.9.3.7 Combat Readiness.

Mohochi (2015) defines combat readiness as “a condition of the Army and its constituent units and formations, weapon systems or other military technology and equipment to perform during combat military operation, or functions consistent with the purpose for which they are organised or designed, or the managing of resources and training in preparation for combat”.

1.9.3.8 Religious Terrorism

Davis (2010) propounds that religious terrorists seek to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes. Religious terrorism is characterized by compliance with belief. Sectarian killings, as practiced both by Nationalists and Loyalists in Northern Ireland fall into this category. Hoffman (2006) postulates that, religious terrorists have three aspects that drive them which are Jihadism, Extremism and fundamentalism. These factors have been the core drivers of religious terrorism across the globe.

1.10 Chapter Breakdown

This research is chronologically organised into five distinct chapters. The first chapter which provides the foundations upon which preceding chapters are based basically addresses a wide spectrum of research issues, determines contextual variables, identifies key players and offers a tentative and preliminary introduction. The major thematic issues encountered in this introductory chapter include background of the problem- which calls for or created conditions requiring research. It then evaluates the significance of the study by justifying why the

research is relevant. It concludes by outlining the research boundaries and limitations of the study.

Chapter Two

The chapter dwells on the review of relevant literature material to the research. It also looked at key factors to terrorism, terrorist strategies as well as the role of international organisations in combating terrorism. Lastly, the chapter assessed the impact of terrorism to society.

Chapter Three

The chapter is about the methods that were used for collecting information in the field. The chapter is mainly explaining how this study was conducted, the applied methods and techniques in data collection and the reasons as to why they were used according to the research aims and main objectives of the study. The chapter discussed the research process, the selection of the data sites, sampling methods and justification and sources of data used in the study. The chapter concludes with the discussion on the reliability and validity of the research as well as the methodological problems encountered during the data collection and analysis.

Chapter Four

The chapter focuses on fieldwork engagements, presentation of findings obtained from the field and analysis of data collected and presented in order to test and verify its empirical worthiness. It then describes and explains the challenges faced by the researcher in the field and the solutions adopted to rectify and counter these problems. Data is presented with the aid of diagrams, charts and tables where necessary, to illustrate and explain the findings obtained.

Chapter Five

The chapter summarises the entire research along with recommendations and suggestions for improvements. The model which can be adopted to counter terrorism in Somalia is articulated in detail.

1.11 Chapter Summary

This chapter provided the foundation for the whole research and it provided the guidelines and framework from which future chapters are split and developed. It is useful as it endeavours to identify and define the working concepts and terms used in the course of the

research and relate them to the broader research questions and objectives underlying the study. The statement of the problem and contribution to literature was also described and explained in this section. Attention was also given to the limitations and delimitations of the study cognisant of the research assumptions embedded.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, attention is given and devoted to a systematic and thorough review of literature for the purpose of identifying gaps and omissions inherent therein. Identifying the gaps in existing literature will assist in adding relevance, significance and contribution of the present work and in understanding the challenges being faced by the AU Standby Force in its efforts to combat terrorism in Somalia. This chapter will also give an overview of terrorism in Africa, highlight the key permissive factors of terrorism, impact of terrorism on the society, role played by continental groupings in combating terrorism and challenges faced in combating terrorism.

2.1 Terrorism in Africa: An Overview

Terrorism on the global polite has gained a significant exponential rise in the past decades and Africa has not been spared as well. To this end it is important to critically analyse terrorism within the broader landscape of Africa's security challenges. According to Njoku et al (2018), terrorist activities and attacks across the African continent are a true picture of the potential and current threat that has bedevilled the continent in the recent times. The African continent has had its fair share of the domestic terrorism and is also struggling with the emergence of transnational terrorist groups (Forest and Giroux, 2017). The events of the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel and airplane, and attacks against the United Nations buildings in Algeria and Nigeria are examples of terrorist activities undertaken on the continent of Africa with a clear attachment to the international dimension.

It is also important to mention that countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Libya, Mali, Tunisia and Egypt to mention just but a few have been experiencing terrorist attacks also. In the majority of cases, terrorists' groups have often resorted to targeting tourists in these countries so as to gain global recognition for their cause. Meredith (2005) posits that during the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the continent recorded above 6000 casualties from 296 acts of international terrorism.

A closer look on the African security situation demonstrates that countries in the Sub-Saharan region have been the most affected with terrorism as sixteen states in this part of the continent

are classified high terror risk areas (Aon, 2015). Njoku et al (2018) notes that the rise and continuous media coverage of terrorism in Sub Saharan Africa is a direct result of the continued acts of terror that ravages the Sub Saharan Africa. Boko Haram in Nigeria has had its activities, influence the security situations in Niger and Cameroon. The terrorist organisation continues to cause security threat to the aforementioned countries and also pose a burden to the governments of the aforementioned countries concerned (Akinfala et al, 2014).

On the other hand in east Africa Al-Shabaab operations in Kenya and other countries has also impacted negatively on security (Watkins, 2015). Notable terror attacks by the group other than the attacks on the United States of America embassy in Nairobi 1998 were the Westgate shopping mall in 2013 and Garissa University College attacks in 2015. In November 2015, a hotel attack was staged in Bamako, Mali whilst there was a bus attack in Tunis in the same month. Kealing (2016) posits that these and other events give clear testimony of the complexity of terrorism on the African continent.

2.2 Key Permissive Factors of Terrorism

The factors that drive terrorism are not consistent but vary over time and place and it is equally significant to understand them if sound counter terrorism strategies can be employed. According to the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (2007), the key permissive factors of terrorism include poverty, madrassas, porous borders and uncontrolled multimedia abuse. Hogan (2006) postulates that psychological and cognitive factors among which include a sense of identity and belonging, expectations and beliefs shape how a person experiences and react to his or her environmental events. It is significant to note that socio-economic and political conditions in Africa make the continent a fertile ground to breed terrorism. It is thus significant that these factors be understood if relevant Counter terrorism efforts are to be pursued.

In terms of poverty one may ask, is it desperation or is it the hope for a better future that leads to terrorism? Understanding and embracing the root causes that terrorism emerges from goes a long way toward developing effective counter terrorism strategies and counter radicalization policies. Another researcher has discovered that in certain localities of Pakistan and Afghanistan, people also join terror groups due to the economic incentive. It can be concluded that under certain circumstances; in certain periods and in certain localities in the world, poverty is a significant and contributing factor in the decision to participate in

terrorism. A feeling of relative deprivation, frustration and rejection can make someone more susceptible to the appeal of terrorism. The youth according to Crenshaw (1981) are the most vulnerable as they often worry about their future and are prepared to take risks to challenge the status quo. The events in Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique and DRC all point towards the rising of those who are in poverty against their governments. This may also be the major challenge in Somalia hence calls for further interrogation.

The second factor is madrassas that is incubators of extremism. Traditionally, madrassas (seminaries) have been a source of all types of knowledge for Muslims where education, even in the science subjects was provided. With the passage of time, the role of the traditional madrassas has been restricted just to impart religious education. Nevertheless, trends point out that religious extremism and fundamentalism have been advanced by such schools. The Madrassas have also been used across Africa for propagating fundamentalist Islamic ideology and terrorism in the continent. Hubschle (2007) postulate that Africa practiced moderate Islam up to the early 1970s and the exponential rise in the funding of mosques, Islamic activities and madrassas on the continent by Islamic states paved way for radicalization. It is significant to note that the dissemination of and exposure to radical ideas and narratives that legitimize terrorism and cultivate its appeal to a target people are critical factors that motivate individuals into terrorism (The Change Institute, 2008).

Terrorist organizations spread their ideas in such a way that resonates with certain individuals targeted for radicalization. Declaring the followers of other sects “Kafirs” or non-Muslims is sort of a normal practice in a majority of the religious seminaries where the target audience is young children. The minds of young children are like wet clay and it can be moulded in any form one desires. Unfortunately, in most madrassas, it is being moulded in a negative manner in Nigeria the rise of Boko Haram terraces its links to Saudi Islamic Scholars who have been the key proponents of radicalization (Sageman, 2004). The Almajiri Heritage schools in Nigeria are believed to have links with madrassas in Central Asia (Onuoha, 2014). The number of madrassas have risen in the past few decades across Africa notably in Kenya, Ethiopia, DRC, Central Africa Republic, Niger and Sudan (Fuluya, 2017). It is not surprising that the aforementioned countries have witnessed rise in the acts of terror in recent years. Given the impact of the madrassas in terms of radicalisation there may be need to explore its impact in Somalia as it may be one of the core drivers of terrorism in that country.

Thirdly, porous borders have been a cause for concern. According to Rosland and Ipe (2008), the borders of most African states are highly permeable and promote the growth of cross border crimes like terrorism. States are recognized under international law by their capability to maintain their boundaries, secure their territories, and protect their citizens. The ability to secure national borders is one of the criteria used to classify states as strong, weak and failed. A state has a primary responsibility of protecting its citizens from both internal and external threats to their livelihoods. It must be pointed out that the strategic location of a country determines opportunities for illegal activities that exists or can take place in its border areas. Some countries are more threatened by insecurities or mismanagement of other countries borders than their own. The challenges facing African states to manage their borders are further compounded by globalization that is tearing down traditional borders through advancement in technology and transformation of international relations. At the moment crimes are committed without crossing borders and huge amounts of goods are sold through cyberspace.

The internet has not only made it more difficult to manage borders and to combat cross border crimes, but has also effectively dismantled borders by allowing imports without going through customs. The greatest challenge facing Nigeria today is international terrorism that is aided by religious extremism, porosity of borderline and cross-border security challenges and crime. Indeed, the existence of porous borders and cross-border and frontier activities in Nigeria has aided crimes and security challenges across Nigerian borders for long without any specific solutions. Nigerian borders with her neighbors-Benin Republic, Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroons. Such a scenario has made it relatively easy for Boko Haram's contacts in Libya and Mali to provide the terrorist group with small arms (Omitola, 2014). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) has taken advantage of the state of affairs of porous borders and has established a safe haven in the vast lands of the Sahel region of Africa. It will be prudent to interrogate Somalia in terms of the security of its boarders as this will assist in coming up with recommendations that can be used as strategies in combating terrorism in that country.

Lastly, multimedia abuse has been fuelling terrorism. The exponential rise in modern communication technologies has led to the rise in terrorist activities across the globe. It is significant to note that Africa has not been spared in this tide of global terrorism. Chiliswa (2015) argues that 90% of terrorism is spread via the social media. Hoffman (2006) equally postulates that terrorist groups target the social media to spread their messages, recruit

followers and also gather intelligence. If media is not controlled it can lead to the radicalisation of the general populace. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has used more than one hundred sites to spread their propaganda messages and they have managed to attract a large base of followers (Gates and Podder, 2015). AQIM operating in the Sahel region of Africa has also adopted the same means of announcing and claiming responsibility for their terrorist attacks as evidenced in the recent bombings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast (Pham 2016).

The kidnapping of the Chibok girls by Boko Haram in Nigeria and its publicity on the social media on 5 May 2014 on the social media by Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau only created a spirit of success among the terrorist group and also might have helped in assisting in adding more followers (Lancu, 2015). In Somalia Al Shabaab has also adopted the use of global information communication tools to recruit and publicize their ideologies and activities. The terrorist group has since launched its twitter account in 2011 to coordinate its movement and other activities. It is thus undisputable that social media may be a driving force in the propagating of terrorism in Somalia a position that need to be examined or explored.

2.3 Terrorist Strategies

According to Kyadd and Walter (2006), it is not possible to effectively counter terrorism without an appreciation of the strategies terrorists employ in different circumstances. Kyadd and Walter (2006) further argues that there are basically five (5) strategies that are employed by terrorists and these include intimidation, provocation, spoiling, attrition and outbidding. In attrition, Overgaard (1994) posits that the terrorists aim to inflict serious costs so that a government yields to their demands. Three variables which are the state's level of interest in the issue under dispute, the constraints on the state's ability to retaliate and the target's cost tolerance are likely to figure in the outcome. In addition, other terrorist groups are in the habit of using the provocation strategy which is often used in pursuit of territorial or regime change agenda (Kyadd and Walter, 2006). More often than not, terrorist may just act to spoil a peace process to ensure that peace overtures between moderate leaders on the terrorists' side and the target government (Steadman, 1997). In cases where two or more domestic parties are competing for power and the citizenry not sure which group best represent their interest, the strategy of outbidding is normally used (Bloom, 2005).

2.4 Role of the International and Continental Organizations in Combating Terrorism

Security organizations the world over have employed various counter terrorism strategies. According to Mohochi (2015), counter terrorism strategies include defensive and pro- active measures in which pro-active measures entail confronting terrorists whereas defensive strategies are aimed at preventing terrorist activities. Some organizations for instance have to some degree of success employed strategies like pre-emption attacks, assassinations, commando raids and hostage rescue missions in their war against terror (Kiper and Sosis, 2016). Nevertheless, military means alone may not be best in some instances. In the European Union, Special Forces are often used for surveillance and apprehension operations as well as in raids and bomb disposal (Quaker Council for European Affairs, 2007). The efforts of the AU Standby Force can thus be evaluated by looking at some of the strategies being used by other international and continental organizations. To this end the UN, EU and Organization of American States (OAS) shall be explored.

2.4.1 Role of the United Nations in Combating Terrorism

While countering terrorism has been on the agenda of the United Nations System for decades, the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 prompted the Security Council to adopt resolution 1373, which for the first time established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Five years later, all Member States of the General Assembly for the first time agreed on a common strategic framework to fight the scourge of terrorism: the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Strategy is a unique instrument to enhance the efforts of the international community to counter terrorism along four pillars which include addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, Preventing and combating terrorism, Building Member States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard, Ensuring the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for countering terrorism.

At the time of the adoption of the Strategy, the General Assembly also endorsed the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), which had been established by the Secretary-General in 2005 in the Department of Political Affairs. Consisting of 38 entities of the UN and affiliated organizations, CTITF works to promote coordination and coherence within the UN System on counter-terrorism and to provide assistance to Member States. Established in 2011, the UN Counter Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) provides capacity-building assistance to Member States and carries out counter-terrorism projects around the world in line with the

four pillars of the Global Strategy. In its quest to fight terrorism in Somalia the AU Standby Force can also borrow a leaf from the counter terrorism strategies being employed by the UN.

2.4.2 Role of the European Union in Counter Terrorism

The European Union uses the concept of 'collective securitization' in dealing with terrorism. It is significant to note that the highlights of 9/11 bombings was a precipitating event, one which led some EU leaders to call upon the member states to develop an EU counter-terrorism policy and to step up counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States. Javier (2009) propounds that various counter-terrorism legislative instruments have since been adopted, defining terrorist acts and having a significant impact on national counter-terrorism policies. 9/11 was thus used by some actors to convince the EU member states that they all faced one collective terrorist threat, embodied at the time by al-Qaeda, rather than each of them facing a distinctive threat as had hitherto been a common view across Europe.

This was a crucial moment, in other words, paving the way for the development of a common EU counter-terrorism policy. The subsequent institutionalization of this cooperation, in particular through the establishment of the European Arrest Warrant, the Counter Terrorism Coordinator and the European Counter Terrorism Centre within Europol, has contributed to a rationalization of counter-terrorism practices in the EU. In the same vein collective securitization may be used by other regional and continental groupings as a counter terrorism strategy. Furthermore the EU has also managed to advocate for effective training of member states police and military forces in counter terrorism. This is enhanced through the exchange of vital intelligence on terrorist groups and their modus operandi.

The intelligence personnel also work together in tracking suspicious money laundering on the internet banking platforms thereby ensuring that financial assistance to terrorist activities is nipped in the bud. Crelinsten (2009) propounds that the EU has also managed to spread its counter terrorism strategy across the EU institutional and agency framework, varying from anti-radicalization education provision and quasi-military responses under the common Foreign and Security Policy. These strategies have actually assisted in combating terrorism among the EU member states. These strategies can also be adopted by various regional and continental groupings in their counter terrorism strategies.

2.4.3 Organization of American States

The organization of American States (OAS) consists of 35 member states from the American region. These countries have joined hands in counter terrorism. Lessons drawn from the 9/11

attacks of 2001 provided a turning point in the history on counter terrorism among the member states. The act was labeled as an act of madness and also a direct attack against all American countries thereby making the fight against terrorism a task for everyone. This where the concept of injure one injure all come to the fore in the fight against terrorism. Ozdar (2008) argues that the OAS adopted the Resolution on Strengthening the Hemispheric Cooperation to prevent, combat and Eliminate Terrorism in 2001.

All member states were called upon to deny terrorist groups the ability to operate within their territories. Furthermore, Kiper and Sosis (2016) posit that the military forces in these member states have successfully employed the modern technology of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) though this has had problems of collateral damage. It must nevertheless be noted that success of counter terrorism is heavily dependent on issues like clear definition of responsibilities among security services, allocation of resources to fight terrorism and focused and intensive training of security personnel in the relevant counter terrorism techniques (Ku, 2016). The resolution nevertheless stressed on the need to ensure that there was rule of law, human rights and democratic values. Governments were called upon to ensure good governance and equitable distribution of resources among its citizens. It was envisaged that such strategies would prevent the breeding of frustration among the general populace owing to deprivation of resources. Such strategies may bring positive results if applied in Somalia.

2.5 Common Challenges Associated with Counter Terrorism Activities

The nature of terrorism and its dynamism makes it complicated to counter there by presenting challenges. These challenges range from lack of resources , lack of inter-agency cooperation, lack of public support and lack of appropriate training for the relevant counter terrorism agencies among others.

Counter terrorism just like any other security endeavor is thus expensive in resources. The ever changing nature of terrorist activities makes it difficult to combat it in both developing and developed countries (Magogo, 2017). Effective counter terrorism strategies require allocation of massive resources to the security and intelligence services for research and development, training and acquisition of modern security equipment like full body scanners, X-ray machines and explosive trace detectors among a host of critical counter terrorism equipment (Mueller and Stewart, 2016. Muller and Steward (2016) postulates that the US government has spent over a trillion dollars investing in counter terrorism in the period 2001 to 2012. In the same vein, The Henry Jackson Society (2014) further posits that it requires a

robust economy to support any meaningful counter terrorism strategies arguing that approximately a quarter of the Nigerian government's 2012 budget was allocated to the security sector with a view to enhance the services capabilities in the war against terrorism. The same applies with the Kenyan scenario where the government of Kenya has actually incorporated its anti- terrorism activities in its national budget (Magogo, 2017). Most of the aspects to do with counter terrorism require funding without which nothing meaningful can be done.

Success in counter terrorism is heavily dependent on the allocation of resources to the security services (Magogo, 2017). These resources are required for security services training, equipment procurement and coordination of operations. Lack of adequate funds limits the security forces capacity to purchase modern equipment and capability to develop other security infrastructure. Without multilateral or bilateral partnerships, African states in particular have struggled in their counter terrorism efforts. Kenya for instance has benefited from donations and multiple grants from the USA and the UK to augment their meagre resources (Omutola, 2008). In most cases it is very difficult to accurately predict what the terrorist will do. Furthermore, national governments often struggle to avail adequate funds and resources which are crucial in the fight against terrorism (Kiggundu, 1991). To that end, poor funding leads to lack of suitable equipment which continues to undermine any efforts to counter terrorism in most states particularly in developing countries (Njogu, 2015).

Modern technological equipment is critical in undermining overall terrorist operations but most of the gadgets required by security services are expensive and beyond their reach (Davis, 2010). Modern technology can also be employed to counter terrorist transactions such as media propaganda and communication in general (Davis,2010). The Nigerian government has been struggling in its efforts to counter Boko Haram owing to lack of modern equipment (Makinda and Okumu,2011). In countries like Ghana and Kenya resources are not enough to enable the provision of detectors, scanners, CCTVs and other gadgets which are of significance in counter terrorism operations. This has negatively impacted on the counter terrorism strategies employed by the security forces in the aforementioned countries. The is need to interrogate the exponential rise in terrorist activities in Somalia as it may be attributed to inadequate resources in the areas of boarder security, intelligence gathering, and procurement of specialized equipment and inadequately armed of the security forces.

The other common problem in counter terrorism is lack of proper training to handle terrorist situations on the part of security services (Ndombi and Auya, 2016). Most training syllabi for security services do not give the due attention that terrorism deserves as an emerging threat to security. This stands as a stumbling block in the realization of effective counter terrorism mechanisms in dealing with terrorism in most African countries. There is no doubt training in counter terrorism skills is critical to the success of the fight against terrorism in any given country. Counter terrorism training for most security agencies across the globe is not in tandem with the latest security threats. This has actually militated on security institutions in dealing with terror related situations (Davonport and Saunder, 2000). Dietrich (2015), commenting on the Nigerian Security Services notes that the agencies often lack counter terrorism training and this has prolonged the war on terror in the country.

Anim (2015) argues that joint training exercises and seminars have been used by Ghanaian Security agencies in preparing their troops on counter terrorism. Equally the same, in Somalia services may be conducting such exercises on counter terrorism nevertheless, the magnitude of the training is what may require some interrogation to establish whether it corresponds with the current threat that is obtaining in Somalia. Ndombi and Auya (2016) argues that the delayed response by the Kenyan Security Services following the terrorist attack at the Garissa University in 2015 where 147 people were left dead and 80 other injured is a testimony on the levels of training and overall state of the Security Services preparedness. Njogu (2015) propounds that the failure to respond by Nigeria Defence Forces following the kidnapping of the Chibok girls by Boko Haram in 2014 served to show lack of training in response timings as well as the absence of counter terrorism strategies given the fact that the Army had been warned of the attack four hours earlier.

In a bid to improve the levels of training in counter terrorism techniques, countries like Nigeria have made partnerships with the U.S Army in the conduct of specialised counter terrorism training on protection and handling of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and preservation of evidence from crime scenes after terrorist attacks (United States Department of State, 2015). Countries like Italy, Germany and Israel have also taken a lead role in providing security and technical assistance while the UK and France have provided military training to the Nigerian armed forces on counter-terrorism (Amy, 2014). Kenya likewise has also taken advantage of both the US and United Kingdom (UK) in bilateral and multilateral collaborations in counter terrorism initiatives thus benefiting the country in counter terrorism training (Omutola, 2008). The war on terrorism needs partnership with a number of countries

so as to increase resources which can be directed towards counter terrorism. Partnership also assists in the sharing of experience as well as key intelligence in counter terrorism thereby enhancing counter terrorism strategies. Such a move may be of value to AU Standby Force in dealing with terrorism in Somalia.

Another important aspect is lack of inter-agency cooperation. Opon, Okoth and Onkware (2015) posit that the greatest hindrance in combating terrorism in Kenya is lack of coordinated efforts by the respective agencies. Likewise, Sanders (2011) posits that a lack of cooperation between security forces resulting from competition between various agencies and poor intelligence sharing negatively affected the counterterrorism abilities in many countries. In the Nigerian case, inter agency mistrust has also been identified as one of the biggest challenges undermining counter terrorism operations against Boko Haram as there was no intelligence sharing among the security agencies (Amy, 2014). Consequently, the Nigerian Government was left with no option but to fuse these security agencies in a bid to pool their expertise together and to allow a free flow of information among institutions (Solomon, 2012). According to Sanders (2016), it is crucial that security services collaborate and share information concerning terrorism and work together as a team if they are to succeed in countering terrorism.

In the Canadian system for example, their counter terrorism strategy has worked relatively well owing to the fact that there is clear definition of responsibilities among the security services hence each security service is aware and performs its function with diligence. Nevertheless in Africa there is always a case of mistrust among security agencies. In addition, the element of inter service mistrust is something that most countries always grapple with the world over and Somalia may thus not be an exception. This is so because security services do not operate in a vacuum but within a political environment in which political players jostle for their control thereby creating cleavages. Such situations may be obtaining in Somalia as well thus the need to explore deeper so as to identify the challenges affecting counter terrorism strategies in that country.

Lack of public support has also been identified as one of the challenges encountered in counter terrorism. According to Magogo (2017), the citizens often view counter terrorism as a purely security services domain in which they have nothing to offer. In light of that, they make no effort to deliver information that is significant in countering terrorism (Anim, 2015). In countries like Kenya for example, this is despite the introduction of initiatives such as the

“Nyumba Kumi” whose purpose is to encourage members of the population to support the security services in intelligence gathering (Magogo, 2017). Hassan (2015) posits that the public is reluctant to volunteer significant information which is helpful in countering terrorism.

In contrast, the American Security Forces have done relatively well in countering terrorism partly because the American public participate actively in counter terrorism initiatives (Merari, 2000). There must be deliberate programs by the security services to align with local communities through community public relations committees which enhance exchange of information on combating terrorism (Otu and Aro, 2013). It is for that reason that the Nigerian army civil military relations department, together with relevant security agencies. In the case of Somalia, political polarisation may be the reason why citizens may not be willing to play a supportive role in the security agencies’ quest to deal with potential security threats.

2.6 Impact of Terrorism on the Society

2.6.1 Hinders Economic Growth

Terrorism potentially has adverse impacts on economic growth, investment, and tourism. Terrorism incidents worldwide usually result in massive destruction with injuries and casualties. Most terrorist groups have the tendency to physically destroy productive assets as well as redirect resources away from productive uses. Studies have focused more on the direct economic cost such as expenditures on direct attack, to financial markets, defense/national security, and supply chain, which are calculated from direct approaches such as cost to property, productivity loss, and human (Barth et al 2006; OECD Report 2002). The indirect costs that are not usually measured include the emotional toll suffered by the victims, friends, relatives, other survivors, and the community at large. Businesses associated with the location of the event usually suffer setbacks. Using the “Terrorism Knowledge Base” with more than 20,000 terrorism incidents from various sources, researchers have made several empirical estimates based on cross-sectional and period fixed effects, and generally found that there is a negative correlation between terrorism and real gross domestic product (GDP) the higher the number of terrorist incidents, the lower the GDP. In addition, GDP seems to be particularly sensitive in an adverse way to terrorist target type particularly airports, transportation infrastructure, private citizens, and property (Barth et al 2006).

In Kenya terrorism has had a negative impact on the overall economy. In the early 2000 tourism started relinquishing because of terrorism. These terror attacks were followed by

subsequent negative travel advisories issued by Kenya's tourism markets which made economy to decrease. Elu and Price (2013) propounds that between 2000 and 2015 linkages between terrorism and tourism become a major issue which needed attention this is because it reduced consumers and firms and states at large extend expectations for the future and has forced the Kenya government and the private sector to invest more in security matters.

It is worth noting that in Nigeria, the incidence of terrorism is highest in the Northern part of the country, and such activities have blossomed over the last one decade. A major effect has been the wanton destruction of lives and properties. This turn of events forced the government to devote more resources to internal security. Such funds could have been beneficially used to develop other sectors of the economy. Fayissa and Nsiah (2010) argue that this severely puts pressure on government revenue and the capacity for provision of necessary social services. Thus, it goes without saying that terrorist attacks in a developing oil-dependent nation like Nigeria is a major clog in the wheel of economic development and overall social transformation. There is need to explore the negative impact of terrorism on the economy of Somalia as the same effects obtaining in other countries may be a replica of what Somalia is also experiencing.

2.6.2 Destructive in Nature

Terrorism is a destructive activity that destroys property, and causes human casualties and fatalities, terrorism has obvious level economic impacts and consequences for countries in general. (Omutola, 2008). These measurable impacts include the loss of the productivity for those permanently injured and killed, the loss of productive capacity and for destroyed physical capita, reduction in GDP (Abadie and Gardeazabel 2008) and the loss of growth-inducing foreign direct investment (Powers and Choi 2012). Additional evidence for the adverse economic consequences of terrorism has been provided by Blomberg et al (2004), who found that the incidence of terrorism is negatively and significantly related to GDP growth and foreign direct investment.

African countries have experienced a high economic cost due to the activities of Ansaru and Boko Haram. These two groups have been linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and have waged a brutal campaign against military, government, and civilian targets including Christians (START 2013). For developing countries such as Nigeria and Kenya, it makes the investment environment unfriendly as investors shy aware because of compromised safety and weak national security, which affects economic growth (Tavares 2003). It is also

significant to note that massive destruction of infrastructure has been recorded in Nigeria, Kenya Mozambique and Libya. Somalia may be experiencing the same problem as well. There is need to interrogate the destructive effects of terrorism on Somalia as well.

2.6.3 Threatens Investors

The potential threat to investors' confidence in the economy can deter investment, as most investors are risk averse, posing a fear of not been able to remove their investment. The economic cost in Africa is far beyond the direct outlay, because terrorist incidents can deter future investment in affected countries, reduce foreign direct investment (FDI), and deter economic growth (START 2013). The significance of FDI as a source of growth in African economies renders these economies vulnerable to the adverse effects of terrorism as its persistence could constrain growth given terrorisms potential to constrain FDI. The increase in terrorism incidents in countries such as Kenya and Nigeria two of Africa's largest economies could render them less attractive for FDI, causing both economies to shrink. (Kaldor 2007). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that in the case of Boko Haram a jihadist terrorist organization in Nigeria the increase in the number of terrorist incidents attributed to them has contributed to FDI decline from US\$8.28 billion in 2009 to US\$6.1 billion in 2010, which constitutes 36 percent decline (Umejei 2011).

For investors, national security is significant too they are likely to stay away from regions and countries where security is not guaranteed (START 2013). For example, Boko Haram, located in the northern part of Nigeria, has the highest poverty rate in the country and has remained relatively unsafe as it is the region in Nigeria experiencing the highest number of terrorist incidents making it difficult to attract FDI. Investment in counterterrorism efforts, while beneficial in constraining terrorism, can also be costly. It is conceivable that at least for some African countries, counterterrorism and security expenditures are too high. Developing countries such as Algeria, Burundi, Nigeria, Egypt and Congo, which rank high with respect to the number of terrorism incidents, have in recent history been spending on average about 30 percent of their GDP on efforts to combat terrorism and other threats to national security (OECD 2002). In general, it seems likely that terrorism has significant adverse economic consequences for Africa. Somalia falls in this category also hence the need to investigate the negative effects of terrorism on investors in Somalia.

2.6.4 Misuse of Remittances.

Elu and Price (2012) argue that remittances to sub-Saharan Africa are used at least in part to finance terrorism. (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2010) this suggests that terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa can possibly crowd out productive investments that are significant for economic growth. This position is also supported by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who also suggest that the financing of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is also significant for the promotion, severity, and duration of wars and civil conflicts which are associated with lower growth in sub-Saharan Africa (Gyimah-Brempong and Corley 2005).

2.6.5 Policy Formulation

On the other hand, there is some evidence that terrorism in Africa may have some beneficial consequences. Wanta and Kalyango (2007) considered the impact of terrorism in Africa on media events in the USA, and the extent to which it can frame US foreign policy toward Africa. In general, a key finding was that terrorist events in Africa triggered media coverage that was associated with presidential policy initiatives leading to significant inflows of foreign aid in Africa. It is undisputable that foreign aid is beneficial for Africa (Juselius and Moller 2013). Its elasticity with respect to growth is larger than its elasticity with respect to terrorist events (for example some FDI is channelled into terrorism finance), terrorism is potentially beneficial for Africa, as it could lead to inflows of growth-inducing FDI.

2.7 Chapter Summary

A documentation of relevant theoretical frameworks enlightening the research was carefully done with special attention being offered to the applicability of such theories in contributing to the understanding of the phenomena or subject under consideration. The theories identified were assessed carefully taking note of their relative strengths and weaknesses especially emphasising the applicability of the views contained therein. The review of literature was done conscious of the need to establish a gap that justified the need for scientific inquiry in order to answer the questions that were raised in the course of this project.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter highlight the methods that were used for collecting information in the field. The chapter is mainly explaining how this study was conducted, the applied methods and techniques in data collection. The chapter will also unpack reasons as to why the chosen techniques were used according to the research aims and main objectives of the study. This chapter will involve a discussion of the research process, the selection of the data sites, sampling methods and justification and sources of data used in the study. There will also be a discussion on the analytical and statistical techniques used in analysing the data for the study. This chapter concludes with the discussion on the ethical considerations that guided the research.

3.1 Research Methodology

Kothari (2004) defines research methodology as a way to systematically solve the research problem and in it one studies the various steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying his research problem along with the logic behind them. Catherine (2002:14) posits that research methodology is the philosophy or the general principle which guide research. It is the overall approach to studying your topic and includes issues you need to think about such as constraints, dilemmas and ethical choices within your research. Research methodology has three types that is quantitative, qualitative and mixed approach. The methodology and procedure for data collection employed in the field had a bias towards the qualitative methodology. Interviews, observations and review of secondary data, were done accordingly.

3.2 Research Design

According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), a design is a summary of procedures that a researcher uses to collect, analyze, interpret and present his or her data. This implies that a research design is the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. It provides the overall framework for data collection. Research design is vital because it allows a smooth sailing of various study operations making research efficient to yield maximum information with minimal expenditure of effort money and time. The researcher in the study applied qualitative approach due to the nature of the data gathered. Due to the increase of terrorism and its growth from national to international, and due to the increase of terrorist

activities which include suicide bombings, kidnappings and killings, the research assessed the impact of AU in combating the threat of terrorism that has plagued Somalia and its neighboring countries since 2006 when it started.

3.3 Qualitative Research Approach

Qualitative research is used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions and motivations (Heppner et al 1994). The method provides insights into the problem or helps to develop ideas or hypotheses for potential quantitative research. Qualitative Research is also used to uncover trends in thought and opinions, and dive deeper into the problem. Qualitative data collection methods vary using unstructured or semi-structured techniques. Some common methods include focus groups (group discussions), individual interviews, and participation/observations. The researcher nevertheless employed qualitative research using different data collecting tools such as questionnaires, interviews, participatory observation, and focused group discussions. Secondary sources like electronic journals, text books, newspapers, scholarly articles on terrorism will also contribute to the compilation of this thesis. The researcher has chosen the qualitative approach since it is an inquiry process of understanding social or human problem based on building a complex holistic picture. The research will require gathering of views and feelings of respondents on how the AU can combat terrorism in Somalia effectively. Thus using qualitative approach allowed me to gather the much needed views and general feelings from the selected population group and assist in coming up with a model to combat terrorism in Somalia.

3.4 Population

Polit and Hungler (1999, p.37) refer to the population as an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications. Bhattacharjee (2012, p.65) also defines population as all people or items (unit of analysis) with the characteristics that one wishes to study. The population of interest identified in a particular study is called the target population. In this study most valuable were personnel from the AMISOM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe National Defence College and embassies of East African countries contributing troops to AMISOM. The researcher unearthed rich information from participants who responded positively to this study especially personnel in the AMISOM and the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Zimbabwe on the role and impact of the AU in combating Al Shabaab threat in Somalia.

3.5 Sample Size

A sample is a subset of a population selected to participate in the study. It is a fraction of the whole, selected to participate in the research project (Polit and Hungler 1999, p.227). According to Al-Busaidi (2008, pp.11-19) and Cohen et al (2007, p.177) other scholars state that in qualitative inquiry there are no rules for sample size. Al Busaidi and Cohen et al further state that other scholars argue that the size of the sample depends on the aim of the research and what is possible, given the time and resources available. In this study, a subset of ten personnel involved in Peace and Security issues of Somalia were selected out of the entire population to represent the entire population from which it was drawn. Nevertheless, eight people participated and provided very rich information on the topic under study. Borrrington and Stimpson (2008) assert that the sample helps getting results quicker and more accurate than the involvement of the whole population.

3.6 Sampling Procedure

Sampling procedure defines the rules that specify how the system calculates the sample size. The sampling technique used was purposive sampling. Purposive sampling also commonly known as judgmental sample is a non-probability sampling technique where the researcher chooses a specific people within a population to use in a particular research project and the idea is to concentrate on people with particular characteristic who will better be able to assist with the research. This is sampling that is carried out with a specific purpose in mind, whereby researchers already have a predefined group which they are targeting for their sample. Cohen et al (2007, p.115) posits that a researcher uses purposive sampling in order to access people who are knowledgeable about particular issues to be researched. These may be selected by virtue of their power, professional role, and access to networks, experience or expertise. These scholars further argue that it is of no use to employ random sample when most of the random sample may not be aware of particular issues and not able to comment on issues of interest to the researcher. A purposive sample was thus significant. Collen et al (2007) further argue that despite the fact that a purposive sample may not be representative and that comments made may not be generalizable, the primary concern is to acquire in-depth information from those who are able to provide it.

Polit and Hungler (1999) posit that judgemental sampling design is usually used when a limited number of individuals possess the trait of interest. In this study, the number of individuals who possessed information on the role of AU in countering Al Shabaab was limited. Polit and Hungler further assert that purposive sampling is the only viable sampling

technique in obtaining information from a very specific group of people. It is also stated that it is possible to use judgmental sampling if the researcher knows a reliable professional that he or she thinks is capable of assembling a representative sample. Wyse (2011) postulates that the researcher uses his or her judgment to select population members who are good for accurate information and that the sample size can be as small as one. In this study, the researcher selected personnel in Peace and Security Studies of Somalia, Ministry of Foreign affairs in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe National Defence College, embassies of East African countries in Zimbabwe and the AMISOM. The researcher conducted face to face and over the phone interviews. The researcher also e-mailed a questionnaire and obtained valuable information on the role of the AU in countering terrorism in Somalia. Information on challenges encountered by the mission was also obtained. With purposive sampling, the researcher incurred low costs and there was less time taken to select perspective sampling group members for the study. Nevertheless, purposive sampling is said to have low level of reliability and high levels of bias. It is further argued that with purposive sampling, samples are not representative of the whole population and provide no objective method for determining whether one person's judgment is better than another's. Nevertheless, the researcher guarded against these weaknesses by making use of other sources which included Journals, books, Articles from websites and Reports. Also the researcher chose the best personnel in the AMISOM who are countering the threat of terrorism in Somalia.

3.7 Sources of Data

These included the various areas where the researcher obtained information for the study. For this study purpose, both primary and secondary sources were used to collect data on the role and impact of AU in countering Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia and its neighboring countries. Cohen, et al (2007, p.193) posits that primary data is original in nature and directly related to the issue or problem and is current data. It is the data which the researcher collects through various methods which include interviews, surveys and questionnaires. Secondary sources are information sources that interpret, include, describe or draw conclusions based on the works written by others. Cohen et al (2007) maintain that a secondary source entails someone describing events which he or she did not witness but got the information from another source or person. Secondary sources used included books, documentary movies, biographies, internet sources and journal articles.

3.8 Research Instruments

These are the tools that the researcher used to collect data from the respondents. This research used in-depth interviews, a questionnaire and secondary sources which included YouTube clips, online news outfits, articles, online data sources, journals and reports as instruments to gather data on the effectiveness of AU in countering Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia.

3.8.1 Questionnaire

According to Bird (2009), a questionnaire is a well-established tool within social science research for acquiring information on participant social characteristics, present and past behavior, standards of behavior or attitudes and their beliefs and reasons for action with respect to the topic under investigation. Bird further expounds that it is an inquiry from which comprises of systematically compiled questions that are also organized and then administered to the population sample. It is simply a „tool“ for collecting and recording information about a particular issue of interest. In this research, a questionnaire was used to collect data on the effectiveness of AU in combating the threat of Al Shabaab. The research instrument was also used to gather data on challenges encountered by the AMISOM in eradicating terrorism in Somalia and the region as a whole. The questionnaire that was used comprised of open-ended questions which invited free ranging responses and varied views pertaining to the study. The questionnaire was delivered via e-mail. The researcher used a total of one hundred (100) questionnaires which were distributed to Zimbabwe National Defence University and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zimbabwe.

The questionnaire had its own strengths and weaknesses. The strengths that the questionnaire had were that the administration was comparatively inexpensive and easy. This tool reduced chances of evaluator bias because the same questions were asked of all respondents. Another advantage was that some people felt more comfortable in responding to a questionnaire than participating in an interview. The use of questionnaire permitted respondents“ time to consider their responses carefully without interference from, for example, an interviewer.

Nevertheless, the challenges encountered with the questionnaire were that there was low response rate. Some individuals to whom the questionnaire was sent never responded. The researcher was also unable to probe for additional details for some questions that were answered. The investigator nevertheless managed to overcome the weaknesses by the use of other instruments such as interviews and internet sources to obtain more information on the topic under study.

3.8.2 In-depth interview

Manson, (2002) defines in-depth interviews as semi-structured or loosely structured form of interviewing which are designed to capitalize the consistency afforded by the highly structured interviews and the level of the detail offered by open-ended or emergent interviews. Cohen et al (2011, p.349) define in-depth interviews as a tool for data collection which is flexible and allows many channels to be used which include spoken, heard, non-verbal, and verbal. These in-depth interviews have their own merits and demerits.

Atkins and Wallace (2012) postulate that interviews are a very flexible research tool which can be used to gather a range of different types of information, including factual data, views and opinions, personal narratives and histories, which makes them useful as a means of answering a wide range of research questions. Cohen et al (2011, p.349) propound that the interviewer can press not only for complete answers but also for responses about complex and deep issues and the order of the interview may be controlled while still giving space for spontaneity. Legard et al (2003, p.138) assert that the in-depth format also permits the researcher to explore fully all the factors that underpin participants' answers: reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs. Another strength that Legard et al (2003) point out is that the interview is generative in the sense that new knowledge or thoughts are likely, at some stage to be created. This research used unstructured interviews on the effectiveness of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. The researcher managed to probe for more detail to be provided on the topic under study.

Nevertheless, the weak spots encountered with this research instrument were that it was expensive in time and open to interviewer bias. Nevertheless, to overcome challenges of bias, the researcher employed same questions in questionnaire to obtain varied views and also used internet sources as instruments for data collection.

3.8.3 Secondary Sources

The researcher made use of a variety of secondary sources including Reports, Journal articles and books to collect data on the role and impact of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. Cohen et al (2007, p.194) noted that though various commentators stress the significance of primary sources, secondary sources are also of great value for they provide valid and reliable historical information. Cohen and other scholars maintain that the literature review carried out in other forms of educational study is considered as a preparation stage to gathering data and helps to acquaint researchers with work of other researchers on topics

under study. It is further argued that this will enable researchers to learn from earlier endeavors, and place their research in context.

Secondary sources had the advantages that they were cheaper and faster to access. Precise information was obtained via search engines. They saved time, efforts and money to the value of the research study. Secondary data provided a way to access the work of the best scholars all over the world. Also the use of secondary research helped the researcher to clarify the research question.

Nevertheless, secondary sources had their own disadvantages that some documents found on the internet were incomplete, inaccurate and reflected personal biases. In some cases, the researcher found information that appeared valuable and promising but the researcher failed to get the full version of the research to gain the full value of the study. With some documents, there was uncertainty over source and it was not always easy to ensure data reliable, authentic or representative. Another disadvantage was that with the passage of time, some data could no longer be accessible from the internet, may be it could have been removed.

Prescott (2008) postulates that the secondary research used must be scrutinized closely since the origins of the information may be questionable and that the researcher needs to critically evaluate the validity and reliability of the information provided. In this study, the researcher identified, reduced and managed the disadvantages that were accompanied by the use of secondary research. A wide range of internet sources were identified and scrutinized to come up with valid and reliable data on the effectiveness of AU in combating Al- Shabaab in Somalia and in the neighboring countries.

3.9 Data Presentation

Data presentation is the method by which people summarize, organize and communicate information using a variety of tools, such as diagrams, distribution charts, histograms and graphs whereas analysis focuses on drawing conclusions from the collected data which will assist in answering research questions and meeting the research objectives. (Neuendorf 2002). Nevertheless some quantitative aspects of data collected required the use of tables, graphs and charts thus statistical analysis was applied for such aspects of data where necessary. Statistical analysis is define by www.businessdictionary.com as the collection, examination, summarisation, manipulation, and interpretation of quantitative data to discover its underlying causes, patterns, relationships, and trends.

3.10 Data Analysis

Bogdan and Biklen, (2003) propounds that data analysis is the process of organising and breaking data into manageable units, synthesising it and searching for patterns. After data collection, data will be analysed for the purpose of determining objectivity and relevancy to the study of collected information. The researcher is going to use content analysis in this research. According to Neuendorf 2002) content analysis lays emphasis on data interpretation, objectivity, inter-subjectivity, explicability, reliability, generalizability and hypothesis testing to related data that the researcher went through. Nevertheless, to complement its weakness of voluminous data thematic analysis will be used to ensure that relevant data will be analysed. Rice and Ezzy (1999) posit that thematic analysis involves organising and describing data into themes and interpreting various aspects of research topic. Cohen et al (2007) argues that thematic analysis has the advantage that “it allows the researchers to expand range of study per individual experience. Hayes (2000) further argues that thematic analysis has a disadvantage only due to inappropriate research questions or poor analysis and not thematic analysis itself. The technique was used to analyse data from in-depth and key informant interviews. Quantitative data was presented through pie charts, tables and graphs before being analysed.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Credibility of any research depends on the observance of research ethics. Ethics are moral standards that an investigator should consider at all stages of inquiry. Polit et al (2001) posit that some of the significant ethics include informed consent, confidentiality and privacy, justice, debriefing and de-hoaxing. Burns and Grove (2003) argue that informed consent and confidentiality are the most significant ethics. In this research anonymity was upheld as there was no intrusion of privacy with regard to information provided.

3.11.1 Informed Consent

The participants should be allowed to choose to participate, or not participate in research, after receiving all relevant information about the risks or harm that could arise if they participate in the research (Hayes, 2000). If the participant is engaged without any knowledge of the risks, and was not given opportunity to choose to participate, then there was no informed consent. The researcher will endeavour to exercise informed consent through giving all relevant information about the research to participants prior to the research works. Also a consent declaration form was completed by participants at the beginning of the research.

3.11.2 Confidentiality and Privacy

According to Welfel (1998), the researcher has to protect the anonymity of the research participants and the confidentiality of their disclosures unless they consent to the release of personal information. The researcher explained the limits of confidentiality and agreed on issues that were to be publicised.

3.11.3 Justice

Heppner et al (1992) argues that people are equal before the law. It would be unfair for one to conduct research in which issues of gender and diversity are ignored. The researcher was concerned with the wellbeing of the participants, irrespective of race or gender or ethnicity. Also the researcher ensured that there was fair and non-coercive recruiting of participants which honored their dignity.

3.11.4 Debriefing and De- hoaxing

The principal demands that the researcher describe the results of the study to participants if they so wish, as soon as the data is ready for dissemination. The researcher conducted debriefing of participants on the results of the research and ensured that all grey areas were cleared.

3.12 Chapter Summary

This chapter has outlined the main features of the research, including research methodology, population, and data collection methods and data analysis. The Chapter discussed how data was collected using the different data collection tools. The various utilities, advantages, disadvantages and differences in data collection tools were also discussed. On the fourth chapter data was presented, analysed and interpreted.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the research study. It also analyses, interprets and discusses the findings made on the effectiveness of AU Standby Force in combating terrorism by Al Shabaab in Somalia. Data is presented thematically within the boundaries of the study objectives mentioned in the first chapter. The findings have been presented in the form of tables, maps, narratives and graphs. The Business Dictionary has also defined data analysis as a process of obtaining raw data and converting it into information useful for decision-making by users. Anderson (2010) maintains that a researcher is expected to analyze data in a manner that avoids misstatements, misinterpretations or fraudulent analysis. The tools for measuring the effectiveness of AU Standby Force include a decline in the number of deaths and the prevalence of peace in the country and its neighboring countries among other aspects. Findings from both primary and secondary sources used, reveal that the African Union has played a crucial role and made great positive impact in mitigating Al Shabaab threat in Somalia. The AU deployed (AMISOM) with the following mandate: take all necessary measures, as appropriate and in coordination with the Somalia National Defense and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory; assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services. Furthermore, it was to provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somali State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions. In addition, it was to, liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees and lastly provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense (AMISOM, 2014). There is need to look at the funding of AMISOM for it to meet the given mandate.

4.1 AMISOM Funding

In order to run a mission of AMISOM's nature, the African Union has to ensure that there are funds to run the administration and programs of the mission. The African Union has this as its first role. Data collected from internet sources indicate that the AU managed to mobilize financial resources for the mission through own AU funds, Bi-lateral donations, United Nations Trust fund in support of AMISOM and international partners like the European Union, the United States and other interested donors (Nduwimana, 2013). The fund grew over the years since 2008 with each new resolution and increase in troop numbers and expanded operations.

A respondent from a questionnaire also states that the AU has made progress in this area of funding in view of the fact that it is getting support from the UN, USA, EU and its member countries who are the major AU partners in peace and security and development to support its efforts in Somalia. This respondent stated that furthermore, the AU member countries have agreed to increase funding to the organization in the next five years to contribute about 25% to peacekeeping budget. According to this respondent, more funding is still required because substantial resources are needed to maintain about 20 000 soldiers. The respondent nevertheless, further notes that it is difficult to get enough resources due to the global challenges facing the UN and its member states but a lot is being done by the AU to seek funding for Somalia. This respondent also stated that it is also significant to note that the AU is also facing peace and security challenges in West Africa- Boko Haram, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Darfur-Sudan and Libya which all compete for resources.

It is nevertheless, significant to note that there are principles that govern AU finances and there is a lot of non-compliance by member states. There is increasing dependence on donors for AU program operations. According to Engel (2015) the AU Commission prepares the budget, collects the approved revenue from various sources and manages the assets and liabilities. The AMISOM operation is different in that it also involves the UN control on the funds as well as donor control especially troop allowances and welfare which is handled by the European Union. Data collected from the secondary sources indicate that member contributions are based on a scale of assessment by the UN of which the criteria include but are not limited to:

- Estimates of gross national income

- Conversion rates based on market exchange rates
- Debt burden and
- Low per capita income adjustment (Engel, 2015)

Below are some graphs and statistics with regards to AU funding and AMISOM.

Table 4.1.1: Below are some statistics with regards to AU funding and AMISOM

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
AMISOM/UNS OA	75.642	213.58	171.43 6	291.09 3	436.90 5	435.80 1	489.96 8	2114.4 25
UNMISS/ UNMIS	876.89 4	958.35	1008.0 26	482.46 1	839.49	476.33	580.83	5222.3 85
MONUC/MON USCO	1191.1 03	1351.5 39	1334.4 26	1419.8 9	1347.5 39	1456.3 78	1398.4 75	9499.3 5
MINURSO	48.375	56.576	60.039	63.219	61.3	60.476	55.99	405.97 5
UNAMID	1499.7 1	1598.9 42	1776.1 55	1689.3 06	1448.5 74	1335.2 48	639.65 4	9987.5 89
UNMIL	603.76 1	561.03 2	524.05 3	525.61 3	496.45 8	924.42 6	427.32	4062.6 63

Source: Extract from UN resources for peace keeping operations in Africa (Engel, 2015)

From the above table (Table 4.1) it can be realized that funding for AMISOM increased quite rapidly from 2009 to 2015. This coincided with the expanded operations that followed the routing of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu. The table also shows relative levels of funding for other major missions on the continent over the same period although these are purely UN missions.

Figure 4.1 below shows AU member states contribution against partner contributions. The AU member contributions started higher, but were soon overtaken by international partners due to non-compliance by member states while the international community showed more

commitment and interest in bringing peace and stability to Somalia. Facts concerning AU member states from Engel (2015) are as follows:

- Members default left, right and center
- In 2003, nine (9) out of 53 countries were listed as not having paid
- In 2005 only 12 states were up to date with payments
- In January 2007 they had increased to 23
- In January 2009 they had increased to 29

About 65.49% of the AU budget was paid by Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa before the Arab Spring. Between 2007 and 2015 expenditure increased from US\$133m to US\$522.1m (Table 4.2). During the same period member states contributions increased from US\$96.7m to US\$147.3m which is way below requirement while at the same time donor contributions increased from US\$36.3m to US\$374 (Engel, 2015).

This performance by AU member states has a profound negative bearing on the AMISOM funding because if the AU total is what it has available for its expenses and programs, the withdrawal of international partners at any given point will have serious effects on AMISOM operations as well as even the administration of the AU itself. From all the above information and data, it is evident that the AU is very dependent on donor funding to the extent that all its operations have become vulnerable. An economic meltdown globally or regionally can easily see donors trimming their budgets towards AMISOM and consequently negatively affecting its operations. A good example is the proposal by the EU to reduce funding for AMISOM troop allowances in 2016. This slowed down the momentum, demoralize the troops as well as bolster Al Shabaab's resolve to fight back. The AU uses some sanctions against defaulting members, but these do not seem to have the desired effect since less and less money continues to get into the AU coffers. The bulk of funding for AMISOM comes from the UN P5 countries comprising the US, Britain, France, China and Russia as well as other interested donors (Engel, 2015). Nevertheless the fact that there is funding for the AMISOM mission is good enough irrespective of the source.

A respondent in an interview also showed concern about AU's dependence on external sources and stated that the African Union should think of ways to provide maintainable funding for AMISOM. African countries should be committed to African solutions to African

problems. The Table 4.2 below sourced from Engel, also demonstrates the AU's dependence on foreign funding.

Figure 4.1: AU member states contribution versus partners




Table 4.1.2: Showing AU revenue and expenditure as well as partners' contributions over the years.

Table 2: African Union budget estimates, 2007–2015 (in US\$ mn)

	Financial Year	2007	2008 (1)	2009	2010	2011 (2)	2012 (3)	2013 (4)	2014 (5)	2014 (6)	2015 (7)
Expenditure	AU total	133.0	140.0	164.3	250.5	256.8	274.9	278.2	308.0	395.2	522.1
	• Operational	n.a.	n.a.	95.6	105.6	112.4	114.8	117.5	137.9	137.9	142.7
	• Programmes	n.a.	n.a.	68.7	144.9	144.3	159.3	160.7	170.2	257.3	379.4
	AUC	n.a.	n.a.	137.9	217.5	221.5	n.a.	216.5	222.9	197.4	435.0
	PAP	6.4	–	13.5	14.2	11.9	n.a.	10.5	14.3	14.3	29.5
	ACHPR	2.4	–	3.7	4.9	7.9	n.a.	9.0	8.6	8.6	9.9
	AfCHPR	–	–	7.6	7.9	9.4	n.a.	8.5	5.6	5.6	5.9
	ECOSOC	–	–	1.6	1.5	1.6	n.a.	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
	AUCIL	–	–	–	0.2	0.2	n.a.	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
	NEPAD	–	–	–	3.0	3.2	n.a.	30.1	40.4	40.4	36.0
	ABoC	–	–	–	0.5	0.5	n.a.	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.8
	PSC	–	–	–	0.7	0.5	n.a.	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
	ACERWC	–	–	–	–	–	n.a.	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6
	AFREC	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.9
Revenue	AU MS: AUC	n.a.	n.a.	75.2	n.a.	97.0	n.a.	95.4	97.0	97.0	111.0
	Partners: AUC	n.a.	n.a.	62.7	n.a.	134.2	n.a.	121.2	125.9	104.0	323.9
	AU MS: total	96.7	107.7	93.8	111.8	122.6	n.a.	122.9	137.9	137.9	147.3
	Partners: total	36.3	32.4	57.4	133.7	134.1	n.a.	155.4	170.1	257.3	374.8

Source: (Engel, 2015)

Table 4.1.2 shows that the partners' contributions are way above what the AU has been contributing and this has to be a cause for concern even to AMISOM itself. African Union members have to be committed to African problems for peace and security in the continent. Data from the internet sources indicate that since 2007, the United States has provided US\$550 million to train and equip African troops in Somalia (Ibrahim, 2015). In addition to a lot of previous funding over the years, Ibrahim goes on to state that in October 2015 the European Union agreed to provide more than US\$186 million to speed up efforts to fight Al Shabaab militants. This continental body plays a pivotal role in funding AMISOM both in humanitarian and military terms. Kelly (2016) asserts that the European Union covers the full cost of payments to AMISOM soldiers through contributions it makes to the AU. Kelly further points out that the EU's total yearly payments amount to about \$200 million and that the AMISOM soldiers receive a monthly allowance of \$828 after their respective governments deduct a \$200 administrative cost per soldier.

According to Lorenz (2016), the AMISOM soldiers are paid by their national governments, which received €1.08 billion in stipends and allowances from the EU's African Peace Facility (APF) since March 2007. These allowances have allowed the AMISOM force to forge ahead and drive Al Shabaab from many small settlements and major towns in South and Central Somalia.

4.2 Findings on AU and Security in Somalia

Data collected showed that one of AMISOM's main parts of the mandate is to defeat Al Shabaab and bring stability to Somalia. This can only be brought about by fighting Al Shabaab and taking over all the areas it controls as well as consolidating the gains. However, owing to the activities of Al Shabaab the number of internally displaced persons has been averaging around 772 000, number of refugees has been around 581 000 with death averaging between 450 000 and 1.5 million every year (Norris and Bruton 2011). The statistics indicate that there is no peace in the country as such the AU Standby Force still has to up its operations if peace is to prevail. Figure 2 is the vast map of Somalia from which Al Shabaab operates showing the towns, cities and infrastructure. Al Shabaab is mainly active in the southern and central regions of the country.

Figure 4.2: Map of Somalia showing all areas including semi-autonomous areas of Somaliland and Puntland



Source: (United Nations Political Office for Somalia, 2015)

Kenya operates mainly in the Middle Juba and lower Juba and Gedo regions where Al Shabaab carries out cross border incursions into Kenya to commit atrocities. Both sides of the Kenyan border with Somalia are occupied by mainly Somali speaking people and this has been fertile ground for Al Shabaab recruitment. According to the AMISOM (2014), the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is made up of the Military, Police and Civilian components. These are the components responsible for ensuring the mandate given to AMISOM comes to fruition. Various levels of achievement have been attained by these components with the military having made tremendous headway.

4.2.1 Military Component

The military component comprises of troops contributed by the African Union member states namely:

Uganda-deployed in Sector 1, the Banair and lower Shabelle area.

Kenya - deployed in Sector 2, Lower and Middle Juba

Ethiopia - Bay and Bakool as well as the Gedo region.

Djibouti - Deployed in Sector 4, Hiraan and Galgaduud.

Burundi - Middle Shabelle region (AMISOM, 2014)

According to the AMISOM (2014), the strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel stands now at 22,126. This includes both troops and police. Along with the current Force Headquarters staff of 81, the military component has 5,432 troops from Burundi, 1000 troops from Djibouti, 3,664 from Kenya, Ethiopia 4,395 and 6,223 troops from Uganda. A round figure of 22000 troops including police is quoted in most recent documentation, but the exact numbers contributed by each country vary from source to source.

Since 2011 AMISOM has managed to drive Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and most towns. Nevertheless, Al Shabaab has managed to blend into the local population and carry out unconventional attacks on AMISOM troops. The map below (Figure 5) shows the different sectors manned by different countries as well as the Al Shabaab remaining hotspots between January 2014 and October 2014.

Figure 4.2.1: Map showing the geographical locations of the sectors from which different country troops operate within Somalia and Al Shabaab territory losses in 2014




Source: (Tojeiro, 2015)

It is clear from the maps above that Al Shabaab was severely degraded between January 2014 and October 2014 with the trend continuing into 2015 as evidenced by Figure 4.2.1. Figure 4.2.1 shows areas of Al Shabaab presence and not control as before. This shows tremendous work and great positive impact by AMISOM in Somalia. Data collected from secondary sources indicate that while AMISOM is a collective AU force, there are signs of self-national interests especially with Ethiopia and Kenya (Albrecht, 2014). It is stated that Kenya entered Somalia to pursue Al Shabaab militants after attacks on hotels and other businesses only to become part of AMISOM later. Ethiopia is deployed mainly along its own borders to ensure its own national security as well as honoring the UN mandate (Figure 4.2.2) while Kenya is deployed in the South in its own border area as well.

The map overleaf also shows vast areas of south and central Somalia with Al Shabaab presence. These areas are in the rural villages off the highways. Al Shabaab can carry out ambushes and return to the sanctuary of these areas thus prolonging the conflict. The fact that it is mainly the highways and towns that have been cleared of Al Shabaab is a cause for concern. The question that comes to mind is: Are the 22000 forces available enough to fight Al Shabaab, hold onto the recovered territory as well as pursue Al Shabaab into the countryside? Are the trained Somali troops equipped enough to assist, hold recovered territory and complement the work of AMISOM?

Figure 4.2.2: Map showing political and military set up as at September 2015



Source: (BBC News, 2015)

Data collected from internet sources reveal that the military component of AMISOM is responsible for fighting Al Shabaab and recovering territory as well as training and setting up a professional Somali national army to take over from AMISOM troops when they disband (AMISOM, 2014). Findings of the research also reveal that in April 2013, Somalia's Defence Minister Adihakim Hayi Mohamad Fiqi, said he would start recruiting clan militias' into the national army (Global Security, 2015). It is also stated that the Somalia's new leaders aim to train and equip a professional army of 28000 soldiers by end of 2016. According to this Global Security, a total of 13829 Somali National Army and 5134 Somali troops were biometrically registered. 9495 soldiers began receiving support funded by the US (Global Security, 2015). The Global Security further states that in July 2015, 1350 personnel were officially integrated into the Somali National Army from Gedo and Juba areas with technical and logistical support from UNSOM and UNSOA and that a total of 16780 members of the SNA and 5200 police were biometrically registered by end of August 2015. The Global Security also states that some 1350 additional troops received training on human rights in Kismayo and became eligible for UNSOA support bringing total beneficiaries to 10507. This shows that AU mission to Somalia is doing immense work of facilitation to ensure there is sustainable peace and security in Somalia.

Findings from both primary and secondary sources used indicate that the military component has also made great achievements in fighting Al Shabaab. Remarkable military success for AMISOM started in 2011 when AMISOM and government-aligned militia forced Al Shabaab to tactically retreat from Mogadishu in August 2011. Several key towns were liberated in lower and middle Shabelle. According to the BBC News (2012), in February 2012 a combined force of Ethiopian and Somali troops backed by fighting vehicles including tanks took over the strategic militant town of Baidoa from Al Shabaab. This was the home town of many Al Shabaab leaders and fighters.

Data from the internet sources also reveal that in September 2012, the Kenyan and Somali defence forces launched an amphibious attack on the port city of Kisimayo and captured it (Chonghaile, 2016). According to Chonghaile, this was Al Shabaab's last major stronghold and key source of revenue. It is stated that the militants were heavily dependent on earnings from charcoal exports through the port, and taxes levied on businesses. In March 2014 AMISOM and SNA liberated six strategic towns of Hudur, Rabdhure, Ted, Weeldheyn and Burdhubow in Gedo and Bakool regions in Sector 3 and Bunlo Burde in Hiraa region (AMISOM, 2014). The Ethiopian Herald of 17 August 2015 reported that Somali, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops had captured a series of towns and villages including Taraka, Jungal, and Duraned. Eel-elaan, Habakhaliul, Meyon, Magalay and major town of Bhadheere (The Ethiopian Herald, 2015). The Ethiopian Herald also reports that in Bakool, operations resulted in the recovery of Buur-dhuhunle, Kulun-jareer, Moragabey, Legaly and Gelowoyni. In Bay region, Ufurow, Eosow, Hasanow-Mumin, Wlidaade, Makoon, Dhargo and Manaas were also taken. The Ethiopian Herald also reported that on August 12 2015, AMISOM troops drove Al Shabaab from the town of Algen. Literature reviewed share the same sentiments with the findings of the research on military successes of the military component of AMISOM on territory recovered from Al Shabaab.

4.2.2 AMISOM Police

According to the AMISOM (2014), the AMISOM Police has the mandate to train, mentor, and monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF). It is reported that the AMISOM police comprises of 386 police officers. The Individual Police Officers (IPO) are from Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe while the Formed Police Units (FPU) from Nigeria and Uganda each comprise of 140 officers. The IPO are deployed in all the AMISOM sectors (AMISOM, 2014). Some 280 FPU are from Nigeria and Uganda and 3 Senior Leadership Team (SLT) officers are from South Africa, Uganda

and Nigeria. The AMISOM (2014) expounds that the Formed Police Units ensure improved security in the liberated areas through joint patrols with SPF, assisting in Public Order Management and providing VIP escorts to AU IPOs and relocated with SPF to new locations. Findings from internet sources also reveal that to date over 5000 Somali police officers have been trained in different categories of police work including human rights and gender (AMISOM, 2014).

4.2.3 AMISOM Civilian Component

Findings from secondary sources indicate that the AMISOM civilian component comprises of a unit that is political which is responsible for monitoring, interpreting and reporting on political and other progresses throughout Somalia as well as giving advice on political developments. It helps to build the capacity of the country's public service and implements political resolutions made by the African union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). It has also tried to launch civil reconciliation initiatives between the government and clansmen with the intention to seek representation and political inclusion (AMISOM, 2014).

The African Union Peace and Security (2013), reports that in September 2012, the AMISOM civilian component managed to transfer power from the Transitional National Government (TNG) to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and elect a president in 2013. In addition to supporting the process, the political section undertook capacity building programs for the government including training of civil servants, facilitating job mentoring and improving office accommodation for government. It is also stated that this civilian component also revamped local governance in liberated areas as well as facilitate humanitarian assistance. It also enhanced gender based training for troops and the general population and undertook to train Somali women on their possible role in governance (African Union Peace and Security, 2013).

From the findings of the research, the humanitarian mandate of AMISOM is limited to a facilitation role. The mandate provides that AMISOM shall "Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (AMISOM, 2014). The achievements reported are that it has secured roads and seaports to enable UN humanitarian work. Findings also reveal that it has provided escorts for humanitarian convoys and used their army medical facilities to treat locals.

4.3 Findings from Questionnaires and Interviews on AU and Security in Somalia

A respondent from data gathered through a questionnaire indicate that Somalia is a permanent agenda on the AU Peace and Security Council and the Summits as the AU tries to bring an end to this conflict which has consumed that country for more than two decades now. The respondent clearly stated that, “Without peace in Somalia, there is no lasting peace in East Africa. The forces of destabilization cannot be allowed to prosper as this will send a wrong signal to Somalis and the world. Progress has been made given the presence of a Somali government in Mogadishu which was not possible five years ago. While the struggle continues, Africa has to be commended for its efforts especially undertaking to build institutions which were no longer in existence and in particular a Somali security apparatus and force that can defend the country.”

Findings from an interview as well as from a questionnaire indicate that African countries are committed to peace in Somalia as evidenced by AMISOM and troops contributing to fight Al Shabaab. It is also indicated that many countries have lost troops in Somalia meaning that they have made the ultimate sacrifice to bring peace to Somalia. The other data collected from the questionnaire is that the AU has committed substantial resources to Somalia in the form of both financial, human, military equipment and time. The same questionnaire specified that African countries have committed to a peaceful Africa by 2020 in order to focus on development on the continent. Data gathered from the same questionnaire has explained well achievements made by the AMISOM in border policing, curbing arms trafficking, capacity building-Somali army and local governance as well as blocking Funds to Al Shabaab.

4.3.1 Border Policing

Data from a questionnaire strongly applauds the AMISOM that it has trained Somali police to be up to the task of border policing to stop smuggling of charcoal out of Somalia by Al Shabaab. The respondent further states that AMISOM has helped to control movement of people and to screen Al Shabaab movements in and out of the country. The respondent further points out that at the request of the AU, there is the support of the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union’s activities. This is taking place under the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), which is working with the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen its criminal justice system, and recognizing the need for all engaged international and regional

organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully. There is support for the development of a coastal police force.

4.3.2 Curbing Arms Trafficking

The data gathered from questionnaires indicate that the police, army and intelligence have also been trained to control arms inflow in Somalia. Without arms AL Shabaab's threat will be limited. The data collected also specified that a realistic police plan linked with medium term rule of law programs and in line with the federal vision is now in operation.

4.3.3 Capacity Building-Somali Army and Local Governance

Findings from a questionnaire with data researched from the UNSC (2015) indicate that the implementation of the Guulwade (Victory) Plan of AMISOM's provision of training and mentoring to the SNA was a critical step towards the development of the capacity of a more effective and sustainable SNA, including the initial priority of backing up and developing the 10,900 SNA troops that can tackle Al Shabaab. According to a respondent of this questionnaire, the Government has made efforts in establishing an integrated army. Findings also indicate that the Somali National Security Sector architecture, as well as a definition of the roles of relevant national security sector institutions as a way of improving coordination between AMISOM and the SNA to tackle Al Shabaab has been completed.

4.3.4 Blocking Funds to Al Shabaab

Data collected from a questionnaire specified that the AU pushed to have the UNSC list Al Shabaab as a terrorist organization and is thus under sanctions. This questionnaire also indicated that Eritrea is also under sanctions for being the conduit of funding to Al Shabaab. Furthermore the findings also reveal that the AU also pushed for the UNSC to ban the export or import of charcoal from Somalia which was one of the sources of funding for Al Shabaab. Findings from a questionnaire with data extracted from the UNSC (2015) indicate that the AU has also pushed against piracy off the Somali coast with the support partners. Findings reveal that the efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Ocean Shield, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151, counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia have been commended. Other States who are acting in a national capacity cooperate with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to guard ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia. Findings also reveal that there are also the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, and

Russia in conjunction with AMISOM and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) UNSC (2015).

A respondent from an interview strongly applauded the work of AU in terms of combating terrorism and cited conventions and protocols made to combat terrorism even well before the OAU transitioned into AU. According to this respondent, the AU has condemned Al Shabaab terrorism as well as other terrorists elsewhere plaguing the African continent. Data collected, has revealed great achievements made by the AU since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007 in stabilizing Somalia. The literature reviewed has also discussed the military and political achievements made by the AMISOM. Nevertheless, findings also reveal that, despite achievements made so far, AMISOM is still suffering from setbacks and challenges some of which were also noted in the literature reviewed.

4.3.5 AMISOM Military Setbacks

Findings from various secondary sources reveal that the AMISOM has encountered setbacks during the fight against Al Shabaab. Major setbacks in military losses involved attacks on troop bases with significant troop losses. According to Laing (2016), in June 2015, 54 Burundians were killed in an attack on their base in Leego. It also reported that on 01 September 2015, an estimated 50 Ugandan troops were feared dead while an equivalent number was said to be missing after Al Shabaab attacked a Ugandan AMISOM base in Janaale south west of Mogadishu in the Shabelle region (Aljazeera News, 2015). Despite a string of successes in routing Al Shabaab out of the towns and other small settlements, Al Shabaab still carries out unconventional attacks like these where their aim is to cause casualties rather than gain territory (Agence France-Presse (AFP) 2015).

Data collected also reveal that in January 2016, Al-Shabaab terrorists launched a suicide and gun attack on a Kenyan African Union base (Lang, 2016). According to Lang, this took place on an outpost manned by Kenyan troops near the town of el Adde, about 340 miles west of the capital Mogadishu near Kenya's northern border. It is stated that the gates were rammed by a suicide bomber in a car followed by gunfire. Initial reports by Al Shabaab said 63 had been killed (Laing, 2016).

Lang further notes that of the 31 military vehicles inside the camp, 28 were confiscated plus all the arms and ammunition in the stores." According to Lang, the Kenyan military denied the death toll but said that fighters on both sides had been killed and declined to give numbers.

Figure 4.3.5: Kenyan soldiers attend a memorial service at Eldoret in Kenya on 27January 2016 for colleagues who were killed in an Al Shabaab attack



Source: (Gaffey, 2016)

Later on the Somali President torched a storm when he claimed about 180 Kenyan soldiers had died in the attack (Gaffey, 2016). The attack on El Adde exposed some serious shortcomings of AMISOM. AMISOM did not manage to provide relief for the attacked soldiers and recover the situation leaving Kenya to send its own forces from Wajir, El Wak and Mandera in Kenya to contain the situation (Githae, 2016). This is probably because AMISOM lacked the relevant resources for rapid deployment. The KDF Chief Gen Samson Mwathethe was quoted in Gathae (2015) saying that AMISOM lacked the necessary capacity of assisting the Kenyan troops in Eldde and this forced Kenya to mobilize its resources to react to the situation.

Data collected indicate that the Al Shabaab terrorists have been attacking AMISOM bases at about dawn, soon after a new set of armed forces arrive in the battlefields (Gathae 2015). According to Gathe, it has also emerged that the staged attacks by Al Shabaab group occur within a few weeks following deployment of new troops. It is argued that the attack on Kenyan base has exposed a tactic which AMISOM was supposed to be prepared for

following the attacks on the Ugandan and Burundian bases earlier where ISIS style methods of using suicide vehicles to break into the camps were used. Gathae has exposed some loopholes in AMISOM that it does not allow troops to be replaced in sequence but demands that new troops come in and old ones go out at one time. Gathae's argument is that troops are replaced by a new set that is not acquainted with the situation on the ground. It has also been pointed out that the worst part of it is that military intelligence officers are also replaced together with other troops in the rotations. According to Gathae (2015) this should not happen in combat ones like Somalia but in peacekeeping missions. He recommends that troops be replaced in sequence where few soldiers are left behind to help the new set of troops acquaint to the situation on the ground.

In addition it has also been stated that intelligence failed as the attack was too massive for the preparations and execution to go unnoticed to such proportions with the possibility of the majority of the locals going along with the militants. Civilian lives have been lost and property destroyed in the fight between Al Shabaab and AMISOM and countries contributing troops have suffered attacks in their countries by Al Shabaab for their role for example, the attacks on the West Gate Mall and the Garissa University in Kenya and bombing of soccer fans in Uganda.

Findings also reveal that AMISOM has lost territory to the Al Shabaab militants in some cases. It is reported that in September 2015 Al Shabaab retook the town of Janale from AMISOM as well as Buqda, El Saliindi and Kuntuwarey. An AMISOM spokesman said the towns were not of strategic value, but this left the residents at the mercy of AL Shabaab again (Eremionkhale, 2015). Other small towns have also exchanged hands elsewhere. Eremionkhale has also pointed out some reasons as to why the AMISOM troops have been losing captured territory. Reasons given from the finding are as follows:

- Locals are wary of AMISOM troops as they claim they treat them no better than Al Shabaab and as a result some even celebrate the militants' return.
- AMISOM is not a Somali standing army and as such Al Shabaab may feel unintimidated.
- AMISOM does not have enough capacity to airlift fighting equipment to areas in demand and provide timely reinforcements. It is not just a case of numbers, but rapid deployment of both firepower and personnel is paramount.

4.4 AU Challenges

Findings from internet sources, questionnaire and interviews indicate that there are a lot of challenges encountered by AMISOM in fighting Al Shabaab menace. The challenges being encountered include lack of sustainable funding, equipment and human resources to fight Al Shabaab, secure the recovered territory as well as pursue Al Shabaab into the countryside. Data collected showed that there are about 22 000 troops who cannot cover the whole country. Findings from the questionnaire stress that the main challenge of AU is financial resources; otherwise member states are willing to provide troops to fight Al Shabaab. A respondent from a questionnaire again pointed out that it is hoped that with more funding, the African Standby Force will be operationalized soon to tackle conflicts on the continent. This respondent further indicates that most African countries participate in UN peacekeeping because under the UN there is more and secure funding for their troops. It has also been noted from the findings that most funds to support AMISOM come from external sources. If these sources withdraw their aid, it would pose a big challenge to Africa.

The findings also specified that a divided Somalia is also a challenge and political process is taking time to consolidate for the Government to be in control. Clan rivalries are rife and reconciliation process is slow. There are not enough trained public administration personnel with the capacity to set up and run government institutions in areas captured from Al Shabaab. Many Somalis have fled the country and are outside the region in USA and Europe.

The other challenge from findings is that though degraded, Al Shabaab continues to launch asymmetric attacks making the liberated areas unsafe. The police component is short of skilled and specialized trainers. The rotational deployment of trainers also disrupts continuity as well as the language barrier. On the same note, findings also reveal that the rotational deployment of fighting troops has made AMISOM bases vulnerable to Al Shabaab terrorists. Also the fact that Al Shabaab is now embedded in the community makes it very challenging for AMISOM to identify and fight them.

4.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented and analyzed findings on the effectiveness and challenges encountered by AU in fighting Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. The findings were presented in the form of tables, maps, graphs and summaries. From the findings on the role of AU, it has been noted that the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), heavily buttressed by the international partners has and is still playing a vital role and has made great positive impact

in countering Al Shabaab threat in Somalia. This is evidenced by the notable military and political achievements made so far since its inception in 2007. Nevertheless, despite the achievements, findings have also shown that the mission is still suffering setbacks due to quite a number of challenges the mission is confronting. Also despite some territorial gains, most areas in the South and Central Somalia still have Al-Shabaab presence mainly in the rural areas while major towns and smaller towns along the main highways are controlled by the AU troops and the SNA. In captured areas, asymmetric attacks are being carried out by Al Shabaab due to lack or weak administrative structures to support the military gains. This serves to argue that the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) still has mounting challenges to defeat Al Shabaab for peace, security and sustainable economic development in Somalia. The following chapter focuses on the summary and conclusion of the study. The chapter also makes recommendations on how best the AU can effectively deal with the challenges encountered to bring a lasting solution to the quagmire of terrorism in Somalia and the East African region as a whole.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter's main focus is to summarize the entire survey and how the study was conducted and also to summarize the findings as well as presenting the conclusion and recommendations. The researcher's conclusion is based on the findings of the study. The recommendations highlight what the AU can do to overcome some of the challenges and effectively deal with Al Shabaab for sustainable peace, security and economic development in Somalia.

5.1 Summary of the Study

The study set out to assess the role of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. The study was prompted by the escalating incidents of deadly terror attacks including suicide bombings, killings and military assaults using sophisticated kinds of weapons leaving hundreds dead and property destroyed. The study is structured in five chapters. Chapter one of the research focuses on the introduction of the study, background to the study, research objectives, research questions, limitations, delimitations and conceptualization of terrorism and the structure of the study. Chapter two is premised on reviewing works of other researchers on the role of AU in combating Al Shabaab terrorism. Literature reviewed indicate that Al Shabaab has been degraded despite the fact that the AU Mission to Somalia is encountering challenges which include lack of funding, human resources, military equipment including helicopters. Solutions were also proffered as to how best the Al Shabaab threat could be eradicated.

The third chapter provides methods employed to collect data on the role of AU in combating Al Shabaab. The qualitative research design was employed and both primary and secondary sources were used to collect data. The research instruments used to collect data were unstructured questionnaires and interviews. The research also made use of varied secondary sources which include Journal articles, AU Reports and Summits, UN Reports, books and newspapers. On sampling, purposive also commonly known as judgemental method was selected as it best suited the topic under study. A sample size of ten personnel involved in peace and security studies of Somalia had been selected, but only five participated in the research by providing answers to a set of questions asked through questionnaires and in interviews.

The fourth chapter set out to present the findings of the research on the impact of AU in combating Al Shabaab in Somalia. The findings indicate that the AU, assisted by the international partners has done a lot in reducing the threat of terrorism in Somalia. The AU deployed AMISOM to Somalia in December 2007 and the mission has managed to mobilise funds from the USA, UN, EU and other international partners to bring sanity to Somalia. The AMISOM, fighting alongside the National Somali Army has degraded Al Shabaab and most major towns like Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo are under government control. Security has greatly improved in most areas of Somalia. Findings have also shown that due to the presence of AMISOM in Somalia, for the first time after 21 years of civil war, Somalia has an interim government and elections have been scheduled to be held in 2016.

Nevertheless, findings also reveal that while the presence of AMISOM and US drone strikes have reduced the terror attacks in the country, Al Shabaab has not been defeated and continues to destabilise the country. Its links to both ISIS and Al Qaeda shows that it wants to stay relevant and get support from these major terrorist groups. Despite the remarkable achievements, findings have also indicated setbacks of the AU Mission to Somalia. Findings have shown that though degraded, Al Shabaab is still very much alive and have changed strategy to asymmetrical attacks using guerrilla tactics and suicide bombings. Their attacks beyond Somali borders particularly in Kenya have intensified with notable examples including the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, 2013, Garissa University College on April 2, 2015, and El- Adde on Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) base that killed many soldiers serving under AMISOM recently, in January 2016. This shows that Al Shabaab is a complex phenomenon to deal with and their decentralized nature complicates the matter more. The group continues to launch deadly guerrilla tactics across the Horn of Africa country.

From the findings of the study, it has emerged that the major challenge encountered by AMISOM is inadequate funding to increase equipment and human resources to continue fighting Al Shabaab and effectively secure areas liberated.

5.2 Conclusion

The conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that despite the setbacks and challenges encountered, the AU has done a great job to enforce peace and security in Somalia. The AU's Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has played a successful role in fighting and degrading Al Shabaab. Relative secure environment has been created in most major towns and cities such as Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo as well as smaller towns which

used to be controlled by Al Shabaab and are now under government control. The AU mobilization of funds from its international partners such as UN, EU, USA and many others to fight Al Shabaab has played a major role in bringing sanity to Somalia and to the East African region as a whole. General security has improved in most areas of the country. An interim government and some local administration institutions are in place though still weak in some of the captured areas. The AU's resolve and successful securing of AMISOM's unique mandate contributed a lot to the success of the AU for it allowed all necessary measures to be taken to secure and consolidate military gains. Nevertheless, more still has to be done to stabilize the situation for sustainable peace, security and economic development in Somalia and in the East African region as a whole.

5.3 Recommendations

For a lasting solution to Al Shabaab terrorism, the following recommendations have been proffered:

5.3.1 Policy recommendations

- There is need for AU to urgently make an appeal to the UN and other International partners for sustainable funding to make an increase in human resources and equipment for AMISOM to effectively carry out its mandate and also the AU to pursue member countries to implement and remit funds collected from tourism levy and airport taxes to reduce reliance from external sources.
- Since Al Shabaab is now embedded in the community, there is need for AMISOM and the Somali government to win the hearts and minds of Somalis so as to be able to recruit reliable informers from the communities.
- There is need for securing all main supply routes of Al Shabaab throughout the country and urgently expand the national army with an additional focus on community-centered approaches to safety and security through community policing.
- The rotation of personnel in detachments should be carried out in a phased sequence so as to allow the new forces time to acclimatize and get re-oriented to a hostile combat situation.
- There is need for AMISOM to ensure that all recaptured areas including those outside the cities/towns are permanently secured by capacitating the local army to take over in those areas especially relying more on local recruits.

- There is need by the Somali government to deal with issues of underdevelopment and poverty in Somalia as most people are very vulnerable to manipulation by Al Shabaab due to their hardships; to be achieved by the delivery of basic services of humanitarian assistance.
- For a lasting peace in Somalia, there is need for a commitment to an inclusive and credible electoral process by government and all Somalis as soon as the security environment becomes conducive.
- There is also the need to establish a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration across the country as the basis of any long term approach to stability, uphold human rights and hold accountable those responsible for such crimes.

5.3.2 Scholarly recommendation

- There is need for more think-tank on factors that trigger terrorism in Somalia and the whole East African region so as to enhance sustainable peace, security and economic development. More strategies are required to enhance the effectiveness of the AU Standby Force as the operating dynamics of Al Shabaab keep on changing.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Questionnaire

My name is **Edward Shekede** I am a student at the Midlands State University studying for a Bachelor of Arts in Development Studies Honors Degree. I am carrying out a study on **the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) Standby Force in combating religious terrorism. A case study of Somalia.** The data and information collected will be used for academics purposes only. To ensure data privacy, integrity and confidentiality, the use of names will be prohibited.

1. African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is a creation of the AU, but the militaries which are fighting Al Shabaab are from volunteer states. What are the obligations of African states in this regard?

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2. One of AU's roles is to mobilize funding for AMISOM. How efficacious has it been in this area?

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3. Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia appear to be pugnacious against Al Shabaab because of their national security fears. To what extent is this likely to compromise the objectives of the AU in Somalia?

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4. In your opinion, what must the AU do to lobby more participation by member states in peace and stabilization missions in Africa in terms of financial and personnel contributions?

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5. What role has AMISOM played in the following areas towards defeat of Al Shabaab?
(A). Reducing arms trafficking

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b). Border regulating

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(c). Capacity building-Somali army and local governance

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(d). Hindering Al Shabaab funding

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(e). Intelligence gathering

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6. Al Shabaab is said to have been tarnished over the years, in your opinion what needs to be done to safeguard there is no resurgence?

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7. Al Shabaab is a home-grown terrorist group and as such has local support, what must AU do to assist in winning the hearts and minds of Somalis so that they stop supporting Al Shabaab terror?

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8. What challenges do you consider are the chief obstacles of AU in defeating Al Shabaab?

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9. Apart from winning the hearts and minds of the Somalis, what likely solutions do you proffer to ensure lasting peace in Somalia?

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10. Following the attack on the El Ade army base in Southern Somalia, how has the attack strengthened or weakened AMISOM's will and zeal to fight Al Shabaab?

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Thank you for your cooperation

APPENDIX 2

Unstructured Interview Guide

My name is Edward Shekede. I am a student at Midlands State University studying for a Bachelor of Arts in Development Studies Honors Degree. I am carrying out a study **on the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) Standby Force in combating religious terrorism. A case study of Somalia**. The data collected will be used solely for academics purposes only. You are assured that your responses will be treated with privacy and confidentiality and your contribution is greatly acknowledged.

1. The African continent is bedeviled by threats to peace, security and development which comprise armed human trafficking, rebellions and terrorism. What is the role of AU Standby Force in combating terrorism on the continent?
2. The AMISOM fighting Al Shabaab is comprised of volunteer countries. What can you say are the obligations of African countries in this regard?
3. One of the AU's roles is to mobilize funding for AMISOM, how fruitful has it been in this area?
4. In your opinion what is the source of weapons used by Al Shabaab and how has AU been successful in curbing arms trafficking and in border policing?
5. AU has an early warning system in its modus operandi, how has this been used effectively to combat Al Shabaab?
6. How effective and efficacious has AU been in capacitating Somali National Force?
7. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti appear to be fighting Al Shabaab because of their national security concerns. To what extent is this likely to compromise the objectives of the AU in Somalia?
8. Al Shabaab is said to have been besmirched over the years, in your opinion what needs to be done to ensure there is no resurgence?
9. I understand Al Shabaab is a home-grown terrorist group and as such has local support. What must AU do to assist in winning the hearts and minds of Somalis so that they stop supporting Al Shabaab terror?
10. What challenges do you think are the main impediments of AU in defeating Al Shabaab?
11. Apart from winning the hearts and minds of the Somalis, What solutions do you proffer to ensure lasting peace in Somalia?
12. Finally, following the attack on the El Adde army base in Southern Somalia, how has the attack reinforced or weakened AMISOM will and eagerness to fight Al Shabaab?